Mohammad-Reza Djalili/ Thierry Kellner
Iran’s growing power has recently come to the fore in the international media. Countless articles refer to the ‘new empire’ that Tehran, taking advantage of the chaos in the Middle East, is building. The Iranian government has taken this rhetoric and adopted it as its own. According to Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, Iran has not been as powerful as it is today since the reigns of Cyrus and Xerxes
Some foreign critics also note this increasing power with concern, as did Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before the US Congress. However, in contrast to this rhetoric, other commentators observe that Iran only has an “empire on paper.” How can we disentangle these conflicting visions? The Islamic Republic of Iran can count on several assets to bolster its regional clout, but the influence it seeks to wield is also subject to major limitations. In order to navigate the many and conflicting arguments that international media air vis-à-vis the Iranian “empire,” both Iran’s strengths and weaknesses need to be addressed in a coherent and systematic manner.
Strengths
A stable state in a chaotic neighborhood
In a regional context marked by growing instability, Iran enjoys relative stability. This cannot be explained by any disposition toward self-restraint on the part of Iranians. The Iranians are the only people in the region to have accomplished two major revolutions in the 20th century (in 1906-1911 and in 1979), and the “Green Movement” of 2009 was a reminder of their capacity for mobilization. Nor can this stability be explained by the repressive capacities of the regime. What explains — at least in part — the stability of Iran is the long-term presence of the state. Like China, Egypt and a few other rare countries in the world, Iran has several thousand years of history. Unlike most of its neighbors, the Iranian state is not a new creation and does not suffer from the fragility that is sometimes seen in recently created states. In the modern age, Iran’s transition from empire to nation-state was an undeniable success. The existence of a very old state tradition and the creation of a modern, centralized state under the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941) have given Iran the means that have enabled it to pass through periods of great upheaval such as the 1979 Islamic Revolution without undermining its unity and continuity.
‘Armed wings’ and representatives beyond its borders
Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian regime has set up “armed wings” outside its borders. Taking advantage of local contexts, it has also cultivated close relationships with various “representatives” to project its ideology and influence and expand its regional policy options. It supports a number of political, military and financial groups. Among its proxies, the best known is the Lebanese group Hezbollah, created within the large Shiite community in Lebanon with the agreement and assistance of former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, the main Arab ally of Iran. In November 1982, the Revolutionary Guards took charge of the structure organization and military training of this movement. Hezbollah, possessing a strategic location in Lebanon, is thus linked to both Damascus and Tehran, but it is ideologically and religiously aligned with the Islamic Republic. During the 1990s and 2000s, it received massive support through Iranian clerical foundations (bonyads). Despite its progressive transformations and sporadic tension with its protectors, Hezbollah has never questioned its links with Iran, even if it sought to appear independent of Tehran. While pursuing its own agenda in Lebanon, it helped to advance Iranian goals in the Levant against the US and Israel, becoming a pillar of the “axis of resistance.” It also cooperated with Tehran against Washington in Iraq during the 2000s by participating in the training of Shiite fighters. The context of the “Arab Spring” has made these close relations between Iran and Hezbollah strikingly apparent.
At the risk of ruining its image in Sunni Arab public opinion — and even within the Shiite community in Lebanon — the movement has become significantly involved in Syria by aligning with Iran to support the Syrian regime, the survival of which Tehran has taken up the challenge of ensuring in one form or another. Hezbollah therefore supported it in its rhetoric before contributing to the training of pro-Damascus regime forces and then participating in major military operations against the Syrian opposition. It has also supervised and trained thousands of Shiites from abroad who have gone to fight alongside the Syrian regime.
In Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Tehran established links with various Shia opposition movements, such as the Islamic Dawa Party. In the 1980s, it also played a key role in the creation of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its militia, the Badr Corps. Tehran then used its old contacts to expand its influence in post-2003 Iraq. It successfully implanted a significant network of Shia militias and its main armed representatives in Iraq are the Badr Corps, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and various Sadrist elements — Tehran having developed links with the Sadrist movement after 2003. Militias such as the Badr Corps and the AAH take their orders directly from Iran.
