Adrian Kavanagh, 22nd February 2016
Figure 1: Dail seat estimate trends across poll analyses between August 2015 and February (22nd) 2016
After three opinion polls in yesterday’s newspapers, we today see the last Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI opinion poll of the current general election campaign. The trends in this poll are quite similar to that of the Sunday Independent-Millward Brown poll. This sees no gains for Fine Gael, going against the trends observed in the other polls – although the time period between Ipsos-MRBI polls is decidedly more frequent than the Red C polls. The Labour support estimate in this poll sits between the extremes of the Behaviour & Attitudes and the Red C poll support estimates, as seen in yesterday’s poll. As with the Sunday Independent-Millward Brown poll, this poll represents the strongest figures of the weekend for Fianna Fail. Sinn Fein do not fare as well as in the Millward Brown poll, however, and the trend of declining Sinn Fein support across the weekend’s polls is also evidenced here. Once again, we see the trend of strong support for the Independents and Others grouping evidenced across the opinion polls carried out across the general election campaign. Instead of fading somewhat as the electorate became more focused on the formation of the next government coming close to Election Day, support levels for this grouping have actually hardened as the campaign has progressed. Today’s Irish-Times-Ipsos MRBI opinion poll estimates party support levels as follows (and relative to the February 4th Irish-Times-Ipsos MRBI poll): Fine Gael 28% (NC), Independents and Others 28% (up 3%) – including Social Democrats 3%, Anti-Austerity Alliance-People Before Profit 3%, Renua 2%, Green Party 2%, Independent Alliance 4%, Other Independents 11% – Fianna Fail 23% (up 2%), Sinn Fein 15% (down 4%), Labour Party 6% (down 1%). My constituency-level analysis of these poll figures estimates that party seat levels, should such national support trends be replicated in an actual general election, would be as follows: Fianna Fail 37, Fine Gael 54, Sinn Fein 23, Labour Party 4, Independents and Others 40.
Independents and Others: Support levels for the Independents and Others grouping in most polls over the past few years have been notably higher than what this grouping stood at for the 2011 General Election and this poll is another very good one for this grouping, continuing on the trend that has been evident for this grouping during throughout the entire election campaign. Seat levels for the Independents grouping can be notably harder to glean than would be the case for the larger political parties. First of all, opinion polls usually measure support for Independents and Others and not just Independent candidates. A number of smaller parties and alliances, including Renua Ireland, the Social Democrats, the Workers Party, the Anti-Austerity Alliance/Socialist Party and People Before Profit Alliance – as well as the Green Party in the case of some opinion polls – are included within this very large and diverse grouping.
In this case, separate figures have been provided by The Irish Times and Ipsos -MRBI for the Anti-Austerity Alliance-People Before Profit (3%), Social Democrats (3%), Green Party (2%) and Renua (2%), as well as for the Independent Alliance (4%) and Other Independents (11%). In some cases however increased support levels for a grouping may simply be absorbed by that grouping running an increased number of candidates, meaning that increased support levels may not translate into increased seat numbers – as happened in relation to the 2002 and 2007 Sinn Fein votes and seats levels. Many of these smaller parties and groupings did not exist in 2011 or contested only a relatively small number of constituencies. For instance, there were Socialist Party and/or People Before Profit Alliance candidates in 17 of the 2011 constituencies – or 16 of the new/2016 General Election constituencies – and this number falls to 14 if Clare Daly and Joan Collins are not included in this number. As this model relies heavily on the 2011 General Election constituency support levels to generate the constituency support estimates, applying the model in this case to calculate estimated Anti-Austerity Alliance-People Before Profit seat levels would be a wholly unreliable approach. This would not be a problem, however, in the case of the Green Party, given that this party contested all 43 constituencies at the last general election. However, there needs also to be a health warning in this case, given that a number of the party’s stronger candidates at the 2011 contest are not contesting this election, or are contesting the election in a different constituency as in the case of Eamon Ryan. Given this, the party’s geography of support at the 2011 contest may not be as strong a predictor of the party’s 2016 support trends to the same degree as in previous elections – for instance, Trevor Sargent’s strong personal vote in Dublin North may not translate as well into the Dublin Fingal numbers, given that the party is running a different candidate in this election.)
The nature of the Independents and Others grouping means that support levels do not usually translate as neatly into seat gains as would be the case with parties such as Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Vote transfer levels across this grouping will generally not prove to be as strong as the extent of intra-party vote transfer levels enjoyed by the larger political parties, who in turn often enjoy a “seat bonus” at most general election contests. Votes for Independents located in the centre-right of the political spectrum (such as the Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael “gene pool” independents or people such as Shane Ross) are probably more likely to be transferred to the two main parties (or else be shaped by local candidate factors) than they are to go to left-leaning independent candidates. In a similar vein, Renua Ireland and the centre-right independents are probably less likely to draw large numbers of vote transfers from left-wing independents than candidates from Sinn Féin, the People Before Profit Alliance or Socialist Party are.
