EUROPE IRAQI FREEDOM ASSOCIATION
Iran’s strategy for regional supremacy has facilitated the rise of ISIS
This report covers the current conflict in Iraq and asserts that the formation and rapid expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been facilitated by the Iranian regime through its interference in the affairs of Iraq and the region. It will emphasise that the US-led coalition against ISIS should at all cost prevent Iran’s meddling in Iraq, evict all its proxies and avoid forming any type of alliance with Tehran. In addition, it will highlight the crucial role of representatives of Iraqi tribes and the Sunni community, who have been marginalised by former Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki, in finding conflict resolution. Furthermore, the report will argue that the Sunni tribes will only become effective in the war against ISIS if Tehran’s influence over Baghdad is reduced and pro-Iranian Shia militias such as the Badr Brigade, Asa’ib Ahl-al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hezbollah are dismantled. The report also underscores that Muslims who advocate a tolerant interpretation of Islam in the region should be supported in order to be able to counter extremists, as a cultural and religious alternative is needed in solving the ISIS crisis.
To support the above made assertions, this report will aim to answer two critical questions, namely:
1) What is the regional strategy of the Iranian regime?
2) How did the Iranian regime’s interference in Iraq facilitate the unprecedented rise of ISIS?
Methodology
This report is the result of research conducted by European Iraqi Freedom Association (EIFA) in to the conflict in Iraq. EIFA has used various sources for data collection in order to support its claims in this report. These sources include newspaper articles, online news resources, published reports, research, television interviews, radio interviews, letters, reports of individuals, telephone calls, personal accounts of individuals and meetings with various personalities and groups from the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities. Some individual sources cannot be disclosed, as this would jeopardise their safety and security. EIFA used data provided by sources in the English, Arabic and Farsi languages. It has done its utmost to uphold the quality of data when it has translated text and transcripts from Arabic and Farsi to the English language.
Executive Summary
The Iraqi crisis, largely the product of a misguided post-invasion U.S. policy, has transformed into a formidable global threat. Iraq is now the frontier of unhinged Islamic fundamentalism, entailing that its defeat in Iraq will deliver lasting repercussions for fundamentalists across the region.
Perhaps the greatest blunder committed by the U.S. in Iraq was to relinquish the country’s nascent post-war order to Iran’s malice and mercenaries. Tehran used this unprecedented opening to expand its influence both in Iraq and in the region. This facilitated the unbridled furtherance of its three-decade-old policy of aggression and exporting of the “Islamic revolution.” It enabled Tehran to solidify control at home and expand the range of its threats to western interests.
Constitutionally, exporting of Islamic fundamentalism underwrites the overall foreign policy of Tehran’s ideological rulers. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its extraterritorial arm, the Quds Force, have a mandate to execute that core objective. Their power transcends factional bickering, which incidentally illustrates that the regime’s quarrelling factions have forged a consensus when it comes to the regime’s strategic trajectory.
Over the past decade, the Iranian regime has expanded its control in Iraq through:
a) The establishment and strengthening of Shiite militias and capture of local control;
b) Infiltration of pro-Iranian Iraqi militias and groups into key positions within the political, military, security and economic structures in Iraq;
c) Deception of the U.S. and empowerment of Iranian proxies in order to consolidate power in influential positions.
Three major factors that led to Iranian domination of Iraq were:
a) Nouri al-Maliki’s rise to power in 2006;
b) The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the ensuing withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq;
c) The Obama administration’s regional policy and its astonishing failure to effectively check the rising Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Iranian regime and its primary proxy, Nouri al-Maliki, provoked widespread anger among the Sunni community through violent suppression, exclusion from body politic, physical annihilation, and forcing Sunni leaders into exile. Despite the success of General Petraeus’ policy of creating the Awakening Councils, which pushed back al-Qaeda in 2007 – 2008, the situation took a turn for the worse with Maliki’s sectarian policies. The crisis deepened following the departure of U.S. forces and the dismantling and elimination of the Awakening Councils by Maliki.
This disturbing trend facilitated the rise and expansion of extremism, particularly through the Islamic State (ISIS). The unbridled sectarianism and corruption permeating Iraq’s security and military structure triggered their swift meltdown in the face of advancing threats. As a result, three months of Coalition airstrikes have produced only modest gains in the absence of a reliable fighting force on the ground. Washington and Baghdad have failed to organize tribal and Sunni Iraqis who have a history of fighting al-Qaeda. The majority of Sunnis and Iraqi tribes who fought against Maliki until a few months ago have now left the scene, with some being recruited by ISIS.
On the other hand, Maliki’s removal from power has dealt a significant blow to the Iranian regime. Desperately seeking to regain lost territory, Tehran pursues a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, it uses Shiite militias to regain control on the ground through the occupation of large swathes of Iraqi territory. On the other hand, it continues to empower Maliki and undermine al-Abadi in a bid to maintain its grip on power in Baghdad’s central government. In the meantime, Tehran’s apparent animosity toward ISIS is tactical at best. U.S. entanglement in the theatre against ISIS gives Iran a chance to restore its dominance in Iraq.
As a result, militias affiliated with the Iranian regime have gained increasing power in Iraq and have recaptured some areas from ISIS. Compounding the numerous atrocities they have committed over the past decade, they are now engaged in what can only be described as acts of genocide in Sunni communities recaptured from ISIS. The recent massacre of 72 Sunni civilians at the hands of Shia militias affiliated with Iran’s terrorist Quds Force in Barwanah village in Diyala Province clearly indicates the dangerous sectarian strife that lurks. The ethnic cleansing and genocide, forced migration, burning of mosques and homes of Sunnis in various regions of Iraq by these brutal militias undermine the fight against ISIS. As Human Rights Watch accurately echoed EIFA’s previous concerns in its World Report 2015, Shia militias have been mobilised without government oversight or regulation and continue committing atrocities against Sunnis as ostensible ISIS sympathisers. However, to this day, PM Haider al-Abadi continues to rely on these Shia militias that operate outside any legal framework and appears to be reluctant to dismantle them, to the great dismay of many human rights groups.
