Professor Mark Galeotti analyzed the composition of the Russian special services, investigating their working methods , ways of interacting and levels close to Vladimir Putin.
The report of the expert in Russian politics and the security bodies of Mark Galeotti published the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Open Russia this text translated into Russian.
On his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was presented with a series of paintings in which he is depicted in the image of Hercules. On one of them he kills “Hydra sanctions” 1 .
The image of the Hydra – ferocious multi-headed monster, which, if cut off his head, he immediately grows a new one – is often referred to when talking about Russian intelligence. Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author Yuri Felshtinsky wrote that “the KGB, like Hydra, has grown into four new departments” in 1991 2 . Not long ago, the British counterintelligence officer compared the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service with the Hydra. He noticed that every failed the plan, each agent are open only to increase their numbers.
West finds himself in a new “shaky” a world where many see Russia not only as an obstacle or a rival, but as a direct threat. the threat to Europe hardly take the form of fighting; rather, it is hidden, indirect and political operations conducted by a variety of Russian intelligence and security agencies, which operate on different fronts, but with one common goal.
These agencies are active, aggressive and well-funded. They were given considerable freedom in their methods, they are not limited to diplomacy and supervisors. Moreover, many of the surrounding Putin – the former security officers and law enforcers. This is particularly important due to the fact that many official institutions, which determine international and domestic policy of Russia, – the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Council – are no longer places for discussions, they simply perform the orders of Putin, his friends and confidants.
The KGB had a huge impact, it is also engaged in espionage, destabilization and subversion, but always under the control of the political forces who wanted to maintain the status quo. Under the direction of Boris Yeltsin in the 90s has weakened Russia, and along with it – its intelligence agencies. During Putin’s first term, they began to restore its influence, but at the time, Putin has pursued a policy of pragmatic cooperation with the West.
When Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, he was “unleashed” scored power of the security services, using them in internal repressive campaigns and the destabilization abroad, hoping to build a new world order.
This is hardly changed in the near future. That is why it is so important to study in detail the Russian special services, their goals, strengths and weaknesses, and their place in Putin’s system. This report examines the role and modus operandi of the security services, tough competition between them, their relationship to crime and willingness to take any action, up to and including murder.
The report rejects the widespread view that the special services are behind all decisions of the Kremlin. The lack of unity and common goals, as well as dependence on Putin say that they should be considered as another branch of the political elite. A system in which all the information received after checking and processing passes through the President, complicating their use and reduces the impact on policy. Russian security services can not be underestimated, but at the same time it is obvious that they have serious weaknesses.
Unlike the hydra heads operated by one mind, intelligence agencies often compete poorly controlled. They do not stand at the head of the Kremlin, but the Kremlin does not have full control over them.
Their actions worsen the situation in Russia and in the long term. Europe should base their policies on the real knowledge of the Russian intelligence, not on speculation and fears. In this report, we urge the European governments to apply in respect of the Russian special services a policy of zero tolerance, increased intelligence sharing and tracking illegal movement of money. By showing that aggression abroad can lead to serious consequences, Europe could force Russia’s security services to act more cautiously.
“Soldiers of the invisible front”
In Russia today there are a number of security and intelligence agencies. In Soviet times, there were only two: the KGB, who was involved in everything – from espionage to internal security – and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which was engaged in military intelligence. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the KGB had to disband, but Yeltsin backed down when faced with a serious political resistance, organized by former employees of the KGB.Their position was strengthened by a former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, who became president after spending a short time as director of the FSB.
Total in Russia four main intelligence agencies. The strongest is still the FSB, whose responsibilities for the maintenance of internal security suddenly began to include some activities abroad, including murder. The service is not simply related to the historically Putin; its current director Alexander Bortnikov and his predecessor Nikolai Patrushev (currently a member of the Security Council) have Putin friendships. FSB is also engaged in espionage and cyber security.
Exploration – area of responsibility of the Foreign Intelligence Service and the GRU 3 . Both departments run by agents working under diplomatic cover in embassies, and undercover agents – so-called illegal immigrants. Their working methods differ greatly. Foreign Intelligence Service has adopted a more conservative methods: a network of agents working under deep cover for years, they went from the KGB. The effectiveness of this approach often raises questions.
The aggressive and risky methods GRU linked to the military background of the agency, as well as access to a wide range of funds: kiberrazvedka, satellites and special forces. As part of the General Staff, the GRU has a certain autonomy, and the head of department communicates directly with the president.
Federal Protection Service (FSO), which includes the Presidential Security Service (SBP) – the last of the major agencies. Formally its role – protection of key officials and public areas. Nevertheless, the FSO has expanded in several unexpected directions, including the supervision of intelligence statements as a whole.
Greater security apparatus includes a whole range of other services. MIA is engaged not only the protection of public order, and undercover operations against organized crime, including terrorists and extremists (in practice, they are peaceful dissidents), together with the Investigative Committee (IC) and the General Prosecutor’s Office. List of agencies dealing with security issues, complete the Federal Service for Drug Control (Federal Drug Control Service), which is engaged in exploration in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) – Coordination Office, created by the director of the FSB.
The National Guard, the establishment of which was announced in April 2016, is not engaged in the exploration, it’s praetorian guard, which is subordinated to Putin personally – so in this report we will not talk about it in detail. But given the tradition of Russian authorities to expand the sphere of influence, it is possible that she will find a new use.During the creation of the National Guard Federal Drug Control Service followed by the submission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Other agencies without enthusiasm looking at the emergence of a new competitor. This allows you to see more detail the main theme of this report: duplication of responsibilities, division and competition of Russian special services.
