Authors: Jakub Dalek1, Ronald Deibert1, Sarah McKune1, Phillipa Gill2, Naser Noor3, and Adam Senft1
1 Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
2 Stony Brook University
3 Independent Researcher
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Key Takeaways
This report provides a detailed, mixed methods analysis of Information controls related to the Yemen armed conflict, with research commencing at the end of 2014 and continuing through October 20, 2015.
The research confirms that Internet filtering products sold by the Canadian company Netsweeper have been installed on and are presently in operation in the state-owned and operated ISP YemenNet, the most utilized ISP in the country.
Netsweeper products are being used to filter critical political content, independent media websites, and all URLs belonging to the Israeli (.il) top-level domain.
These new categories of censorship are being implemented by YemenNet, which is presently under the control of the Houthis (an armed rebel group, certain leaders and allies of which are targeted by United Nations Security Council sanctions).
We identify disruptions to infrastructure, such as electricity and fuel, as an important component of information controls in the conflict. Although we are unable to attribute specific disruptions to parties responsible, we find that on balance the limited access to information brought about by the disruptions favours the interests of the Houthis.
Network measurements tests undertaken in Saudi Arabia and Iran show that there is a significant international “spillover” of information controls among state parties to the conflict; both states have blocked websites related to their opponents in the ongoing political and military conflicts.
Detailed Summary
Recent political conflicts and periods of violent unrest — such as those in Syria, Thailand, and Iraq — have demonstrated the ways in which information and communications often become a focal point of contestation during a crisis. As information becomes a critical factor in a conflict, information controls — which we define as actions conducted in or through information and communication technologies that seek to deny, disrupt, secure, or monitor information for political ends — may increase in scope, intensity, and depth. Authorities may introduce new types of censorship as a means of preventing information from leaving the country, or in some cases even cut off access to communications entirely, such as the Internet or mobile phones services. Service providers may be required to undertake emergency measures to control information or communications, or suspend services because of violence, loss of personnel, or disruptions to their infrastructure. Contests over information controls can also become “internationalized” as outside parties to the conflict, including neighboring states, companies, non-state groups, and civil society, get involved and take action that impacts the information environment in the zone of conflict and beyond.
This report presents research on information controls in the context of the ongoing Yemeni armed conflict. After months of crisis following the September 2014 Houthi rebel takeover of the capital Sana’a, the situation in Yemen degenerated into ongoing violent conflict. The conflict has expanded since 2014 to include a military response from a coalition of Arab states led by neighbouring Saudi Arabia.
Using a combination of network measurement tests, reference to technical data sources, as well as contextual and in-country field research, we undertook a detailed examination of information controls related to the Yemeni armed conflict from the end of 2014 to October 2015. Our research was guided by the following framing questions:
How is access to infrastructure, including basic electricity and fuel, a component of information control in Yemen’s armed conflict? Do disruptions to infrastructure favour one side of the conflict over others? Can we attribute disruptions to infrastructure to specific parties to the armed conflict?
Citizens’ ability to access information has been significantly impacted by the ongoing violence, with deliberate power outages and shortages of fuel used to power generators further weakening the country’s infrastructure. Citizens are unable to power their computers, TVs, or mobile phones. These disruptions have limited citizens’ ability to communicate with their families, keep abreast of news related to local developments, or receive advance warning from Saudi-led coalition forces to leave their homes prior to airstrikes in active military conflict zones. The disruptions, though difficult to attribute to any particular group, favour the Houthis who have a demonstrated interest in restricting information flow.
What other techniques of information control factor into the Yemen armed conflict?
Information controls in Yemen have taken different forms. The Houthi rebels have banned domestic telecommunication providers from sending news updates generated by local and regional media to subscribers. They have raided and shut down TV channels and radio stations, arrested journalists, raided newspaper offices, and blocked websites of local and regional media. We also take note of numerous reports of digital surveillance, but were unable to draw positive conclusions about the veracity of these reports or map Yemen’s surveillance infrastructure.
Is Internet censorship a factor in the armed conflict? Have Yemen’s Internet content filtering practices shifted substantially, and if so how? How transparent is the filtering?