A solution to the crisis is hopelessly out of reach without the active and pervasive participation of Sunnis and tribal forces in the reconstitution of the broken political process. These forces are prepared to engage on the ground, and their potency was at its most obvious when they successfully repelled al-Qaeda during the past decade. However, in order to engage these forces effectively, the current policy has to be reconfigured and corrected. The new and pro-active policy should include the rigorous restraining of Iranian influence in Iraq and the expulsion of its destructive proxies, whose main objective has been to aggravate sectarian sensitivities and hostilities. Shiite militias such as the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah must also be evicted from Iraq in order to rekindle a lasting environment of political reconciliation. Furthermore, PM Haider al-Abadi must restore the Iraqi judicial system to one that is independent of political and particularly Iranian interference and establish the rule of law in Iraq.
Hinting at possible collaboration with Tehran to solve the Iraqi crisis would unquestionably constitute an irreversible mistake. This irrational and mistaken approach has already been tested by two U.S. administrations – Bush and Obama – over the past fourteen years. At a time when Iraq is turning a historic corner, Washington’s collaboration with Tehran and turning a blind eye to the regime’s vicious meddling, will undermine PM al-Abadi. This counterproductive and dangerous policy will in all likelihood lead to al-Abadi’s defeat, if he is indeed serious about making real changes and detaching Iraq from past sectarian policies. He will end up being a victim of America’s misguided policy with potentially catastrophic consequences that will reverberate throughout the region.
The new approach, which would include a serious restraining of Iran’s influence in Iraq, promises the only political and lasting solution to the spiralling sectarian strife in Iraq and the region. In the absence of this alternative, the war against ISIS will morph into a sectarian war pitting Shiites against Sunnis, which even if temporarily restrained, will resurface in due course, haunting the region for decades to come.
The strategy to defeat ISIS should be fundamentally predicated on a cultural and religious alternative and antithesis that can mount a strategic challenge to the violent, fanatic and extremist view of Islam. America’s resolute support for a tolerant and democratic Islam that is indigenous to the Middle East will be instrumental in drying up the breeding ground of fundamentalism, whether in its Sunni form of ISIS or its Shiite version of the Iranian regime and its merciless mercenaries.
Chapter 1
Iran’s regional strategy
Since the formation of Ayatollah Khomeini’s[1] regime in 1979, Iran’s core objective has been to establish a global Islamic state, which according to Khomeini constitutes an Islamic caliphate. This ambition has been unambiguously specified in the Iranian regime’s Constitution. Article 11 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states:
“In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur’an (“This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me” [21:92]), all Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world”[2].
Khomeini’s aspiration for a global Islamic state is also evidently echoed in his will and testament:
“My advice to all the Muslims and the oppressed of the world is that you must not
sit and wait expecting that the rulers and political leaders of your country or foreign
powers bring you independence and liberty as a gift. You and I have witnessed the
fact that in this century gradually the world-devouring big powers penetrated into
all Islamic countries, as well as into other smaller countries. We saw…that none
of the governments that ruled over these countries were ever concerned with the
freedom, independence and welfare of their own people themselves and whatever
they did was for their own self-interests or for the higher income people who lived
in complete comfort while the poor ghetto dwellers were deprived of all necessities
of life…The ruling classes exploited them for the interests of the comfortable
and pleasure seeking classes… [and they] converted countries into markets for the
East and the West… [and] led countries to backwardness and consumerism…0
oppressed people of the world and you 0 Muslim countries and Muslims of the
world, rise up, and with your teeth, demand your rights. Do not be afraid of the
propaganda noise of the super powers and their mercenary agents.
Kick out your criminal rulers who hand over your hard earned wealth and income to your enemies
and the enemies of Islam and of the world have deprived classes.
Move towards an Islamic government with free and independent republics with whose realization
you will put all the arrogant powers of the world in their places and lead all the oppressed
people to leadership and inheritance of the earth”[3].
Khomeini’s will is not merely an expression of desires, but rather a specific agenda for expanding Iran’s regional influence. The Constitution defines from the outset the military’s role as “expanding God’s state of law” and further elaborates:
“In establishing and equipping the country’s defence forces, the focus should be on faith and religion as the main pillar and standard. Therefore, the army of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards are formed with the above mentioned objective; they will not only defend the borders, but also spread the message of jihad in the path of God and fighting to expand God’s state of law in the world”[4]
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), charged with safeguarding the regime’s interest and providing training support to terrorist groups throughout the region and abroad[5], is authorised to carry out this mission of spreading Jihad and expanding god’s state of law internationally. The IRGC uses the Quds Force, its overseas arm, to accomplish such an essential strategy of the Iranian theocracy. It relies on various state institutions, such as the ministries of foreign affairs and intelligence, and has established entities involved in political, ideological and cultural activities in order to, as Tehran describes it, effectively “export the revolution”. The following organisations are examples of such entities:
• Ahlul bayt World Assembly (serves to recruit local Shiite forces)[6]
• Taqrib Mazaheb – The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought (serves to recruit local Sunni forces)[7]
• Islamic Development Organisation[8]
By founding these groups and allocating enormous funds for their activities, the Iranian regime has succeeded in establishing itself over the years as the pivotal point for the creation of an Islamic caliphate, with Tehran heading the axis.
Exporting revolution
During the last 25 years Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, heir of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, has had the final word on all matters related to exporting the Islamic fundamentalist ideology and the regime’s so-called revolution. It is noteworthy that during Khomeini’s tenure, Khamenei was the highest-ranking official in contact with various terrorist and ideological elements outside of Iran. The Secretary General of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God), Hassan Nasrallah, has specified that he had links with Khamenei from the very start. On 6th June 2014, the IRGC’s associated Fars News Agency published Nasrallah’s speech of 2003 in which he addressed a group of students, elaborating on this connection:
“In 1979, Lebanese Shiites (and Sunnis) were passive. However, there was good attention towards imam Khomeini and he had much influence over the Lebanese nation… in such conditions the imam said the army and IRGC must go to Syria and Lebanon where the Israelis were stationed. The IRGC stationed its forces in readiness. The Islamic Republic of Iran went to the limit in providing support for Lebanon; money, training, spiritual support and … we called on the imam to have a representative in Lebanon so we would not waste his time. At that time the imam said: “Mr Khamenei is my representative who has full authorization”. Khamenei was very kind to us. From the beginning when Hezbollah was established, Khamenei was in charge of our affairs. In issues related to Israel he had much more expertise than all other experts. In short, we continued the work; the imam had ordered us to continue until a complete expulsion [Israeli forces from Lebanon]. Then the imam passed away. We went to see Khamenei who is now your leader, asking him to assign an individual so we would not bother him too much. Khamenei replied: “No, the issue of Israel and Lebanon is my case and I am the one in charge”. Khamenei knows the characteristics of each and every one of us. This deep relation was one of the main elements of victory and amongst the biggest blessings for Hezbollah”.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) was also linked to Khamenei early on. Khomeini in Tehran founded the ISCI in November of 1982 with the objective to advance ‘jihad against imperialism’ and to ‘establish an Islamic state’. Khamenei, the Iranian regime’s current supreme leader, was in charge of codifying the statute of ISCI around the leadership of Khomeini. Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of ISCI stated that: “The Supreme Council, its laws and statute have all been formed by the supreme leader [Khamenei] himself under the supervision of the imam of nations [Khomeini]”[9].
