Q: Two bachurim were playing ball. Reuven threw the ball to Shimon, who neglected to catch it, allowing it to smash the windshield of a legally parked car. Are either of the boys obligated to pay for the damage, either according to basic halachah or latzeis Yedei Shamayim (to avert Heavenly judgment)?

A: Reuven, who threw the ball, just learned Bava Kamma this year, and he claims that according to the Gemara he learned (26b, cited as halachah in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 386:3), he is not obligated to pay. The Gemara there says that if a person throws an object off a roof toward pillows and blankets, which should cushion its fall, and before it lands, someone — even the person who threw it — moves the cushioning material so that the object breaks, he is not obligated to pay; his throwing the object should not have broken it, so he is not considered a mazik. (The Rishonim and Poskim debate whether the person who removed the pillows is liable due to garmi [direct causation] or whether he is not liable because his action is considered grama [indirect causation], because he did not do anything directly to the object that broke [see Tosafos].)

Similarly, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 77b) states that if someone shoots an arrow at someone holding a shield, and someone — even the shooter — takes away the shield, allowing the arrow to kill him, the shooter is absolved, because when he shot the arrow, his action could not have killed his victim.

Now, there seems to be a big difference between the sugya in Bava Kamma and our case. In that case, when the person threw the object off the roof, his act could not be defined as a maaseh mazik (action that would cause damage), because the pillows should have cushioned the fall. In our case, the second the ball left Reuven’s hand, it was headed to the windshield, and only Shimon stepping in and catching it could have prevented that damage from happening. Notwithstanding the tacit understanding that Shimon would catch the ball, the action Reuven did is by definition a maaseh mazik. He is at minimum a shogeig (person who causes damage inadvertently), who is liable for the damage unless it was oness gamur (circumstances that were absolutely beyond his control). This case is not considered one of oness, because Reuven did not appoint Shimon as a shomer (guardian) to protect the car (see BHI issue 529). This is certainly true if it wasn’t obvious that Shimon would catch the ball each time (such as if they were playing baseball, and Reuven was hitting the ball sharply instead of merely tossing it toward Shimon).

There is an additional exemption in the murder case in contrast to damages: If the victim was holding a shield and could have protected himself from being killed by placing it in front of himself, the shooter would not be responsible for the victim’s death, because he could have assumed that he would save his own life by blocking the arrow. (See Shu”t Divrei Malkiel 4:87 that this is only when the victim himself had a shield and not if the shooter relied on someone else to save him.)

A mazik, however, would have to pay damages to compensate the victim, even if he was relying on the victim to prevent the damage he had set into motion, because the victim may decide not to prevent the damage but to sue the mazik instead (Choshen Mishpat 418:18).

Reuven is therefore liable for the damage to the car.

As for Shimon, he certainly isn’t liable in terms of basic halachah, because his actions were at most a grama; he is certainly less responsible for the damage in this case than the person who removed the cushions in the case of the Gemara, whom many Poskim absolve (ibid. 386:3).

Regarding Shimon’s obligation to compensate Reuven for causing him to have to pay: If Shimon’s failure to catch the ball was considered absolute peshiah (negligence), then he should pay latzeis Yedei Shamayim; but in many cases, this would not be considered absolute negligence, just a failure to do enough to prevent harm, because he didn’t think the ball would land on the windshield. Furthermore, even had he been doing his best, he still could not necessarily have caught the ball and prevented the damage, so he is likely not required to pay even latzeis Yedei Shamayim.

Q: Our Jewish firm has a maintenance company which is contracted to clean the premises — a four-hour job — every evening after closing at 5 PM. May I allow them to clean Friday evening?

A: Although you pay the maintenance company a set monthly fee for their service, so that they are considered a kablan, you are not allowed to designate that work be done on Shabbos, because then they are your agents to do the work on Shabbos (O.C. 247:1; 252:2).

Moreover, even if you allow them to clean anytime over the weekend by Monday morning, so that you do not instruct them explicitly to clean on Shabbos —because the work is done on the premises of the Jewish firm, there is still concern of mar’is ayin if they work on Shabbos, because people may think that you hired them to work on Shabbos (O.C. 252:2).

Therefore, you should stipulate initially that the weekend cleaning be done on Sunday.

If the non-Jewish cleaning person nonetheless comes on Friday evening or Shabbos for his convenience, in violation of your stipulation, it is questionable whether you are required to protest. In any case, you are not required to offer additional payment so that he should leave (Rema 244:3; Mishna Berurah 244:22).