Luther Martin feared that the Constitution was not a blueprint for liberty, but rather a framework for centralized control that threatened state sovereignty.
He hammered this point home in Genuine Information, criticizing unequal representation in Congress, condemning an executive branch designed to accumulate unchecked power, and exposing impeachment as a flawed safeguard that would ultimately reinforce executive power.
DANGER OF UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION
Martin argued forcefully against unequal representation in Congress, insisting that “one State ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous.”
He further contended that unequal representation was not characteristic of a federal system but rather a hallmark of a centralized national government, where concentrated power posed a grave threat to liberty.
“An adequate representation of States in a federal government, consists in each State having an equal voice, either in person or by its representative, in every thing which relates to the federal government.”
Instead of the structure proposed by the Constitution, Martin was an advocate of retaining the system of representation under the Articles of Confederation where “in determining questions in the united states, in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.” This underscored his belief that only equal representation in Congress could preserve state independence.
Martin stressed that a genuinely federal system required every state to have an equal share in both lawmaking and its implementation.
“in a federal government over States equally free, sovereign, and independent, every State ought to have an equal share in making the federal laws or regulations, in deciding upon them, and in carrying them into execution”
THE TYRANNY OF LARGER STATES
Martin warned that the proposed system undermined this ideal by concentrating power within a few large states, denying smaller states “an equal voice in the legislature” and placing key appointments in the hands of “the executive, the judges, and the other officers of government.”
He further warned that without equal representation, smaller states would be entirely at the mercy of larger ones – effectively enslaved to their will.
“By giving one State, or one or two States, more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such State or States, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put, of individuals, when one has more votes than the others.”
Martin illustrated his concern with an example: if 36 representatives were required for a quorum, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania alone would hold 33 votes.
He warned this would give those three states “much more than equal power and influence in making the laws and regulations, which are to affect this continent.” It would also provide them “a moral certainty of preventing any laws or regulations which they disapprove, although they might be thought ever so necessary by a great majority of the States.”
SECESSION OPTION
Although proponents argued that the Senate was meant to secure state interests, Martin lamented the absence of a recall power for senators, pointing out that they would be “absolutely independent of their States,” throughout their entire six-year terms “without any bond or tie between them.”
Martin warned that this complete independence would leave states vulnerable to unchecked legislative overreach.
“During that time, they may join in measures ruinous and destructive to their States, even such as should totally annihilate their State governments, and their States cannot recall them, nor exercise any control over them.”
Martin was so opposed to this system of “unequal votes” that at the Philadelphia Convention, he suggested secession from the union – “letting a separation take place if [states] desired it.” He declared “I had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any other principle than an equality of votes” in the second branch.
APPOINTMENT POWER
Luther Martin feared that the executive branch would devolve into an elective monarchy, with the presidential appointment process serving as a primary mechanism for consolidating power.
Even at the Philadelphia Convention, he observed strong opposition to granting the President broad appointment powers.
“To that part of this article also, which gives the President a right to nominate, and, with the consent of the Senate, to appoint all the officers, civil and military, of the United States, there was considerable opposition.”
Martin argued that nomination was, in effect, the same as appointment, since the President’s choice would almost always be confirmed. As he noted, “It was said, that the person who nominates will always in reality appoint.”
He further warned that “this was giving the President a power and influence, which, together with the other powers bestowed upon him, would place him above all restraint or control.”
Martin expressed fear that the President’s power might become quasi-monarchical – that his continued authority would depend solely on his personal moderation.
Beyond the issue of concentrated power, Martin feared the appointment system would create a vast network of loyalists throughout the government, effectively forming a private bureaucracy “devoted to his interest, and ready to support his ambitious views.”
He further cautioned that the President’s power over nominations would erode legislative integrity, as members of Congress, hoping for appointments, would fall under his influence, warning there would be “no possible security for the integrity and independence of the legislature, but that they are most unduly placed under the influence of the President, and exposed to bribery and corruption.”
For Martin, this was more than a flaw – it was a fundamental structural defect that would compromise the balance of power, making the legislature subordinate to the very executive it was meant to check.
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER THE MILITARY
Highlighting another avenue for concentrating executive power, he observed that the military would not be exempt from this presidential power and control and “may be increased without restraint as to numbers, the officers of which, from the highest to the lowest, are all to be appointed by him, and dependent on his will and pleasure, and commanded by him in person, will, of course, be subservient to his wishes, and ready to execute his commands”
Furthermore, Martin pointed out that, “the militia also are entirely subjected to his orders.”
Martin concluded with a stark warning: these powers would enable the President “to become a king in name, as well as in substance, and establish himself in office not only for his own life, but even, if he chooses, to have that authority perpetuated to his family.”
This stark warning underscored Martin’s fear of a future in which the executive branch would evolve into an elected monarchy.
VETO POWER
Martin also recorded several objections raised at the Convention concerning the veto power delegated to the President.
He argued that extending a veto (negative) power to the President would be both unprecedented and dangerous in the American context. By comparing the American President unfavorably to a British monarch, he argued that such power would place the President above effective legislative restraint.
First, he noted, “There were some who thought no good reason could be assigned for giving the President a negative of any kind.”
Next, he pointed out that existing checks – through the interplay between the two branches and the composition of the Senate – would make a presidential negative redundant.
“Upon the principle of a check to the proceedings of the legislature, it was said to be unnecessary; that the two branches having a control over each other’s proceedings, and the Senate being chosen by the State legislatures, and being composed of members from the different States, there would always be a sufficient guard against measures being hastily or rashly adopted”
Martin contended that since “the President was not likely to have more wisdom or integrity than the senators, nor better insight into state interests, there was no justification for granting him additional veto power.