We find that information controls implemented by Yemen’s national ISP, YemenNet, a state-owned and operated national ISP that has served the entire country since 2001, and which is now controlled by the Houthi rebels, have changed substantially since the Houthi takeover of the capital and, by extension, control over the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Content filtering now includes a wide variety of political content, and blocking of the entire .il (Israel) domain. We also determine that all political filtering that targets local and regional news and media content is undertaken in a non-transparent way, with fake network error pages delivered back to users instead of block pages.
What equipment is used for content filtering? Can we identify the manufacturer of filtering services? Did that company undertake any due diligence around providing services to a country in the midst of an armed conflict, and to ISPs now under the control of a group (the Houthis) whose leaders are subject to UN Security Council sanctions?
Our prior research on Yemen (as part of the OpenNet Initiative) identified Websense, and later Netsweeper, as commercial providers of content filtering services and equipment to Yemen’s ISPs. In our latest research, we are able to positively verify that Netsweeper is still provisioning services to YemenNet. We also conducted an experiment confirming that Netsweeper is actively updating Netsweeper installations in the country, and thus knows or has reason to know of the recent expansion of the filtering regime to include political content linked to the conflict and the Houthi takeover. As part of the research for this report, on October 9, 2015 we sent a letter to Netsweeper regarding its provision of services to YemenNet and its human rights due diligence. As of the date of publication, we have not received a reply.
Have information controls been “internationalized” as part of the Yemen armed conflict?
In prior research, we have observed that information controls can “spill out” of a particular conflict and affect access to the Internet in other countries. To continue this line of inquiry, we undertook network measurements in Saudi Arabia and Iran. We find that that Saudi Arabia has implemented new Internet content filtering aligned with its military operations in Yemen. We also find that there is significant similarities between content filtering undertaken in Iran and that which has been implemented in Yemen since the Houthi takeover.
Our report begins with background to Yemen and the armed conflict, as well as to the history of information controls in the country. Part 1 provides a summary examination of information controls around the armed conflict based on contextual and field research. Part 2 presents the findings of the network measurement tests we undertook for Internet content filtering in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and details experiments we undertook to confirm Netsweeper’s provision of services in Yemen. We evaluate Netsweeper’s provision of services on the basis of existing human rights laws and norms, and provide details on questions we sent to the company. We conclude the report with observations on research on information controls in armed conflict in general, and the Yemen case in particular.
Full Report: Background
2015 Political and Armed Conflict
Yemen is strategically located on the Bab al-Mandab strait, which links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is a passage for much of the world’s oil shipments. However, power struggles and unequal access to resources have frequently led to violent conflict and instability in the country — the poorest in the Middle East with a weak governance system and widespread corruption. Yemen has also been the base for attacks staged by the militant Islamist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), posing a security threat at the regional and international levels. There have been six armed conflicts between the government of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Shiite Houthi rebels, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), from 2004 until a ceasefire was signed in 2010. Saleh was removed from power in 2011 following popular uprisings in which the Houthis participated. Taking advantage of the vacuum created afterwards, the Houthis expanded their power to more provinces outside their stronghold Saada, and eventually seized control of the government.
Subsequent to this power shift, former President Saleh allied himself with the Houthis. A letter from the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140, notes that interlocutors informed the panel that “despite waging six wars against the Houthi movement in the north of the country between 2004 and 2010,” Saleh has “aligned himself with the Houthis to destroy the power base and property of his enemies,” “ordered his supporters in the Government, the security services and the tribes not to intervene and curb Houthi forces in the achievement of their goals,” and that “Saleh was seeking revenge against these people for contributing to his loss of power in 2011 and 2012” (para. 80).
Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who took power after Saleh’s departure in 2011, and his government submitted their resignations in January 2015 after the Houthis expanded their control by force over the country. The Houthis then put the president and government cabinet members under house arrest. In February 2015, the Houthis unilaterally announced a constitutional declaration that dissolved parliament and formed a “revolutionary committee” chaired by Mohammed al-Houthi, a relative of the group’s leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi. The Houthi-led revolution committee became the de facto government and Houthis the de facto rulers running the country.
On March 27, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed and led a coalition of Arab states in launching airstrikes in Yemen against the Houthi rebel group as it continued to take over more parts of the country, including the capital Sana’a. The coalition of states included majority Sunni Muslim countries United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, and Egypt. The coalition considered the Houthis, who are Shiite Muslims, to be proxies for the Shiite government of Iran, which condemned the military intervention. The coalition also imposed a naval blockade of ports in Yemen at the end of March, restricting imports including food and other basic necessities, which has contributed to the humanitarian crisis in the country.
Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, said when announcing the start of the military intervention: “This is really a war to defend the legitimate government of Yemen and protect the Yemeni people from takeover by a radical militant group aligned with Iran and Hezbollah.” The military intervention was requested by President Hadi, who had fled the country to the Saudi capital city of Riyadh after the Houthis and their allies advanced to the city of Aden, in southern Yemen, where he had taken refuge.
The Houthis warned against the coalition military operation in Yemen, saying president Hadi’s request for military intervention could lead to civil war and that the operation is a “conspiracy against Yemen and proves Hadi is a traitor.” An official from the General People’s Congress (GPC) led by former President Saleh — an ally of the Houthis — criticized President Hadi’s move, saying “Yemenis will reject any interference because it will bring more problems than solutions.”
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has taken action concerning the situation in Yemen. In February 2014 the UNSC adopted resolution 2140 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which it expressed “concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence,” and decided that all UN member states must enact an assets freeze and travel ban against individuals designated by a newly established sanctions committee (the “2140 Committee”) as “engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen.” The measures implemented in that resolution were renewed and extended in February 2015 in resolution 2204. Also in February 2015, the UNSC expressed grave concern in its resolution 2201 over escalating violence and other actions of the Houthis, noting as well its concern over “the takeover by the Houthis of state media outlets and reject[ing] the use of the media to incite violence.”
Shortly thereafter, in its resolution 2216 of April 2015, the UNSC demanded that “all parties in the embattled country, in particular the Houthis, immediately and unconditionally end violence and refrain from further unilateral actions that threatened the political transition.” It further demanded that the Houthis “refrain from any provocations or threats to neighbouring States, release the Minister for Defence, all political prisoners and individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained, and end the recruitment of children.” Additionally, the UNSC decided that member states would expand sanctions to include an arms embargo against designated individuals, and named additional persons to the 2140 Committee’s list.
The list established and maintained by the 2140 Committee currently designates the following individuals, whom the UNSC and the 2140 Committee have found to threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen:
Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who, “[a]s of fall 2012, . . . had reportedly become one of the primary supporters of violent [Houthi] actions in northern Yemen. More recently, as of September 2014, Saleh has been destabilizing Yemen by using others to undermine the central government and create enough instability to threaten a coup. . . . The September 2014 United Nations Panel of Experts report on Yemen also states that allegations have been made that Ali Abdullah Saleh has been using Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives to conduct assassinations and attacks against military installations in order to weaken President Hadi and create discontent within the army and broader Yemeni population” (2140 Committee narrative summary of reasons for listing).
Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, the son of former President Saleh, who “has been working to undermine President Hadi’s authority, thwart Hadi’s attempts to reform the military, and hinder Yemen’s peaceful transition to democracy” (UNSC resolution 2216, Annex).
Abdulmalik al-Houthi, who “assumed the leadership of Yemen’s Houthi movement in 2004 after the death of his brother, Hussein Badredden al-Houthi. As leader of the group, al-Houthi has repeatedly threatened Yemeni authorities with further unrest if they do not respond to his demands and detained President Hadi, Prime Minister, and key cabinet members” (UNSC resolution 2216, Annex).
Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, the “[Houthi] group second-in-command,” who “reportedly held a meeting in order to plot a coup” against Yemeni President Hadi and commanded forces that engaged in violent takeovers in the country; in late 2014 his role was to “organize military operations so as to be able to topple the Yemeni Government, and he was also responsible for securing and controlling all routes in and out of Sana’a” (2140 Committee narrative summary of reasons for listing).
Abd al-Khaliq al-Huthi, a “[Houthi] military commander” who “led a group of fighters dressed in Yemeni military uniforms in an attack on locations in Dimaj, Yemen. The ensuing fighting resulted in multiple deaths.” Moreover, “unknown number of unidentified fighters allegedly were prepared to attack diplomatic facilities in Sana’a, Yemen, upon receiving orders from the Abd al-Khaliq al-Huthi” (2140 Committee narrative summary of reasons for listing).
UN member states have enacted sanctions against these designated individuals reflecting the UNSC resolutions. Canada, the United States, and the European Union, among others, have all implemented Yemen-related sanctions.