Against that, candidates from the Independents and Others grouping may be more likely to attract transfers from political parties than would be the case with candidates from other political parties. And, of course, the better that candidates from this grouping fare in different constituencies, the more likely they are to attract vote transfers given that they will be placed higher up in the order of first preference vote levels and hence well placed to last longer/until the end of the election count.
Furthermore, votes won by the Independents and Others grouping tend to be shared across a larger number of candidates than would be the case with the larger political parties, with a significant number of these candidates also having little or no chance of winning seats. For instance, candidates from the Independents and Others grouping won 20.4% of the vote in Laois-Offaly at the 2011 General Election, but, with this constituency being contested by eleven candidates from this grouping, none of these went on to win a seat here. (By contrast, Sinn Féin’s Brian Stanley won a seat there with 10.8% of the vote.) At this year’s local elections, 583 independent candidates and 139 candidates from the “Others” (smaller parties/alliances) grouping combined to win 26.6% of the national vote, emerging as the largest political grouping in terms of vote share. But, with this vote being divided up between a much larger number of candidates than Fine Gael (468) and especially Fianna Fáil (415), this grouping accounted for a smaller number of Council seats (225) than the number won by Fianna Fáil (267) or Fine Gael (235). This may also be a factor at this general election contest, given that the Independents and Others grouping accounts for 307 candidates out of the 552 candidates contesting the February 2016 General Election.
The main issue when it comes to sustaining current support levels for the Independents and Others grouping over the final days of the election campaign was believed to be related to how the electorate tends to become increasingly focused on the composition of the next government in the months leading up to this contest. The precedent in recent electoral contests shows that significant changes in public opinion can occur in the months leading up to a general election. In the past, such changing support trends have often seen this grouping becoming increasingly marginalised, or “squeezed out”, the closer one gets to polling day, especially when election contests are perceived to be close, as was the case with the 2007 General Election. However, the Independents and Others grouping includes a number of alliances or groupings that could possibly command five, or more, seats in Dáil Eireann after the next election. Such alliances/groupings could be in a position to play a significant role within the next government. Falling into this category on the left of the political spectrum would be the Social Democrats, Socialist Party/Anti Austerity Alliance and People Before Profit Alliance, as well as a number of left-leaning independents. By contrast, Renua Ireland would also be well placed to challenge for similarly high seat levels, while another key player here, of course, will be the Independent Alliance. If these groupings can portray themselves as groupings that could be potentially strong actors within the next government, then they are less like to get “squeezed out” in the final days of this election campaign when last-minute decisions as regards government formation will probably weigh heavier on political choice.
Sinn Féin: Sinn Féin support levels still remain well in excess of the levels won at the 2011 General Election, but this is a disappointing opinion poll for that party in a similar vein to this weekend’s Red C or Behaviour & Attitudes polls. A major concern for Sinn Fein has focused on the need to maintain their relatively high support levels over 2014, 2015 and early 2016 into the final days of this general election campaign and the vote slippage that has been evident in the opinion polls published over these two days must be of concern to that party. But the party also faces concerns that Sinn Fein support levels measured in opinion polls does not convert neatly into similar support levels in actual electoral contests, as evidenced in the City and County Council elections of May 2014 where the national average support level for Sinn Fein was a few percent lower than that registered in opinion polls around the time of those contests. The remaining evidence of transfer toxicity also poses concerns for Sinn Fein and the fact that Sinn Fein candidates can struggle to win vote transfers off candidates from other political groupings could prove costly in tight electoral contests, as evidenced in the Dublin West and Dublin South-West by-elections of 2014. That being said, Kathleen Funchion fared notably stronger in terms of attracting vote transfers at the 2015 Carlow-Kilkenny by-election contest. Moreover, if Sinn Fein were to win 19% nationally in the next general election, quite a number of their potential gains would probably be in a position where they would not be requiring transfers in order to win seats, as suggested in this analysis. As Sinn Fein did not contest some constituencies in 2011 (e.g. Clare, Dublin North/Fingal, Dun Laoghaire, Kerry South, Limerick (County)), the estimates for these constituencies are undoubtedly under-estimated here. Indeed the results in these areas in the May local elections suggest Sinn Fein are probably in a much stronger position in these areas than would be suggested by the results of this analysis.
