I can neither confirm nor deny the complete authenticity of this article. The author is a senior propagandist in Russia.
Notice this article is written from a Russian perspective. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and Russia is ignored.
Note the lack of references and citations, as is the norm in Russia. One must take the author at his or her word, for authenticity. One cannot even read or discern the context.
</end editorial>
(Translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)
14.06.2012
Igor Panarin
Consider the case of a sudden attack on the USSR, Nazi Germany in 1941.
It must be remembered that the operation was carried out disinformation not only propagandists of Goebbels, but British intelligence MI-6, the agent of which was Admiral Canaris – the head of military intelligence in Germany.
In preparing for war against the Soviet Union, the Germans carefully camouflaged its actions, classify all organizational and administrative activities related to the preparation of war. Realizing that completely hide the large-scale military preparations is not possible, the Nazi leadership had prepared an elaborate action plan to cover them.
Disinformation activities were carried out on the level of state policy, in their design were also involved top leaders of the Third Reich, and after Hitler authorized R.Gessa trip to the UK May 10, 1941 – and in close cooperation with the secret MI6 British intelligence.
In late 1940, the heads of the major outreach centers Reich – Propaganda Ministry, Foreign Affairs, the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), as well as the Eastern Division’s foreign control of imperial leadership of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) – the task of preparing for war in person Hitler was staged against the Soviet Union.
At the beginning of 1941, when preparations for war took a wide sweep, the German High Command has set in motion a whole system of measures for the false explanation implemented on a mass scale military buildup on the border with the Soviet Union. So, February 15, 1941 by Field Marshal Keitel signed the guidance of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command to conceal the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union. Disinformation campaign ordered to be carried out in two stages. In the first phase, until about the middle of April 1941, it proposed “to maintain the current uncertainty about the intentions of Germany.” The characteristic lines of the German disinformation at the time were trying to give a false explanation of the objectives of troop movements and military engineering works near the borders of the USSR, to create the impression that the main enemy of Germany remains England, although it was not so.
February 21, 1941 with the plan of attack on the Soviet Union was a familiar head of the Propaganda Department of the Wehrmacht Colonel Wedel. From this moment for “Sea Lion” propaganda operation units into a strategic disinformation campaign, codenamed “Icebreaker”, during which they conducted more than 100 individual measures. In one of them supposedly to invade Britain formed a battalion of propaganda “K”, a part of which is included experts in the UK, English language translators from all departments of propaganda, including those located on the eastern borders, with certain permitted leak. In Berlin, replicated leaflets for distribution in England after the invasion of German troops on it that are delivered are stored in the respective airfields. War correspondents are preparing reports on the ongoing large-scale exercises on dropping, the publication of which imposed a strict ban, but 1-2 of the material due to “omissions” censorship hit the front pages of newspapers, the circulation of which supposedly completely withdrawn.
A May 10, 1941 there was a famous R.Gessa flight to the UK in order to obtain secret agreements with the British Empire to support the German attack on the USSR. Collusion Hitler and the leaders of the British Empire held the second agreement – after the Munich Agreement of 1938.
And May 12, 1941, Keitel signed another directive that clarifies the direction and methods of global disinformation operation against the USSR. This directive was signed exactly one day after reaching secret agreements Hess (number 2 man in Nazi Germany with the top of the British Empire). Misinformation has been undertaken and British intelligence in the circles where it could become a thing of Soviet agents. They began to hold meetings, ostensibly to attack England, which “inform” the Soviet residency.
To illustrate the actions of the Nazis misinformation give a few brief excerpts from documents.
“… Notes OKW. Office of Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the East, will significantly increase our … From these rearrangements in Russia in any case should not give the impression that we are preparing an offensive on the East …
To use your own intelligence, as well as for the possible answers to the questions of Russian intelligence, should be guided by the following basic principles:
1. Mask the total number of German troops in the East, as far as possible, the spread of rumors and news about the supposedly intensive replacement of military units taking place in the area. Troop movements to justify their translation into training camp, re-formation …
2. To create the impression that the main direction of our movements is shifted to the southern districts of the Government-General … and that the concentration of troops in the North is relatively low … “And on many measures of the same kind.
