Presidential and legislative elections were held in Costa Rica on February 2, 2014. The President is elected to a four-year term, not immediately renewable. A presidential candidate must win 40% of the vote in the first round to win, if no candidates wins over 40%, the top candidates go to a second round (on April 6 in this election). The unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is composed of 57 members elected by proportional representation in each of the seven provinces (the number of seats allocated to each province is based on the provincial populations). Elected concurrently to the President, members of the Legislative Assembly serve four-year terms and are ineligible for immediate reelection.
In legislative elections, party lists are closed and seats are distributed proportionally using a quotient and sub-quotient method (no threshold). It is explained in further detailed here.
Background: Costa Rica’s unique democracy and the two-party system
Costa Rica stands out from the rest of Central America. Whereas in most Central American countries, the second half of the twentieth century was marked by fledgling oligarchic democracies, popular challenges to oligarchic elites and – in every country except Honduras – long and bloody civil wars which ended only in the early 1990s, Costa Rica has been a unique democratic success story. It has been the only Latin American country which has consistently been rated as a functioning democracy since 1950, it is the only Latin American country which has been rated as ‘free’ by Freedom House every year since 1973, it had the second freest press in the Americas after Jamaica in 2013 (according to Reporters Without Borders) – even freer than Canada or the US and generally ranks as one of the most democratic countries in Latin America. As a result of democratic stability, Costa Rica also ranks far ahead of its Central American neighbors (except, in some cases, Panama) on socioeconomic rankings such as the Human Development Index (HDI), poverty and literacy.
Costa Rica has long been relatively remote from the rest of Central America, sparsely populated from the outset. It never developed a large black or Indian subservient class, a wealthy landed elite or a powerful oligarchy. Coffee cultivation began on modest, family farms – creating a fairly large agrarian middle sector and urban merchant class, without creating a landless peasantry. The United Fruit (UFCO) established banana plantations on the east coast and it became the country’s main export.
After independence and until the 1940s, liberals dominated the political system, ruling in tandem with the local elites in a traditional oligarchic system. However, politics were generally quite peaceful; the 1889 election saw the peaceful transfer of power from one liberal faction to another, constitutional principles were adhered to and only a single military dictatorship (1917-1919) disturbed the political order. Some presidents were progressive, in the sense that they supported the development of public education and adopted some welfare policies. It was an imperfect democracy, still largely dominated by a small, closed circle of political elites.
In 1940, Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia was elected president with the backing of the incumbent moderate liberal president, León Cortés Castro. The outgoing President had likely seen Calderón as a pliable novice politician; however, Calderón turned out to be an astute politician, who broke with the dominant ideology of classical liberalism by supporting significant welfare policies, influenced by the Catholic Church’s social teachings and Christian democracy, whereas past liberals had supported laissez-faire capitalism and been rather anticlerical. Calderón, in a bizarre alliance with the Archbishop of San José and Manuel Mora Valverde, the pragmatic leader of the Communist Party, passed a number of progressive social reforms known as the Garantías Sociales (social guarantees). These included the creation of the University of Costa Rica, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (a universal healthcare system for all residents paid for by employer and employee contributions) and the promulgation of a labour code (minimum wage, eight-hour workweek, vacations, right to strike, employee protections etc). Calderón’s policies were popular, but also aroused significant opposition from conservative politicians and the coffee/banana elites. During World War II, Calderón’s persecution of local Germans and Italians in the name of the fight against fascism were criticized.
In 1944, Calderón’s National Republican Party (PRN) allied with Manuel Mora’s communist Popular Vanguard (PVP), and the caldero-comunista alliance’s candidate was elected, defeating former President León Cortés, who had broken with his successor and led the conservative opposition. Political conflict increased, with an undeterred opposition clashing with the president and communist allies. Matters came to a head in 1948, when Calderón, backed by the Communists, ran for a second nonconsecutive term. Aligned against him were three opposition parties: the Democratic Party, the party of former President León Cortés (who died in 1946), the conservative and vehemently anticommunist Partido Unión Nacional led by Otilio Ulate Blanco and the centre-left Social Democratic Party, led by José Figueres Ferrer, an hitherto unknown figure who had denounced Calderón in a radio broadcast in 1942. The three parties united behind the conservative Otilio Ulate Blanco.
Calderón lost the election, but Calderón and the incumbent president refused to accept the new electoral commission’s certification and called on the outgoing legislature, dominated by the caldero-comunistas, to review the result. In March 1948, the legislature voted to nullify the election results on the grounds of alleged irregularities. José Figueres Ferrer assembled a diverse coalition of opponents in a Army of National Liberation; including his ragtag anti-dictatorial Caribbean Legion, conservatives, former fascist sympathizers, oligarchs and the United States. Figueres led an armed rising beginning on March 12, leading to a short civil war which ended on April 24 with the surrender of the government forces and the communists. Communist leader Manuel Mora Valverde had previously agreed to surrender in exchange for guarantees that Figueres would not seek retribution against the communists and would not repeal the garantías sociales. Within days, the communists, Calderón and the outgoing president surrendered and handed power to a transitional junta led by Figueres. He soon broke his promise to the communists and banned the PVP, dissolved the communist union and persecuted the communists. Mora and Calderón both went into exile. Around 2,000 people died in the short civil war.
A transitional junta (Junta Fundadora de la Segunda República), led by Figueres, assumed power. In May 1948, Figueres and the winner of the election, Ulate, agreed that Figueres’ junta would govern for 18 months before handing power over to Ulate. During this time, a Constituent Assembly would be elected to draft a new constitution – which remains in place to this day. Figueres’ junta did not dismantle Calderón’s progressive reforms and in fact built on them: women’s suffrage, creation of a public electricity and telecommunications company, levied a wealth tax on bank profits, nationalized the banks, eliminated racial segregation (the small Afro-Costa Rican minority had faced segregation and discriminatory policies in the past) and – most famously – abolished the military. The junta defeated, in December 1948, a first attempt by Calderón, allied with Nicaraguan dictator Antonio Somoza, to invade the country and overthrow the government. In April 1949, another rebellion, this time led by a conservative minister in the junta, was defeated.