The new nobility 4
At first glance, this system is familiar to Europeans. Nevertheless, it has its organizational and cultural characteristics, which, coupled with the practice of all decisions by one person, indicate that these agencies and the “new nobility”, which in their work, have their own peculiar political culture, words Patrushev 5 .
Duplication of functions
If the Soviet leaders for greater efficiency laid almost all security responsibilities to one agency – the KGB, their successors went the opposite way, which led to duplication of responsibilities between departments.
For example, in Ukraine before the overthrow of Yanukovych in 2014 and acted in the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Federal Security Service. GRU has been involved in the Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Even the Interior Ministry extended its influence on the Kiev police. Nobody expected such an outcome of the Maidan (although a source in the Interior Ministry told me that they had warned a month before the riots that Yanukovych’s regime has created an irreversible situation of its inability to contain the protests).
When Yanukovych fled to Russia, Foreign Intelligence Service took over the entire Putin’s anger, expressed in lay-offs and reduced (this was confirmed by the source F 6 ). Despite the fact that the FSB general Sergei conversation, visited Kiev in just 10 days before the escape of Yanukovych, the agency was able to avoid responsibility for failure, albeit with great difficulty. FSB even made a priority in future intelligence operations in Ukraine 7 .
This is the same principle of “competing agencies” which are guided in the United States, but with a dash of social Darwinism. Blurred boundaries and overlap of responsibilities between the intelligence services leads to wars not only for spheres of influence, funding and access to power, but also a business opportunity for the command, and sometimes just to survive.
Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAGCI) experienced it myself when the alliance of the FSB, the SVR and GRU led to the takeover of the agency, but it is one of the glaring examples. “The war security forces’ continued since 2004. More recently, the FSB managed to put his man at the head of management of economic security and anti-corruption Ministry of Interior, the deputy head who died under mysterious circumstances. During interrogation, the Investigation Committee, he was able to escape from the protection of the hands and jump from the sixth floor window 8 .
Most competition is not so bloody and noticeable. Agencies are trying to show that they are more effective than its rivals to cope with the responsibilities, getting the most useful information for senior management. According to a source with SVR and GRU mined identical economic information, sometimes the officers even bribed employees of embassies, in order not to give opponents to get the latest information.
In 2014, an officer of the GRU Colonel Viktor Ilyushin was expelled from France when he tried to collect compromising material on President Francois Hollande, although it is included in the RAF duties, or even FSB 9 . FSB expanded influence in the Baltic and Northern Europe, in defiance of the GRU and SVR 10 .
This competition can be helpful. Office show ingenuity, resourcefulness and aggression. Although such a system, areas of responsibility overlap, in theory, this provides a broader perspective. As Yulia Latynina wrote: “War of the security services – it is our” separation of powers “.” Some whisper in the right ear of the president, the other – to the left ” 11 . The political reality of Putin’s regime suggests otherwise, but we’ll discuss this later.
There are also serious disadvantages. In pursuit of quick results intelligence agencies prefer easy prey. Moreover, the desire to please the Kremlin does not give them a timely process and verify the information. Coordination and exchange of information is limited and only take place under the control of Putin and his representatives.
For example, it is incredibly important that the Winter Olympics in Sochi went smoothly. One of Putin’s trusted officials Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, responsible for the organization of this event. He has created a task force headed by Oleg Syromolotov, the former head of the FSB military counterintelligence department and includes the Deputy Interior Minister and Deputy Head of the National Anti-Terrorist Committee. Such a number of senior officials from various departments in the group was needed: the usual level of coordination was not enough. It was obvious that these career officials depend on the productive collaboration and exchange of information. As the source said the FSB: “We knew that the fly’s head; if we were not forced to work, we would have played their game.”
War law
Russian special services consider themselves not just spies to obtain information for the decision makers, but also artists who are ready to take decisive action. This is especially noticeable in the GRU, which operates in unstable regions and through dubious intermediaries and agents. From arms dealer Viktor Bout (serving in the United States with the term of 2010) to the fighters mercenaries in Donbas 12 . As former GRU officer: “Not all of us have been in the special forces, but we are like a riot.”
However, enforcement practices and risky operations say that Russian special services operating in military time.Even before the deterioration of relations with the West, they felt over Russia threatened.
wartime regime reflected in three aspects, which can be illustrated by quotations. First: “If the West loses, we win.”This approach is “neither myself nor the other” left over from the Cold War and was voiced by Russian academician from the words of the RAF command.
The second: “Over Russia threatened,” so put the source B, the FSB officer in 2014 (the Crimea). He cited the example of the Maidan, which he regarded as a matter of western secret service. This intelligent, educated, world-traveled man claimed that the West is trying to overthrow the government in Russia and thereby destroy its special historical, religious and social identity in order to weaken its resistance to US hegemony.
Third: “It is better to act than to be idle.” The phrase, which is the source of F heard at a meeting with officers of the Foreign Intelligence Service. A source agreed that, despite the corruption, the Russian special services have encouraged risk, especially in a competitive environment. The cause or the consequence of this was the weakening of control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs overseas operations, which could have a negative impact on Russia’s image. For example, the abduction of Estonian security officer of the FSB, which, apparently, passed with minimal MFA.
Security Monetization
Many officers who consider themselves defenders of their country, nevertheless did not miss an opportunity to make legally and illegally. Corruption is familiar to any institution in Russia, but the lack of transparency and the lack of control makes the problem particularly acute in the security services.
This is particularly important because of the large number of available special services equipment. Officers may use or, even better, to threaten to use force or administrative resources to gain access to the delicate, dangerous or just financial information. From this huge number of stories about businessmen who pay officers for “protection” or just give them (especially FSS), part of the business.
