Şener Aktürk, Istanbul
Abstract
On November 24, 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft that violated Turkish airspace. is has been interpreted as the primary cause of the spectacular crisis in Russian–Turkish relations that fol- lowed. However, this incident should rather be interpreted as the symptom, not the cause, of a signi cant geopolitical reversal that has been underway since 2008, as Russia and Turkey have found themselves on opposite sides in military con icts in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015).
November 24, 2015: Symptom, not the Cause, of a Geopolitical Reversal
During Russian President Putin’s visit to Turkey on December 1, 2014, which was set against the back- ground of Western sanctions against Russia that Tur- key did not participate in, some thought that there was a Russian–Turkish “alliance” in the making. us, the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft that violated Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015, came as a shock and was interpreted as the primary cause of the most spectacular crisis in Russian–Turkish rela- tions in the 21st century. However, the shooting down of the Russian bomber aircraft was not the cause, but rather the symptom, of a tectonic reversal in the geopo- litical dynamics underlying prior cooperation between the two countries.
Thee most remarkable feature of the crisis between Russia and Turkey is that they continued to maintain their strong economic relations, including approxi- mately 30 billion USD in annual trade between 2011 and 2014, agreement on the building of Turkey’s rst nuclear power plant by Russia in 2008, and between three and four million Russian tourists visiting Tur- key every year. However, despite developing strong eco- nomic ties, Russia and Turkey have continued to have signi cant and very consequential geopolitical con icts of interest over Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, the latter turning into an escalating proxy war following Russia’s massive military intervention in Syria, which began on September 1, 2015.
Prelude to the Rift: “Five Day War”between Russian and Georgia, August 2008
Georgia is the most critical country in Turkey’s strat- egy in the South Caucasus, and also the only coun- try that geographically lies between Russia and Tur- key, akin to a “bu er state” moderating the potential for con ict between the two countries. Moreover, ever since its reemergence as an independent state in 1992, and especially since the “Rose Revolution” of November 2003 which brought to power Mikhail Saakasvili as the president in January 2004, Georgia has been a close ally
of the United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Georgia under Saakashvili enthusiastically sought NATO mem- bership, a pursuit that drew it even closer to Turkey, its only NATO member neighbor. e Baku–Tblisi–Cey- han pipeline, an important objective of Turkish foreign policy that would cement Turkish–Azerbaijani–Geor- gian common interests and connect Caspian oil to the world markets, was nally completed and the rst oil was pumped from Baku in May 2005, reaching the Turk- ish port of Ceyhan in May 2006. Among other coop- erative developments during this period, there was also agreement in principle on building the Kars–Tblisi rail- road between Turkey and Georgia, connecting Turkish, Georgian and Azerbaijani railroad networks. us, tan- gible and signi cant steps were taken to bring Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia closer together.
Thee major disadvantage for Georgia was that, It did not have de facto control over any of its autonomous republics, Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, at the time of the Rose Revolution. The Saakashvili gov- ernment successfully forced the pro-Russian leader of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, to resign in May 2004, and brought this region under central government control. However, when Georgia attempted to bring South Osse- tia under control in August 2008, the Russian military responded massively by defeating the Georgian army in South Ossetia and occupying several towns in Georgia proper. As a result of the “Five Day War”, as this con ict came to be known, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. e decisive defeat of Georgia in this con ict, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence, and the subsequent increased Russian military presence in these regions, all dealt a major blow to the process of Caucasian inte- gration led by Turkey. e Kars–Tblisi railroad has not been built at the time of writing, and a new Prime Min- ister and then President who prioritized reconciliation with Russia took power in Georgia in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Despite the signi cant damage to Turkish interests that the Russian victory over Georgia entailed, Turkey did not actively and vocally support Georgia during the war. is may be interpreted as a sign that Turkey did not want to risk its much more important relations with Russia over its intervention in Georgia.
Cooperation despite Con ict: Trade and Nuclear Power Plant Deal, May 2010 Russian–Turkish cooperation continued and even increased in other areas of common interests in the after- math of the Five Day War. Perhaps the most remark- able example of cooperation, given its economic scale and its strategic and symbolic signi cance, has been the Russian–Turkish nuclear power plant deal. Rus- sia and Turkey signed an agreement in May 2010, rati- ed by the Turkish parliament in July 2010, according to which a subsidiary of the Russian state corporation Rosatom would build and operate a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, by the Turkish Mediterranean coast.