Ulate became President in November 1949, and, while ideologically conservative, did not change Figueres’ reforms – but he did allow private banks to compete against the nationalized banks. In 1951, Figueres founded his own party, the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN) and in 1953, Figueres was elected president, easily defeating Fernando Castro Cervantes, one of his erstwhile conservative colleagues in 1948. Calderonismo and the communists remained illegal; in 1955, Calderón, against with Somoza’s support, unsuccessfully attempted to invade the country and overthrow the government. Figueres increased expenditures on education and housing, increased income taxes on the wealthy and negotiated a new contract with UFCO in which the Costa Rican share of profits increased from 10% to 30%.
The ruling PLN suffered a split ahead of the 1958 elections, with Figueres’ finance minister, Jorge Rossi Chavarría creating his own party after losing the primary to Francisco José Orlich Bolmarcich. In the election, the split of the liberacionista family allowed the conservative candidate, Mario Echandi Jiménez, who had the support of the calderonistas, to win the presidency on a plurality (46%) of the vote. The new president, however, had trouble implementing his agenda of small government and reductions in public spending; in the legislature, Echandi’s party, the PUN, had only 10 seats against 20 for the PLN and 11 for Calderón’s PRN. The main achievement, therefore, of Echandi’s presidency, was national reconciliation: Calderón and his supporters reintegrated the system, and calderonismo effectively became the more conservative rival of liberacionismo (or figuerismo).
In 1962, PLN candidate Francisco José Orlich Bolmarcich was elected president, with 50% against 35% for Calderón and only 13.5% for former president Otilio Ulate Blanco, the oficialista (governing party) candidate. In a regional context marked by the Cuban Revolution, all three major parties – the PLN, PRN and PUN – traded accusations of being communist, the PLN’s social democratic (but anticommunist) ideology being dangerously communist for the right while the PLN played on Calderón’s former ties with the communists. Chico Orlich continued Figueres’ traditional policies: progressive social democratic domestic policies (he nationalized and redistributed unused land of the UFCO) and staunch anticommunist (pro-American) policies internationally.
Politics make strange bedfellows. In 1966, Calderón’s PRN joined forces with his former enemy Ulate’s PUN in a conservative coalition (Unificación Nacional, UN) to defeat the PLN’s candidate, Daniel Oduber. The UN’s candidate, José Joaquín Trejos Fernández, criticized the PLN’s statist and social democratic policies; advocating instead for economic liberalism. In a Cold War context, the PLN was likely hurt by the endorsement of leftist leader Enrique Obregón and communist leader Manuel Mora Valverde’s call to vote against Trejos. In a close race, the PUN candidate won with 50% against 49% for Oduber, but the PLN retained a majority in the legislature. Unlike Echandi, Trejos proved fairly successful in implementing his liberal agenda: he reduced government spending, created a sales tax and controversially granted a bauxite mining concession to ALCOA.
In 1970, former President José Figueres Ferrer, endorsed by his PLN, went up against former President Mario Echandi, nominated by the governing UN after a difficult and tortuous internal process marked by clashes between Ulate’s PUN and Calderón’s PRN. Given the domination of ex-presidents in the political system, a constitutional amendment in 1969 put a complete ban on reelection in all circumstances, but this amendment was not retroactive. Figueres was elected, with 54% against 41% for Echandi and the PLN expanded its majority in the legislature. Figueres did not intend for much controversy in his administration, but in 1972, he was accused of corruption for letting an American fraudster fleeing prosecution in the US reside in Costa Rica and refusing US demands for his extradition. Otherwise, Figueres maintained moderately social democratic policies at home (but, to the dismay of the PLN’s left, maintained the ALCOA concession) and softened the anticommunism somewhat – restrictions on leftist parties loosened, he established diplomatic relations with Moscow.
The 1974 election broke with the trend of anti-incumbency and the two-party system. The PLN remained relatively united behind its candidate, 1966 candidate Daniel Oduber, but a dissident (and left-leaning) faction led by PLN deputy (and Figueres’ rival in the 1970 PLN primaries) Rodrigo Carazo created the Partido Renovación Democrática (PRD) and ran for president himself. The right was increasingly torn apart; the UN ultimately nominated Fernando Trejos, the cousin of former president Trejos. But his own cousin, José Joaquín Trejos, endorsed Carazo while former president Echandi backed Jorge González Martén, an independent right-winger. Attempts to unite the anti-liberacionista opposition proved unsuccessful, and with that, the PLN won with a plurality of 43% against 30% for the UN, 11% for Martén and 9% for Carazo. Former communist leader Manuel Mora Valverde, who had been allowed to return home and form his own party, the Socialist Action Party, won 2% of the vote.
Oduber established diplomatic relations with other communist countries, legalized the communists, raised the banana export tax and threatened the UFCO with expropriation if they opposed the tax. The brewing conflict in Nicaragua began troubling Oduber’s administration, and would come to place major strains on the country during the full-scale civil war in Nicaragua. Politically, the PLN’s back-to-back victories in 1970 and 1974 impelled all the opposition parties, except the Marxist left, to form a common front against the PLN in 1978 – the Coalición Unidad (Unity Coalition). The coalition was made up of former presidents José Joaquín Trejos and Mario Echandi; Carazo’s PRD; Martén’s PNI; the calderonistas, now led by Calderón’s son Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier (Calderón died in 1970) and a small Christian Democratic Party. Rodrigo Carazo, the PLN dissident, won the primaries with the support of the Christian democrats and Trejos, defeating a right-wing businessman backed by the calderonistas, Echandi and Martén. Calderón Fournier endorsed Carazo after his candidate was defeated in the primaries, but Martén – backed by Echandi – broke with the coalition. The PLN nominated Luis Alberto Monge, a unity candidate who had the support of the bulk of the PLN establishment of the time. Carazo won with 50.5% against 43.8% and the coalition won a plurality of seats in the legislature.