By positioning itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause and the resistance against Israel, Tehran also developed links with Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in particular with the Sunni Islamist movement Islamic Jihad, considered the closest Palestinian organization to Iran. To diversify its sphere of influence in the Levant and threaten Israel, it has also sought to establish links with Hamas, but has never had an unwavering ideological proximity to the organization, and rather shares a pragmatic convergence of interests. Hamas has pursued its own objectives and maintains a broad freedom of action. After the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas was isolated and turned more towards Iran, which provided it with financial and military aid. However, this proximity was undermined in the context of the Arab Spring, where Hamas adopted opposing positions to those of Iran on Syria. This positioning was criticized by Tehran, but ties were not broken completely. Iran has benefited from the new isolation of Hamas due to the dismissal of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the Gaza crisis of summer 2014, using Hamas’s isolation to re-engage with the group.
Overall, these links increase the sphere of influence, intervention and action of Tehran over various Middle Eastern theaters, and strengthen its means of deterrence because some of these movements are able to act as auxiliaries as needed.
An external special intervention unit
To disseminate the revolution more effectively beyond its borders, in 1990 Tehran established a specialized unit within the Revolutionary Guards, the Quds Force (Jerusalem Force). It reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and is responsible for interventions and special operations abroad. Today comprising between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers and possessing substantial resources, it has been controlled by Gen. Qassem Soleimani since 1997 or 1998. For several years now, it has helped organize and finance the Badr Corps in Iraq, which is considered by some people to be one of its direct components. In the 1990s, it supported Bosnian Muslims against Serb forces and the “Northern Alliance” in Afghanistan against the Taliban. It also participated in the reinforcement, funding, equipment and training of Hezbollah in Lebanon until the Arab Spring. It is also responsible for relations with Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
In the context of the Arab Spring, the Quds Force has deployed military and organizational forces in Syria. It took charge of the supervision of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and, starting in the summer of 2012, in cooperation with Hezbollah, of the mobilization, organization, financing and military training of thousands of Shiites recruited in Iraq and Lebanon and countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen to fight alongside the Syrian regime. It also assisted in the establishment and training of Syria’s National Defense Forces, a multi-religious paramilitary organization modeled on the Iranian Basij and which consists of up to 50,000 members. A total of 1,000 members of the Quds Force have been present at all times in Syria; it has probably lost 100 of these men. Its influence and direct involvement in the Syrian conflict has continued to increase, as demonstrated by the presence of Soleimani in the region of Deraa and the major role played by the Shia militias it controls during the offensive launched by Damascus against rebel positions in February 2015. The asymmetric strategy deployed in Syria was first tested in Iraq, where it became well established during the post-2003 period. It also contributed by supervising the Iraqi army after the departure of the US in 2011, and by assembling, financing, structuring and supervising volunteers and Shia militias fighting in that country. The Quds Force has thus invested considerably in these two fields, increasing the military capabilities of its Syrian and Iraqi allies, and contributing to the establishment of direct Iranian influence in these areas.
Thanks to the Quds Force’s actions, Tehran has so far been able to help prevent the collapse of its Syrian ally and establish its influence in this country, greatly extend its regional network of Shiite groups (organized on the model of Lebanon’s Hezbollah) and considerably increase its influence in Iraq — to the point of irritating Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in Iraq, who has said that Tehran must not forget that Iraq is an independent country. This strategy has also allowed it to spread its radical ideology to Syria and Iraq and to strengthen its image by demonstrating its powers of mobilization and power projection in Shiite communities across the Middle East.