Fianna Fáil: Fianna Fáil support levels in this poll are six percentage points higher than the level of support won by that party at the 2011 General Election, continuing the trend by which that party has fared worse in Red C polls than in other types of opinion polls in recent months. But as most electoral contests held since 2011 have shown, Fianna Fail have tended to perform better in actual elections than they have been performing in opinion polls. They did of course recently win the Carlow-Kilkenny by-election of 22nd May 2015, although the party was admittedly better placed to win that contest than would have been the case with the six previous by-elections held during the lifetime of the current Dail. Furthermore, the Fianna Fail performance in the 2014 Local Elections exceeded expectations based on the opinion polls leading up to that contest (and indeed the exit poll taken on the day of that contest). Could it be the case that voters are more inclined to support Fianna Fail candidates than they are to support Fianna Fail, the party? In any case, despite the party’s disappointing poll standings, this analysis suggests that Fianna Fail would be well placed to make a number of gains at the next election (even with the overall reduction of Dail seat numbers from 166 to 158), with the increasingly fractured political landscape and the declining fortunes of Fine Gael and Labour creating an opportunity space for Fianna Fail seat gains (or, rather, regains).
One area that may cause some concern for Fianna Fail strategists is the fact that these figures suggest that the party could have been in contention for second seats in constituencies where the party is just running one candidate. The overtly conservative candidate selection strategy – with the party running its smallest ever number of general election candidates (71) – may have made sense when the party was at 17/18 per cent in the polls but may not have made sufficient allowances for a late swing to the party, as seems to be evident in this election campaign.
The problem for Labour: Given the Labour Party’s geography of support, but also given the increased level of opposition the party faces on the left of the political spectrum from Sinn Fein, the People Before Profit Alliance, the Anti-Austerity Alliance and other left-wing groupings/independent candidates, Labour will struggle to convert votes into seats if their national support levels fall below the 10% level, as evidenced in this analysis and as discussed in greater detail in the concluding section to this post. If the party’s support levels nationally were to fall around the 6% or 7% level, or lower than this, at the upcoming general election, then – given the changed nature of political competition, transfer patterns and the new Dail constituency boundaries – Labour would need a lot of luck to end up winning more than a handful of seats at this contest. Effectively, as the constituency support estimates suggest, the party would be struggling to win seats in every one of the 40 Dail constituencies. Unfortunately for Labour, when a party is leaking support at an election, it also tends to start running out of luck as well.
This analysis now excludes the Labour Party vote in the constituencies that Labour will not be contesting in the coming election – namely Offaly, Cork North-West, Limerick County, Cavan-Monaghan, Donegal and Mayo. This means the 6% Labour national vote share is now being shared out across a smaller number of constituencies (34, as opposed to 40) than was the case in previous analyses. The knock on effect of this change should be to slightly increase the Labour support estimates in these constituencies, relative to the other parties and groupings, in this analysis.
There may be some constituencies where Labour do better than expected (or better than the constituency support estimates are suggesting) – maybe due to the candidate selections of the other parties and groupings or maybe due to a strong personal vote for a local candidate – and they do actually win seats. There may be some stronger Labour constituencies also in this analysis, where luck in terms of vote transfers could secure some Labour seats. The model (as it is a model and not real life) does have to assume perfect, or close to perfect, vote management involving candidates from the same party. Even on these constituency support estimates, there may be cases where poor vote management for other parties “lets in” a Labour candidate to win a seat. But leaving these provisions aside, the ultimate message here is that Labour cannot expect to won more than a handful of seats, at best, unless they get close to, or over, the crucial 10% of national support level. If their national support level falls below this level, as is suggested by the support levels trends in this particularly poll, then Labour will need a good bit of luck, or some exceptional performances by individual Labour candidates, to get their seat levels into double figures. At 6% of the national vote, every constituency becomes a struggle for Labour to pull seats out of.