These officers may also be due in the criminal world, which they can use for their own purposes. This affects the mixing money, crime and the authorities in Russia, as well as the willingness to use intelligence services of criminals as a state security tools. For example, some Russian hackers can not worry about what they are caught until they are attacking targets specified FSB – the liberal media to individual States 13 .
FSB Kidnapped Estonian security officer Kohver was investigating cigarette smuggling. It is unlikely that a corrupt official of the FSB, risking to create a diplomatic incident, would have sent an elite unit in another country, to hide the traces of their crime and avoid punishment then. Much more likely that the operation was planned by the FSB, which collaborated with organized crime in the region in exchange for a share of the profits 14 . The funds, obtained in Europe without the control of Moscow, ideal for bribing officials and the financing of a political organization.
However, the more agencies cooperate with criminals, the more difficult to figure out who someone is using. An interesting case was that of an agent of the GRU in Canada. Besides the usual information, economic, political and military intelligence, he was using his position in the military intelligence center, to learn that the Canadian police know about the local Russian mafia 15 . Our interlocutors in Russia and Canada have suggested that such information is not of strategic importance for the GRU, but it has a certain value for the Russian mafia and GRU officers, who could sell this information to them.
In other words, the criminal structures using state assets, and not vice versa.
As a result, we have a culture of corruption pervades all power structures of Russia. It is difficult to understand how much this limits their opportunities, but its influence is felt even at the highest level. For example, in 2014 the head of the Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin persuaded Putin to introduce the bill, which allows the plant to cases of tax crimes, without consulting with the tax inspection, and gave broad powers to the Investigative Committee, more convenient for abuse than policing 16 .
The highest roof
In general, Putin highly values its special services. In 2015, during the celebration of the day of law enforcement officers, he called them “strong and courageous people, real professionals, which reliably protect the sovereignty and national unity of Russia and the lives of our citizens who are prepared to the most complex, responsible and dangerous tasks” 17 . This goodwill is not talking about his sentimental feelings, rather it reflects their common views on the situation and objectives of Russia and pragmatic political alliance.
Under his intelligence services feel good, their budgets and powers grew. When in 2015, 10% of the FSB reduced due to the financial crisis, it was a shock for the agency, whose budget has increased every year since 1999, even during the crisis of 2008 18 .
Their political influence has increased, too. After Putin’s return in 2012, the balance of power has shifted, and spies became much easier to break, and in Moscow, and in the embassies. SVR and GRU agents working under diplomatic cover in embassies, and their actions are reflected in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sources C and F noted that during the first Putin’s terms, if the SVR agents Inflicts damage to the reputation of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov could “cause someone from Yasenevo (SVR residence), to yell.” Even President pdministratsii officials had to apologize if GRU operation did not go according to plan.
Such support for Putin was balanced political realities and the attitude to specific agencies. Despite its close relationship with the FSB, Putin often refuse department in the embodiment of his most ambitious plans, in which it was going to absorb the Federal Drug Control Service and even the SVR, thus creating something like 2.0 FSB. Being a former security official, he knows how dangerous it is to give individual agencies have too much power. Instead, it encourages competition between them – for example, between the SVR and the GRU, or between the Prosecutor General’s Office and the UK.
Special services, in turn, must maintain their status.After the Georgian war
2008 GRU’s reputation was severely damaged. Their special forces showed themselves well, but the government believed that intelligence as a whole has failed. Irrelevant information about the location of the enemy led to air strikes on empty airfields and analysis of information to the GRU did not reflect the real situation, and as a result the Kremlin has underestimated the Georgian army.
Opponents of the GRU did not want to miss the chance. SVR demanded priority in foreign intelligence, the FSB hungry eyes looking at electronic intelligence FAGCI, which is run by the GRU since 2003. Even the military advantage of the situation. In 2010, the Kremlin handed riot police armed forces of the Russian Federation 19 and cut thousands of GRU officers 20 .
There were rumors that military intelligence will move from the jurisdiction of the General Staff. It would be a big blow to the reputation of the department, it would have lost its autonomy, and its head was unable to have direct access to the president. Eventually Igor Sergun, head of the GRU from December of 2011 until his death in late 2015, was able to break the black band because of luck and a good knowledge of what is going on in the Kremlin 21 . This was an extreme example of how the future authorities depends on its effectiveness, or at least appear efficiency.
The strong left hand of the state
In the Soviet era, as well as the common people had to go “to the left” in order to obtain scarce products through a friend, or black market, the government relied on the KGB to address critical issues, whether it’s a change of public opinion or reduction of the backlog from the West in the process development. Similarly, Putin’s security services not only to deal with matters of national security, but also perform a number of functions that are not included in the zone of responsibility of similar agencies in other countries.
Espionage
Back in 2010, the British International same security (MI5) warned that “the threat from the Russian intelligence service, comparable with the times of the Cold War […] the number of Russian spies in London is on the same level as in Soviet times,” 22 . Since then, the security services across Europe began to celebrate the increasing scale and aggressiveness of Russian operations. Head of the Norwegian police warned that “Russian intelligence has the greatest potential to harm the interests of Norway” and the Swedish Security Service of the Russian espionage SÄPO described as its biggest test and warned of “impending military operations against Sweden” 23 . Russian conduct massive campaigns and insatiable intelligence-gathering, which still generously paid out of the treasury, and are encouraged by the Kremlin, which mereschatsya plots and ulterior motives even in places where they do not exist.
All European counterintelligence agencies agree on one thing: Russian intelligence operations are highly professional. Although everything is not so smooth with the production tasks. SVR and GRU are well aware of the task from a military point of view, but their political goals at times naive and reflect their dubious knowledge of democratic political systems.
