Britain’s Secret War: The Conflict in Dhofar
Introduction
With the last 20 years of British involvement at different levels in Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria, it is easy to overlook the most successful of all British Middle East interventions since the end of WW2.
The Setting
By 1966 in the Middle East, the British had withdrawn from Southern Yemen following the Republican victory in the Civil War, and finally from Aden in 1967. Thereafter, the Republic of Yemen quickly became a communist stronghold, and their eyes turned eastward to the Sultanate of Oman.
Situated at the southern end of the Arabian Gulf (then called the Persian Gulf), the Sultanate of Oman controlled the strategic bottleneck of the gulf at the Straits of Hormoz, through which passed 85 percent of the West’s oil tankers en route to their destinations—a point well appreciated by the communist bloc.
Oman itself was about as backward as any country could possibly be. It was poor, and ruled by a Sultan who was medieval in his attitude to progress. Despite the recent discovery of oil in commercial quantities, he was in no hurry to modernise his country. Outside of the capital Muscat, there were no roads, no hospitals, no schools, no electricity, no piped water and no authority other than the Sultan. Anyone who left the country for education was not allowed to return.
The city of Salalah is situated in the southern province of Dhofar, separated from Muscat by 500 miles of waterless desert; the Omani ruler Said bin Taimur had remained there for the previous 15 years.
The eastern part of Dhofar is dry mountainous country, spreading westward to Yemen. To the north the desert stretches out into the Empty Quarter, and the eastern coastline continues for 500 arid miles to the gulf. All in all, it is one of the most inhospitable places on the planet.
However, by a freak of nature, one small section of Dhofar is unlike the rest of the country. Sweeping around the main coastal city of Salalah in an arc about 40 miles long and 20 miles deep, is an area of mountains (jebel) that catches the moist winds of the annual Indian monsoon. For three months of the year, from July to the end of September, the jebel is shrouded with mist and cloud, the resulting moisture enabling grass, trees and other vegetation to flourish. This is the home of the “incense” trees from biblical times.
On these mountains the local tribesmen lived, tending their crops and herds of cattle. They were, however, in dispute with the Sultan in his palace in Salalah. The origins of the dispute are unclear, but by the late ‘60s the Sultan had banned all trade with the coast, and the jebel tribesmen had taken up arms against him. They joined together in the formation of the Dhofar Liberation Front, and looked toward Yemen for help.
The scene was a textbook case for communist infiltration and manipulation. From their base at Hauf in South Yemen, communist cadres moved among the jebel tribes bringing weapons, spreading their ideology and taking tribal leaders and young men away for courses in Russia and China. Their overall aim was to first take Dhofar, and then the rest of Oman to control the Straits of Hormoz and dominate the West’s oil supplies.
Nowadays, since the collapse of the USSR in 1990 (a generation ago), it is difficult to understand the West’s fear of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Communism was seen as the Taliban, Al Qaida and ISIS rolled into one. Over 90 percent of the West’s military budget was spent in “defending” itself against the communists and their influence. By the end of 1969, there were an estimated 3,000 armed communist insurgents on the jebel in Dhofar.
The Sultan had an army of nearly 3,000 all ranks, which was rapidly reforming and modernizing to meet the threat from the Dhofar Liberation Front.
Outside Involvement
Unlike the last 20 years of military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, at the end of the 1960s, employment prospects for the “soldier of fortune” were rather bleak. The previous decade had been a good one, especially in Africa, with plenty of employment in the Congo, Biafra, Mozambique and Angola and training opportunities in Zambia and Kenya. There had been other opportunities such as in North Yemen and Far East Asia, but by 1970 even the CIA was no longer recruiting “specials.” Many of the African mercenaries had come from Rhodesia, and returned there to enlist to fight against the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) rebels.
The British had maintained presence in the Arabian Gulf since the end of WW2, but by 1969 was closing its bases in Bahrain and Sharja. Its local force, he Trucial Oman Scouts, ceased to exist as such, and many of the Gulf States (emirates) raised their own forces, such as the Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF), the Dubai Defence Force (DDF) and the Ras al Khaima Mobile Force (RKMF). Well paid jobs were available again, especially for ex-British Army officers and NCOs.