Many members of Khamenei’s inner circle are individuals holding dual Iranian-Iraqi nationalities who provide the necessary means for the Iranian regime’s meddling abroad. Mullah Shahroudi, former head of the judiciary, and Mullah Mohammad Ali Taskhiri, are both very close to Khamenei and hold dual Iraqi-Iranian nationalities.
Iraq’s significance
Subsequent to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq was immediately nominated by the Ayatollahs as the key state to export the ‘revolution’ to, due to numerous geopolitical, historic and demographic reasons. Iraq would serve as a catalyst for Tehran to pursue its strategy of exporting its ideology and revolution. Khomeini, who resided in Iraq for 13 years prior to 1979, rapidly laid the basis for exporting the revolution and began through various methods to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. Kayhan newspaper, one of the main papers in Iran at that time, published an article on 19th April 1980 heading “The Imam invites the Iraqi army to uprising” following Khomeini’s general speech, two days earlier, on 17th April 1980 in which he declared that:
“The Iraqi government is a government in which a number of military officers have come and sat around each other and they do whatever they want. They are old and this Saddam Hussein is crazy and old, and all he talks about is that we are Arab. This means we are Arab and we don’t want Islam… their army is comprised of these Muslims, these Sunnis, and these Shiites. Well, an army of Muslims must rise. The noble Iraqi nation must free itself from their grasps. The Iraqi army must pay attention to this meaning that it must repress these figures and it must destroy them”.
On a different occasion Khomeini addressed the Iraqi army:
“… I am very much disappointed in Iraq’s senior ranks. However, I am not disappointed in the officers and soldiers. I am expecting them to rise bravely and uproot the pillars of cruelty as it happened in Iran or desert the garrisons and barracks and not tolerate the cruelty of the Ba’ath party. I am not disappointed in the labourers and government employees working for the usurper Ba’ath government and I hope they join hand in hand with the Iraqi nation and rid this disgraceful stain of this nation”[10].
The Jomhouri Islami daily that continuously published Khomeini’s calls to the Iraqi people to overthrow the government reported that his messages have been translated into Arabic and distributed amongst the Iraqi people and military[11].
From the outset of the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini defined the conflict as a “divine blessing”. In June 1982, less than two years after the war began, Iraqi soldiers retreated from all Iranian territory and a dignified peace was completely in reach. However, Khomeini continued the war for another 6 years until July 1988 with the slogan of ‘Conquering Jerusalem through Karbala’. He only accepted the ceasefire agreement when he suffered major defeats in all fronts and no longer had any prospect of winning the war.
Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by Saddam Hussein’s forces, Iraq was led into the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraqi government subsequently grew weaker. Iran took advantage of this opportunity to intensify its interference in Iraq, reaching its peak during the 2003 US led-invasion. The regime in Tehran deliberately encouraged the Iraqi government in 1990 not to withdraw from Kuwait and simultaneously stirred the West to launch an intervention, cunningly directing the chain of events to its own interest.
A similar scenario reoccurred in a much larger dimension in 2002 and 2003 during which Tehran was in fact a tacit supporter of the US invasion of Iraq.
Occupying Iraq in 2003 – a new chapter for Tehran
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iran expanded its political, intelligence, terrorist and economic interference into Iraq in an unprecedented manner. As the first step after the fall of Saddam, Tehran dispatched thousands of Iraqis who had lived in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war back to their country, all organized into groups linked to the IRGC. After 2003 they gradually entered the military and other institutions, while maintaining their militant identities by receiving their orders from Iran’s Quds Force. In parallel measures, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence established its comprehensive presence by stationing its agents in various areas of Iraq. At the time Iraqi newspapers wrote that this ministry had over 200 offices throughout the country. The Iranian regime adopted a multi-faceted policy in Iraq. While Tehran was attempting to place the Iraqi government, army, security groups and intelligence services under its control, it was also attempting to form Shiite militias that were directly linked to the Quds Force and pursued the regime’s objectives in Iraq. These groups were both pressure centres on the US and conducted attacks against US forces, while simultaneously expanding the Iranian regime’s influence and interests regarding the Iraqi government.
In January 2007 the Iranian opposition, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), revealed the identities of 32,000 Iraqis on Iran’s payroll. The document exposed details including Iranian and Iraqi names, when they entered the IRGC, mission location, bank account numbers and the salaries these Iraqis received from the IRGC, specified in Iranian currency. The Associated Press wrote on 26 January 2006:
“An Iranian opposition group stationed in France said on Friday that Iran has thousands of employees active in Iraq, publishing the names of nearly 32,000 individuals they claim are regime elements… the National Council of Resistance of Iran published the names, the alleged dates they were hired by Iran and the wages of 31,690 Iraqis. The Council claimed that most of the money of these people is paid by Iran’s IRGC Quds Force, part of Iran’s army that the US military says pays the expenses of militants in Iraq and equips them with weapons.”
Subsequently, 400 of these Iraqis were hired in the office of Prime Minister Maliki. One of them was Hadi al-Ameri, the commander of the Badr terrorist militias, who later became the minister of transportation in the second term of Maliki’s premiership. Ameri is currently a militia commander and involved in perpetrating appalling crimes in Iraq.