“… The Order of Chief of Staff of the Supreme glavnokomandovaniyavooruzhennyh forces of 12 May 1941 to conduct the second phase of the enemy misinformation in order to preserve the secrecy of concentration of forces against the Soviet Union.
1. The second phase of the deception of the enemy begins with the introduction of the most packed trains timetable on 22 May. At this point, the efforts of higher headquarters and other bodies involved in the misinformation should be increased as directed on to represent the concentration of forces in “Operation Barbarossa” as broadly conceived maneuver designed to mislead the enemy …. For the same reason it is necessary especially vigorously continue preparations for an attack on England …
2. All of our efforts will be in vain if the German troops will definitely learn about the impending attack and spread this information across the country. Orders in this regard should be developed for all the armed forces in a centralized manner …
… Soon, a number of ministries will be assigned tasks related to the demonstrative actions against England … “And so on.
Thus, Hitler’s command to his troops did not open the card. On the French coast with the full voltage operation was preparing the invasion of “Sea Lion”. And the secret to the flight R.Gessa May 19, 1941 for a meeting with the leaders of the British Empire, many of the activities of the German troops were real.
I must say that the Soviet intelligence apparently passed very precise information on the timing of the attack. Who does not know about R.Zorge messages, other scouts? In the mass consciousness is gradually formed a stereotype: that accurate reports on the matter fell like a horn of plenty. But the reality was different.
Since the end of 1940 in the Centre received very conflicting information about the timing of the start of the war. War, indicated they will start in the second half of 1941, the spring of 1941. Since May 1941 the character of this information is somewhat different. It can not be called is not very accurate. It becomes false. It is reported that the attack will take place in mid-May, at the end of May. And this information comes just days before the term referred to the invasion. For example, R.Zorge May 21 announced the beginning of the war in late May.This – “disinformation”, because on April 30, Hitler set a date for the attack – on 22 June.When are the dates of the beginning of the war, our scouts, of course, begin to report new: the second half of June, after the end of agricultural work, June 15-20, June 20-25, June 22.This is inaccurate. But take into account the fact that the most accurate information began to come in two or three weeks before the start of the war, or even a few days. When they walked into the information flow of inaccurate information. Considering all available reports on a more or less concrete terms the attack, we can see an interesting picture: passed continuous “gliding” of information on the calendar. This “sliding” along with the flow of inaccurate and simply false information securely “stoked” reliable information.
Imagine: one said the start date of the war takes place, the other – pass, third – passed. A war that is not all. What could be the reaction of our top political and military leadership? A sigh of relief? Probably. Keeping in constant tension? Certainly. But whether it contributed to the maintenance of confidence in our intelligence, to her informants, to the sources of information used by our scouts?
And that Soviet intelligence reported about the power of the German army intended for the invasion of the Soviet Union? On this issue, the Centre received a completely distorted information. Stalin was difficult to understand where the truth is.
Here, for example, the opinion on the matter GK Zhukov, who held the post before the war chief of the General Staff (See .: GK Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections in 3 volumes Vol.1 – 8th ed – M – 303…..):
“March 20, 1941 Head of General Intelligence Directorate FI Golikov presented management report containing the information of exceptional importance. This document outlines some options for possible areas of blows of Nazi troops in an attack on the Soviet Union. The document states that “the beginning of military operations against the Soviet Union can be expected between May 15 and June 15, 1941”. However, conclusions from the information contained in the report, in fact, removed all their value and administered Stalin misleading.
At the end of his report, General FI Golikov wrote: “Rumours and documents that speak of the inevitability of this spring, the war against the Soviet Union, must be regarded as disinformation emanating from the British and even, perhaps, the German intelligence” (str.196).
May 6, 1941, IV Stalin sent a note to the People’s Commissar of the Navy Admiral NLKuznetsov, which talked about the preparation of the German invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic States and Romania. Data contained in this document, also had exceptional value. However, the conclusions of Admiral GI Kuznetsov did not meet them driven by the same facts and misinformed Stalin. “I think – I said in a note GI Kuznetsova – that the information is false and is specifically focused on that channel in order to see how it will react to the USSR “(s.216).