One of the goals of several agents disclosed in the US in 2010, was the penetration into the analytical center to find out its purpose, which can be found on its website 24 . In other cases, agents had to find the information that was already available from public sources. For example, according to the charges against him, “illegal” Eugene Buriakov when set before him the task of figuring out how economic sanctions impact on Russia, simply by searching on the Internet 25 .
Active measures
“Active measures” – perhaps one of the most prominent Russian foreign operations from political assassinations to sabotage. The security services of other countries also carried out such operations, but Russian intelligence gives them a major role in its strategy. They are more likely to use in their operations, other agencies, organizations and civilian – from banks and charities to journalists and heavy-drivers.
Murder, how to plant, engaged in the GRU and the FSB. After the murder of Litvinenko in London in 2006 for every Russian citizen who died in England the British have seen Moscow’s murderers; usually the purpose of such murders – to remove the threat, or create chaos. For example, the FSB and the GRU were involved in the murder of Chechen rebels and their allies abroad.
In Georgia before the war of 2008 and in Ukraine after the 2014 frequent assassinations and terrorist acts, which do not lead to specific objectives, rather they were aimed at creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity 26 . They had to suppress political and social will and the people to impose the Russian view that their country slipping into anarchy. Where not acted bomb may well act a computer virus or a DDoS-attack. As mentioned above, the FSB is engaged in cyber attacks, either directly or through a hackers recruited.
There have also direct political operation aimed at discrediting or recruitment of certain persons or groups or to sabotage strategies unprofitable Russia. Such operations are carried out less frequently than one might imagine, since they are associated with high costs and serious risks. Nevertheless, they had a great impact on the political landscape of Eurasia. For example, in Ukraine, the FSB accused of poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential race in 2004; were evidence of the fact that the agency with the help of forged documents trying to derail the contract between Ukraine and Turkmenistan 27 .
Much more frequent use of special services to support political and other movements that are useful for Moscow.This practice has long been used in countries that, according to the Kremlin, included in the Russian sphere of influence. For example, support for FSB Renato Mustached elections in Moldova in 2014 28 . SVR and FSB are now particularly active in Europe. Organizations that are supported include opponents of shale gas production (which, albeit unintentionally, help maintain demand for Russian gas), the nationalist group, Russian diaspora in the Baltic countries and various separatists from Spain to Scotland.
Sometimes they act through public agents, such as Rossotrudnichestvo, charitable organizations and even through Russian banks, which issued a multimillion-dollar loan “National Front” Marine Le Pen 29 . Sometimes it is difficult to determine where the work ends with the Russian special services and begins the work of other institutions, but it is not so important, all means are good for him for the Kremlin.
Economic Resources
Even before the current economic crisis, the Kremlin has naively believed that, as in the case with the Soviet Union and the KGB, the intelligence will help reduce the economic and technological gap.
Though the security services and the long-term deal with the discrediting of the idea of economic sanctions, the latter does not restrict Russia’s access to international markets and, therefore, are not a priority for the intelligence services issue. The main economic challenge SVR, in particular, is to support the core contracts of Russia abroad, such as the equipment of “Temelin” NPP Czech 30 . Anything goes, from blackmail and bribery of officials of distributing contracts to industrial espionage.
Meanwhile, the GRU and SVR are trying to gain access to technologies that are not available for various reasons, Russia. For example, in 2012 the FBI opened a network of agents who used a Texas company, to smuggle illegal in Russia high-tech microelectronics for military purposes 31 . Germany, in turn, opened the SVR operation to gain access to renewable energy technologies 32 .
Political Control
Any operation abroad, first of all, must have the support at home. The main role of the security services – to protect the regime. So it was with the kings, emperors, the Bolsheviks, and in today’s Russia, this principle still works: not to protect the constitutional order, and individuals. Operations are conducted in order to prevent external “interference” in the affairs of the Kremlin and share strategic opponents, such as the European Union.
In a falling standard of living, Putin can no longer maintain the rating promises “stability” and strengthens its position with the help of the image of an external enemy and promises about the revival of Russian greatness. The security services have an important role not only in the creation of this image, but also in the conduct of operations against the enemies of the state, and these fictitious.
The fight against terrorism has always been a priority for the Russian special services, from tracking down and destroying the leaders with their supporters to monitor recruiters and sources of funding. Terrorist threat no longer comes only from the North Caucasus under suspicion – all Russian Muslims and migrants from Central Asia – which means that the security services are in need of more resources.
At the same time, many agencies are engaged in tracking down and suppression of dissidents and critics of the government. Famous figures such as the liberal nationalist Alexei Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov, a Communist, are under the scrutiny of the FSB, the UK and the Center “E”. Critics have tried to drown out how to use the pressure on individuals (FSB has revived the practice of “preventive conversations” of the KGB), and through the obstruction of the free flow of information via the Internet trolls and pressure on independent media, such as the channel “Rain”.
Economic instability raised a wave of small protests of the working class. Intelligence agencies not only keep track of attempts to organize strikes, and study public opinion in general to suppress the nascent protest in the early stages. Responsible here – the Foreign Ministry and the FSB as well as the FSO with their wide range of responsibilities, which include carrying out their own case studies and management of inter-departmental task force, which directs funds in distressed regions 33 .
In general, the Russian security services are extremely active and versatile. They perform a much wider range of responsibilities than their counterparts in the West. They have revived the Soviet principle of the secret services as a multifunctional tool of the Kremlin. It is unclear whether they are satisfied with themselves, this situation and just how far they can go, trying to please the Kremlin. For example, if the SVR agents wanted to participate in the operation with the Czech nuclear contract? Do people go to the FSO to deal with public opinion polls? In other words, whether the intelligence agencies Putin nobles or his servants?
Shpionokratiya?