Fine Gael: There had been a notable increase in Fine Gael support levels in opinion polls across 2015, even allowing for a dip in support for that party in the Summer 2015 polls. This was most notably evident if the party’s support levels in the final Ipsos MRBI polls of 2014 and 2015 are contrasted. The 4th December 2014 Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI opinion poll had estimated Fine Gael support as standing at 19% and had shown Fine Gael to be on a lower level of support than Sinn Fein and Fianna Fail, as well as the Independents and Others grouping. But the most recent edition of the Ipsos-MRBI opinion poll saw the party effectively gaining eleven percentage points across the four Ipsos-MRBI polls of 2015. The party has, however, lost some ground in the first few weeks of this election campaign, but Fine Gael did regain some degree of support in this weekend’s Red C and Behaviour & Attitudes opinion polls (but not the Millward Brown and Ipsos-MRBI polls, but these cover a longer time period than the Red C polls). Fine Gael still remains the largest party in the state, by far, based on these poll figures. As such, Fine Gael stand poised to enjoy a significant seat bonus in terms of how the party’s support level nationally may relate to the percentage of seats that the party might hold in the next Dail, as illustrated in this analysis. This is in keeping with the results of most recent general elections, which have seen significant seat bonuses for the largest parties – Fine Gael in 2011 (36.1% of votes, 45.8% of seats), Fianna Fail in 2007 (41.6% of votes, 46.4% of seats), Fianna Fail in 2002 (41.5% of votes, 48.8% of seats) and Fianna Fail in 1997 (39.3% of votes, 46.4% of seats). It is interesting to compare the seat bonus in this poll analysis with that for yesterday’s Red C poll analysis. Fine Gael are probably getting a bounce due in part to the weaker support levels for Labour in this particular poll, but this is offset by the higher Fianna Fail support numbers, given that this party is directly challenging Fine Gael for the same vote base in many constituencies.
How this model works: Constituency support estimates for different parties and groupings form the basis of the general approach taken with this analysis. This seeks to ask the following question in relation to different opinion poll results – what do these poll figures mean in terms of the likely number of Dail seats that could be won by the different parties and groupings on those national support levels? Although the Irish electoral system is classified as a proportional electoral system, the proportion of seats won by parties will not measure up exactly to their actual share of the first preference votes, mainly because geography has a very significant impact here. First preference votes need to be filtered through the system of Irish electoral constituencies (and the different numbers of seats that are apportioned to these). In order to address this question, I estimate what the party first preference votes would be in the different constituencies, assuming similar (proportional) changes in party vote shares in all constituencies to those that are being suggested by a particular opinion poll. This of course is a very rough model and it cannot take appropriate account of the fact that changing support levels between elections tend to vary geographically, while it also fails to take account of the local particularities of the different regions in cases where no regional figures are produced in association with different national opinion polls meaning that there is no scope to carry out separate regional analyses based on these poll figures.
Thus constituency support estimates for different parties/groupings will be over-estimated in some constituencies and under-estimated in others, but the expectation would be that the overall national seat figures figures estimated will be relatively close to the true level, given that over-estimates in certain constituencies will be offset by under-estimates in others. Based on these estimated constituency support figures, I proceed to estimate the destination of seats in the different constituencies. The constituency level analysis involves the assigning seat levels to different parties and political groupings on the basis of constituency support estimates and simply using a d’Hondt method to determine which party wins the seats, while also taking account of the factors of vote transfers and vote splitting/management (based on vote transfer/management patterns observed in the February 2011 election). Due to unusually high/low support levels for some parties or political groupings in certain constituencies in the previous election, the model may throw up occasional constituency predictions that are unlikely to pan out in a “real election”, but of course the estimates here cannot be seen as highly accurate estimates of support levels at the constituency level as in a “real election” party support changes will vary significantly across constituency given uneven geographical shifts in support levels.
The point to remember here is that the ultimate aim of this model is to get an overall, national-level, estimate of seat numbers and these are based, as noted earlier, on the proviso that an over-prediction in one constituency may be offset by an under-prediction in another constituency. This model does not aim, or expect, to produce 100% accurate party support and seat level predictions for each of the 40 constituencies. Based on such an analysis and using the new constituency units (as defined in the 2012 Constituency Commission report), these analyses estimates what party seat levels would be, should such national support trends be replicated in an actual general election. For a variety of reasons (including the impact of high levels of undecided voters in a specific poll), the actual result of an election contest may vary from the figures suggested by an opinion poll, even if the poll is carried out relatively close to election day, or on election day itself as in the case of exit polls, but the likelihood of such variation is not something that can be factored into this model. Vote transfer patterns of course cannot be accounted for in the constituency support estimate figures, but I do try to control for these somewhat in my set of amended seat allocations.
I have made some further corrections to the base support figures for the different parties for this analysis to take better account of the impacts on support of the 2012 Constituency Commission report boundary changes with especial reference to the Dublin constituencies. For instance, these figures better reflect the weaker positions of Fine Gael and Fianna Fail in Dublin Central after the moving out of the Ashtown area to Dublin West and the Botanic/Drumcondra area to Dublin North West, but also their stronger positions in Dublin West and Dublin North West. Fine Gael are assigned an extra seat in Dun Laoghaire on the basis that the Ceann Comhairle, Sean Barrett, will be automatically returned at the next general election and this constituency will effectively be rendered a three-seat contest at the next general election. (Changes in constituency boundaries as outlined in the 2012 Constituency Commisison report have been factored in to this analysis. An overview of the political impacts of these changes (carried out in an earlier post) suggests that Fianna Fail would seem to be the party most likely to be positively effected by the redrawing of the constituency boundaries, with the Labour Party being the party likely to be the most adversely effected by these changes.)