Maliki’s premiership: gradual expansion of Iran’s influence in Iraq
Due to the presence of US forces in Iraq, Tehran was unable to bring Iraq entirely under its control through merely Iranian backed militias and the Quds Force. When Maliki assumed office in 2006, the Ayatollahs accelerated their gradual domination over Iraq. Maliki, who was installed by the Americans, became a key figure in implementing Tehran’s agenda in Iraq. The Iranian regime’s slyest move was to beguile the Americans into thinking that Maliki was safeguarding the interests of both Iran and the US simultaneously even though Maliki made no secret about his hostile view towards the US. Dia al-Shakarchi, an activist from the Islamic Dawa Party, told journalist Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker that: “Maliki was known as an anti-American… Even after 2003, his stance was very aggressive toward Americans” [12]. Furthermore, Maliki was one of the leaders of Dawa in Iraq that was also in charge of bombing US and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983. Maliki had spent seven years in Iran in the 1980s. Filkins argues that in Iran Maliki “commanded a camp, in a border town called Ahvaz, to train Iraqi fighters for missions against Saddam’s invading Army. The operation was financed and directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards”[13]. Maliki’s second term as PM had catastrophic consequences for the people of Iraq and the wider region. Ali Khedery, an advisor to various US ambassadors to Iraq from 2003 to 2009, wrote in the Washington Post on 3rd July 2014 regarding Maliki:
“In 2006, I helped introduce him to the U.S. ambassador, recommending him as a promising option for prime minister…. By 2010, however, I was urging the vice president of the United States and the White House senior staff to withdraw their support for Maliki. I had come to realize that if he remained in office, he would create a divisive, despotic and sectarian government that would rip the country apart and devastate American interests. America stuck by Maliki. As a result, we now face strategic defeat in Iraq and perhaps in the broader Middle East…. He began a systematic campaign to destroy the Iraqi state and replace it with his private office and his political party. He sacked professional generals and replaced them with those personally loyal to him. He coerced Iraq’s chief justice to bar some of his rivals from participating in the elections in March 2010. After the results were announced and Maliki lost to a moderate, pro-Western coalition encompassing all of Iraq’s major ethno- sectarian groups, the judge issued a ruling that awarded Maliki the first chance to form a government, ushering in more tensions and violence….Our debates mattered little, however, because the most powerful man in Iraq and the Middle East, Gen. Qassim Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, was about to resolve the crisis for us… After admonishing the feuding Iraqis to work together, Soleimani dictated the outcome on behalf of Iran’s supreme leader: Maliki would remain premier; Jalal Talabani, a legendary Kurdish guerrilla with decades-long ties to Iran, would remain president; and, most importantly, the American military would be made to leave at the end of 2011….Maliki never appointed a permanent, parliament-confirmed interior minister, nor a defense minister, nor an intelligence chief. Instead, he took the positions for himself. He also broke nearly every promise he made to share power with his political rivals after they voted him back into office through parliament in late 2010”[14].
Withdrawal of US troops, handing Iraq over to Iran
In accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Iraq and the US, American forces began to withdraw in early 2009, granting Iran a golden opportunity to achieve its objectives in Iraq, which was a great and unprecedented gift from Washington to the Ayatollahs.
Gradually, Maliki’s government distanced itself from Washington and became closer to Tehran. While Washington’s influence was waning, it was Tehran who now had the final say in Baghdad. A clear indication of the new status quo was echoed in Maliki’s approach towards the main Iranian opposition, the PMOI. The Iranian exiles, who lived in Iraq for almost 25 years by then, had set up a modern town called ‘Ashraf ’ in Diyala province, central Iraq, with their own resources. From the onset following Saddam’s fall, Tehran conspired for the massacre of its arch-enemy and annihilation of Ashraf.
As US troops withdrew from Iraq, Ashraf’s protection was transferred to Maliki’s government. Considering that the US government had signed an agreement with each and every resident of Ashraf to guarantee their safety and security in lieu of voluntary disarmament, the transfer of the responsibility to protect by Washington to Maliki’s government meant essentially singing the death warrant of these defenceless residents. From 2009 to 2013 six massacres were carried out against the residents of Ashraf. During a meeting with Iraq’s president on 29th February 2009 Khamenei emphasised that PM Maliki must uphold his commitment to the “bilateral agreement” which dictates the expulsion of PMOI members from Iraq. On 28th and 29th July 2009, Five months after Khamenei’s directives, Maliki perpetrated the first bloodbath in Ashraf. For obvious political reasons, the Obama administration had no interest in leaving even a small unit in Iraq. Thus by the end of 2011, Washington rapidly left Iraq without considering the consequences.
In his interview with Euronews on 28th November 2014, Senator John McCain said: “According to former Secretaries of Defence Panetta and Gates, as well as Ryan Crocker we could have had a residual force left behind. The President wanted out, that was their view”[15]. He further argued: “but the most credible people in America I know – Ryan Crocker, Leon Panetta and Bob Gates – all three of them said we could have left a residual force behind, we could have”[16].
In late 2011, following the withdrawal of the last US soldiers from Iraq, the country turned into an Iranian colony. Less than 24 hours after the departure of the last convoy of US troops, Maliki’s government issued the arrest warrant for Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, the highest Sunni official. The Public Prosecutor accused Hashemi of leading a death squad for the assassination of police officers and state officials. Ali Khedery wrote in the Washington Post:
“He [Maliki] also abrogated the pledges he made to the United States. Per Iran’s instructions, he did not move forcefully at the end of 2011 to renew the Security Agreement, which would have permitted American combat troops to remain in Iraq. He did not dissolve his Office of the Commander in Chief, the entity he has used to bypass the military chain of command by making all commanders report to him. He did not relinquish control of the U.S.- trained Iraqi counterterrorism and SWAT forces, wielding them as a praetorian guard. He did not dismantle the secret intelligence organizations, prisons and torture facilities with which he has bludgeoned his rivals. He did not abide by a law imposing term limits, again calling upon kangaroo courts to issue a favorable ruling.
And he still has not issued a new and comprehensive amnesty that would have helped quell unrest from previously violent Shiite and Sunni Arab factions that were gradually integrating into politics.
In short, Maliki’s one-man, one-Dawa-party Iraq looks a lot like Hussein’s one-man, one-Baath Party Iraq. But at least Hussein helped contain a strategic American enemy: Iran. And Washington didn’t spend $1 trillion propping him up. There is not much ‘democracy’ left if one man and one party with close links to Iran control the judiciary, police, army, intelligence services, oil revenue, treasury and the central bank. Under these circumstances, renewed ethno-sectarian civil war in Iraq was not a possibility. It was a certainty”[17].