As the armed conflict continues to escalate, the UN sponsored peace talks on the conflict in Yemen in Geneva in June 2015 between delegations from President Hadi and the Houthi rebels. The talks, however, failed to produce a ceasefire.
In July 2015, the Saudi-led coalition successfully pushed Houthi forces from the strategic southern port city of Aden, which permitted both the first delivery of food aid to Aden’s port and the first flights to land at Aden airport since March 2015. The re-capture of Aden appeared to mark a turning point in the conflict, as coalition forces began preparing to advance on the Houthi-controlled capital of Sana’a. Troops from numerous coalition countries began to arrive near the city of Marib to participate in military operations there, in advance of operations on Sana’a. By the first week of September 2015, coalition airstrikes had escalated in Sana’a following a Houthi-led attack that killed 60 coalition soldiers in Marib.
In the midst of the military build-up, both sides agreed on September 11, 2015 to engage in United Nations-mediated peace talks the following week. The talks aimed to “create a framework for an agreement on implementation mechanisms for UN Security Council resolution 2216, a ceasefire and the restoration of a peaceful political transition.” However, Hadi later pulled out of the talks, as he conditioned his participation on Houthi agreement to accept the UN resolution. As no major political breakthrough has occurred, the Houthis have maintained their grip on power. In October 2015 they mobilized tribes loyal to them to stand united against activities perceived hostile to the Houthis. An agreement (in Arabic) signed by tribesmen and published by the government news agency (Saba News) under the control of Houthis said the tribes declared “freedom of liability,” a term used to describe the tribal tradition that should someone hurt or even kill someone else for hostile activity, the offender would not be held responsible. The statement added that the “wrongdoers” should be punished according to tribal traditions, even if a political settlement is reached.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report in September 2015 detailing the impact of the violence in Yemen, with over 1500 civilian casualties and widespread violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law. Saudi Arabia, however, has resisted calls by the United Nations Human Rights Council “for an international inquiry into abuses by all parties to the Yemeni conflict.” In October 2015, the Netherlands withdrew a draft resolution that it, along with other Western countries, had sponsored that would have requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to “send experts to Yemen to investigate the conduct of the war.” Reacting to the collapse to establish an independent, international investigation into the conflict, Amnesty International, which headed the organization’s fact-finding mission to Yemen, stated, “The world’s indifference to the suffering of Yemeni civilians in this conflict is shocking. The failure of the UN Human Rights Council last week to establish an international investigation into violations committed by all sides is the latest in a series of failures by the international community to address total impunity for perpetrators of serious violations in Yemen.” Based on a report published in October 2015, Amnesty International stated: “Damning evidence of war crimes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, which is armed by states including the USA, highlights the urgent need for independent, effective investigation of violations in Yemen and for the suspension of transfers of certain arms.”
Internet Infrastructure and Market in Yemen
Yemen has a small but rapidly growing population of Internet users. In 2014 the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimated that 22.55% of Yemeni citizens used the Internet, up from less than 1% a decade earlier and that the country has 340,000 fixed-broadband subscriptions, which works out to 1.36 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. In March 2014, PTC estimated (in Arabic) the number of Internet users in Yemen to be 3,240,109 and the number of Internet cafes as 12,008. Mobile use has increased quickly in the last several years, with ITU statistics estimating the number of cellular subscriptions in the country in 2014 at just over 17 million.
Yemen is primarily served by one Internet service provider, the state-run YemenNet, which dominates the market amid calls from users to end the government monopoly over the Internet industry. YemenNet is part of the state-owned Public Telecommunication Corporation, (PTC), which operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. TeleYemen, another state-owned telecommunication provider, also provides Internet services, but its share of the market is not known. Yemen’s National Security Agency uses Internet filtering software to block political and pornographic content, which slows down Internet speeds according to an official at YemenNet quoted by local media. Yemen’s National Security Agency was established (in Arabic) in August 2002 by a presidential decree issued by then president Ali Abdullah Saleh, which established that its objectives are: to gather and make available intelligence related to Yemen’s national security, to reveal and combat activities that sabotage Yemen’s security, and to secure Yemen’s borders and prevent penetration of foreign elements.
Figure 1 shows the centrality of YemenNet to the country’s international connectivity.