A varied and substantial soft power
The fourth advantage Iran possesses is its “soft power.” Alongside the popularity of Iranian culture in the Muslim world, the ideological discourse of the Islamic Republic — the first Shiite state in the world — has proved attractive to some non-Iranian Shiite populations in the Middle East. Through its bonyads Iran has also distributed material assistance to poor communities to encourage them to support political movements that it benefits from. Another means of influence at its disposal consists of the Shiite clerical transnational networks that traditionally link the Iranian clergy to Shiite clerics across the Muslim world. These clerics are united by family ties or have followed the same studies in Shia training centers (hawza). Beyond these aspects of the “Shia card,” anti-Israeli and anti-Western dimensions of Iran’s ideological discourse have also enabled it to strengthen its image and win the support of Sunni Arab public opinion. This card has, however, lost its luster in the context of the Arab Spring and Iranian support for Assad.
To this list we must add the investments made by Tehran to further its propaganda policy, with the creation of satellite television channels and international radio stations in foreign languages in order to spread the government’s message worldwide. Moreover, as part of its cultural diplomacy, in 1995 it established the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO), which is responsible for the coordination of religious and cultural activities abroad. The ICRO is affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Guidance, and its activities are supervised by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Although theoretically independent, the overseas representations of this organization (mainly in Muslim countries and in some European capitals) work in association with Iranian embassies. The organization also runs a publishing house that produces propaganda publications in 25 languages.
Vulnerabilities
A policy more reactive than active
Iran has been much more a “reactive” than an active power in the political upheavals that have shaken the Middle East for three decades and which have enabled it to establish a place on the regional chessboard. There is no doubt that it has contributed to the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but it is not responsible for the weaknesses of the Lebanese state, which enabled the formation of a militia whose military capabilities surpass those of the national armed forces. Moreover, it is not the cause of the Arab Spring or the Syrian civil war. Tehran is involved in the latter, both to defend the Assad regime — its long-time ally — and to try to maintain its role as a major player in the Levant’s affairs. In Iraq, Iran has become a major actor due to the 2003 US intervention that allowed the installation of a Shia power in Baghdad, not because of any effective foreign policy. In Bahrain, the uprising of the Shiite majority has been caused by the local context and the Arab Spring rather than an operation led by Tehran. Similarly in Yemen, although according to a confidential UN report Iran has financially helped the Houthis and delivered them weapons since 2009, it is the local context that explains the seizure of power by this Shia movement in Sana’a in February 2015 rather than any Iranian role. However, the Islamic Republic has cleverly exploited this last event by building more links with this movement by politically supporting it and vehemently denouncing Saudi Arabia’s military’s air operations in the country. The Iranian regime has shown maneuvrist intelligence and a tactical ability to take advantage of events that have occurred in the region without actually having triggered them. This shows that Tehran is more a “default power” than a “true power” initiating changes.
Low military capabilities
Despite its ambitions in the Middle East, Iran is weak militarily. A national army was only formed relatively recently (in the Pahlavi Dynasty) and it does not have a strong martial tradition. Apart from their involvement in Oman before the revolution and the war against Iraq, the Iranian armed forces have little military experience in modern times. Moreover, after the Islamic Revolution, the focus was on internal security and the protection of the regime, which is why Tehran created the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij paramilitary militias linked to it. Since its foundation, it has invested enormously in this ideological army. The Revolutionary Guards, which are very involved in the economic sector, have what are generally considered the best equipped land, naval and air forces in the country and a unit specialized in cyber warfare, but they have not been tested in the field since the Iran-Iraq War. Alongside this praetorian guard of the regime, the national army (Artesh) is thought of as the poor parent. The Islamic regime has long been closely monitoring this army and there is a latent competition between the Artesh and the Revolutionary Guards, a situation that could potentially lead to vulnerability for Tehran.
For many military experts, the conventional land, naval and air forces of Iran have limited capacities, with their equipment dating from the time of the shah. Although Tehran has managed to modernize to some extent, much of their equipment is considered obsolete and of poor quality. The Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf have higher defense budgets and more modern and efficient equipment due to their arms purchases and military cooperation with the West. Their air forces, vital in case of conflict in the Persian Gulf, are numerically and technologically superior.