Note that the approach used in this analysis is different to those of the constituency level analyses of the 2011-13 in that it now takes account of defections/changing party affiliations for people who were candidates in the 2011 General Election, as will be outlined in greater detail later in this post (and as such the seat estimates for this, and later posts, cannot be directly compared with those for the 2011, 2012 and Early 2013 analyses of post-General Election 2011 opinion polls). In cases where a General Election 2011 candidate has definitely left a party (or the independents ranks) to join another party or to become an independent, a portion of their 2011 will be taken away from the constituency base figures for their former party/grouping and added to those of their new party/grouping. The approach taken in the run up to the 2011 General Election was to assign all of the votes won by that candidate to their new grouping, but the actual 2011 results showed that this was an over-estimation of the likely impact of such changes. For instance the Labour Party constituency estimates for Mayo and Roscommon-South Leitrim following the moves of Jerry Cowley and John Kelly into the Labour Party ranks were well in excess of the actual votes won by that party in those constituencies. In this approach, half of the votes won by a candidate in the 2011 contest will be assigned to their new party/grouping while the rest of the votes will remain assigned to their old party/grouping. Where a constituency boundary change is involved, meaning that part(s) of a candidate’s old constituency is now moved into another constituency/other constituencies, the base figures for all these constituencies will be recalculated to take account of this. For instance, the impact of Peter Mathews leaving the Fine Gael ranks means that the Fine Gael and Non Party base figures are altered in Dublin Rathdown, but also in the Dublin South-West and Dun Laoghaire constituencies. Note that this approach will not take account of candidates who have lost the party whip but who may ultimately return to the party at a later date or who have been temporarily suspended from their party, as in the cases of Brian Walsh (Fine Gael, Galway West) or Peadar Toibin (Sinn Fein, Meath West). This approach also takes account of those candidates who did not win Dail seats at the 2011 contest, including people like David McGuinness (Dublin West), Averil Power (Dublin Bay North), Fidelma Healy-Eames (Galway West), Eddie Fitzpatrick (Offaly), James Heffernan (Limerick), Jenny McHugh (Meath West) and Tom Fortune (Wicklow). In the wake of Patrick Nulty’s resignation from the Dáil, the correction made in Dublin West to the Labour and Independent/Non Party bases figures has now been reversed there. In the case of David McGuinness, his 2011 vote is undoubtedly a significant under-estimate of his potential vote (given that he was an obvious sweeper candidate for the late Brian Lenihan) while his by-election performances would probably over-estimate where his support levels would stand if accompanied by a running mate, such as Jack Chambers. An estimate lying midway between these two extremes has been applied (with some degree of caution!) in this analysis. As with the case of Patrick Nulty, this correction will be reversed in subsequent polls should it transpire that David McGuinness decides not to contest the next general election as an independent candidate (or indeed as a candidate for another party or grouping).
Constituency Support Estimates: The constituency support estimates based on the Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI poll (22nd February 2016), when using the new constituency units (as to be used at the next general election), are as follows:
Constituency
FF
FG
LB
SF
OTH
Carlow-Kilkenny
38%
32%
6%
14%
10%
Cavan-Monaghan
23%
24%
0%
35%
18%
Clare
28%
33%
5%
5%
28%
Cork East
26%
35%
13%
19%
8%
Cork North Central
21%
23%
9%
22%
25%
Cork North West
37%
44%
0%
12%
8%
Cork South Central
38%
28%
7%
12%
15%
Cork South West
33%
41%
5%
11%
9%
Donegal
23%
18%
0%
37%
22%
Dublin Central
20%
16%
10%
19%
34%
Dublin Mid West
17%
28%
12%
19%
23%
Dublin Fingal
21%
24%
9%
4%
42%
Dublin Bay North
14%
22%
8%
13%
42%
Dublin North West
16%
13%
10%
31%
29%
Dublin Rathdown
12%
23%
6%
4%
56%
Dublin South Central
14%
19%
14%
23%
30%
Dublin Bay South
10%
22%
9%
9%
50%
Dublin South West
15%
24%
11%
20%
31%
Dublin West
15%
24%
11%
10%
41%
Dun Laoghaire
21%
31%
11%
3%
34%
Galway East
28%
34%
4%
7%
27%
Galway West
24%
23%
4%
8%
41%
Kerry County
15%
27%
5%
16%
37%
Kildare North
21%
30%
11%
9%
28%
Kildare South
31%
30%
10%
10%
20%
Laois