Trade and tourism were two other areas of massive Russian–Turkish interaction. Bilateral trade increased from around 23 billion USD in 2009 to around 33 bil- lion USD in 2012, remaining above 30 billion USD in 2013 and 2014. e number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey gradually increased, surpassing three million in 2010 and four million in 2013.1 Turkey has been the sec- ond biggest customer of Russian natural gas after Ger- many in Europe, and the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey has been second only to German tour- ists. us, in both bilateral trade and tourism, Russia and Germany consolidated their status as Turkey’s two major partners.
Beginning of the End? the Arab Spring, December 2010
e string of anti-authoritarian protests and rebellions that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and came to be known as the “Arab Spring” arguably constituted a critical development for the geopolitical dynamics that decisively pitted Turkey and Russia against one another, leading to their eventual clash, most spectac- ularly over Syria in Fall 2015. However, this interpre- tation also contains a degree of retrospective bias. First, the three North African countries in which the Arab Spring began, namely, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, are geographically remote from Russia and Turkey, and are not immediately considered as key countries of Rus- sian–Turkish competition. Second, there could have been a mutual accommodation of Russian and Turk- ish preferences, if the two sides pursued such reconcili- ation. However, this otherwise plausible counterfactual scenario did not materialize.
As the protests gained momentum, Turkey sided with the revolutionary movements in Egypt and Tuni- sia, and after a brief hesitation, also in Libya, whereas Russia resolutely sided with the ousted Libyan dictator Muammar Gadda and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the mili- tary dictator who ousted the rst democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi. While Turkey has been perhaps the most vocal supporter of Presi- dent Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government in the world, Russia has been one of the most explicit supporters of Sisi’s military dictatorship that followed. us, Russian and Turkish preferences became polar opposites even in the North African countries where the Arab Spring began.
While regime change, civil con ict, or military takeover in Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia, did not pose an immedi- ate threat to the national security or territorial integrity of Turkey or Russia, the momentous developments that engulfed Ukraine since November 2013 had direct con- sequences for both countries individually, as well as for Russian–Turkish relations more speci cally. e imme- diate cause of the mass protests that began at Indepen- dence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine, was a geopolitical choice: e Ukrainian government led by President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Azarov suspended preparations for signing the Association Agreement with the European Union in favor of seeking closer ties with Russia.
This is critical and evidently pro-Russian decision pro- voked people who favored a pro-European course for Ukraine. is led to mass protests between Novem- ber 2013 and February 2014, which combined with his removal from the presidency by the Ukrainian parlia- ment, forced Yanukovych to initially ee to Kharkiv in Eastern Ukraine, and then to Russia. e coming to power of an avowedly pro-Western government in Ukraine, in what Russian policy makers depicted as a “coup” and decried as being illegitimate, was the pre- text for Russia’s swift occupation of Crimea in February 2014. is was followed by a dubious referendum held under occupation, which allegedly resulted in a popu- lar endorsement of the peninsula’s annexation by Rus- sia in March 2014.
The annexation of Crimea was a critical juncture for Russian–Turkish relations. Crimea has a central posi- tion in the Black Sea, akin to the location of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Turkey had naval and strategic superiority in the Black Sea. Russia’s annexation of Crimea dramat- ically changed the strategic balance in the Black Sea, making Russia the emerging hegemonic power with an offensive capability that threatens all the littoral states of the Black Sea, including Turkey.