Chapter 2
Maliki’s Madhouse
Imprisonment and torture
The former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, emphasised in July of 2014: “Every day we receive accounts of a terrible litany of human rights violations being committed in Iraq against ordinary Iraqi children, women and men, who have been deprived of their security, their livelihoods, their homes, education, healthcare and other basic services”[18]. Pillay further added: “The deliberate or indiscriminate targeting of civilians, the killing of civilians, the use of civilians as shields, the hindering of access for civilians to humanitarian assistance may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity”[19]. Agence France Presse (AFP) in Baghdad reported on 28th April 2010:
“Iraqi men were raped, electrocuted and beaten in a ‘secret prison’ in Baghdad, Human Rights Watch said on Wednesday, in a harrowing report reminiscent of the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib. The watchdog interviewed 42 men who were recently transferred from a jail where they say the brutality took place, to another detention facility in Baghdad, after details of misconduct were passed to the government. Human Rights Watch, who described the prisoners’ accounts of abuse as “credible and consistent,” said there must be an independent and impartial investigation, and called for prosecutions at the highest level. “The horror we found suggests torture was the norm in Muthanna,” the watchdog’s deputy Middle East director Joe Stork said, referring to the west Baghdad prison where the men were held until recently. According to HRW, prison guards hung blindfolded detainees upside down during interrogations, then kicked, whipped and beat them before placing a dirty plastic bag over suspects’ heads to cut off their air supply. When prisoners passed out, they were awoken by electric shocks to their genitals or other parts of the body, the report said.
The detainees, who were interviewed at the Al-Rusafa detention facility in Baghdad on April 26, told HRW that interrogators and security officials sodomised some detainees with broomsticks and pistol barrels. Some young men said they had been forced to perform oral sex on interrogators and guards, according to the report, and said they were whipped with heavy cables, burned with acid and cigarettes, and had their teeth smashed. “What happened at Muthanna is an example of the horrendous abuse Iraqi leaders say they want to leave behind,” Stork said. “Everyone responsible, from the top down, needs to be held accountable”[20].
Women
Of the 37,000 inmates in Iraq in 2012, nearly 11,000 were women and they were tortured in the most atrocious ways varying from beatings, electric shocks on sensitive parts of the body, sexual harassment, to rape. Amnesty International has also reported cases in which security forces detained daughters, wives and mothers to force another member of the family whom they are after to turn himself in. In Iraq it is widespread that one’s confession is considered as the most important document confirming the accuracy of the charges, even if the confession is obtained under torture and duress. The court cites these confessions even if the defendant denies them at a later stage. According to human rights organizations such conduct by the judiciary has allowed interrogators to portray their measures as legal.
Executions
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Iraq has one of the highest execution rates in the world. Executions in Iraq are usually carried out in a collective manner; in one incident in 2013, 34 people were hanged in a single day. Al-Hurra television, a US-based Arabic language satellite TV channel, cited on 11th March 2013 Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, who emphasised that executions are used “horrifically” and the death sentences of many inmates were issued following unfair trials, based on confessions that are reported to be obtained forcibly under torture. She further argued that the time has come for Iraqi officials to end this “ring of vicious violations” and halt executions as a first step towards abolishing capital punishment. In January 2013 then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, condemned the execution of 34 individuals in Iraq, including two women. Pillay said: “Even if the most scrupulous fair trial standards were observed, this would be a terrifying number of executions to take place in a single day”[21].
She continued: “Given the lack of transparency in court proceedings, major concerns about due process and fairness of trials, and the very wide range of offences for which the death penalty can be imposed in Iraq, it is a truly shocking figure…Most disturbingly, we do not have a single report of anyone on death row being pardoned, despite the fact there are well documented cases of confessions being extracted under duress”[22]. On 19 October 2014, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed their concern over the increasing number of executions in Iraq. There was an increase in the number of executions in Iraq between 2005 and 2009. In 2009, 124 people were executed. Even though there was a decrease in the number of executions in 2010 during the elections in Iraq, however the country witnessed a stark rise from 2011 to 2013. In 2013, at least 177 people were sent to the gallows and in the first 9 months of 2014, at least 60 people were executed.
Chapter 3
Sunnis persecuted
The people of Iraq largely suffered from sectarianism and crimes perpetrated by Maliki and his militia. The Sunnis were particularly targeted by these policies and faced a genocidal threat. Maliki pursued a specific and coordinated plan under supervision and with the support of the Quds Force and its commander, Qasem Soleimani. Maliki used all the resources at his disposal, such as the Iraqi judiciary and illegitimate para-military groups, in order to execute this plan.
The coordinated strategy devised by Iran and Maliki was founded on the following pillars:
The physical elimination of or exile of political and religious leaders from the Sunni community. These were leaders of various factions, members of parliament (MPs) and imams who led Friday prayers and who could potentially oppose Maliki and Iran’s gradual influence in Iraq. Tehran and its proxies, like the Badr Army and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, were engaged in such acts immediately after Iraq’s occupation. Under Maliki’s tenure persecution became more coordinated and streamlined.
To remove patriotic army personnel and specialists and replace them with those loyal to Maliki in order to eliminate the threat of dissent within the security forces.
These actions were carried out under the pretext of “fighting terrorism” based on Iraq’s Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Iraq’s judicial system was exploited to this effect. As such, the country’s prisons were filled with members of the Sunni community and nearly all of those who were executed were Sunnis. In December 2011, immediately following his return from a trip to the US, Maliki conspired against Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, one of the most respected Iraqi Sunni leaders. Al-Hashemi’s bodyguards and associates were all arrested. Maliki had a number of them sentenced to death and others were killed under torture. Al-Hashemi, who fled to Iraqi Kurdistan and subsequently to Turkey, was sentenced to death in absentia.