38%
29%
4%
20%
8%
Offaly
31%
20%
0%
8%
41%
Limerick City
30%
36%
8%
12%
14%
Limerick
26%
42%
0%
6%
26%
Longford-Westmeath
28%
33%
9%
12%
19%
Louth
19%
24%
6%
29%
22%
Mayo
23%
54%
0%
10%
12%
Meath East
27%
35%
8%
14%
16%
Meath West
31%
35%
2%
24%
8%
Roscommon-Galway
17%
23%
3%
8%
49%
Sligo-Leitrim
27%
26%
3%
23%
21%
Tipperary
18%
22%
5%
7%
47%
Waterford
19%
31%
7%
15%
29%
Wexford
25%
28%
7%
9%
31%
Wicklow
13%
25%
5%
14%
44%
Seat Estimates: Based on these constituency estimates and using a d’Hondt method to determine which party wins the seats in a constituency, the party seat levels are estimated as follows:
Constituency
FF
FG
LB
SF
OTH
Carlow-Kilkenny
2
2
0
1
0
Cavan-Monaghan
1
1
0
2
0
Clare
1
2
0
0
1
Cork East
1
2
0
1
0
Cork North Central
1
1
0
1
1
Cork North West
1
2
0
0
0
Cork South Central
2
1
0
0
1
Cork South West
1
2
0
0
0
Donegal
1
1
0
2
1
Dublin Central
1
0
0
1
1
Dublin Mid West
1
1
0
1
1
Dublin Fingal
1
1
0
0
3
Dublin Bay North
1
1
0
1
2
Dublin North West
0
0
0
2
1
Dublin Rathdown
0
1
0
0
2
Dublin South Central
0
1
0
1
2
Dublin Bay South
0
1
0
0
3
Dublin South West
1
1
0
1
2
Dublin West
1
1
0
0
2
Dun Laoghaire
1
2
0
0
1
Galway East
1
1
0
0
1
Galway West
1
1
0
0
3
Kerry County
1
1
0
1
2
Kildare North
1
2
0
0
1
Kildare South
1
1
0
0
1
Laois
1
1
0
1
0
Offaly
1
0
0
0
2
Limerick City
1
2
0
0
1
Limerick
1
1
0
0
1
Longford-Westmeath
1
2
0
0
1
Louth
1
1
0
2
1
Mayo
1
3
0
0
0
Meath East
1
2
0
0
0
Meath West
1
1
0
1
0
Roscommon-Galway
0
1
0
0
2
Sligo-Leitrim
1
1
0
1
1
Tipperary
1
1
0
0
3
Waterford
1
2
0
0
1
Wexford
1
2
0
0
2
Wicklow
0
1
0
1
3
STATE
36
51
0
21
50
Amended Seat Estimates: The seat estimates also need to take account of the candidate and competition trends unique to the different constituency. Amending the model to account for seats that may be won or lost on the basis of estimates here being based on support levels derived due to a large/small number of candidates contesting the election in 2011 (as in the large number of independent candidates competing in constituencies such as Wicklow or Laois-Offaly in 2011) or one candidate polling especially well in that election (e.g. the Shane Ross vote in Dublin South/Mick Wallace vote in Wexford) in a manner that would not amount to an extra seat for another member of the same party/grouping. Vote transfer patterns and vote management issues (e.g. discrepancies between votes won by party front runners and their running mates which would see potential seat wins fall out of a party’s hands) also need to be accounted for. I have also in this analysis tried to make some allowance for the potential impact of a vote transfer pact between the two government parties, Fine Gael and the Labour Party. Taking these concerns into account, the amended seat allocations across the constituencies would look more like this:
Constituency
FF
FG
LB
SF
OTH
Carlow-Kilkenny
2
2
0
1
0
Cavan-Monaghan
1
1
0
2
0
Clare
1
2
0
0
1
Cork East
1
2
0
1
0
Cork North Central
1
1
0
1
1
Cork North West
1
2
0
0
0
Cork South Central
2
2
0
0
0
Cork South West
1
2
0
0
0
Donegal
1
1
0
2
1
Dublin Central
1
0
0
1
1
Dublin Mid West
1
1
1
1
0
Dublin Fingal
1
1
1
0
2
Dublin Bay North
1
1
0
1
2
Dublin North West
0
1
0
1
1
Dublin Rathdown
0
1
0
0
2
Dublin South Central
0
1
1
1
1
Dublin Bay South
0
1
0
0
3
Dublin South West
1
1
0
1
2
Dublin West
1
1
0
0
2
Dun Laoghaire
1
2
0
0
1
Galway East
1
1
0
0
1
Galway West
1
1
0
0
3
Kerry County
1
1
0
1
2
Kildare North
1
1
1
0
1
Kildare South
1
2
0
0
0
Laois
1
1
0
1
0
Offaly
1
1
0
0
1
Limerick City
1
2
0
1
0
Limerick
1
1
0
0
1
Longford-Westmeath
1
2
0
0
1
Louth
1
1
0
2
1
Mayo
1
3
0
0
0
Meath East
1
2
0
0
0
Meath West
1
1
0
1
0
Roscommon-Galway
0
1
0
0
2
Sligo-Leitrim
1
1
0
2
0
Tipperary
1
1
0
0
3
Waterford
1
2
0
0
1
Wexford
1
2
0
1
1
Wicklow
1
1
0
1
2
STATE
37
54
4
23
40
% Seats
23.4
34.2
2.5
14.6
25.3
There are, of course, quite a number of constituencies where – on the basis of the constituency estimates calculated – the final seat, or final seats, would be very close to call. For instance, in the case of Dublin West – especially in the wake of the David McGuinness defection – the final two seats here look like being a toss up between Fianna Fail, Sinn Fein, Labour and the Independents and Others grouping (with Fine Gael and the Anti-Austerity Alliance best placed to take the first two seats there on the basis of these figures). In the case of Dublin North-West, these figures suggest that the final seat would be closely fought out between the second Sinn Fein candidate, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. The fact that national shifts in support patterns tend to vary geographically across constituencies, of course, means that the actual results in constituencies will pan out somewhat differently to the levels suggested by these support estimates – as noted already this model is not aiming to/cannot provide accurate constituency support estimates.