Unfortunately, this recruitment did not help the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces (SAF), which lost 20 contract officers and eight pilots to the emirates the same year – nearly 30 percent of their force. So, they set about recruiting in earnest by placing advertisements in various journals and by word of mouth. Suitably qualified ex-soldiers were required to serve in infantry battalions and would be granted commissions by the Sultan in the rank of captain. The pay was £2,600 (U$ 4,900) per year free of tax (about double the British Army pay), plus 68 days leave per year with airfare to home country. At the same time, the Sultan’s Armed Forces started to expand and to buy new equipment.
The British Government wanted to help Oman, but was only too aware that in Malaya it had taken the presence of 40,000 British troops 12 years to finally defeat 3,000 communist guerrillas. They had also witnessed America’s ever increasing involvement in Vietnam, and with the escalating terrorist activity in Northern Ireland they did not wish to commit serving British personnel to Oman. So they encouraged the increased use of mercenaries, politely referred to as “contract” officers. By 1975, contract officers (including pilots) comprised nearly half the force.
This gave rise to a unique situation in that contract officers were serving under regular British Army officers and regular British Army officers were taking orders from contract officers.
The Wherewithal
To anyone who has served in Iraq or Afghanistan, the level of military technology early in the Dhofar conflict would seem primitive, at about the same level as WW2. Initially, there were very few maps of the area, and those that did exist consisted mainly of grid lines with very little topographical information. There was no body armor. There were no satellites or satellite navigation, and all moves and positioning were done by compass work and dead reckoning. There were no drones or laser-guided bombs, and no aerial photos. There were no night vision aids or video cameras. There were no mobile phones or digital radios. Communication over one mile was generally by high frequency (HF) radio, with administrative messages being sent and received in Morse code. Short range communication was by single channel walkie-talkie (with everyone on the same channel, those with the most powerful transmission got through). Ground-to-air communication was by SARBE air/sea emergency rescue radios.
The soldiers’ dress was of khaki cotton and webbing equipment was British 37 pattern of WW2. Camouflage dress was achieved by dabbing shirts and trousers with green and gray dye. Footwear consisted of brown canvas PT shoes.
Until 1970, the SAF was armed with .303 Lee Enfield No. 4 bolt-action rifles, .303 Bren guns and a few WW2 Vickers heavy machine guns. The insurgents, called the adoo, were well armed with the typical communist bloc weapons of the time: SKS rifles for militia, AK47 for cadres, PKM and RPD light machine guns, 82mm mortars and later shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers (RPGs).
In 1970, the old .303s were replaced by the 7.62mm FN FAL. Initially there was resistance from many of the soldiers. Although they appreciated the increased firepower of the FN, the battle sights only went up to 600 meters, whereas the AKS and AK47s of the enemy went up to 1300 meters! A few firepower demonstrations soon convinced them that the 7.62mm (.308 Winchester) round was more powerful than that of the enemy, and so the FN was accepted. SAF also adopted the 7.62 FN MAG as well as 7.62mm Brens, and what was to prove to be their most effective infantry support weapon the Canadian L16 81mm mortar.
Lack of electricity meant that frozen meat was unavailable, so it was not unusual to see an army position with a herd of goats attached to it. The remainder of the rations was based upon rice, flour and lentils. Later, supplies of tinned meat and fish became available.
Of major importance was the air support provided by the Sultan’s Air Force (SOAF), the base of which was an airfield just outside Salalah. SOAF consisted of a squadron of BAC Strikemaster jets armed with 7.62mm MGs, rockets and bombs, a helicopter squadron with Bell UH-1 Hueys and Shorts Skyvan STOL freight planes. Nearly two-thirds of the pilots were contract officers.
Daytime temperature was 35–40 degrees Centigrade, dropping to 5 degrees at night. Those who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan will be familiar with these unpleasant diurnal changes.
The fighting itself was on a very personal level, most operations being at patrol, platoon or sometimes company level. The terrain could change suddenly from open rolling grassland, to deep, steep-sided wadis, full of bush and scrub. During the monsoon season, visibility could change from infinity to five yards in seconds!
In July 1970, the Sultan’s son Qabus bin Said ousted his father in a palace coup, and declared himself ruler of Oman. This was a popular move and brought about immediate changes, as the new Sultan was prepared to modernize his country. In Dhofar, many of the original insurgents were happy to accept the promises of the new Sultan and were keen to surrender to the government forces; but others were less convinced or sought to further the communist aims. The insurgents changed their name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), in the hope of attracting additional support. They also began a reign of terror over the local population to prevent further defections to the Sultan.
