In the 1990s the citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) endured a devastating famine. Poor economic planning and structural problems left the country unable to feed its people, resulting in an estimated 1 million deaths. Floods and droughts in the mid-1990s provided the regime with an external source of blame. The DPRK had long been a recipient of fraternal assistance, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, but in 1995 launched its first wide-scale international appeal. In the decades since, the DPRK has hosted at least 180 international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in both humanitarian and development aid.
Humanitarian aid intends to reduce human suffering and meet basic needs. Examples include food aid, supplementary nutritional aid, medical supplies and personnel, and water and sanitation programs. Humanitarian aid is thus often associated with emergencies, either natural or man-made, though it can also be necessary in cases of prolonged need. Development assistance has a wider remit, and is generally aimed at helping a state develop its infrastructure, governance, economy, and other capacities. This is an admittedly simple overview, but one that serves its purpose for examining the DPRK context.
Within the humanitarian and development fields, there are several approaches to how the two types of assistance should interact
Within the humanitarian and development fields, there are several approaches to how the two types of assistance should interact. One approach sees humanitarian and development aid as a continuum. Humanitarian aid provides life-saving help in the aftermath of a crisis, and is followed by efforts to rebuild and reconstruct. Then, development assistance can further these efforts to strengthen systems.
Critics of the continuum approach say it is too simple and idealistic. Instead, some advocate a contiguum where humanitarian and development aid overlap and exist within the same space simultaneously. Programs can respond more closely to community needs and operate under the reality of diverse situations inside a single country. In the DPRK, the current situation falls mostly under the contiguum idea – though this has not always been the case.
TWO DECADES OF AID
The problem leading to the 1995 appeals, according to the DPRK authorities, was that natural disasters left citizens without enough food. By 1996, at least 45 IOs and NGOs had begun humanitarian projects in the DPRK to bring food, medical supplies, and other basic needs into the country. The organizations ranged from large IOs, like the World Food Program (WFP), to smaller NGOs like the American group Christian Friends of Korea. Some groups maintained a residential presence in the DPRK while others attempted to fill humanitarian needs through shipments and regular visits.
By 1999, 15 European NGOs had permanent full-time staff in the DPRK. All 15 worked in humanitarian sectors including food aid, medical supplies and support, material assistance, energy and heating, water safety, sanitation and physical rehabilitation for the handicapped. Some also had projects with a greater emphasis on sustainability, like Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) of Switzerland and their bakery in Pyongyang, or Doctors Without Borders’ training of healthcare workers in Anju. Non-residential groups and IOs followed a similar pattern. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s the scope of aid in the DPRK did have elements of development, but largely focused on humanitarian needs. It seemed as though the continuum of assistance was at work.
Perhaps it was 2005’s improved harvest, or perhaps it was simply that the DPRK, a vocal supporter of self-reliance, was embarrassed of a decade of humanitarian aid – whatever the reason, the authorities switched focus. In 2005, the DPRK attempted to garner more development assistance by expelling humanitarian groups. Three residential NGOs left: ADRA, CESVI of Italy, PMU Interlife of Sweden. A fourth, Agape International, left and later returned as a non-residential NGO with a focus on sustainable energy. Some non-resident NGOs cut off or changed their programming, such as Canadian Foodgrains Bank, which took a three-year hiatus from 2005 to 2008. IOs were also affected, notably the WFP. Several years earlier, the WFP was a partner in the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection Plan (AREP). AREP was meant to address some of the structural issues in DPRK agricultural planning, but the program struggled with funding issues and regime scepticism towards change. In spite of – or perhaps because of – AREP, in the fall of 2005 the DPRK demanded that the WFP end food aid and focus on development work. The WFP took several months of hiatus and negotiated a return in 2006 with a program one-third the size of their previous operation.
Photo by Eric Lafforgue
The DPRK has not attempted such a bold move toward exclusively development assistance again, but they have welcomed a larger range of projects. Singapore’s Chosun Exchange runs workshops on topics like entrepreneurship and women in business, Germany’s Hanns-Seidel Foundation conducts business and agriculture training, and the German group TOGETHER-Hamhung supports training programs for deaf and blind North Koreans. These three examples are also representative of the DPRK’s shift to allow their own citizens to travel abroad with NGOs for training, or to allow NGOs to bring their own groups in for engagement events such as TOGETHER-Hamhung’s annual meeting of deaf people from around the globe hosted in the DPRK.
The majority of these groups do not have residency in the DPRK, with only seven NGOs maintaining a permanent presence on the ground
Yet even as groups and programs diversify, basic humanitarian aid is still being delivered. The WFP remains a major player in the DPRK aid landscape, and dozens of international NGOs continue with programs aimed at meeting basic human needs, including food and nutritional aid. The majority of these groups do not have residency in the DPRK, with only seven NGOs maintaining a permanent presence on the ground. These seven work in a wide range of humanitarian and development programming, including education, sustainable agriculture, food aid, disaster preparedness, water and sanitation, and livelihood security.
MOVING FORWARD
Like in any country, it is impossible to predict exactly what the future holds for the humanitarian needs of the DPRK. The country seems to have gone from a passive humanitarian-development continuum, to an attempt at forcing the continuum along, to the current state of an aid contiguum. For the DPRK, a contiguum approach has benefits. North Koreans with vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs such as children, the elderly, the disabled and the sick have opportunities for humanitarian assistance from NGOs and IOs. North Koreans who the authorities view as trustworthy also have opportunities for development engagement with foreign groups.
The DPRK’s nuclear and satellite tests present their own challenges to the future of humanitarian and development aid. Donors have been already been showing fatigue in the humanitarian realm for many years, and wider support for development engagement is unlikely while the DPRK continues to test its nuclear capacities. Events that have adverse affects on the DPRK’s willingness to trust foreigners – and vice versa – can further hinder groups’ abilities to deliver aid in the country. For now, the DPRK has demonstrated a degree of willingness to allow the contiguum of aid within its borders. A diverse set of NGOs and IOs must now more than ever confront the challenges of securing access to the populations that need them most.