Potential Governments?: Based on these seat estimates, a potential Fine Gael single party government (combined seat level of 58 seats) would fall twenty one seats short of the number of seats required to form a government (79 seats). If an agreed transfer pact between Labour and Fine Gael proved especially effective – over and above the degree to which this model allows for – these parties could win more than the number of seats estimated for them here – especially if the support levels for Opposition parties and candidates in different constituencies proved to be especially fractured across a number of different parties and independent candidates. There are, for instance, a number of constituencies here where some luck in terms of vote transfers, or in terms of the breakdown of transfers between opposing parties or groupings, could result in even more seats for Labour and Fine Gael, although poor transfers between Labour and Fine Gael candidates could of course see the loss of some of the seats being assigned to the parties in this analysis. In a number of cases, however, extra seats for one of the parties might well becoming at the expense of their coalition partner. A potential Sinn Fein-Fianna Fail alliance (combined seat level of 50 seats) would fall twenty-nine seats short of this 79-seat target, which could make this alliance a viable option based on these numbers if it could attain a sufficient level of support from left-leaning deputies from the Independents and Others grouping (and/or Fianna Fail gene pool independents) to form a government. A Fine Gael and Sinn Fein pairing, on these estimates, would just miss out on the required number of seats required to form a government (combined seat level of 77 seats), but such an alliance looks highly unlikely in the present political climate in any case. A potential Fine Gael-Fianna Fail alliance would amount to the other two-party alliance that would be capable of mustering enough seats to form a two-party coalition government without needing the support of other Dail deputies (with a combined seat level of 91 seats). Two-party coalitions have proved to be difficult to form in most of the poll analyses engaged in since Summer 2014 due to the very strong support levels for the Independents and Others grouping in those polls.
The Opposition: Given the improved support levels for Sinn Fein relative to the 2011 General Election – although not especially evident in this analysis – the seat estimates based on these constituency-level analyses suggest a significant improvement in that party’s seat levels relative to those won by the party at the 2011 contest (especially given that the fact that the eight fewer seats in the next Dail has been factored into this analysis), effectively pointing to significant gains on the part of the main Dail Opposition parties since 2011. It is worth noting that, on the trends evidenced in previous such analyses, Sinn Fein would also be competing strongly for seats in a number of other constituencies as well, especially if they can regain some of the support lost in this weekend’s polls over the final days of the February 2016 General Election campaign. Fianna Fail support levels in this poll are seen to be six percentage points higher than their 2011 support levels. The favourable changes made (in their perspective) in the 2012 Constituency Commission report, in addition to the impact of the loss of support for the government parties, means that the party would be almost doubling their Dail seat numbers if these support levels were to be replicated at the next general election. It is worth noting that, as opposed to the parties, the Independents and Others grouping is a very broad church and includes a range of parties, groups and individuals with very different ideological perspectives, including the Socialist Party/Anti-Austerity Alliance and the People Before Profit Alliance as well as left-leaning independents, but also politicians located in the centre-right of the political spectrum, including a significant number of Fianna Fail/Fine Gael-gene pool independents and people such as Shane Ross. Looking at the constituencies where this grouping is predicted to win seats in this model, it can be seen that left-leaning parties and independents would take at least 19 of the 40 seats being assigned to this grouping in the Irish Times-Ipsos MRBI opinion poll.