Carazo’s administration faced crisis at home and abroad. Costa Rica had become embroiled in border incidents with Nicaragua; up until 1979, San José provided support for any groups opposing Somoza’s authoritarian regime, an old enemy of Costa Rica. After Somoza was routed in 1979, Costa Rica generally sided with the US against the Sandinistas, and paid a heavy price for the conflict in Nicaragua with an influx of Nicaraguan refugees and Contra rebels ensconcing themselves in Costa Rica. Domestically, Costa Rica was hit hard by the global economic crisis of the late 1970s which caused coffee prices to fall. The government, unable to get the legislature to pass tax hikes, resorted to borrowing and the country ran up a foreign debt of $4 billion. The IMF and the government reached agreement on an assistance package, in exchange for austerity measures, liberalization of the economy (removing price controls, reducing public sector subsidies) and a devaluation of the currency. Carazo failed to comply with the IMF’s demands, leading the IMF to suspend its loan agreement and withdraw from the country.
By the time of the 1982 election, the governing coalition was highly unpopular. Calderón Fournier won the coalition’s low turnout primaries against a candidate backed by President Carazo. In the general election, however, he was no match for the PLN’s Luis Alberto Monge, who was elected in a landslide – 58.8% against 33.6% for Calderón Fournier, 3.8% for former president Echandi and 3.3% for the candidate of the communist Pueblo Unido party. In the Legislative Assembly, the PLN won 33 out of 57 seats.
Monge stabilized the country and Costa Rican democracy suffered perhaps its toughest test. He reopened negotiations with the IMF, in which San José accepted the IMF’s previous conditions plus one – the privatization of several deficit-ridden public enterprises. Compliance with the IMF’s stringent conditions placed great strains on the population and the PLN: the increase in utility prices led to protests, and the government was forced to concede a wage increase to public servants. A lot of his efforts paid off. Relations with Nicaragua worsened, as San José aligned itself with Washington, in exchange for American aid and investment in Costa Rica.
In 1983, the parties of the opposition – Calderón Fournier’s PRC, former president Trejos’ Popular Union (PUP), the Christian democrats and former president Carazo’s PRD – merged into one, creating the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, PUSC). In the 1986 elections, the PUSC backed Calderón Fournier for a second shot at the presidency. In the PLN, a new faction emerged, around Óscar Arias, which opposed the old factions and the old caudillos of the PLN – President Monge and former presidents Figueres and Oduber. Despite little establishment support in the PLN, Óscar Arias won the primaries against a figuerista candidate handily. His campaign, a plea for peace (under the campaign slogan paz para mi gente), was widely seen as a not-so-subtle criticism of President Monge’s militarist policy in the Nicaraguan conflict. Óscar Arias was elected president by a comfortable margin, 52.3% to 45.8% for the PUSC’s candidate.
A two-party system was consolidated, between a vaguely centre-left but largely moderate PLN and a social Christian PUSC, a more enthusiastic supporter of economic liberalism. In Costa Rican terms, the PUSC was closely associated with calderonismo, a term which gradually lost ideological content but is akin to European Christian democracy.
Óscar Arias initiated a peace process with his Central American neighbors, culminating in the Esquipulas accords. The Costa Rican-faciliated peace deal called on the war-torn nations to initiate a cease-fire, engage in dialogue with opposition movements, prevent the use of their territory for aggression against other state and cease aid to irregular forces. The 1987 agreement also called for free elections and democratization in all nations. In good part, it was not enough to fully end the civil wars raging, but it had a major effect in pushing forward the later peace deals which did end the civil conflicts. For his efforts in bringing peace to his regime, Óscar Arias received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. Domestically, however, Óscar Arias was accused of being a strong supporter of neoliberal policies: for example, he tried to privatize the electricity company, weakened the state monopoly on telecommunication and allowed for the private generation of electricity.
Arismo declined after the end of Óscar Arias’ term in office, with the acrimonious 1989 PLN primary opposing Carlos Manuel Castillo, backed by former presidents José Figueres and Daniel Oduber, and Monge’s nephew, Rolando Araya Monge. Carlos Manuel Castillo emerged victorious. The PUSC’s primaries were similarly acrimonious. Two-time presidential candidate Calderón Fournier originally declined to run again and backed a liberal businessman, Manuel Ángel Rodríguez, in his stead. However, with low polling numbers for any non-Calderón candidate, Calderón Fournier threw his hat back into the race, with the backing of the PUSC’s predominantly calderonista caucus and leadership. Calderón Fournier defeated Manuel Ángel Rodríguez in the primary by a landslide. In the 1990 general election, Calderón Fournier (PUSC) narrowly defeated the PLN candidate, 46.2% to 41.9%. Calderón Fournier’s administration continued the liberal economic policies of the last two (PLN) governments – he reduced tariff barriers, joined the GATT (WTO).
The 1993 PLN primaries were a family affair: it opposed José Maria Figueres Olsen, the son of the former president; Rolando Araya Monge, the nephew of the former president; and Margarita Penón Góngora, the wife of former president Óscar Arias. José Maria Figueres emerged as the winner. In the 1994 election, he went up against Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (PUSC). After a dirty campaign, in which the PLN branded the PUSC’s candidate as a cold and distant neoliberal businessman while the PLN’s candidate was painted as an autocrat and militarist, Figueres Olsen won by a narrow margin – 49.6% to 47.7%.
Figueres Olsen continued the general shift towards liberal economic policies, ending the checking account monopoly held by state owned banks since 1948 and reformed the teachers’ pension fund, causing a long teachers strike. For the left of the PLN, Figueres Olsen and Óscar Arias’ presidencies are seen as betrayals of liberacionista values and right-wards shift in the party. The 1998 election and its outcome would increase resentment at the two-party system, increasingly stale and corrupt. In a context of an unpopular government, the PLN’s supporters nominated a relative outsider, José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, as its candidate (Corrales had already run in the PLN’s 1993 primaries, and had been noted for virulent personal attacks on Figueres Olsen) against Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, who came out strengthened from the 1994 election and had consolidated the liberal and calderonista wings of the PUSC. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez was narrowly victorious, with 46.9% against 44.4% for Corrales. Smaller parties on the left and right managed to win seven seats in the legislature, managing to reduce the combined PLN and PUSC caucuses in the legislature to 50 out of 57 seats (the two parties had 53 out of 57 seats in the 1994 legislature). Yet, by and large, the PLN and PUSC’s dominance of the system remained unchallenged.