In 1999, shortly before Putin took over as acting president, he proposed a toast to the former colleagues from the KGB: “The group of FSB officers, aimed to work undercover in the government, the first phase of its job well” 34 . Of course, it was a joke, there was no plan for the implementation of the Kremlin, and Putin – is not simply an agent of the FSB. Nevertheless, many believe that “the reins of power in Russia captured security officers” and that the FSB “has established control over the economic and political sectors,” creating “new gebistskoe state” 35 .
Perhaps because of such statements make beautiful titles, but the evidence of a secret submission to the country’s leadership and the FSB secret police as a whole is not. So, Putin said that he had decided to annex Crimea in person, and only then assembled heads of departments to discuss its implementation 36 . Moreover, there were many cases where the security services did not receive what they wanted, there is clear evidence of differences between agencies and within them. Simply put, the prestige and big budgets do not guarantee control and, especially, cohesion.
Silovarhi 37 and the colonists?
After the collapse of the USSR were concerned about the conversations that security forces colonizing state apparatus and economic oligarchy 38 . It is obvious that many of the security forces have taken good positions.According to research by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, the security forces made up 25% of the state elite in 2003 and 42% in 2008, although there are other opinions. Bettina Renz noted that most of them held positions of lower rank 39 .
Many believe it is the result of a quiet revolution KGB 40 . But the reason for this career siloviki growth may lie in the system. Work in KGB attracted ambitious and successful careerists, and not only the opportunity to travel and get rich. Once in the KGB, it was possible to count on the good life and regime change.
A major role is also played by the old ties, especially around Putin. Former employees of his security quickly rose through the ranks. Viktor Zolotov, former head of the SBP – now the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; Alex Dyumin – deputy head of the GRU: less than a year, he is from Guard colonel Putin became a deputy minister of defense, a potential head of the GRU and the governor of the Tula region 41 . Putin has surrounded himself with people he knew and trusted.
As soon as the officials left the secret service, their interests and circles of friends and enemies are stronger than me.The most glaring example – Igor Sechin, director of “Rosneft”. Many consider one of the most influential security officials, but it adheres to the years in its official statements, the business and did not do anything that could benefit departments. I’ve never heard someone talking about it for all my experience in dealing with the current and former employees of special services. Now he is an oil baron, not a strength.
There have been many cases where the security forces did not achieve his. The situation around the bulk – that it is judged, then show him leniency – said the inability of the Federal Security Service and the Center
“E” to withstand even a political adviser to the Kremlin. Trying to head IC Bastrykin to push a bill amending the controversial trial basis, it failed due to the presidential administration.
Block security forces?
Between departments no solidarity, no coordination. They chop up common views, but, as noted by an analyst Denis Volkov, those views – particularly on the “Western threat” – shares the entire political elite 42 . In general, the probability of the presence of security forces in a single block government is very small.
Usually agencies unite against a common threat. According to the source the D, FSB supported GRU, when it tried to prevent the appointment Dyumina, a person from the outside, the head of military intelligence; FSB did not like the precedent itself. Practice shows that solidarity is lost as soon as it is possible to make or avoid responsibility. The bureaucratic struggle harm the interests of individual departments. For example, the General Prosecutor’s Office, which initially supported Bastrykin in his desire to review the entire legal system in general, Putin offered a bill that passed her supervisory powers over raising the Investigative Committee 43 .
Putin’s policy was favorable for security services, it reflected many of their views. The reason could be that the Putin himself worked for the KGB, as well as the fact that the elite had to adjust to the loss of a world-class power status.As a result, liberal, ready to reform minority was expelled from high politics, but there is no evidence that this had a hand in the KGB.
Special services are thriving when they are useful to the Kremlin. Putin generously funded by the FSB, because he needs a tool of political control, rather than because it fulfills their orders or afraid of them. It supports the GRU, because it provides the US intelligence and performs the dirty work.
Syromolotov after successful execution of their duties at the Winter Olympics
Sochi was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister for Counter Terrorism. It was not the introduction of the Federal Security Service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather, it says that the Kremlin hopes to cooperate with the West in the only sphere in which it can become an indispensable partner in terms of sanctions.
It is useful to think of the Russian special services as institutions, meeting people and factions involved in the political process. It forces its way with the help of personal relationships, influence and, most often, executive and attractive ideas. In this sense, they are simply part of the elite – along with the military, the financial community and other external agreed, but in practice disparate elements of contemporary Russian political scene. That is why it is so important to study how these agencies are controlled and how they influence policy.
Gatekeepers President
In many systems, the intelligence evaluation and comparison of all the data in one place occur. The US Director of National Intelligence has supervisory powers and is responsible for the daily briefing of the president. In the UK, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers supervises the activities of exploration and analysis of the data, which are formed in the reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Moreover, often the information is checked by outside experts. For example, US president advises the National Security Adviser, well-informed person responsible personally to the head of the state and does not depend on the security services.
The Russian intelligence authorities are structures that transmit the orders of special services management; they are not engaged in the collection and verification of information. Most of the secret service reports directly to the president, the rest – indirectly. In practice, the information comes to Putin after presidential administration, and not through the Security Council. It is important to understand this personalized political system – who are the gatekeepers that transmit data to Putin, and in which he respects them.
Security Council
The Security Council is composed of representatives of all security services. In practice, it is rather a consultant rather than decision-making body. It consists of 30 people, including Putin. And this is not the place for meaningful discussions. Rather, it is managing the forum. Council hears reports announces the decisions and solve technical issues related to the coordination and jurisdiction. The most important aspect of the Council – the work of the Secretary Patrushev and his secretariat.
Patrushev – one of the closest associates of Putin, another former KGB officer. Putin chose him as his successor as director of the FSB before he became Secretary of the Security Council in 2008. In fact, Patrushev has been supervision of intelligence.