To counterbalance its conventional weakness, Tehran counts on asymmetric means and strategy, on coastal defense and on missiles. Its nuclear policy also answers in part to this conventional weakness and its need to strengthen its deterrence. Aiming at self-sufficiency, Iran has also developed an arms industry, although its production remains limited in terms of quality and technological prowess. Its military strategy being essentially defensive, it has very few means of power projection at its disposal. However, it could disrupt the oil tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf — even though an extended shutdown of traffic is not as simple as it seems and Iran would suffer too — or use its proxies to threaten its opponents in case of conflict. An accurate assessment of Iran’s military capabilities remains a delicate exercise. Research institutes specialized in military matters lack reliable information, while Iran extensively publicizes its missile tests and the country’s maneuvers in the Strait of Hormuz. In view of the country’s weaknesses, this policy contributes to its vital strategy of deterrence, while also contributing to the domestic propaganda of the regime.
The dangers of the rise of radical Sunni Islam
Iran is home to the largest Shia population in the world, but it is also home to a substantial Sunni minority. Although not a very large group nationwide — constituting between 8 to 15 percent of the population — the Sunnis are geographically concentrated in the margins of the old empire, where they are very numerous (West Azerbaijan province, the Kurdish-populated areas of Iran, Khuzestan province and the bank of the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan). Moreover, they belong mainly to non-Persian ethnic groups (Turkmens, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis). This localization on the borders and the cross-border character of the ethnic groups to which they belong constitute vulnerability for Tehran. This vulnerability is accentuated by Tehran’s policy toward the Sunni religious minority. Unlike non-Muslim religious minorities (Christians, Jews or Zoroastrians) who are numerically fewer, the Sunnis have no special status. In fact, given the very strong Shia character of state structures, they are more marginalized and discriminated against than they were during the time of the shah. The sporadic tensions between the central authorities and Sunnis have increased since the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, Tehran is faced with armed Sunni groups like Jundallah in Sistan and Baluchistan province — the leader of which was executed in 2010 — or more recently Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which appeared in 2012. The latter condemns Tehran’s support for Damascus and claimed a series of attacks in border districts with Pakistan between 2013 and 2015. It is also responsible for the kidnapping of Iranian border guards in February 2015.
In addition to these domestic groups, Tehran — already targeted by Sunni radicals in Lebanon and Yemen — now has to deal with the rise of new hostile forces in its neighborhood. This is the case to the west of the country, with Islamic State installed in Iraq and Syria, and to the east in Afghanistan with the Taliban, which has always been anti-Shia and has been regaining power since the Western withdrawal. Tehran was surprised by the rapid advance of Islamic State. To prevent intrusions on its territory, it strengthened — first discreetly then more overtly — its involvement in Iraq and Syria. Politically, in order to try to reduce support for Islamic State, it pragmatically facilitated the replacement of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki to open the way for a new Iraqi government more supportive of Sunnis and Kurds. To reinforce its image, it also presented itself as the protector of religious minorities, especially of Iraqi Christians threatened by Islamic State. Militarily, it provided aid in terms of materials, logistics and information as well as advisers to groups considered to be counterweights to Islamic State (Shiite militias, Kurdish fighters and the Iraqi national army) and dispatched Gen. Soleimani and al-Quds forces to advise and assist Baghdad in the fight against this movement. Its action in Iraq gained greater visibility with direct air raids targeting Islamic State at the end of 2014 and the retaking of Tikrit, mostly by Shiite militias, in March 2015. Allied Shia groups were also in the forefront during the spring offensive in 2015 in Anbar province. Tehran publicizes its action in Iraq by distributing propaganda presenting Iran as the only real opponent to Islamic State in the country, with the West being accused of doing nothing.