The fall of the two-party system and the new party system
That would change with Miguel Ángel Rodríguez’s presidency, which effectively killed the two-party system (derided by critics as ‘PLUSC’). Rodríguez strongly supported neoliberal policies which ran into a wall of significant opposition from the population. He managed to reform the pension system to open it to private participation and granted a concession to a private firm to operate the main port on the Pacific, but his attempts to privatize the telecommunications company were blocked by unions and major protests. With the outgoing president so unpopular, the PUSC’s supporters turned to an outsider in the primaries – Abel Pacheco, a populist TV personality and one-term PUSC deputy, who won 76% of the vote against Rodolfo Méndez Mata, the candidate of former president Calderón Fournier. The PLN was in no better shape than the PUSC, however: the shift towards neoliberalism had been badly taken by a good section of the party, led by the arayistas – the leftist and more traditionally socialist wing led by Rolando Araya Monge, former president Luis Alberto Monge and the mayor of San José, Johnny Araya. Rolando Araya won the PLN primaries in 2001, defeating Corrales.
The 2002 election saw the emergence of a party which would go on to fully kill the PLN-PUSC hegemony. The Citizens’ Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC), a centre-left anti-establishment party founded by former members of the PLN and PUSC and independent civil society activists. The PAC nominated Ottón Solís, a former cabinet minister under Óscar Arias and later one-term PLN deputy between 1994 and 1998, as its presidential candidate. In the first round of voting, Ottón Solís placed a very strong third with 26.2% against 31.1% for Araya and 38.6% for Pacheco. For the first time in the post-1948 republic, no candidate obtained 40% to win on the first round and a second round was organized two months later. In the concurrent legislative elections, the PAC won 22% and 14 seats, establishing it as a strong third party against the much weakened PLN and PUSC – the latter with 19 seats (-8 seats) and the former with 17 seats (-6 seats). The PAC wasn’t the only party to profit from the PLN and PUSC’ loses: on the right, the Libertarian Movement (Movimiento Libertario, ML) won 9% of the vote and 6 seats in the legislative elections.
In the second round in April 2002, the populist Abel Pacheco, running a campaign heavy on personality and low on ideology, was elected in a landslide, taking 58% against 42% for Araya. The first even back-to-back defeat for the PLN threw the liberacionistas into a frenzy, while the PUSC’ victory would turn out to the equivalent of the Titanic’s stern towering out of the water before plunging under.
Pacheco’s own administration was not particularly remarkable in a positive or negative way (although he supported the US war in Iraq, despite Costa Rica lacking an army), but the PUSC was killed by major corruption scandals involving former presidents Calderón Fournier and Ángel Rodríguez. Roughly around the system, former PLN president José Maria Figueres Olsen was embroiled in a separate corruption scandal which further weakened the PLN. Former president Calderón Fournier was accused of corruption and influence peddling in a case related to the acquisition of medical equipment for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social through a Finnish loan. In 2008, he was sentenced to five years in prison, a sentence reduced to three years in jail in 2011 (the Costa Rican law apparently allows those sentenced to three years or less to escape formal imprisonment). Other members of the PUSC were also accused of having received bribes from a Finnish medical equipment firm; the Finnish loan had been speedily approved by PUSC legislators and the loan conditions effectively made sure that Finnish company would be the favourite for the bids. President Rodríguez was accused of receiving bribes in three separate cases: over $1 million from the Taiwanese government (perhaps to press Costa Rica to maintain its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan; Costa Rica eventually recognized the PR China in 2007), £1.2 million from a British reinsurance firm in exchange for a contract with the state insurance monopoly and $800,000 in bribes from Alcatel in exchange for a contract. Rodríguez was put on trial in Costa Rica in the Alcatel case, but in 2012 the lower court’s sentence was dismissed because of prosecutor misconduct. Alcatel paid $10 million in settlements to Costa Rica. Rodríguez had been named Secretary-General of the OAS in June 2004 but resigned in November 2004 to face these corruption charges. Former PLN president Figueres Olsen was also accused of receiving $900,000 from Alcatel for consultancy work after his presidency. No charges were laid.
The 2006 elections marked a realigning moment in Costa Rican politics. Firstly, the rules of the game had been altered, in 2003, by the Supreme Court’s decison to strike down the 1969 amendment and allow for presidential reelection after a two term hiatus. Former President Óscar Arias has lobbied extensively since he left office for an amendment to allow presidential reelection, but this was firmly opposed by Arias’ rivals within the PLN – the arayista faction. Luis Alberto Monge called the court’s decision a ‘judicial coup d’état’. This allowed Óscar Arias to make a long-expected comeback as the PLN’s presidential candidate in the 2006 election.
The PUSC nominated Ricardo Toledo, a close supporter of outgoing President Abel Pacheco, but the PUSC was deeply discredited by the scandals involving its two former presidents and Pacheco’s unpopular administration. Instead, the PLN’s main competition came from the PAC, and, to a much lesser extent, the Libertarian Movement (ML). The PAC nominated, for a second time, Ottón Solís while the ML nominated, for the second time, its leader Otto Guevara. One of the issues which polarized the election was the free trade agreement with the US – CAFTA. Arias and Guevara supported CAFTA, but PAC candidate Ottón Solís opposed CAFTA, arguing that it would increase poverty by displacing farmers and workers. Solís vowed to renegotiate CAFTA if he won. Otto Guevara, the candidate of the Libertarian Movement, had moderated the ML’s more radical libertarian positions and moved towards more liberal positions. For example, the ML accepted state participation in education, healthcare, infrastructure and other areas, Guevara accepted public financing for his campaign and the past calls for dismantling government subsidies were dropped. The ML shifted its focus to denunciations of corruption and political cronyism exemplified by the ‘PLUSC’ system; however, it still supported CAFTA and advocated for individual liberties.