Figure 1: Map of YemenNet’s international connectivity. (Image courtesy Dyn)
Pre-conflict Internet Filtering in Yemen
Prior to the conflict, Yemen had a long track record of filtering political content. The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) documented Internet filtering in the country dating back to 2006. Network measurement results from 2006 showed filtering of content from a variety of content categories, including pornography, anonymization tools, LGBT issues, and a small number of opposition political groups. Results from 2009 showed an increase in political filtering, including websites of opposition political groups and independent media. Interestingly, while filtering of some types of content (like pornography) was implemented with a descriptive blockpage noting the reason the content was blocked, political content was blocked using injected TCP reset packets, a non-transparent method meant to emulate network connectivity problems. This covert blocking of political content provides plausible deniability to the government that is censoring constitutionally protected speech, while other types of content, like pornography, are blocked openly based on Sharia law. Internet censorship during this period was performed with filtering products produced by the U.S.-based company Websense. However, following the ONI’s publication of its reports, the company blocked access to software updates from Yemen. Later ONI research showed that the ISP YemenNet had switched to the products of Canada-based Netsweeper to implement filtering.
Part 1: Information Controls in Yemen in 2015
The following sections elaborate on several different forms of information control in Yemen during the 2015 conflict. We review the impact of the attacks on national electricity grids and the information environment in Yemen and how the scarcity of fuel and manipulation of its sale in a black market contributed to limiting alternative power generating methods needed to keep information infrastructure operational. We examine traffic data to Google services from Yemen against reports of power outages in the country, and use reports from the Internet performance monitoring company, Dyn, showing Internet outages. We then assess how these disruptions serve the interests of the parties involved in the political and armed conflict. We also review attacks on media professionals and outlets, reports of expanded Internet filtering, politically motivated breaching of websites, digital surveillance, and removal of TV channels from satellite operators.
Electricity and information control
Figure 2: Fuel truck unloads and sells gas in the streets of the Houthi-controlled capital city of Sana’a, instead of gas stations where it can be sold at official price. (Photo credit: Naser Noor)
Information and communication technologies require electrical power for operation, and so access to electricity is a fundamental element of information control. Frequent attacks on national electricity grids have disrupted access to telecommunication and Internet services. Google real-time data of traffic to its products and services shows a sharp drop in traffic on certain dates. We examined these dates against media reports on attacks on electricity grids and found a correlation. Figure 3 shows sharp drops occurring occasionally, such as on the week of February 3 and the week of September 12, 2014. Media articles report attacks on electricity system on these weeks.
Figure 3: Traffic data to Google services from Yemen, showing frequent disruptions during 2014. [Source]
As the armed conflict intensified, access to electricity has been heavily disrupted. National electrical lines were destroyed in June 2014 as a result of violence in the governorate of Marib, which houses the country’s primary power plant. Engineers from the Ministry of Electricity and Power were unable to repair the damaged grid lines in the active conflict zone amid conflicting accusations of who is responsible for disobeying a ceasefire. Similarly, much of the country was left without electricity on April 13, 2015 following an attack on power transmission lines.
The electrical shutdown combined with the severe shortage of fuel needed to operate household generators (for those who can afford them) has resulted in citizens without access to television or the ability to power computers or mobile phones. The Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General stated that Saudi-led coalition caused fuel scarcity in the local market, saying: “Severe import restrictions, caused mainly by the naval blockade imposed by the coalition forces during the conflict, have also aggravated the humanitarian situation, resulting in fuel scarcity, which adversely affects the distribution of food and water, as well as the functionality of hospitals.”
Figure 4: Long line of taxis waiting for gas to be available at a gas station in the city of Sana’a. (Photo credit: Naser Noor)
Moreover, local media has reported (in Arabic) that the Houthis have created and operated a black market for fuel so that they can sell it at a much higher price to finance their military operations. The reports publish photos of what they describe as gas trucks unloading and selling in the streets instead of delivering the fuel to gas stations where it can be sold at the official price (see also Figure 2 above). The lack of easy access to fuel has also brought about scarcity in access to information. Without fuel to power generators, and thus electrical powered computers and television, battery-operated radios have become the primary source of information. Notably, the only local radio news stations available are Sana’a Radio Station, which is government-operated, and al-Masirah, the official Houthi radio station. Like many government media institutions, the Sana’a Radio Station is controlled by the Houthis since they took control of the capital city of Sana’a. As a result, the editorial policy of government radio reflects Houthis’ political points of view, and the station is essentially a mirror of al-Houthi’s official radio, al-Masirah. Therefore, Yemenis are left with news and views reflecting a single political opinion.