As I argued in my interview with the Turkish–Armenian newspaper, Agos, in March 6, 2014, “with the annexation of Crimea, Rus- sia became the greatest immediate military threat to Tur- key” once again, as it was during the Cold War and in the previous two centuries.2 Crimean Tatars, the indige- nous population of the peninsula, have been historically persecuted by the governments in Moscow, and hence vociferously opposed the annexation and boycotted the referendum. While there are a quarter million Tatars remaining in Crimea after centuries of persecution and deportations, there are up to one million descendants of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, including many among the academic, business, and intellectual elites. ere have been numerous protests in Turkey against the Russian annexation of Crimea. e reemergence of the Russian military threat with the annexation of Crimea, in part, reversed the geopolitical dynamics that had sustained relative peace and a high level of cooperation between Russia and Turkey since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Increased Cooperation despite Con ict: Turkish Stream, December 2014
Despite seemingly irreconcilable di erences between Russia and Turkey over Crimea, economic cooperation continued unabated. Turkey did not participate in the Western embargoes imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea, hence bene tting from the rerout- ing of some Russian goods to Turkey. Meanwhile, con- struction began at the site of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in April 2015, with plans for the rst reactor to be operational in 2020. After years of discussion, during his visit to Turkey on December 1, 2015, Putin announced a plan for a new natural gas pipeline named “Turkish Stream,” which would replace the South Stream proj- ect that was canceled following the Western embargoes placed on Russia in relation to Crimea. e announce- ment of the Turkish Stream project surprised most observers, and fed overblown speculations about an emer- gent Russian–Turkish axis. Combined with Turkey’s alienation from the Western alliance, some groups such as the Turkish Eurasianists, which have been advocating a Russian–Turkish axis as the new geopolitical orienta- tion for Turkey for many years, became even more vocal.
The Last Straw: Russian Intervention in Syria, September 2015
Turkey, along with the United States and France, has been supporting various opposition groups figating against the Assad regime in Syria since 2011, mostly grouped together as the “Free Syrian Army”. Also known as the “moderate opposition,” these groups have their stronghold in northwestern Syria, around the cities of Aleppo and Idlib, which are very close to the Turkish border. After the Assad regime’s encirclement of Aleppo failed in February 2014, these opposition forces regis- tered rapid and signi cant gains, and the Assad regime seemed to be gradually collapsing during the Spring and Summer of 2015.
Baathist Syria had been a pro-Soviet state during the Cold War. Russia’s only military base in the Med- iterranean is the naval base in Tartus, Syria, which it inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia has supported Syria diplomatically, most importantly in the UN Secu- rity Council, especially shielding the Assad regime from international criticism after its use of chemical weapons in the Gouta attack in August 2013. Nonetheless, Rus- sia’s massive military intervention in Syria that began on September 1, 2015, came as a surprise to many observers.
The Russian Air Force began bombing Syrian opposi- tion forces, including Turkmen ghters, many of whom are directly supported by Turkey, and over the course of several months violated Turkish airspace on numerous occasions, with a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft nally shot down by Turkey on November 24, 2015. is inci- dent should be interpreted as the result of a signi cant geopolitical reversal that has been underway since 2008, as brie y explained above.
The Next Red Line: Russia’s Military Support for the PKK and the PYD Russian–Turkish relations hit their nadir on November 24, 2015, but I would maintain that the 1990s, the Cold War, and the Tsarist–Ottoman relations were much worse. e key di erence is a critical turning point in late 1998, when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Marx- ist-Leninist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—which is recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the United States—was forced to leave Syria under Turkish pressure, and ed to Moscow where he sought political asylum. On November 4, 1998, the Russian Duma voted in favor of granting asylum for Öcalan. Despite this Duma decision, the Russian government denied Öcalan’s request and forced him to leave Moscow. is was a critical turning point in Russian–Turkish rela- tions. For decades, Moscow had supported numerous terrorist groups and armed insurgencies against Turkey. By denying Öcalan’s request, Moscow signaled that it would respect Turkey’s territorial integrity by not sup- porting terrorism or armed insurrection against Turkey. In return, Turkey signaled that it would not support ter- rorism or armed insurgency against Russia, which was important for Russia given the very strong separatist insurgency in the North Caucasus at the time.
Russian support for the PKK or its Syrian a liate, PYD, is the next red line in the relationship, the crossing of which could lead to a further deterioration in relations to level not seen since before the 1998 status quo took shape.
END NOTES
1 Habibe Özdal and Kerim Has, “Türkiye Rusya: Derin Ayrışma (mı?)”, Analist 60, February 2016, p.40.
2 Şener Aktürk, “Kırım’ın işgaliyle, Rusya Türkiye’nin en büyük tehdidi olur”, Agos, 7 March 2014, p.3.