But how to act NKVD intelligence, according to one of its leaders Paul Sudoplatova (See Paul Sudoplatov Exploration and the Kremlin Moscow, 1996…):
P.134 “NKVD Intelligence reports about the threat of war with November 1940. Although the data denounced Hitler’s intention to attack the Soviet Union, but many reports contradict each other. ”
P.141 “intelligence reports of a possible beginning of the German invasion were contradictory.So, Sorge reported from Tokyo that the invasion is scheduled for 1 June. However, our time residency in Berlin reported that the invasion is planned for June 15. Prior to this, on March 11, military intelligence reported that the German invasion is planned for the spring. ”
In the book “Secrets of Hitler on a table with Stalin. Intelligence and counterintelligence for the preparation of German aggression against the Soviet Union “, based on archival documents state the following:
C.11 On March 1941 the flow of information coming from sources in Berlin and other residencies, sharply intensified military preparations of Germany. The rose and the amount of data received by counterintelligence agencies. Summary analysis of this information leads to the conclusion that the German government has taken a political decision to attack the Soviet Union. Cited in the collection of documents clearly testify to this. However, foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence had not assessed the totality of the extracted data is not analyzed information received, does not draw the necessary conclusions. In those days, there was order to report to the leadership of the country each material separately, usually in the form in which it did, without the analytical assessments and comments. It determines only the degree of reliability of the source and authenticity of the data.
C.12 As Reported the country’s leadership in a fragmented form, information about military preparations did not create a convincing coherent picture of the events, did not answer the main question: what purpose these preparations made, whether political rulers of Germany made the decision to attack, when to expect aggression what are the strategic objectives of the enemy tactical military operations. for a convincing answer to these questions required a deep analytical work.
June 22, 2001 “Izvestia” newspaper published an interview with the historian Yuri Nezhnikovym, who spoke about foreign intelligence declassified documents of the USSR.
By June 21, 1941 on or about the date of the German attack on the USSR, Stalin received three reports of political intelligence, and four – the military. However, Soviet intelligence before called SIX different terms the attack on the Soviet Union. None of these terms is not confirmed.
Moreover, to June 21, 1941 four largest intelligence wrong in their forecasts. Stalin, she did not really trust.
1.Vvod German troops into Austria March 12, 1938 came as a surprise to the Soviet Union.
2.Svedeny of the Munich Agreement of Western countries (USA, UK, France) on the occasion of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany failed to produce in 1938. Moreover, it was in the days of signing the agreements, our intelligence had warned of the proximity of the war.
3. Information on the preparations for the German attack on Poland also receive intelligence failed.
4.Razvedka failed to warn about the preparation of the German attack on France, May 10, 1940 and the simultaneous introduction of troops in the Benelux countries.
Communications intelligence on strategic conception of the Nazi leadership often did not correspond to reality. As a result of the Kremlin complex had contradictory information prepared in large part in the depths of the German and British intelligence services. Stalin had to make a great effort to understand the flow of accurate and false information. Generalissimo Stalin for the first time openly about the impending attack of Nazi Germany in May 1941, speaking to graduates of military academies in the Kremlin. Then Stalin began June 12, 10 days before the war, the withdrawal of the Red Army to the positions they held at the border defense plan. It began mining roads and bridges, the output of front-line controls on the main command posts. Not on the night of 21 on June 22 of a sudden for herself has alerted the Red Army. Recent pre 7-10 days she lived anticipation of anxiety and the preparations for it. Why Stalin’s instructions were not fulfilled – a separate conversation.
Information counter the fascist aggression of the USSR
For a long time enemies of Russian myth was created specifically that allegedly Stalin in the early days of the war was lost. In fact, it was in the early days of the war Generalissimo Stalin has done a titanic work to create an information Victory mechanism. But the situation was dire. June 24 was left Vilnius on 28 June – Minsk. June 30 the Germans captured Lviv, and on July 1 – Riga.
Numerous documents are recorded in the history of vigorous action and Stalin’s actions aimed at mastering the strong position his creation of an effective management system and counter.In the first period of the war, Stalin was working 16-18 hours a day, haggard. It is impossible not to recognize the inhuman in scale and scope of responsibility of the work, which lay on his shoulders.