In Syria, its action has been less publicized. Tehran has continued to assist the Syrian regime by providing it with massive military and financial support, and organizing the transfer of Shiite fighters from Iraq to Syria in order to increase Assad’s resistance capacity. This has also enabled Tehran to consolidate its role as an essential ally for the Syrian regime. However, in Syria, the “fight” against Islamic State is more ambiguous than in Iraq. Damascus gives priority to focusing its military operations on other more moderate rebel groups rather than Islamic State — although it does also fight Islamic State — in order to present itself as the only possible alternative to the Islamist caliphate. The regime’s survival strategy corresponds to Iran’s objectives in this country. With the successes of Islamic State in spring of 2015 in Syria, Tehran seems to be acting defensively by strengthening coordination between Baghdad and Damascus. A trilateral meeting (Iran-Iraq-Syria) to improve the “anti-terrorist” fight (officially against Islamic State) was organized in Baghdad. Through its actions, Tehran has strengthened its image, presence and influence among its neighbors but it has also become more exposed and has been designated, alongside the US, the main enemy of Islamic State.
In Afghanistan, most of the Taliban do not recognize Islamic State’s leadership, but some Taliban fighters have recently pledged their allegiance to it. In January 2015, a spokesman of the movement announced its “expansion” to “Khorasan” — a geographical area covering the northeast of the Iranian plateau, Afghanistan, Pakistan and also southern Central Asia, an area from which Islamic State has managed to recruit fighters. A former commander of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan was appointed “governor” of the “province,” and in April 2015 Islamic State claimed a suicide attack in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. Its supporters have gained ground in Nangarhar in particular. Even if this country does not appear as favorable as the Middle East for the growth of the movement — the Taliban considers Islamic State a competitor and has warned it to stay out of Afghanistan — the fact remains that these developments are worrisome for Tehran. The worst-case scenario would be the establishment of coordination or cooperation between Islamic State and the Taliban, or among some of their components. It would place Iran in the delicate position of fighting on several fronts. Such an agreement could also use the discontentment of the Iranian Sunni minority to find representatives in Iran. To avoid this scenario, Tehran seeks to extend the discreet contacts it made with the Taliban in the 2000s and find common ground with them to fight against the progression of Islamic State in Afghanistan.
A foreign policy, prisoner of ‘sectarianism’
The regime founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is an “Islamic republic.” However, even if it is based on the rule of Shiism in Iran and of Shiite communities outside Iran, it does not present itself as a “Shia republic” but as the best support for the concept of “Islamic unity” (Vahdat-e eslam) and the champion of the struggle of the Muslim world against the “global arrogance” of the US and its allies and Muslim regimes associated with the West. Thus, Iran has developed an ideological discourse in which it presents itself as the defender of the “oppressed” against the US, described as “the Great Satan.” It has also taken up the cause of the Palestinians against Israel. These aspects of its rhetoric have had positive effects in terms of Iran’s image in and influence on Muslim public opinion and in particular the Arab world. This representation of the Iranian regime as the vanguard of the struggles of the Muslim world as a whole, above sectarian divisions, was maintained until the outbreak of the Arab Spring.
With the Syrian crisis, Iran’s multiform support for Damascus and its massive involvement in the civil war, which has become increasingly sectarian, has significantly deteriorated its image in Arab and Sunni public opinion. In the summer of 2014, Islamic State’s advance to control swathes of Iraqi territory helped to strengthen the pan-Shia character of Iran’s foreign policy. Tehran’s military involvement in Iraq is no longer hidden, at the risk of exacerbating sectarian tensions in the country. Meanwhile, the “cold war” with Saudi Arabia, following the Arab Spring and the Shia uprising in Bahrain, has taken on a more sectarian color with the seizure of power in Yemen by the Houthis, who have been depicted by Riyadh as Iranian proxies. The reaction of Saudi Arabia was quick, with the establishment of a Sunni military coalition to counter the Houthis and their alleged Iranian support. Even Turkey, which is prudent in its relations with Iran, severely criticized its actions in Yemen and Iraq, as well as its regional ambitions.
Ultimately, Tehran’s de facto alignment with Shia causes across the Middle East — even if it does not admit them — has pushed its foreign policy into a sectarianism trap, despite the fact that Iran had managed to avoid this with great success for a long time. This situation is dangerous for Iran; it is clear that locked in within the strict limits of Shiism, which is already divided, it is no match for the size of Sunni communities outside Iran.