Moreover, the significantly degraded telecommunication services and unavailability of fuel have had a direct detrimental impact on the lives of civilians living in active military operations. The Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General notes that in May 2015 the Saudi-led coalition forces declared a military operation against the Houthis stronghold governorate, Sa’ada, and warned civilians to stay away from what they said were Houthi locations and crowds. The forces declared the cities of Marran and Sa’ada military zones. The report states that “[a]ccording to Saudi State television channel Al-Ekhbariya, flyers announcing the operation were released over Old Sa’ada”, however “the limited availability of fuel, the particularly challenging terrain, and barely operational telecommunications services prevented tens of thousands of civilians from complying with the ultimatum launched by the coalition.” The same report says OHCHR later observed that coalition air strikes hit at least six residential homes and five markets, but it was not able to obtain detailed information on resulting casualties.
The electricity outage and shortages in fuel have affected other forms of media as well. A number of newspapers have ceased to publish due to the lack of power, and some websites, such as the news portal News Live, announced (in Arabic) they are no longer able to publish as the telecommunication disruption has left them unable to receive updates.
As disruptions to electricity can be caused by violence or deliberate manipulation, they are often accompanied by mutual accusations of responsibility. Power outages can also have coincidental impacts that benefit some groups over others. Although we cannot determine which side of the armed conflict is responsible for all the disruptions, power outages as a whole appear on balance to favour the Houthis and their strategy of degrading information flows. Accusations that they are manipulating fuel supplies as part of a broader information control strategy warrants further research, a topic to which we return again in the next section.
Figure 5: A busy street in Sana’a in total darkness because of electricity shutdown, except for the lights of the cars. (Photo credit: Naser Noor)
Figure 6: Businesses rely on gas-operated power generators like this one outside a shop. (Photo credit: Naser Noor)
Internet and telecom disruptions
Similar to disruptions during the 2011 revolution in Egypt or the ongoing Syrian conflict, international telecommunications connectivity in Yemen has been either completely or partially disrupted several times during the armed conflict. The number of routing instabilities has increased since the conflict escalated in late March 2015, as shown in Figure 7:
Figure 7: Traffic data showing increase in unstable networks and unavailable networks in Yemen. (Image courtesy Dyn)
On March 31, 2015, international telecommunications services to and from Yemen were cut off briefly by the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. At the end of March and in early April 2015, another outage occurred affecting Yemen’s submarine fiber connection to neighbouring Djibouti (See Figure 8) — particularly problematic as Yemen has only two international submarine fiber connections.
Figure 8: Traffic data from YemenNet showing impact of disrupted submarine fiber cable. Source: Dyn
Reports emerged on April 7, 2015 that the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology had cut off phone and Internet connections in the city of Aden following fighting between supporters of president Hadi and Houthi rebels. On April 12, Internet connectivity was disrupted in numerous cities throughout the country. Conflicting reports from local media attributed this disruption to a severed international fibre optic cable, while others suggested the disruption was a result of the installation of filtering and surveillance equipment on the national network by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.
In late April and early May 2015, telecommunications systems were at risk of going offline as a result of fuel shortages throughout the country. On April 28, local media reported that Houthi rebels had seized gasoline and diesel shipments intended for humanitarian relief, including shipments intended for telecommunications providers, who had been relying on generators as a result of instability in electrical infrastructure. As a result, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology announced that it would sever Internet access in four governorates (Aden, Dhale, Abyan and Lahj) on May 1 as a result of the fuel shortages. Days later, local media reported that the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology announced that this shutdown would extend to the entire country, beginning on May 4 at 9:00am. However, the Ministry later announced that they had secured the required fuel to maintain telecommunications service and a shutdown was avoided.
Other data sources have illustrated the impacts of disrupted Internet traffic and widespread power outages. Figure 9 shows traffic from Yemen to Google’s search services, with the red arrow showing the steep drop-off in traffic on April 13, 2015, the date of a major power outage in the country.
Figure 9: Traffic data from Yemen to Google Search services showing significant disruption beginning in mid-April 2015.