For June 23, 1941, on the initiative of Stalin created GHQ. Her working bodies – the General Staff, Office of the Ministry of the Defense and the Navy. At first it was headed by Marshal S.Timoshenko, but in August 1941, Stalin himself took full responsibility for themselves and supervised rate to the Great Victory Day.
On the same day, on the orders of Stalin, the General Directorate of the political propaganda of the Red Army prepared a directive, according to which the main task of the military education of the press became heroism, courage, martial arts, discipline. They also formulated the basic slogan, which was guided by the press, in particular: “Fascism – it is the enslavement of the peoples. Fascism – a hunger, poverty, ruin. All the forces in the struggle against fascism! “,” Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!”.These and other Stalinist slogans largely determined the main content issues of both military and civilian newspapers.
And the next day, Stalin began to establish a mechanism to ensure the activities of the Information Bids. He began to create a mechanism for information management in a crisis situation – a situation of war.
June 24, 1941 on the initiative of Stalin adopted a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government “On the establishment and tasks of the Soviet Information Bureau.” The ruling determined its main objectives: “a) guide light of international developments and the internal life of the Soviet Union, in the press and on the radio; b) the organization of counter-propaganda against Germany and other enemy propaganda; c) coverage, and military actions at the fronts, preparation and publication of reports based on the military High Command. ”
Daily summaries of the Soviet Information Bureau were the main source of information about the situation at the front during the entire period of the war. Employees of the Soviet Information Bureau received reports from TASS, editors of major newspapers from their own correspondents, but the underlying data come from the Supreme Command. Stalin attached great importance to counter-propaganda and information warfare. And he set up an effective mechanism to ensure the victory of information – Information Bureau (CIB).
The fact that the head of the new organization – NIB – was a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Party Central Committee Secretary A. Shcherbakov, indicates that this area was given the work of paramount importance. For Sovinformburo immediately allocated a room in the Central Committee of SHerbakova unit was seconded to the IRB a few people invited writers and Afinogenova Fadeev them to help in the first phase of work. To establish the functioning of the new organization under the circumstances, it was not an easy task.
When creating Sovinformburo he entrusted three very different objectives in form, though unified in purpose. Preparation and publication of military reports produced mainly by the General Staff and then the ad hoc group, which has worked in the apparatus of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the WKB (b) to collect additional evidence and compiling information to the main summary of the General Staff.
Difficult was the decision of the second objective – to inform the public of foreign countries about the events taking place on the Soviet-German front and on the work of the Soviet rear.In the Soviet Information Bureau did not have any links, it was necessary to create everything from scratch. Meanwhile, opponents of the Soviet Union, starting with Germany, had a powerful propaganda apparatus, a large number of radio stations, press. Allies of the Soviet Union as quickly created a huge propaganda organ. Before the Soviet Information Bureau had the task as quickly as possible “to track down and find all over the world of communication – newspapers, magazines, radio stations, agencies, etc., – through which you can convey information about the Soviet Union materials about it.”
The big difficulty is the selection of personnel: required knowledge of foreign languages, experience in advocacy. it was necessary to organize its practical work in the Soviet Information Bureau. NIB structure was created on the day of its occurrence.
Four days after the establishment of the Soviet Information Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) returns to the question about him and June 28, 1941 decides: “To approve the to work in the Soviet Information Bureau comrades Dyatlovsky VM, Petukhov PI, SN Sedunova ., Dyatlov GS, Osminina VS Senyushkina NP, Kobrin GD, Zhukov VP, Tsygankov KM ”
The fact that during the first weeks of the war the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) twice addressed the issues related to the organization of the Soviet Information Bureau (NIB), – evidence that the activities of the Soviet Information Bureau Generalissimo Stalin attached great importance.
June 29, Stalin began to translate the whole country on a war footing. Programme of Action to turn the country into a single military camp had been formulated in the “Directive SNK and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Party and government organizations frontline areas on the mobilization of all forces and means to defeat the invaders.” It is this Directive and was the basis of Stalin’s speeches on the radio 3 July 1941.
June 30 decision of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the CPC was established the State Defense Committee (GKO), concentrated all the fullness of state power in the Great Patriotic War. T-bills of the war Stalin was headed.