An economy under pressure
Structurally, Iran suffers from decades of economic mismanagement, which have put a strain on the country’s undeniable potential. More circumstantially, it suffers from the combined effects of international bilateral and multilateral sanctions because of — but not limited to — the nuclear issue and the very significant drop in oil prices. Because of the sanctions, oil exports have been fallen by half since mid-2012, while oil prices have also been contracting, accentuating all the constraints on an economy still very dependent on the hydrocarbon sector, despite attempts to diversify. To this must be added the weight of the financial support that Iran provides to Hezbollah and other groups in Iraq or Palestine and, since 2011, to the Syrian regime and the Shia militias that have proliferated in Syria and Iraq. This would amount to several billion dollars since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The decline in oil prices and the fact that the Iranian budget is under pressure could cut this financial support. However, despite rumors of debates within Iranian power structures about the exorbitant costs of the support to Damascus, there is no indication so far that Tehran is ready to abandon its ally. Finally, the costs related to the implementation of the nuclear program are far from negligible. A study in 2013 estimated a loss of investment and oil exports of more than $100 billion, while the Bushehr nuclear power plant alone could have cost as much as $11 billion, making it one of the most expensive nuclear power plants in the world. In Iran itself, criticism has increased recently. As stated by Prof. Sadegh Zibakalam, “The imposed war [with Iraq] did not damage us as much as the nuclear program has.” This set of factors, therefore, weighs very heavily on Tehran’s economy and significantly limits its intervention capacity. After the nuclear deal concluded on July 14, 2015, the future prospects of the Iranian economy could improve. A part of the Iranian assets frozen abroad could be released as part of the global agreement (up to $50 billion, according to some estimates). Tehran has also implied that it has been preparing to open a “new page” in its economic relations with the world. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) plans to launch tenders for 40 projects after the lifting of sanctions. Investors, including many from the West, are interested but cautious, not being sure about rushing into Iran after the conclusion of such an agreement. Finally, it should not be forgotten that given its structural weaknesses, the real revival of the economy will take time, while the various sanctions imposed on Tehran will only be lifted gradually, and could be re-imposed in the event of a breach of the agreement by the Iranian side.
Competition with other regional powers
The presentation of Iran as the only regional power able to calm the storm blowing through the Middle East is highly exaggerated; Iran alone does not have the means, is diplomatically isolated in the region and cannot base its regional ambitions on major international players. Moreover, Iran is not the only power in the region. Other states such as Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia are able to compete with it. Turkey is a comparable country to Iran. It has a population of similar size (81.6 million against 80.8 in Iran). Its economy exceeds that of Iran and has many assets, including a very dynamic private sector — a major advantage over Tehran. Historically and culturally, it has a very strong military tradition; the army has always played a central role in Turkish history. Turkey is also a NATO member, has a substantial defense budget and well-equipped and modern armed forces. At the diplomatic level, it is not isolated like Iran; it maintains close relations with the West but also with many Middle Eastern countries. Largely Sunni, Ankara has an advantage over Iran within the Muslim world. Finally, it holds strong soft power linked to the spread of its history and culture but also to its successful economic and contemporary political modernization binding Islam, democracy and economic growth. It is attractive for countries in the Middle East, even if the “Turkish model” has lost its luster in recent times due to political choices by the government.
Israel must also not be disregarded. Although a small state with a small population (7.8 million people), Israel is a leading economic, military — including nuclear — technological and scientific power in the Middle East. Tel Aviv enjoys significant political, military, economic and financial US support, further increasing its capacity for action. Despite difficulties with its Arab neighbors due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has official relations with Jordan and Egypt and has begun to form discreet bonds with certain states in the Persian Gulf worried about Iran’s ambitions. Israel definitely has the means to limit and counter Iranian ambitions.