Why are Labour likely to win less seats than in 1987 on a low national support level?: The seat level estimates in all of the recent poll analyses for the Labour Party have been stark and the estimate in this poll is especially stark (highlighting the fact that the PR-STV system is proportional, but only to a limited extent). Previous analyses have, moreover, suggested that, especially given the increased competition on the Left from Sinn Fein, other smaller left of centre parties and left-leaning independents, that it will be a struggle for Labour to win seats in most, if not all, constituencies if the party’s national support levels fall below the ten percent level, as has been shown in similar analyses of most recent polls. The further the party falls below this ten percent level, the more problems Labour faces in terms of winning seats. Labour would be in serious trouble if their national support levels fall below ten percent as the party is also facing a “perfect storm” from electoral geography and changed competition levels. These factors include the reduction in Dail seat numbers (from 166 to 158) and other changes made to general election boundaries by the 2012 Constituency Commission (which militated against Labour while seeming to advantage other parties, but notably Fianna Fail) as well as the increased competition the party now faces on the Left from Sinn Fein, other smaller left-wing parties and left-of-centre independents, as well as from Fianna Fail. When Labour support levels fell to similarly low levels in the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s, the party was in a position to be helped (as in the 1997, 2002 and 2007 General Elections) by transfers from lower placed candidates from the smaller left-wing parties. But on these constituency-estimate figures outlined in these analyses Labour Party candidates would find themselves polling below candidates from Sinn Fein, the Socialist Party, the Workers and Unemployed Action Group or the People Before Profit Alliance, or left-leaning independents, in a number of constituencies. Instead of being in a position to possibly benefit from vote transfers (which themselves would be likely to dry up in any case), the Labour candidates would now in a number of cases be eliminated before the final count and would be providing the transfers to see candidates from other left-of-centre political groupings over the line. (If we look at the 1987 case study – we see Labour won 6.5% of the vote in the 1987 General Election and won 12 seats, but it is also worth noting that they did not contest nine constituencies in that election, whereas their 7% national vote is being distributed across all forty constituencies in this analysis, as with the most recent general elections in which Labour has contested all constituencies. In two of the twelve constituencies in 1987 where Labour won seats – Dublin South-Central, Dublin South-West, Galway West and Wexford – vote transfers were crucial in ensuring Labour won these these seats – i.e. Labour candidates were outside the seat positions on the first count but overtook candidates with higher first preference votes as counts progressed due to transfers from other candidates.
Constituency
FPV
Total Poll
Quota
% FPV
Lab/quota
Carlow-Kilkenny
7,358
57,485
9,581
12.80
0.77
Cork South-Central
4,862
56,259
9,377
8.64
0.52
Dublin South-Central
4,701
51,692
8,616
9.09
0.55
Dublin South-East
3,480
38,270
7,655
9.09
0.45
Dublin South-West
5,065
41,454
8,291
12.22
0.61
Dun Laoghaire
6,484
55,702
9,284
11.64
0.70
Galway West
3,878
52,762
8,794
7.35
0.44
Kerry North
6,739
34,764
8,692
19.38
0.78
Kildare
7,567
53,705
8,951
14.09
0.85
Louth
6,205
46,809
9,362
13.26
0.66
Wexford
5,086
52,922
8,821
9.61
0.58
Wicklow
7,754
46,003
9,201
16.86
0.84
Voting statistics for constituencies in which Labour won seats at the 1987 General Election. The table above shows that there was no constituency in 1987 in which a Labour candidate exceeded the quota and indeed successful Labour candidates, Ruairi Quinn and Michael D. Higgins won seats in their constituencies despite winning less than half of the quota in their first preference votes. In addition, Dick Spring came within a handful of votes of losing his seat in Kerry North.)
Although there has been an improvement in their figures recently, the Labour Party has tended to fall below the ten percent level in most opinion polls, as in the case of this Red C poll. Labour seat level estimates in most of the poll analyses I have carried out in the past few years have been quite stark, highlighting the fact that our PR-STV electoral system is proportional but only to a limited extent. The further Labour support nationally falls below the ten percent level, the more it will face in terms of winning seats as this would leave it facing a “perfect storm” from the combined effects of boundary changes, electoral geography and changing political competition patterns. These factors explain why Labour faces greater challenges in translating lower levels of national support into seat numbers than it did back in 1987 when the party won 12 sea