Beginning May 30, 2015 there was a further disruption on YemenNet affecting its upstream link to upstream provider Reliance, as shown in Figure 10:
Figure 10: Traffic data showing May 30 disruption between the ISP YemenNet and upstream connection Reliance. (Image courtesy Dyn)
Conflicting reports emerged about the cause of this disruption. The Houthi-controlled Ministry of Communications and Information Technology claimed the disruption was the result of damage to fibre optic cables in a number of locations. Local media sources disputed this account, instead attributing the outage to increased filtering by the Houthi-controlled Ministry, citing individuals who used circumvention software to access sites which were otherwise inaccessible — an act which would not be possible if the disruption was caused by fibre optic cable damage.
Internet filtering
Following the 2015 Houthi takeover of power, the scope of filtered content in Yemen has increased. Reports emerged that the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, under the control of the Houthis, began blocking additional independent news websites including Mareb Press, Yemen Voice, Sahafa Net, Al-Sahwa Net, and Yemen Press. This increase in blocking was condemned by the Yemen chapter of the Internet Society.
In June 2015, in response to the increase in political filtering, a number of Yemeni websites and journalists established (in Arabic) the Electronic Media League to Fight Website Blocking. The League agreed to collectively adopt a new editorial policy, including the use of specific terminology to describe the Houthis. For example, they agreed to refer to Houthi leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthis as the “rebel,” and the Houthi movement as the “rebel movement” and the “rebel Houthi militia.” The league promised further media escalation and criticized the Houthi movement for trying to enforce an information blackout and create tensions with the media.
There have also been reports of an increase in Internet filtering on the other side of the military conflict, in Saudi Arabia. On April 28, local media reported that the Saudi authorities blocked Yemeni government news websites controlled by the Houthi rebels and websites affiliated with ousted president Saleh, an ally of the Houthis. Other media reports said Saudi authorities are censoring clerics who criticize the Kingdom’s military intervention in Yemen.
We provide a detailed analysis of our own testing of Internet content filtering in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran in Part 2 of this report.
Targeting journalists and media outlets
After seizing power in September 2014, Houthi forces targeted media outlets and journalists through raids, kidnapping and harassment. Reports emerged that gunmen raided at least four news outlets, detaining staff and confiscating equipment. Other reports have said the Houthis continue to target journalists, media outlets and media support institutions by means of death threats, abduction and looting, with at least 67 cases of such methods (as of March 2015) used to stop journalists from doing their work.
Another report says Yemeni journalists face their “toughest times ever” as a result of the Houthi militia’s violations of press freedoms, which have included kidnapping, detention and physical aggression, beatings, and forced disappearance of journalists working for local and international media outlets. The report adds that these violations, as well as an economic recession and the shortage of fuel, have forced many local independent media to stop printing and cease operating their online presences, leaving the market solely with media owned by the Houthis and Saleh, whose control over government financial institutions allows them to finance such media using public money.
In April 2015, the Houthis launched an investigation into 39 politicians, activists, and journalists for allegedly compromising “the country’s independence, unity and territorial integrity.” The figures include Yemen’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman and reporters of local TV stations. Also in April 2015, Yemeni journalist Waheed al-Sufi was reported to have been kidnapped by armed gunmen, and his current whereabouts are unknown.
Activists accuse the rebels of intentionally imprisoning their opponents in military sites known to be coalition targets. On May 20, two Yemeni TV journalists were abducted by militiamen allegedly aligned with the Houthis. Also in May, local and regional media reported that Houthis used kidnapped journalists as human shields at military locations, and as a result two journalists were killed in airstrikes. In August 2015, it was reported that 11 journalists remain held hostage by the Houthis, 9 of which were abducted simultaneously in Sanaa in June.
After having its offices raided and its website blocked, news website Almasdar Online moved its operations outside of Yemen. Mobile phone operators reported that they have received orders from the Houthi rebels to stop the news alert services sent by media organizations to mobile phones.
In March 2015, the Houthi rebels raided and shut down local TV channels including Suhail TV, Yemen Youth TV, Al-Saeedah TV, Maeen TV and the office of the pan Arab Aljazeera TV.
The Houthis have also shut down radio stations. In September 2014, they raided (in Arabic) the headquarters of local social radio station Hayat FM and confiscated its equipment. The equipment was returned to the radio station after negotiations with the Houthis, but the Houthis raided and shut down the station again in June 2015. The station remains shut down as of the writing of this report.