Surrendered enemy personnel (SEPs) were largely formed into tribal groups, called firqas, which were rearmed and turned to fight against their former communist comrades. They were mostly trained and led by members of the elite British SAS, who to this day have never officially been recognized for their role in the conflict. Later, the main role of the firqa was in the policing and protection of their own tribal areas to prevent the communists from returning. The conflict was unusual in that holding ground was important. It had to be kept secure in order for development to take place.
With the advent of the new Sultan came an increased provision for the armed services and a commitment to end the conflict with a victory as soon as possible. The overall general strategy was for an aggressive offensive against the adoo, combined with a simultaneous expansive ‘hearts and minds ‘campaign, the latter being a new idea at the time.
The communist control and supplies came into Dhofar from the area around Hauf in South Yemen, so it was decided to commence operations in the eastern areas of the jebel, at the farthest end of the supply chain. At the same time, a line of blocking points was to be established some 40 miles westward, on a north–south axis, to prevent the flow of supplies.
Water was the dominating factor for both sides, and prior to receiving the first helicopters in 1970, incursions into the mountains of more than 24 hours duration meant being accompanied by donkeys to carry water and other supplies, with an accompanying lack of secrecy. Once the helicopters arrived, the army was able to gain the initiative to move in any direction and later be resupplied. The army was also able to move in and sit on the known waterholes, denying them to the adoo.
Some of the fiercest fighting during 1971 was over these water supplies. The army wasted no time in bringing in engineers to drill for water, thus providing supplies for local civilians and guarded by the firqas.
Three major operations – Jaguar, Amatol and Cyclops – were carried out in the eastern region between October 1971 and March 1972, so that by the end of 1972 the area was clear of adoo. This success was due mainly because the advent of helicopters meant that SAF could remain operating on the jebel for months rather than days, and the adoo soon became short of supplies.
Civil aid teams moved into the area with veterinarians for the animals, doctors, school teachers and engineers to drill for water. A local shop was built to provide supplies at subsidized prices.
The air force base was frequently attacked by the adoo, so it was ringed with small forts made of sand-filled oil drums and known as “Hedgehogs” to keep the adoo at bay. Later the base was protected by further positions called “Dianas” located on the mountains.
In April 1972, SAF launched Operation Simba, which seized high ground in the far west of Dhofar, only a few kilometers from the Yemen border and completely dominated the adoo supply lines into Dhofar. This move brought some international notice, with the result that the King of Jordan and the Shah of Iran – both ardent anti-communists – offered aid to the Sultan.
Things were looking bright for SAF. However, on 19 July 1972, adoo from both the central and eastern regions gathered for a massed attack on the coastal village of Mirbat. Nearly 200 adoo attacked early in the morning, but in a five-hour battle they were beaten off, mainly by a nine-man squad of British SAS. Because of the secrecy surrounding the Dhofar conflict, this battle was not reported at the time.
The Battle of Mirbat, Operation Jaguar and Operation Simba became the principal turning points of the war. By the end of 1973, the balance has turned in favor of the Sultan’s forces. The adoo had lost 465 dead and a further 400 as SEPs, most of whom had joined the firqa.
Nevertheless it was still anyone’s game and General Tim Creasey, the Commander SAF at that time, is quoted as saying, “The outlook was black. For the enemy it was difficult to see how he could win, but he could possibly. For ourselves it was difficult to see how we could lose, but we could possibly.”
End Note
The conflict was to continue for another three years, with further casualties on both sides, until final victory for the Sultan’s forces in 1976. The conflict remains almost unknown today, and yet, in view of the limited resources, was probably the most successful anti-communist war ever fought.
No distinction, other than pay, was made between serving British officers and those on contract. The planned staffing was three officers to each company of 120 Omani soldiers, but this ratio was rarely achievable, and frequently there was only one. In such situations it can be readily imagined that it required very special qualities of leadership. It was recognized that good leadership by example, combined with trust and respect for their values and respect for and belief in the new Sultan Qabus, was the greatest motivation for the soldiers. The officers spoke local Arabic and were therefore able to communicate, not only with their soldiers but also the local population, endorsing the “hearts and minds” campaign. Any examination of the Dhofar conflict has to recognize that a major contributing factor toward victory over the communist insurgents was the overwhelmingly friendly and trusting relationship established between the officers and NCOs, and the Omani soldiers and civilians. The mutual respect and affection that existed between the officers and NCOs and their Omani soldiers carries on to this day.
For further information on the Dhofar war, check out the DVD Operation Oman. This contains original war footage, together with interviews with people who took part in the conflict. See www.Operationoman.com