The election was extremely close, with Arias winning by a margin barely over 1%. Arias won 42.3% of the vote against 41.1% for Solís. Otto Guevara placed third with 8.8%, matching the ML’s legislative vote from 2002. The PUSC suffered an historic collapse: Toledo placed fourth, with only 3.7% of the vote. In the legislative election, the PLN took 25 seats to the PAC’s 17; the ML held its 6 seats while the PUSC collapsed from 19 to 5 seats in the legislature.
The two-party system was dead. One element of it, the PLN, remained standing but it was not immune from severe criticism of its own corruption and complacency. The other element of it, the PUSC, was killed off. The root of the two-party system’s collapse was one of the elements behind Costa Rica’s unique democratic stability: there was little antagonism between the PLN and PUSC, who agreed to peacefully alternate in power and to share the spoils of power. Senior civil service positions were split between the two and the two parties often worked together on major issues. This had the effect of breeding significant corruption and cronyism, blurred ideological distinctions between liberacionismo and calderonismo and an ideological convergence around economic liberalism. The decay of the two-party system allowed for new political actors to emerge, many of them stemming (indirectly and partially) from the PLN and PUSC. On the left, the PAC denounced corruption and, with its economic policies, challenged the neoliberal policies adopted by PLN and PUSC governments. On the right, the ML denounced corruption (and Guevara popularized the ‘PLUSC’ barb against the party system) and was a clearer advocate for liberal policies than the PUSC (which remained too closely wedded to the ideological vagueness of calderonismo for many liberal intellectuals).
The CAFTA issue remained a contentious issue during Arias’ second term. Eventually, it was taken to a referendum in October 2007. The PAC, PUSC, small parties on the left, trade unions, social movements, the arayista wing of the PLN (Rolando Araya) and former presidents Carazo, Luis Alberto Monge and Calderón Fournier all supported a NO vote. President Arias’ administration, the PLN, the ML and the PUSC’s legislative caucus supported a YES vote. In a tight contest, the YES won, with 51.6% against 48.4% for the NO. Otherwise, Arias’ administration continued the liberal policies of the past. Costa Rica was able to escape the 2009 recession quickly, its economy grew by 5% in 2010, the highest of any Central American country except Panama.
Óscar Arias was one of the few presidents to be succeeded by the candidate of his choice. First Vice President Laura Chinchilla, endorsed by the President and arismo (Arias’ faction in the PLN), defeated the mayor of San José, Johnny Araya in a close primary battle. Araya, the nephew of former President Monge and the brother of Rolando Araya, was the arayista candidate – from the party’s left, more supportive of traditional socialism and in opposition to CAFTA (although Araya’s brother and uncle have tended to be the most vocal on those matters). Araya lost to Chinchilla, 41.6% to 55.5%. While Araya endorsed Chinchilla, Rolando Araya and the former president both endorsed PAC candidate Ottón Solís. The 2010 election held little suspense. Chinchilla won handily, with 46.9% against 25.1% for Solís and 20.9% for Guevara. Luis Fishman Zonzinski, the PUSC’s candidate after former president Calderón Fournier was forced by his trials to drop out, won only 3.9%.
In the legislative elections, the PLN won 24 seats against 11 for the PAC (a net loss for both), while the ML gained 3 (holding 9 total) and the PUSC gained one (holding 6 total). With the backing of the small Accessibility with Exclusion Party (Partido Accesibilidad sin Exclusión, PASE, a conservative party for disabled persons’ rights), National Restoration (Restauración Nacional, a small Evangelical party on the right) and Costa Rican Renovation (Renovación Costarricense, another conservative Evangelical party), the PLN has a majority in the legislature. Originally, the PAC, ML, PUSC and PASE formed an opposition bloc which held a majority in the legislature, but PASE defected to the government in a move which smacked of a corrupt bargain.
Chinchilla’s presidency has been unremarkable, but also very unpopular. A wide poll of approval ratings for Latin American leaders done by a Mexican polling firm found that Chinchilla was the most unpopular of all her Latin American colleagues, with only 12% approval. Other Costa Rican pollsters have confirmed her government’s unpopularity. On the surface, there is little which appears as cause for such deep unpopularity: the economy grew by 4-5% between 2010 and 2012, although it slowed to growth of ‘only’ 3.5% in 2013 and is projected to grow by 3.8% in 2014. A favourable investment climate for foreign investment, tourism and strong exports have helped the economy along. The country has been spared the huge increase in violence (often drug-related) which has afflicted Honduras and El Salvador (but also, at a less extreme rate, Mexico, Guatemala and Belize); there was, however, a net increase in the homicide rate from 8/100,000 in 2006 to 11.3 in 2010. But it fell to 10 in 2011 and Chinchilla’s government has generally been recognized as being successful at curbing crime and violence.
In 2010, Chinchilla faced a border dispute with Nicaragua over a small island in a lagoon region. Nicaragua justified its claim using Google Maps, but it was more serious than that: Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega sent troops to occupy the contested island and was seen as drumming up nationalist sentiment over the remote island to shore up his reelection. Chinchilla’s handling of the affair was criticized as naive by her predecessor, Arias. The crisis calmed down and was temporarily resolved in 2011-2013.
Although the Costa Rican economy has been performing well, there is mounting concern about a growing debt and deficit. In September 2013, Moody’s put the country on negative outlook because of widening budget deficits, a rising debt burden and failure to pass fiscal legislation. The country’s deficit has increased to about 4-5% of GDP, because of rapid increase in government spending since 2008 while government revenue has not kept up, and the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio has grown from 24.8% in 2008 to 36.7% in 2013. In 2012, the Supreme Court found the government’s tax plan – which included scrapping the sales tax for a higher VAT and a 15% withholding tax on new companies in the free trade zones – was unconstitutional, forcing Chinchilla to settle for a far less ambitious plan.
This has led some politicians and economists to talk of a ‘fiscal crisis’, and regardless of whether there’s a crisis or not, the government’s economic policies have failed to please its critics to either the left or right. The right claims that the crisis is due to excessive government spending and mismanagement and that increasing taxes would not resolve the matter. The left downplays the importance of the ‘fiscal crisis’, instead emphasizing the country’s rising social inequality and proposing a progressive tax reform. According to the left-wing Frente Amplio‘s 2014 manifesto, Costa Rica’s Gini index has increased from 0.358 in 1988 to to 0.518 in 2012 and, citing the World Bank, claims that Costa Rica is one of only three Latin American countries which has failed to reduce inequality or poverty in 10 years.