The trend of eliminating and purging Sunni politicians continued and in December 2012 Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi was arrested along with his bodyguards and colleagues. All these measures, evidently carried out under the orders of the Iranian regime, happened with America’s blessing. Even though Maliki desperately attempted, as usual, to justify his policies as legal measures focused on fighting terrorism, Rafe al-Essawi underscored in an interview with The New Yorker in 2014 that these measures were essentially not limited to Maliki’s main policy of eliminating Sunni leaders. Rather, it was the result of al-Essawi’s position regarding an immense corruption case involving Maliki’s clique and billions of dollars. Al-Essawi publicly denounced Maliki’s plot against him and described the attack on his office as “deliberate and premeditated” and he believed that Maliki took revenge on him due to his efforts to halt corruption in Iraq. He told The New Yorker that he believed that the raid was ordered in retaliation for his attempt to block the theft. “I am being punished because I refused to work with the other side”[23] he said. Al-Essawi emphasises in the interview that several American and Iraqi officials have told him that Maliki must have ordered the raid and he further elaborates that a former senior C.I.A. official has told him that: “The only troops that can move inside the Green Zone are under Maliki’s control”[24].
By the end 2012, one year after the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, peaceful anti-government protests in Sunni provinces began in response to the daily crimes of para-military forces and Maliki’s sectarian policies. The protesters demanded their minimum legal rights under the Iraqi constitution and first and foremost respect for the human rights of the Sunni community. Six years of suppression, execution, torture, arbitrary arrests and marginalisation of the Sunnis by Maliki reached its peak when security forces attacked the office and home of then Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi and arrested a number of his bodyguards on 21st December 2012. The Sunni residents of Anbar Province launched a massive and unprecedented protest in the form of a sit-in, blocking Ramadi’s international highway that links Iraq with Jordan. The protesters explained they would no longer tolerate Maliki’s repressive policies and that their protest would continue until their genuine demands, presented in the form of 13-articles, were met.
In solidarity with Anbar Province, similar protests were staged in other provinces such as Salaheddin, Nineveh, Al-Ta’mim and Baghdad. The major squares of these provinces became the scene of anti-government protests. The protesters used the occasion of Friday prayers every week as a platform to hold their demonstrations and deliver anti-Maliki speeches. The sit-ins continued throughout the year, non-stop, with specific slogans against the Iranian regime’s meddling in Iraq and Maliki’s government. The protestors upheld the peaceful nature of these gatherings. People from all walks of life participated in these demonstrations. From the start, the leaders of this movement formed “Coordination Committees” which were responsible for organising the protests. A unified entity called “Popular Movement” was formed in the provinces to this effect. Members of the Coordination Committee consisted of clerics, MPs, city councillors and youth leaders. They were in charge of planning rallies, ensuring publicity and taking care of the logistics. During this process, the religious and political leaders and the spokespersons of the movement were also elected.
The demands of the protestors were frequently proclaimed during rallies and Friday prayers and were widely broadcast in the media. These demands, presented in the form of 13- articles, were as follows:
Release of all female detainees who were imprisoned based on the infamous law of combating terrorism. The referral of women who were charged with felony to the criminal courts of their own provinces with the exception of cases from Baghdad, which should be referred to the Diyala Province. Transferring the legal case against Dr Rafe al-Essawi and his bodyguards to the judiciary in Anbar Province. Those who disobey the above ought to be brought to justice.
A moratorium on executions in response to international calls to stop the implementation of all these verdicts.
Suspending article 4 of the terrorism law in its entirety and halting all cases related to it until it is revoked by parliament.
Parliament should swiftly adopt the general amnesty law and remove all exceptions to it and immediately release all prisoners.
Suspending the infamous law of Accountability and Justice until it is rescinded by parliament.
Facilitating stability in all governmental institutions, particularly the military, security and judiciary and initiating the necessary executive actions and guaranteeing a dignified life for all Iraqis.
Termination of all command operations of the unlawful security services and the withdrawal of the army from the cities and residential areas in Baghdad and all other provinces of Iraq; removal of concrete blocks as they are discriminatory. Serious measures need to be taken to ensure the security of all citizens in the new Iraq provided by a local police force.
New investigations should be launched into issues regarding religious and national symbols both inside and outside of Iraq, by impartial judicial authorities and without imposition of political influence.
Sectarian phrases and slogans should be prohibited in governmental institutions, particularly in institutions related to security, as well as in all media.
A comprehensive census should be carried out prior to nationwide elections where details of religion, ethnicity and faith affiliations of all Iraqis should be declared.
Indiscriminate assaults and attacks at night should be halted; the accused should be arrested through legal means during daytime. The laws relating to secret informants should be overturned as it fuels animosity and sectarianism.
Accelerating the formation of the Supreme Federal Court comprised of honest and professional judges and staff with no affiliation to a political faction or party with power, in order to guarantee an independent judiciary.
Returning all usurped mosques and sites of worship, endowments and citizens’ private properties and the abolition of law 19 of 2005.
Despite mass arrests and brutal suppression, Maliki failed to tame the social unrest. The uprising continued in Anbar, Salaheddin, Diyala, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Baghdad. The epicentre of these rallies was Anbar, the largest province in Iraq, which is of strategic importance due to its borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The uprising began in Sunni provinces due to the unjust treatment of the Sunni population by Maliki. However, it was not a religious movement but a tribal and nationalistic uprising that gained also much sympathy amongst Shiite tribes in the south. This was due to common political motives of anti-despotism and patriotic views and historical close tribal relations. Therefore, many sheikh councils and tribal dignitaries from the south issued statements or dispatched delegations to the protests and demonstrations in Sunni provinces to express their support of the movement and its legitimate demands. The Sunni demonstrators welcomed these delegations by raising pictures and placards of sacred Shiite sanctities during their rallies. As such, the protestors manifested their anti-sectarian views and demonstrated that it was Maliki and the Iranian regime that sought to flare the sectarian sedition in Iraq.
Within a year, despite many obstacles created by Maliki, the movement grew and matured gradually. Maliki’s attempts to bribe tribal leaders in order to denounce the movement proved to be futile. Maliki attempted to set up Awakening Councils that were associated to him. He even tried to use Martin Kobler, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, to weaken the uprising and its movement. Despite Maliki’s propaganda and actions against the movement, the leaders insisted on the peaceful nature of the protests and insisted on their 13-article demands. For a year Maliki was unable to respond to the protesters’ rightful demands and peaceful rallies. Under various pretexts, such as the presence of weapons and terrorist elements inside the protesters’ tents and at protest squares, Maliki attempted to pave the grounds for a military attack and to take-over the protest sites. However, the protesters were aware of this and avoided clashes with the military that Maliki was aiming for. They were able to postpone Maliki’s attempts for a military confrontation for a year. The protesters declared repeatedly that there are no weapons in their protest squares and announced their readiness for full inspections of these sites by government forces.