He sees to it that the security services will fulfill the Kremlin, and examines issues important enough for Putin. It also conveys the views of the management of special services for various problems. So, in 2012 he surprised many by saying in an interview that the mass protests “suggest the free activity of our citizens. […] They participate thus in the process of developing the most important state decisions, ” 44. According to a source in the Interior Ministry, he spoke on behalf of the ministry, who did not want to be arbitrarily used against peaceful protesters.
His bellicose public statements range from the famous “The United States would prefer that Russia did not exist at all” to the statement that “the words of the leaders of some Western countries on the defensive nature of NATO only cover up the aggressive nature of the Alliance” 45 . The source said S: “If you want to he approved your report, it must be written by the most rude language.”
The task of its secretariat – analyze and disseminate information and prepare documentation for the Security Council and the President as well as to monitor the implementation of presidential directives. In particular, the secretariat is playing a leading role in the periodic review of the Russian National Security Strategy. He has the right to request reports from all agencies, including intelligence services. This is one of the main channels of the Kremlin information.
Despite the special status, the Secretariat is quite small. When Putin came to power, the entire staff consisted of 200 people, and perhaps since then, this figure has changed a lot. For example, more than 2000 people work in the British secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the unit of the US National Intelligence Director has 1,600 employees. In other words, the Security Council, the Secretariat is able to except an overall picture and highlight the main reports, worthy president of attention.
Administration of the President
The presidential administration – an executive body responsible for all processes: from drafting laws to communicate with the press, government monitoring and control of the envoys of the president. Although representatives of many departments can access directly to Putin, most of the information comes to him through the administration.
It is no coincidence that the head of the institution in his time served in the KGB. Sergei Ivanov, a former secretary of the Security Council, also served in the SVR and the FSB and has a friendly relationship with Putin. And although he is more reserved in his public utterances than Patrushev, his views are not much different, and it sets the tone for the organization.
The presidential administration – organization is primarily a political rather than intelligence. Exploration – only one source of information that is collected and sorted for the administration of the high command and, above all, for the president. It is more similar to the British Cabinet, but there is no central department, such as the Secretariat of the British Intelligence Committee; instead several departments work with equal amounts of information.
The agencies themselves do not know how and what information will be used. Administration officials who do not have experience in the exploration, decide which of the management to send one or the other report. Thus, use of materials, usually dictated by political considerations.
Putin is known for his suspicion, so the administration require that the information has been confirmed by several sources. As a result, valuable classified data may be mixed with article from a newspaper or a report of the analytical center. As a result, valuable information is simply wasted or lost.
Boss Briefing
The Security Council and the presidential administration controlled the flow of information to the President and various structures. But this is not the only way to communicate intelligence with the president and his entourage.
SVR and FSB produce daily reports, such as the daily briefing of the US President. This gives them free access to the president. GRU and the FSO also send periodic reports directly to the president. Each department makes a report separate from the other, cooperation and discussion between them – a great rarity. There are formal and informal meetings at which the head of different departments to discuss strategy, but even this is quite rare. Using the open list of Putin’s official meetings, Michael Rodriguez and Andrei Soldatov found that in 2000-2007, Putin held a meeting siloviki 14%, while in 2008-2015 – only 5.5% 46 .
Briefing alone can be very effective and useful, but it very much depends on the relationship of the conductive briefing with the President, by his desire to please. They rarely entered into details during these briefings. Sometimes the Security Council or the administration of President immediately before the briefing decide to support or to question this or that decision, as they do not spend enough time to check the information, especially given the absence of a specialized department in both departments.
No, and the post of national security advisor – a third-party expert who can question the intelligence. Under Yeltsin, the post there, but not so long ago, it was combined with the position of the Security Council. However, Patrushev not only has sufficient administrative and political responsibilities, but also stays true to the FSB.
In fact, this role sometimes played the head of the Federal Security Service (Open Russia translated report Mark Galeotti after Murov resignation, which occurred May 26, 2016, shortly after the original publication) General Eugene Moores. Given that the FSO responsibilities include supervision of other departments, he has (had to resign -. Open Russia) and the ability and the authority to determine which cases are based on unconfirmed data or personal interests officers. He is the only one of its kind “security officer of the old school,” as he called his source A. It is the longest – since 2000 – serves (served -. Open Russia), head of the power structure and explicitly seeks above. For two years, he tries to retire, and it is unlikely that his successor will have enough will and authority to continue his work 47.
Personal method of transmitting information suggests that much depends on the ability of the president to take the bad news and the willingness of the agency “to put bad news to the king’s table.” After his return to the presidency in 2012, Putin became hostile to criticism.
This is evident by a decrease in the circle of trusted individuals and away the most liberal and open-minded former teammates such as Alexei Kudrin.
This is evident in the field of intelligence. Many officers of the GRU said that the agency thrives only because of talent Igor Sergunov flatterer. The source said C: “He knew how to seduce, posing with a formidable soldier.” My other companion was even more precise: “Sergun always adrift. He chose his words, sensing the mood of the interlocutor. He even wrote a good phrase in the notebook, just in case. ”
Many attribute the relatively low SVR status with cold relations between its head Mikhail Fradkov and Putin, as well as with the slow adaptation to changing circumstances departments. During the discussion of the use of social conservatism in Europe to create the SVR instability expressed doubts about this strategy, while the FSB showed great enthusiasm and apply it.
To get to “the office”
To get to “the office” and to influence policy, heads of departments shall not carry out their direct responsibilities – to communicate the facts without regard to consequences. They need to embellish and adjust to the President, and otherwise – risk losing their trust. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the flowering of the FSB. Office briefings, even on foreign affairs, which are not included in its management. And this is only the beginning. One Western diplomat suggested that Putin’s belief in the absurd conspiracy theory, as in the case of the Maidan, originates in the briefings of the FSB, “which obviously drew the information from the yellow rags, not from trusted sources.”