The government has also faced scandals. The Minister of Finance resigned in 2012 after the newspaper La Nación reported that he had not paid property taxes, the Minister of Transportation resigned over corruption in a road project and the President faced questions about her use of a private jet to fly to Peru. During her first two years in office, 13 cabinet ministers resigned for various reasons, undermining confidence in Chinchilla’s administration.
Candidates
The PLN’s nomination was ultimately uncontested. The contest began in 2012, and originally the field included five candidates: the mayor of San José Johnny Araya; Óscar Arias’ brother and former Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias; former President José Maria Figueres Olsen; Antonio Álvarez Desanti and Fernando Berrocal Soto. Johnny Araya, who has been mayor of the capital since 1998, was the runaway favourite and his overwhelming advantage in the polls – including over his main rival, Rodrigo Arias – forced all his competitors out of the race by January 2013.
Although Araya hails from the PLN’s left – considered the main left-wing opposition to the PLN’s right, incarnated by arismo – his campaign did not stray much from what has been PLN policy in the past years/decades: rather bland centrism, although with some negative references to neoliberalism and language which could be interpreted as critical of Chinchilla and Arias’ administrations. Araya’s manifesto focuses on bread-and-butter issues such as job creation (especially for certain sectors), infrastructure projects, social security and education but also addresses government reforms, especially for local government. Araya talked of replacing the 13% sales tax with a higher VAT, likely set at 14-15%.
Given the unpopularity of Chinchilla’s government and the PLN brand, Araya did his best to distance himself from the unpopular government. At the outset, he even briefly toyed around with the idea of dropping the PLN’s traditional green from his campaign propaganda in favour of blue and red (colours of the flag but also the PUSC). In his campaign ads, Araya ran solely on his record as mayor of San José while not making any mention of Chinchilla or Óscar Arias. In December 2013, former President José María Figueres Olsen joined Araya’s campaign team – but former President Arias and his brother, Rodrigo,
The main party of the opposition, the PAC, had a contested primary in July 2013. Ottón Solís, the PAC’s most famous figure and three-time presidential candidate, announced that he would not run. Luis Guillermo Solís, a former secretary-general of the PLN who joined the PAC in 2008, narrowly won the primary with 35.5% against 35% for his closest rival.
The PAC’s plan highlighted three priorities: fighting corruption, promoting economic growth through a more equitable distribution of the wealth and reducing inequalities (eliminating extreme poverty). Luis Guillermo Solís considers himself a social democrat, and his manifesto reflects that orientation with its relatively moderate centre-leftist language.
To fight corruption, the PAC’s platform proposed to guarantee access to information, strengthening state institutions to make them effective and efficient in the fight against corruption and improving transparency in the hiring process for public servants. Solís’ manifesto talked of promoting economic growth through a development bank providing differentiated loans to small businesses and certain sectors (women, youth), reducing interest rates, reducing electricity rates, defending the ‘interests of national production’ with ‘effective control of free trade treaties’, promoting small businesses and cooperatives, promoting public investment in infrastructure projects generating jobs and greater competitiveness and helping the youth through training, grants and internships. Although Solís opposed CAFTA, he does not see a renegotiation of the treaty as being possible today. His proposals on reducing poverty were vaguer, but included planks such as new schools in poor areas, enforcing the minimum wage law and ensuring beneficiaries of conditional subsidies fulfill the requirements.
Solís’ more detailed platform also listed ‘ten commitments’: developing and improving transportation infrastructure, strengthening healthcare and pensions, safeguarding national agricultural production (food safety and sovereignty), guaranteeing quality academic and technical education (spending 8% of the GDP on education), ‘environmental management compatible with human development’ (stricter land use laws, environmental oversight, protecting water, cost-effective and clean public transit, exploring clean energy), promoting effective public security, promoting culture and sports, defending and respecting human rights, responsible administration of public funds (more progressive taxation, a VAT) and finally measures for women’s rights.
The Libertarian Movement (ML) nominated Otto Guevara, the party’s leader and main figure. With the party’s moderation in recent years, moving away from more radical libertarian planks, it may more accurately be described as a right-wing liberal party – it is a member of the Liberal International, whatever that means. Guevara’s manifesto talked of eliminating unnecessary regulations hindering job creation, facilitating access to financing and capital for job creators, free trade, breaking state monopolies (in certain sectors, notably allowing private electricity generation), defending property rights (‘one of the most fundamental human rights’), attracting foreign investment (using the current zonas francas) and improving infrastructure.
Economically, the ML has familiar rhetoric: controlling inflation, no new taxes (the ML’s manifesto say they ‘impoverish persons and are a confiscation of money from those who produce it’, it wants to keep taxes as low as possible) and reducing public spending (stop the growth of the public sector, eliminate privileges, ban strikes in essential services, reducing duplication, ‘tertiarize’ non-essential services). It supports replacing the current PAYGO pension system with a capitalization system. In a debate, Guevara confirmed supports a flat, 15%, corporate tax (currently progressive between 10% and 30% based on the companies’ revenues). Left-wing candidate José María Villalta correctly pointed out that his tax plan would increase taxes on small businesses.
On the whole, the ML’s philosophy of the state is that of the estado subsidiario (subsidiary state), providing the essential services and guidance and helping those who can’t help themselves (with the objective of promoting self-help). On the issue of poverty, the ML is critical of asistencialismo (which it says breeds clientelism and dependency) and proposes instead to review existing social programs to eliminate waste, and coordinating them with the private sector and NGOs/charities. The ML also emphasizes tough stances against corruption and more transparency.
In a bid to attract former PUSC supporters, the ML candidate took very socially conservative on major moral/ethical issues (moreso than the other candidates): declaring himself resolutely pro-life, opposing same-sex marriage or civil unions and against the legalization of marijuana. Guevara also stated that his party has adopted Christian principles and the social doctrine of the Church, in addition to liberalism.