“That the President was not likely to have more wisdom or integrity than the senators, or any of them, or to better know or consult the interest of the States, than any member of the Senate, so as to be entitled to a negative on that principle”
Some supporters of the veto power invoked British constitutional precedent during the debates, but Martin noted that those arguments were ultimately dismissed as inapplicable.
“And as to the precedent from the British constitution, (for we were eternally troubled with arguments and precedents from the British government,) it was said it would not apply.”
Martin further contrasted the British model with the American system, arguing that while a monarch’s negative power was justified to preserve hereditary rights, such authority was inappropriate for the President, whose role is subordinate to the legislature and “was no more than an officer of government.”
He reiterated that although some delegates at the Convention argued the negative “ought not to be of so great extent as that given by the system,” the final decision granted the President extensive veto power – a decision Martin believed would disrupt the balance between the branches, “since his single voice is to countervail the whole of either branch, and any number less than two thirds of the other.”
FLAWS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Martin also expressed concern about the election of the President, warning that it was further evidence of centralized control.
He pointed out that “those who wished as far as possible to establish a national instead of a federal government, made repeated attempts to have the President chosen by the people at large,” noting that such a proposal was rejected no less than three times during the Convention.
However, Martin said he wasn’t satisfied with the final plan either, noting that “the large States have a very undue influence in the appointment of the President.”
He further explained that there was almost no scenario within the process for electing the President in which smaller states could have an equal say, “Except where two persons shall have an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole number of electors, (a case very unlikely to happen,) or where no person has a majority of the votes.”
In short, equal representation among states in presidential elections was virtually impossible. Only in the rare event of an electoral tie or the absence of a majority winner would states have an equal say – and even then, such scenarios were highly unlikely.
He continued, highlighting how, even in those unlikely scenarios, the process still favored large states.
“In these instances the House of Representatives are to choose by ballot, each State having an equal voice; but they are confined, in the last instance, to the five who have the greatest number of votes, which gives the largest States a very unequal chance of having the President chosen under their nomination.”
Thus, even when equal state voting occurred, it was limited to a pool of candidates already shaped by the influence of the most populous states, further marginalizing smaller ones. Martin’s arguments reveal a profound fear that the executive branch would devolve into a tool for centralized, monarchical power through expansive nomination power, far-reaching veto power, and a skewed electoral process.
This underscored his broader warning that the proposed system risked subverting the balance of power essential to a free government.
IMPEACHMENT: A SAFEGUARD OR ILLUSION?
Martin dismissed the impeachment process not as a genuine safeguard, but as a sham – a political charade incapable of restraining presidential power.
He warned that the impeachment process was inherently flawed because a Senate “constituted as a privy council to the President” would lack independence and thus fail to effectively check executive misconduct.
“It is probable many of its leading and influential members may have advised or concurred in the very measures for which he may be impeached; the members of the Senate also are by the system, placed as unduly under the influence of, and dependent upon the President, as the members of the other branch, since they also are appointable to offices, and cannot obtain them but through the favor of the President.”
Furthermore, since senators were equally eligible for presidential appointments, Martin argued that this created a system in which those meant to hold the President accountable were beholden to him.
He further warned that the members of the House, tasked with initiating impeachment, would be compromised by their ability to receive appointments to lucrative offices through the President’s patronage.
With both the House of Representatives and the Senate vulnerable to presidential patronage, Martin warned that those responsible for holding the President accountable would instead be beholden to him.
Martin also pointed out the extraordinary difficulty of securing a conviction, noting that requiring a two-thirds Senate majority made the impeachment process heavily biased in the President’s favor.
He pointed out that the President’s ability to ensure his safety by cultivating loyalty among senators through appointments or other means of influence effectively rendered the impeachment process an illusion – essentially designed to placate concerns about executive overreach while offering little real protection against it.
Moreover, Martin feared the potential for abuse of the impeachment process itself. He suggested that a corrupt executive could use the mechanism to punish political adversaries, especially if they held positions within the government. By controlling a pliant Congress and judiciary, Martin warned, an ambitious President could turn the very safeguards of the Constitution into tools of oppression.
In Martin’s view, the impeachment provisions of the Constitution were emblematic of the broader structural flaws in the proposed system. Rather than serving as a robust check on executive power, they would only reinforce the dangerous concentration of authority in the hands of the President and those loyal to him. In Martin’s view, this was yet another example of how the Constitution paved the way for centralized control and the erosion of liberty.
CONCENTRATED POWER, ENDANGERED LIBERTY
Luther Martin’s incisive critiques reveal his deep concern that the new Constitution would concentrate power in ways that threatened both state sovereignty and the liberties of the people.
He argued that unequal representation in Congress would leave smaller states at the mercy of larger states, subjecting them to the domination of disproportionate power. Equally alarming, Martin warned that the expansive presidential appointment and veto powers would transform the executive branch into a de facto monarchy – one in which a single individual could build a vast, loyal bureaucracy and rule without effective checks.
Moreover, he denounced impeachment as a flawed safeguard at best – one easily subverted by a President protected through patronage networks.
Luther Martin refused to sugarcoat what he considered the dangers of the new Constitution. He warned that such a system wasn’t designed to protect freedom; it was designed to serve the powerful few.
His no-holds-barred critiques challenge us even today: if we allow centralization to keep growing, our liberty will be the price we pay.
The post Luther Martin’s Warning: Executive Power, Unequal Representation, and the Illusion of Impeachment first appeared on Tenth Amendment Center.