Of course, wrongly assume that all decisions are made by Putin. He is involved in dealing with some particular issues, especially in the allocation of resources, but in many areas it just sets the general parameters, and waits for him to give a decision. It creates a marketplace of ideas and choose your favorite. Agencies can use it, arranging discussions on various issues.
Sometimes they act through friendly legislators who proposed laws, initiating the discussion beneficial for the institutions 48 . FSB often uses the services of Irina Spring, a former prosecutor and member of the Duma’s security committee. It is, for example, put forward a bill that allowed the FSB to shoot at women and children in certain circumstances 49 . Each department has its own hand-parliamentarian – from the head of the faction “United Russia” Vladimir Vasiliev to the former journalist and friend of the Prosecutor General Alexander Hinstein.
Think tanks and media
Special services also influence public opinion through the media and independent (sometimes only on paper) analytical centers. At the FSB, for example, has his own Twitter account and to work with the media department. It is known that the FSB close relationship with the tabloid LifeNews, which she uses to harm the reputation of his enemies. Gennady Gudkov and Boris Nemtsov suffered from publishing video with a hidden camera and other materials of questionable content 50 . FSB publishes even through the intermediary of the Public Council of its own magazine “FSB: Pros and Cons” 51 . Usually, the answer to this question – “yes”.
Agencies such as the SVR and GRU have no such access to the public (except for vigorous scenes of special forces in the army kanale “Star”). They stimulate the channels to make films about the exploits of Russian intelligence – historical and contemporary. They also support the analytical centers, which play is poorly understood role in the political process.
One of the outstanding examples known to us – the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS), headed by former SVR officer, Lieutenant-General Leonid Reshetnikov. This is an expensive organization with 12 branches, its magazine and a channel on YouTube «RISS-TV». And while the institution has ceased to be a part of the RAF in 2009, the source F describes it as «PR-department offices.” Since his warnings to join NATO against Sweden and Finland and ending with curses against the “terrorists” of Ukraine – Institute always keeps up with the official position and analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Service 52 .
There are a variety of little-known political research centers – from the Institute of Strategic Studies and Analysis, headed by a former KGB major general Vagif Huseynov, to the Institute for Policy Studies, in a close relationship with a number of special services and headed by Markov, Sergei, for his views have become persona non grata in Estonia and Ukraine. Presidential Administration reports often orders from these think tanks, adding small recommendations for the implementation of the order.
Conclusions and recommendations
Next categorization system used by many generals behind the scenes 53 :
“I share my officers into four classes: smart, hardworking, lazy and stupid. Every officer always has two of these qualities. ”
“Someone who is smart and hardworking, I am sending to the General Staff. Under certain circumstances, lazy and stupid, too, can benefit. Clever and lazy you can appoint to senior management positions: He has the mental stability and clarity of mind for making difficult decisions. But if a person is stupid and industrious, to get rid of it immediately: it is too dangerous. ”
Similarly, it can be classified and secret services. They are aggressive and defensive, well-controlled and uncontrolled. Poorly controlled defense agencies are not harmful in times of peace, but do not protect in times of war. Well-controlled defense ministry will provide a reliable shield against the enemy.
Aggressive become a formidable weapon, if uncontrollable, but if not – then they inflict great damage.
With regard to the aggressiveness of the Russian special services no doubts. The more important question: how well they are managed – not only in their daily work, but also in the performance of tasks and data mining affecting world politics? How well they fit into a broader strategy?
Ukrainian conflict has given us the opportunity to look into the matter. In the Crimea and Donbas Russian secret services worked perfectly at the tactical level – a precise indication of the positions Ukrainian forces, the willingness of officers to fight when government troops were preparing to attack. Moreover, they adopted a series of effective measures – from terrorist and hacker attacks to the disinformation campaigns and political gimmicks.
On the other hand, the lack of political and economic intelligence was evident before and during the campaign.Either the security services did not expect that the West will act more decisively after the Georgian war of 2008, or they have not told their concerns to management, or it they were not heard. Either way, this intelligence failure was not an isolated case, it points to a serious problem in the system.
Intelligence agencies, which are now taking active measures in the West, may seem effective, but from the point of view they are disastrously short-sighted strategy. Russia did not create the tectonic pressure that is now tearing Europe apart (the phenomenon of nationalism to the refugee crisis), but she gladly uses it for its own purposes. In the long term, it hardly will lead to the division of Europe and the rule of Russia. Take for sanctions or not, Russia is in decline and destabilized by the day faster. Moreover, Russia’s aggressive actions alienated her from such countries as Germany, NATO stepped up and destroyed what little remained of its former influence.
And this is the irony. Putin received the intelligence community, which he wanted: a powerful, fierce, many-headed Hydra, and obedient. But he and his dream of reviving Russia as a great power become a real victim of the uncontrollable monster. Intelligence agencies play up to his fantasies rather than to inform and expand his vision of the world, as befits a good exploration.
When the Hydra’s heads do not bite each other, they support through their actions the image of Russia – a savage and thieves at best – force, which does not comply with international etiquette, and at worst – unpredictable threat, which can not reach an understanding. According to the source E: “The more engaged and” productive “special services, the higher the price for it, we will sooner or later pay.”
Now the main task of Europe – to prevent the invasion of the Russian special services, making it impractical and too costly for Moscow.
Recommendation 1: The hybrid defense against hybrid threats
Leaving aside the debate about whether it is possible to call Russia’s aggression “hybrid war”, it becomes clear that it does not overwhelm conventional military means.