Because the government of President Hadi lost control over government news websites, including the official state news agency Saba News, it launched a new Saba News website in May 2015 with the same design but a slightly different domain name (http://sabanew.net/ as an alternative for http://sabanews.net). The website was to represent the “legitimate” government and act as an alternative to the original Saba website that has been under the control of Houthi rebels. The Houthi-controlled Saba news agency later issued a statement describing the new website as fake and a moral and intellectual crime. In an attempt to reach out to citizens inside Yemen, the Saba News website, which is run by the internationally recognized government launched (in Arabic) in August 2015 a news update service via the application WhatsApp. It asked users to subscribe to the service by adding the Egypt-based phone number 00201151665166. It also launched a news update application for Android mobile devices.
Figure 11: Screenshot from Yemeni private TV channel Azaal TV. Arabic banner says: “The terrorist Houthi militia continues to occupy Azaal TV station headquarters in Sana’a after it raided it, confiscated its equipment, and expelled its staff.” (Photo credit: Naser Noor)
In September 2015, the Yemeni coalition for monitoring human rights violations discussed (in Arabic) at the Office of Human Rights Commission in Geneva what it called the “documented atrocities of the Houthi and Saleh militias” committed between September 21, 2014 and August 15, 2015. The coalition documented offenses including the Houthi confiscation of most government-own media outlets and their controlling of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and the national ISP YemenNet, “which enabled it to block 61 websites.”
Saudi-led coalition forces have been accused of targeting Yemeni media outlets. In April 2015 for example, a blast caused by a coalition airstrike in Sana’a killed a TV journalist and three staff members of the Satellite TV station Yemen Today, which is affiliated with ex-president Saleh. The manager of the TV station accused the coalition of targeting the media outlet because Saleh is an alley of the Houthis. A few weeks earlier, the collation spokesperson had said that media outlets supporting the Houthi rebels would be targeted, but he did not explain how. An email request for explanation from the Committee to Protect Journalists that was sent to the Saudi Embassy in Washington was not answered.
Contestation over TV broadcasts
Yemeni TV channels operated by the competing political and armed parties have been the focus of contestation. While Houthis used their military power to raid, physically control, and editorially shape the state-run TV stations, the government of president Hadi used its political influence to have these channels taken off air by the regional satellite providers covering the Middle East and North Africa. State-run television channel Aden TV, which prior to the Houthi takeover had been under the control of the government of President Hadi, has been the object of intense contestation. In February 2015 the Houthis hijacked the broadcast frequencies of the channel, forcing the channel to resume broadcasting on new frequencies. Further back-and-forth hijacking attempts continued in March.
The contestation continued at another level. In March, the two primary regional satellite broadcasters, Egypt-based Nilesat and Saudi-based Arabsat, stopped broadcasts of Yemeni state-run channels at the request of President Hadi after the channels fell under Houthi control. In May, Nilesat dropped the Houthi-owned channel Al-Masirah, knocking it off the air for millions of subscribers in the Middle East and North Africa. The channel would later advertise new frequencies on a Russian satellite. Also in May, Nilesat stopped broadcasting Yemeni TV channel Yemen Today, which is owned by toppled president Saleh. Saleh has been targeted by the Saudi-led coalition for backing the Houthi rebels; on May 10 his house in Sana’a was destroyed by airstrikes. There have been no statements from either Nilesat or Arabsat as to which specific party requested the TV channels be dropped, nor have there been any official statements about the legal frameworks used to take such a measure by either of the satellite providers. We sent queries to the broadcasters (Nilesat and Arabsat) seeking an explanation on October 15, 2015, but as of the time of publication have not received a reply.
Electronic surveillance
Foreign and domestic electronic surveillance is widespread in Yemen, existing prior to as well as during the current armed conflict. Political rivals have allegedly conducted surveillance on their political enemies throughout the ongoing armed conflict. For example, amidst the political rift between the Houthis and President Hadi in January 2015, the Houthis broadcast (in Arabic) on their TV station al-Masirah a telephone conversation between Hadi and his office manager discussing political issues that the Houthis criticized. In the same month, al-Jazeera broadcast a leaked telephone conversation allegedly between ex-president Saleh and a Houthi leader “apparently coordinating military and political moves.” The government of President Hadi has accused Iran of operating spy cells in Yemen that include members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, for the purpose of aiding the Houthis. The Minister of Interior in the government of President Hadi said (in Arabic) Iranian-made advanced surveillance and wiretapping equipment was found in Aden in July 2015