The demands raised in peaceful million-man protests received no positive response from Maliki and on 23rd April 2013 Maliki attacked a protest site in the small town of al-Hawija in Kirkuk Province. According to Al Jazeera TV, “At least 50 people were killed and over 250 others injured.” Mohamed al-Tamim, Iraq’s former Minister of Education, resigned from Maliki’s cabinet following the al-Hawija massacre and emphasised “What took place in al-Hawija was nothing but a massacre in the exact meaning of the word”[25]. Al Sharqiya TV quoted on 26th April Salim al-Jabouri, then Chairman of the Human Rights Commission in the Iraqi parliament: “A committee has been formed by parliament to establish the truth… The claim that the protesters had no weapons has been proven with facts… The assailants were SWAT units who accepted no peaceful solutions. They had nothing but weapons at their disposal to use. About 80% of the victims were targeted from the waist up, meaning the chest, face, head or side”.
Following the al-Hawija massacre, Maliki was not confronted by the US or the international community. They remained silent in the face of such gross violations and even approved and provided tacit support to the tyrant. Maliki was certain of Iran’s all-out support and therefore calculated that he could end the protests and demonstrations in the six protesting provinces through military attacks. As a result, he tried to round up the protest squares and carry out ground attacks. Maliki’s main focus was on the focal point of the uprising, i.e. Anbar Province. He also attempted to pursue a major military operation in various areas of Baghdad and the beltway surrounding it (mainly Sunni communities) under the pretext of fighting terrorism. In addition to mass murder and arrests, tens of thousands of locals were displaced as a result.
During the eighth months of protests in Sunni provinces against Maliki’s government, in July 2013 sporadic demonstrations began in Iraq’s southern Shiite provinces. The protesters condemned the widespread corruption in Maliki’s government and its poor public services. At first the provinces of Ziqar, Basra and Meisan protested against lack of services. However, slogans rapidly turned against Maliki. Some of the chants heard in the demonstrations in Basra province were: “No to dictatorship, no to bloodshed”, “Nouri al-Maliki is a liar”, “The government has failed”, “Maliki is a murderer”, “Maliki, out, out”. Lawyers, intellectuals and civil society organisations joined these protests. This series of demonstrations turned into a much larger nationwide rally on 31st August 2013, held in various parts of Baghdad and 13 other provinces (Diyala, Anbar, Najaf, Karbala, Ziqar, Babel, Diwaniya, al-Emara, al-Mothana, Basra, Nineveh, Salaheddin and Kirkuk). Hence, the demonstrations in the six Sunni provinces were joined by the southern Shiite provinces in rallies against Maliki.
Increasing general dissent to Maliki’s policies and corruption created a new equilibrium among the political movements and led to an increasing tension between almost all of them and Maliki. This crisis inevitably entered the ranks of the National Alliance (a Shiite coalition of mainly pro-Iranian political movements) and set the stage for its disintegration and fragmentation. This led to a new alignment within the coalition, with the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq of Ammar al-Hakim and the Sadrists aligning against the State of Law Coalition, headed by Maliki.
Despite all the conspiracies, arrests and repression imposed by Maliki, the protests not only continued but gained strength day by day. Furthermore, Maliki was politically isolated more than ever before due to public dissent resulting from the lack of public services, poverty, corruption and most importantly a lack of security. Regionally and among Arab countries he was completely isolated due to his sectarian policies in Iraq and for allying with the Iranian regime and Russia on Syria, by backing Bashar al-Assad. Steadily he relied more on the Iranian regime, the Quds Force and its associated militias. This jeopardised the security of Iraq, which resulted in Maliki declaring a “state of emergency” in order to keep his government intact until the next elections.
On 4th December 2013 Maliki paid a visit to Iran. There were reports that his main goal during the trip was to obtain Tehran’s blessings for a third term premiership. Securing Syria’s eastern border with Iraq was one of the Iranian regime’s pre-conditions on continuing to support Maliki for a third term as prime minister. Anbar Province is located in this border region and with the support of the Free Syrian Army, the Sunni community prevented ground support, provided by Tehran and Maliki, from reaching Assad’s forces in Syria. The requirements included providing security in the eastern border and also rounding up the Anbar protest square. This would enable Maliki to crackdown on the protesters and his security forces to control the province and expand their reach. Therefore, Maliki began his preliminary measures in Anbar Province to reach this objective.
Finally, considering these dilemmas and his very weak status ahead of the general elections, Maliki decided to attack the Anbar protest square with the goal of achieving a simple victory similar to the al-Hawija crackdown. The objective was to uproot the main centre of protests in Anbar and silence the Sunni movement. He sought to use this victory as his electoral springboard in the southern Shiite provinces and present himself as a loyal supporter to the Shiites, having been able to suppress the Sunnis, and thus gain the Shiite votes. As such, on 25th December 2013 Maliki announced that if the protesters didn’t leave the square in Anbar, their tents would be set ablaze. On that very day Sheikh Ali Hatam Suleiman, one of the prominent leaders of the Iraqi tribes, revealed the nature of Maliki’s threats: “Let Maliki hear my words, the tents will not be removed… Maliki wants to attack everywhere under the pretext of terrorism… he wants to create problems… If Maliki starts, I don’t know what will be the ending… all the people of Anbar, young and old, men and women, we will fight against Maliki and those like him… Maliki and the Dawa Party are more dangerous than al-Qaeda for the Iraqi people. Maliki wants to start a war in the protest squares and say to the Shiites he is the man of this era that fights against terrorism, all aimed at gaining votes in the elections”[26].
Operation Anbar
At the end of 2013 Maliki ordered his military forces to enter Anbar under the pretext of targeting al-Qaeda and ISIS forces. The operation began in the desert area with helicopter gunships and massive military forces. Maliki instigated clashes on 28th December by raising fabricated charges against Ahmed al-Alwani, a prominent Sunni member of the Iraqi Parliament, which led to his arrest. Maliki was fully aware that the arrest of Ahmed al-Alwani would lead to a reaction from the tribes. Therefore, on 27th December, he first opened fire on the protesters in the Ramadi Square, killing one youth and injuring three others. This set the stage for clashes and the pretext to attack Ahmed al-Alwani’s house. On the morning of 28th December, fifty armoured vehicles and helicopters stormed al-Alwani’s residence, killing at least six of his family members and bodyguards. Al-Alwani’s brother was summarily executed at the scene and al-Alwani arrested despite the fact that he enjoyed immunity as an MP. He was first beaten and injured and then rushed to Baghdad with a helicopter.