The PUSC held a primary in May 2013, in which the calderonista candidate, Rodolfo Hernández emerged victorious over the liberal/social Christian candidate Rodolfo Piza, 77 to 23, but Hernández dropped out of the race in October 2013 and Piza replaced him. Hernández, in a letter to supporters explaining his withdrawal, blamed betrayals and intrigues against him in the PUSC and lamented the state of politics. If early polls placed Hernández on a strong footing against Araya, Piza never polled over 6%. His platform showed a Christian democratic orientation: humanism, ethics and morality, social development and democracy.
Of particular interest in the campaign has been the success of José María Villalta, the candidate (and sole legislator) for the main leftist party, the Frente Amplio. Since the 1948 civil war, the left – understood as the ideologically Marxist or socialist left – has always been weak, hardly polling over 3-5% of the vote (although historically the top distant rival to the PLN and the right). The left has been hurt by its illegality (until the 1970s), weak organization, infighting, numerous splits, the polarization of politics until 2002-2006, the PLN’s ideological flexibility and – after 2002 – the rise of the PAC as a viable centre-left alternative. The Frente Amplio was founded in 2004, notably by members of the former Fuerza Democrática, the main left-wing party in the 1990s. The party defines itself as socialist, progressive, patriotic, feminist, democratic, ethical and Latin American; it has cheered on the election of leftist leaders in Latin America – from the ‘radicals’ of the Chávez/Morales/Correa variety to moderates such as Lula/Tabaré Vázquez; and it is a member of the Foro de São Paolo.
Villalta’s manifesto was very critical of neoliberalism – which his party claims is responsible for the increase in inequality and the weakening of the welfare state. The platform focused on reducing inequalities and poverty, ‘saving’ and strengthening social security (the CCSS), public education, infrastructure, popular participation in governance, fighting corruption, a dignified livelihood, protecting the environment and food security and sovereignty (among others). In detail, he promised to improve workers’ rights, promote local small-medium businesses, limit increases in the cost of living, a progressive taxation system to expand the tax base and raise taxes on the wealthiest and opposing privatization. He received press abroad for his promise to renegotiate CAFTA and his opposition to any new free trade deals, a position shared with other candidates including Solís (PAC) but not Araya (PLN) or Guevara (ML). Villalta’s tax plan would increase the corporate tax rate on the biggest businesses to 35-40% (they currently stand at 30% for companies earning more than $183,000), supports a VAT (but progressive and limited at the current sales tax rate of 13%). He also proposed reducing tax deductions for companies and raise the salaries of low-level public sector employees.
Villalta has called concerns about the ‘fiscal crisis’ to be alarmist, arguing that it has been blown out of proportion by neoliberal economists.
The PLN was at the forefront of a negative campaign against Villalta (worried by his strong polling numbers), accusing him of sympathy with Hugo Chávez and Daniel Ortega and of being a communist seeking to implement authoritarian policies. The PLN candidate, Araya, presented himself as the safe centrist option against the dangerous ‘extremes’ of Villalta (on the ‘far-left’) and Guevara (on the ‘far-right). But attacks on Villalta were not confined to the PLN: Guevara proved equally as virulent in debates against him, and private businesses (including Avon and Subway) circulated materials calling on its employees not to vote for Villalta. Ottón Solís, the PAC’s former presidential candidate and PAC candidate for the legislature, came to Villalta’s defense and said that it was wrong to attack him and brand him as a chavista. Villalta decried the ‘dirty campaigns’ as means for the PLN to distract attention from the economic crisis, but Villalta was carefgul to erase references to his more radical past. While he openly declared himself a communist in the past and praised Chávez, in the campaign he stated that his links to Chávez were limited to shared membership with the PSUV in the Foro de São Paolo and he declared himself as the heir to Manuel Mora’s moderate and pragmatic local brand of communism (comunismo a la tica).
In the 1970s, alongside Johnny Araya, Villalta was a member of the far-left revolutionary Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (whose leader was none other than Johnny and Rolando Araya’s brother).
The other candidates were disabled rights advocate Óscar Andrés López Arias for the PASE (he already ran in 2010), José Manuel Echandi Meza, the nephew of former President Mario Echandi (1958-1962), for his Partido Avance Nacional; perennial conservative candidate Walter Muñoz Céspedes for the Partido Integración Nacional; Sergio Mena Díaz for the socially liberal Partido Nueva Generación; 1998 PLN presidential candidate José Miguel Corrales Bolaños for the Partido Patria Nueva; Evangelical pastor and deputy Justo Orozco Álvarez for Renovación Costarricense; Evangelical pastor and deputy Carlos Luis Avendaño Calvo for the Partido Restauración Nacional; and Héctor Monestel Herrera for the Trotskyist Workers’ Party.
Results
Turnout was 68.25%, down slightly from 69.12% in the 2010 election. The preliminary results reported on election night, with 89% of precincts counted, were:
President
Luis Guillermo Solís (PAC) 30.95%
Johnny Araya (PLN) 29.59%
José María Villalta (FA) 17.14%
Otto Guevara (ML) 11.19%
Rodolfo Piza (PUSC) 5.97%
José Miguel Corrales (PPN) 1.5%
Carlos Avendaño (PREN) 1.35%
Justo Orozco (PRC) 0.8%
Óscar López (PASE) 0.53%
Sergio Mena (PNG) 0.29%
Héctor Monestel (PT) 0.25%
José Manuel Echandi (PAN) 0.22%
Walter Muñoz (PIN) 0.22%
Legislative Assembly
PLN 25.52% (-11.64%) winning 18 seats (-6)
PAC 23.82% (+6.14%) winning 14 seats (+3)
FA 13.08% (+9.42%) winning 9 seats (+8)
PUSC 10.01% (+1.96%) winning 8 seats (+2)
ML 7.92% (-6.56%) winning 3 seats (-6)
PREN 4.11% (+2.49%) winning 1 seat (nc)
PRC 3.97% (+0.18%) winning 2 seats (+1)
PASE 3.95% (-5.22%) winning 1 seat (-3)
PPN 2.07% (+2.07%) winning 0 seats (nc)
PNG 1.25% (+1.25%) winning 0 seats (nc)
ADC 1.15% (+1.15%) winning 1 seat (+1)
Others 3.15% (-1.24%) winning 0 seats (nc)
The Costa Rican election went somewhat unnoticed on February 2, when most media attention abroad focused on the Salvadoran election, because of El Salvador’s more confrontational ideological politics and its tumultuous political history in contrast to Costa Rica’s consensual politics in a stable democratic country. However, it was by far the most interesting of the two Central American battles on that day.