July 3, 1941 in the early morning on the radio all over the country was handed over to Stalin’s speech in which he called his listeners to “brothers and sisters”, “friends”. He explained the retreat and military failures of the first days of the suddenness of the attack the Nazis, their perfidy. Since the beginning of the war until November 1941 Stalin almost never mentioned in the newspapers, there are no portraits of him.
The theme of patriotism, love for the motherland during the war begins to sound with extreme force. After years of propaganda of ideas of proletarian internationalism began an appeal to the national feelings, national pride, the peculiarities of the national character. The publications were often used historical analogies, it was told about the great Russian generals about military successes of the country in the past, were shown liberation tradition of the peoples of Russia.
Thus, Stalin – July 3, 1941 he returned to the implementation of the main geopolitical doctrine Rurik (Doctrine Moscow – Third Rome), making it possible to defeat the evil empire GLOBAL – fascism.
In accordance with the doctrine of “Moscow – the Third Rome” Stalin restores the old state of the Great Russian attributes, emphasizing continuity with it his rule. So reviving the worship of the great Russian hero Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov, and many others. In the difficult war years out remarkable works on Russian history, culture, art, ancient Russian architecture.
In 1943 reduced the uniforms and insignia of the old pre-revolutionary army established military schools by type of old cadet – Suvorov and Nakhimov schools.
May 15, 1943, Stalin personally decide on the abolition of the Communist International, the last stronghold of the supporters of the Leninist-Trotskyist idea of world revolution.
January 1, 1944 the Communist anthem “The Internationale”, which served since 1918 as the official national anthem of the USSR, canceled (it becomes a hymn of the party). Instead, it introduces a new national anthem, the first stanza of which reads: “the unbreakable union of free republics, Great Russia united forever. Stalin brought us up on loyalty to the people, to work and to the exploits inspired us. ”
Work as special propaganda units of the Red Army on the German troops to the middle of 1942 differed unsystematic. Since its establishment in June 1942, the Council of the military-political propaganda impact on the psyche of the German soldiers and the German population was greatly enhanced. The first positive experience of information and psychological warfare was acquired during the Battle of Stalingrad. Implement and promote structural changes in organs. In August 1944 7 Division of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army was deployed to the Office. a new concept of “propaganda operation” appeared in 1944. It refers to a set of promotional activities developed in the field of printed and oral propaganda, billboards, the use of prisoners of war, including a return vacation, etc. All these actions were focused thematically around one idea, subordinated nature of combat operations, plans and objectives of command. In 1944-1945. 27 propaganda operations were carried out.
facts organized surrender under the leadership of the German generals presented in the materials printed propaganda. So, Lieutenant-General B. Müller, the acting commander of the 12th Army Corps, July 8, 1944 surrendered, and then ordered the surrender of the personnel of the association. The leaflet, entitled “General Muller went reasonably” was placed his portrait, as well as a photocopy of the order with the facsimile. On July February 9 th. Man surrendered, and the whole order of General of 33 thousand. Surrounded followed by 15 thousand. Soldiers.
From Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi boiler reached 55 thousand. Soldiers and officers with leaflets calling for surrender, written Generals Seidlitz and Korfes.
To induce the enemy troops to surrender and was further developed this method of information-psychological influence as a reverse vacation prisoners. In the case of hopeless position of enemy units and the low morale of his troops to use this method was very effective. So: write, if in January 1943 from the 96th Division in the area surrounding the Stalingrad prisoners were noticed to 34, of whom only five were able to return, bringing with them 312 enemy soldiers. And in May 1945, all 54 prisoners of war returned from mishandled surrounded the garrison city of Breslau, bringing with him some 1,500 soldiers and officers.Given the need for rapid sending of prisoners across the front line, the command of the 2nd Belarusian Front in 1945 issued an order permitting all officers in the platoon commander and above, without waiting for the permission of the superior command, send the prisoners of war in the enemy’s rear with agitation task for surrender.
May 9, 1945 it became clear that under the leadership of Generalissimo Stalin, our people have won a great victory over fascism, including in information-psychological sphere.
Читать полностью:http://www.km.ru/spetsproekty/2012/06/14/informatsionnaya-voina-i-22-iyunya-1941-goda
Source: http://www.km.ru/spetsproekty/2012/06/14/informatsionnaya-voina-i-22-iyunya-1941-goda
Filed under: Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: information warfare, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda 