Maliki’s armed forces began subsequently their all-out assault on the cities of Anbar Province. Following al-Alwani’s arrest, intense clashes erupted in Anbar Province. Maliki who had already dispatched a large number of soldiers to this province, sent even more troops after witnessing resistance from tribal forces. Based on the policy that was improvised by Tehran, Maliki’s propaganda apparatus branded the tribal resistance as ISIS and al-Qaeda. With this spin, Maliki justified his war in Anbar and was successful to a certain extent. As a result, he enjoyed US support and this paved the path for the Iranian regime’s presence in Iraq under the guise of fighting ISIS. Anbar’s armed tribes rose to defend their families and lands against Maliki’s forces. They repeatedly demanded their rights through the course of their peaceful demonstrations. Their demands remained simple and legitimate: the withdrawal of troops from their cities, transferring security operations to local forces, releasing political prisoners and putting an end to pervasive religious discrimination.
Maliki ran into a quagmire during his crackdown as he faced the perseverance of Anbar’s united tribes and their high morale. His troops suffered heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw from major cities. He resorted to intense and indiscriminate shelling of residential areas, including the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, which resulted in widespread casualties amongst the civilian population. In addition to homes and schools, hospitals were also targeted during these heavy bombardments and long-range missile attacks by army helicopter gunships. According to one account, the Fallujah General Hospital was targeted 17 times by Maliki’s forces during the 8 months of clashes, with the latest attack taking place on 5th August 2014. Al Jazeera TV reported on that day: “Maliki’s aviation forces bombarded the Fallujah hospital with three barrel bombs leaving behind dozens killed and injured”. The International Organization for Immigration underscored on 28th February 2014 that only two months after the start of the war the number of people displaced from Anbar province has been registered at 400,000[27]. However, Maliki’s forces were not able to gain even the slightest military victory due to the extensive resistance by tribal forces. Most of the Anbar Province came under the control of tribal resistance forces and Maliki’s forces witnessed a systematic and remarkable desertion in the very first days of the clashes. This included Maliki’s senior officers who fled the battlefields. The scope of this desertion reached a point where a platoon and even a full battalion surrendered themselves or were completely destroyed with its rank and file fleeing the scene.
According to figures reported by Al- Rafidain, a local Iraqi TV, on 19th February 2014, Maliki’s army had lost 5,900 army soldiers and 9,800 others injured after 50 days of the conflict. Additionally, over 12,300 soldiers deserted their units. Sheikh Ali Hatam said to Al Jazeera TV on 1st April, 2014: “To this day 6,000 soldiers of Maliki’s units have been killed in the battles against the tribes; over 21,000 have deserted and over 400 vehicles have been destroyed”. During his tenure Maliki attempted to reinforce his rule by forming military commands and arming over 1.2 million soldiers. By relying on this force he practically marginalized all other political parties and even his own partners in government. However, he was caught completely off guard in the wake of repeated defeats suffered by his military forces against the tribes.
Quds Force clampdown on Sunni provinces
Immediately following the uprising, signs of mass desertion amongst Maliki’s military apparatus became apparent. The Iranian regime, having experienced a similar trend in Syria, quickly began taking action and entering the scene directly and indirectly to prevent the complete dissolution of the military apparatus. According to numerous reports a large number of Iranian regime’s IRGC forces entered Baghdad airport on 8th January 2014 to provide support for Maliki’s forces in Anbar. Maliki planned to use them in Anbar Province and for defending the Green Zone.
Prior to 8th January 2014, a number of Arab media outlets reported that the Sunni tribes in Fallujah detained a number of IRGC officers and other forces dispatched by Tehran. According to these sources the IDs of some of those who were arrested near Fallujah showed they were Iranians. One of the tribesmen told al-Gharbiya TV on 4th January 2014, “Here we are actually fighting the Iranian regime that is supporting Maliki’s government.” According to al-Arabiya TV, from the onset of military operations in Anbar Province there were continuous reports of Iranian regime’s forces taking part in these battles. A credible Iraqi source told al-Arabiya at the time that more troops from the Iranian regime’s IRGC-linked Quds Force entered Iraq. They brought heat-seeking missiles, which are fired from helicopter gunships and also missiles that Hezbollah forces use in Syria. According to this Iraqi source Tehran was directly and blatantly involved in the conflict of Anbar Province.
As resistance was growing during the Anbar clashes among Iraqi people and tribes opposed to Maliki’s forces, the Quds Force concluded that the Iraqi provinces with large Sunni populations posed a serious threat to Maliki and his government and particularly to the Iranian regime. Therefore, it took measures to prepare and organise its associated militia forces in various provinces to confront such a threat. In this regard various plans and different measures were pursued:
• Widespread training in a series of urban and sectarian warfare scenarios for militia forces such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Quds Force garrisons in Iran.
• Establishing a generic Bassij force through the 9th Badr Corps and Hadi al-Ameri, commander of the Badr militia; arming tribes and elements linked to Badr forces in various provinces with the aim of having the ability to enter conflicts similar to Anbar and place cities under control.
• Additionally, Qais Khazali, founder of the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq, and Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq were ordered to pull their forces out of Syria and dispatch them to various Iraqi provinces. They were to be organized and placed on full alert to have the ability to take urgent action if all Sunni provinces experienced conditions similar to Anbar Province.
• Furthermore, elections were close and Maliki sought to launch a wave of assassinations in order to prevent Sunni candidates’ activities in mixed Shiite-Sunni provinces. Through such measures, Maliki pursued his own policy regarding the elections.
On 5th February 2014, the first series of militants linked to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, including 200 troops from Diyala province, were sent to Iran to undergo a 15-day training course at Quds Force bases. They received the following training:
• Street and urban warfare
• Assassinating dignitaries
• Attacking and seizing checkpoints
• Taking over buildings
Following their training, these militants returned to Iraq and were dispatched to Sunni provinces, especially Anbar where they joined groups with the ‘Dirty Division’, anti-terrorism units and SWAT Forces. The militants would use the uniforms of these forces during their operations. Their activities were focused both on intelligence gathering and operations. The militants are