Finally, Saudi Arabia has a population one-third that of Iran, but its economic and financial capabilities should not be underestimated. Calculated according to purchasing power parity, the Saudi economy has a similar position to that of Iran. However, Saudi Arabia and the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf close to it within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) enjoy a financial capacity that is far beyond that of Tehran. Sovereign wealth funds established by these countries control colossal capitals compared to those of the Islamic Republic (more than $2,334 billion against $62 billion for Tehran). At the military level, the capacities of Saudi Arabia and its partners within the GCC also exceed those of Iran. If their military budgets are added up, they reach around $115 billion, compared to $14.8 billion for Tehran. Furthermore, the Gulf monarchies can obtain supplies of high-tech Western military equipment, a possibility denied Iran. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia is not an isolated country in the Middle East. In late March 2015, King Salman launched an unprecedented movement to rally Sunni Arab countries to counter Iranian influence. Riyadh created a military coalition of nine countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Sudan — an achievement of which even the US is incapable. The coalition intervened directly in Yemen against the Houthis. The operation aimed to “ensure that no Iranian support spreads in Yemen,” according to a diplomat interviewed by Le Monde . In the wake of this operation, better coordination between Sunni countries seems to be emerging in other locations, including in Syria.
The regional powers have varied and substantial capacities, alone, in coordination or even in cooperation — a scenario that could materialize, as shown by the recent Turkish-Saudi rapprochement or rumors of discreet contacts established between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. They constitute a formidable obstacle to any attempt to expand Iranian power.
Conclusion
By trying to build a zone of influence based on fragile states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen –and even Lebanon — Iran is fishing in troubled waters. It also runs the risk of building on quicksand; the new Iranian “empire” risks failing to establish firm foundations. It will not resist for long the internal dynamics of these countries put in motion by the Arab Spring and the turmoil that the region regularly experiences.
Relying on Shia solidarity, as Tehran has been de facto forced to do since the Arab Spring, is not a wise calculation. The Shiites, a minority in the Muslim world and even in the Middle East, are very fragmented. The sectarian tone of Iran’s foreign policy — amplified since the emergence of the Islamic State — coupled with its regional ambitions already has had the counterproductive effects of provoking the hostility of Sunni populations in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, bringing together — to a certain extent — regional powers, reducing inter-Arab rivalries that it was able to exploit before then and grouping the Sunni Arab states and the Sunni world in general around the fear that Shia Iran will extend its influence throughout the Middle East. Iranian politics has allowed the unprecedented launch of a joint military force project within the Arab League, a historic first for an organization known rather for its divisions. It also led Saudi Arabia to regain the initiative in the Arab world and to have increased autonomy against Washington, which is not necessarily good news for Tehran. Finally, through its actions Tehran has also become more exposed and has been designated — alongside the US — the main enemy of Islamic State.
Can the signing of the nuclear agreement between Tehran and the P5+1 contribute to a shift in Iran’s regional policy? It is difficult to come to a conclusion at the present moment. The July 14 agreement does reintroduce complexity and uncertainty. It offers the possibility of a real return of Iran in the international diplomatic game while relieving Tehran from external pressures, which should enable it to regain necessary room for manoeuver on the regional scene. This could be used for cooperation in resolving ongoing conflicts, but it could also give the Iranian regime new opportunities to exploit rivalries and ideological divides between regional powers. Only the future will tell which of these two options Tehran will finally choose.
REFERENCE
Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Thierry Kellner, “The rise of Iran in the Middle East: between fiction and reality,” Turkish Review 5, no. 5 (2015): 384-393.
*) PROF. MOHAMMAD-REZA DJALILI1 and PROF. THIERRY KELLNER 2 / 1 – Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies of Geneva / 2 – Université Libre de Bruxelles
Quoted in Golnaz Esfandiari, “Nuclear Program Has ‘Hurt Iran More Than Iraq War’,“ RFE/RL, Dec. 18, 2014.
Hélène Sallon, “La Ligue arabe crée une force anti-Téhéran,” le Monde, March 30, 2015.