This requires a “hybrid protection” 54 . It is necessary to begin by addressing governance challenges, not least with the resolution of disputes, which allows Moscow to play on differences within Europe, from Greece to the alienation of the refugee crisis in Germany.
It is also extremely important to develop a counter-intelligence and data sharing, especially in small countries with limited resources. NATO members set a goal of spending more than 2% of GDP on defense, but it should not come at the expense of counterintelligence. For countries that are faced with a particularly aggressive operations of the Russian special services, such as the Baltic states, counterintelligence should be paramount. Military support can provide other countries, but to fight with the Russian intelligence and information operations are only the Balts.
Similarly, the countries in which the main challenge is the penetration of capital, cyber attacks, or even Russian propaganda, should pay more attention to protect it against these threats. Perhaps the improvement in the financial control bodies and the increasing number of financial experts in the UK where the police will bring more benefits than investment in the army.
Recommendation 2: zero tolerance for the Russian invasion
The debate about how tough and you need to publicly respond to the Russian intelligence operations, are carried out constantly, especially given Moscow’s commitment to the principle of “tit for tat”. In today’s political climate, Europe must not become hostage to fear or hope to improve relations. They must meet openly and harshly to such intervention, without fear of consequences. Estonia has already started to apply this practice, delivering justice, and spies publicly voicing their names, instead of quietly send them home 55 .
Europe also stands to punish accomplices of Russian operations. For example, if open an illegal intelligence agent working in the Russian company, it must pay the penalty. There were cases when the news agencies provide cover for spies, as was the case with the “RIA Novosti” and Leonid Sviridov, who was brought to trial for having pretended to be a journalist in Polshe56. If there is enough evidence to send a man out of the country, people or organizations who helped him, should also be punished.
This is not only to denounce their political message (now the Kremlin believes that Europe is more tolerant of his spies than the US) – but also a blow to the particular department and its allies. Special services make resources and prestige through the achievement of results and losing them when defeated. Carrying out risky operations said that they believe that the stakes are high and the risks are minimal. By changing this ratio and convince them that aggressive behavior will cost them to manage, European governments may force them to start acting much more cautiously. And, although the Kremlin determines the general policy of the state, tactical decisions take command of the security services, and they can be influenced.
Recommendation 3: follow the money and starve Hydra hunger
The more Russian operations rely on active measures, the more they demand money. European governments should pay attention to the possibility of the Russian intelligence service (as well as the Mafia, embezzlers and tax evaders) freely transfer funds, concealing their sources. This question can not be solved for a long time, but now that it is a problem of national security concerns, things can change.
Countries such as Latvia, in which the financial system for a long time to penetrate the Russian money of dubious origin, making great strides in the fight against this problem. However, smaller countries such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, keeping the impressive volumes of Russian money, should make financial security a major goal. Most of these funds may well be legitimate or even not related to intelligence, but the free movement of funds by the Kremlin – is still a big problem. Large financial sites such as London, Frankfurt and Luxembourg, should strengthen supervision of the financial sector.
Recommendation 4: understand the beast
European authorities have extensive knowledge of Russian intelligence operations. Much information is transmitted through NATO and the EU, but the government must work to expand cooperation. However, though many, and it is clear how the Russian intelligence work, about why she is doing and how it affects the policy, few know.
This is nobody’s fault. Counterintelligence is struggling with the threat on the ground, while on the international policy experts are focused on their own problems. Bearing in mind how important the security services for Russian geopolitics, it is necessary not only to understand how they work, but also to explore how far they are separated, they compete as they are used.
European authorities should focus their analytical power in the political environment in which the Russian intelligence services operate. This will not only open up new tactical possibilities, such as the ability to use the rivalry between departments, but will provide us with another source of knowledge about Russian politics. Kremlin – a rational player, but he can only use the information available to him for decision. The better Europe will examine the sources, limits and nature of the information, the more accurate it will be able to anticipate the actions of Russia.
Recommendation 5: feel the balance
Despite all the above, it is not a new Cold War. Russian does not represent for the West serious geopolitical threat in the long term, and European governments are already worth thinking about the restoration of relations with Russia after Putin’s departure. There are still many problems – such as the recruitment of European citizens in Russia 57 .Among the Russian students, businessmen, tourists and workers in Europe will inevitably operatives hiding the Russian special services. But they are also an important resource for Europe not to recruit (although not do without it), but as cultural contacts, undermining the Kremlin’s attempts to give the aggression of a defensive campaign against the hostile West.
Russia – fading power of the average level, which was achieved with the help of the disproportionate impact of the concentration of resources, political control and willingness to break the rules of international conduct. But not for long. Russia’s inability to manage their own security services said that the whole system can not survive for long under the current restrictions.
Europe must find a balance between the protection of Russian intelligence, deterrence Kremlin adventurism and exclusion of the Russian people. Despite all the propaganda, the Russians are still culturally associated with the West, and in the near future, it is likely to want to achieve a social, legal, economic and political progress.
Abbreviations
FAGCI – Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information
FSB – Federal Security Service
Federal Drug Control Service – the Russian Federal Service for Drug Control
FSO – Federal Security Service
GRU – Main Intelligence Directorate
KGB – Committee for State Security
MIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs
NAC – National Anti-Terrorist Committee
SBP – Presidential Security Service
SC – Investigative Committee
FIS – Foreign Intelligence Service
Methodological note
Conduct research on intelligence and policy in the best case – is not easy, especially in today’s Russia. In addition to public sources, this report is based on conversations with the people that serve or had served in the Russian intelligence had any experience with them. For obvious reasons we can not name them. We can only give general information on the activities of the six (AF sources) of them that are particularly helped in creating this report.
Source A