The election took place in a context of record levels of political apathy and discontent. Identification with political parties has declined to record lows, especially with younger voters; there is major dissatisfaction with the political leadership’s performance and behaviour (poor records on issues such as jobs, growth, infrastructure and inequality; corruption); and an increasingly large number of voters have become politically apathetic. Turnout was 81% in the 1994 election, and fell to a record low of 65.2% in 2006. At the outset of the campaign, few voters appeared captivated by the election and there was concern about turnout. However, the campaign proved quite heated and the closely disputed race drew voters to the polls. Turnout was down less than one point from 2010.
One of the main aspects of the collapse of the two-party system in Costa Rica is increasingly electoral volatility and an ever more fickle electorate. Party loyalty is of some, but ultimately little, value. In the last poll of the campaign, in the field from January 20 to 27, 43.9% of voters were undecided or did not intend to vote. When the campaign began late last summer, about 55% of voters were undecided. PLN candidate Johnny Araya, by pure value of name recognition, held a wide lead over his lesser-known rivals in the early polling in August-October 2013 but he still was polling only in the low 20s. In November 2013, left-wing candidate José María Villalta surged into contention as a close second (even first, in two polls) behind Araya – with right-wing candidate Otto Guevara not very far behind. Villalta’s surge was built on an anti-establishment (and anti-neoliberal) message which attacked the traditional political leadership of the country for its numerous failures. Villalta built a strong base on social media and with young voters, and became a refuge for voters fed up with the political system. But voters remained fickle. Anti-PLN voters whose top goal was to dislodge the PLN oscillated between Villalta the leftist and Guevara the ‘libertarian’; anti-communist voters whose aim was to keep Villalta ‘the communist’ from winning power, hesitated between Araya and Guevara.
However, the negative campaigns by the PLN and ML against Villalta had a clear effect on voting intentions. In a socially conservative, politically moderate country, talk of Villalta’s radicalism and fears of his ties to unpopular leftist regimes in Nicaragua and Venezuela uneased many. In this highly volatile situation, another candidate, hitherto lagging behind in the polls, gained the ‘big mo’ and surged into contention: Luis Guillermo Solís, the PAC candidate. Despite representing the country’s second largest party, Solís struggled throughout most of the campaign, suffering from low name recognition. However, Solís made a name for himself in the many debates and on social media. In the last poll (Jan 20-27), Solís placed third with 11.6% (up from 9.5% earlier in January and 4% at the start of the race) – Araya and Villalta remained first, with 17.4% and 14.4% respectively, but were on a downwards trend. Guevara, who was polling a strong third and considered a possible contender for a runoff spot until the very end, collapsed to fourth and 7.3% in the last poll. However, the huge number of undecideds made the outcome unpredictable.
The outcome was indeed rather surprising. Solís actually placed first with nearly 31% of the vote: a remarkable feat for a candidate who had been polling single digits until the final weeks and who was not considered as one of the top three candidates, and a feat which really underlines the country’s electoral volatility. Araya, the only candidate who did not move much during the campaign – because he has a solid, but small, base of about 25-30% of voters who remain loyal liberacionistas - placed second, with 29.6%, a significant blow. Villalta, the left’s favourite, saw his fickle support evaporate (somewhat) on election day and won only 17.1%. It is still a solid result for the FA, which had until then been a very minor force in Costa Rican politics, but comes out of the 2014 election with a much-expanded legislative presence and a promising future. Yet, the anti-Villalta campaign by conservative/centrist politicians and businessmen had its impact; Villalta kept a large base considering the FA’s lack of existing grassroots, but other voters likely strategically voted for Solís, a ‘safer’ (and more moderate) progressive candidate and late anti-PLN standard bearer. In fourth place, Otto Guevara and the ML had a surprisingly bad result: Guevara won only 11.2% (down from about 21% in 2010), while the ML’s legislative caucus shrank from 9 to 3 seats – falling behind the PUSC. The PUSC itself had a better run, recovering two seats in the legislature, but the PUSC isn’t any closer to regaining its spot as the PLN’s main rival.
This election is fairly historic on a number of points. For only the second time in the country’s history, a second round is required (on April 6) because no candidate won over 40% of the vote. The last time a runoff was necessary was in 2002, a watershed election which marked the first blow to bipartidismo in Costa Rica: in that election, Araya’s brother, Rolando, placed second behind the PUSC candidate but failed to get much of the PAC’s support and was trounced in the runoff by the PUSC’s Abel Pacheco. It is the first time that the first-placed candidate is not from a traditional party: that is to say, from neither the liberacionista tradition (PLN) or the calderonista tradition (PUSC). Finally, with the FA’s support, it is the left’s best result in the country’s history.
The PLN had a tough election. To begin with, it is attempting to do what no party has ever done in post-1948 Costa Rica: win a third consecutive term in office. More importantly, the PLN’s image has been hurt by President Chinchilla’s unpopular and overall unsuccessful administration – even if Araya did all he could to distance himself from her, admit that the PLN had lost its social democratic essence and promised change and a more ‘social’ orientation. Araya, who comes from a faction of the PLN which has been the arch-rival to Óscar Arias (and Chinchilla, although she is faction-less today), criticized his own party’s past record. But, in good part, his promises of change and a more responsive PLN administration failed to convince voters. He admitted as much himself on election night, when he recognized that Chinchilla’s record had hurt the PLN and said that ‘undoubtedly’, the PLN had not given ‘sufficiently clear signals’ that it wanted to make up for past failings and sought ‘responsible change’.
Araya will face a difficult runoff. Polls show that only 30% of voters want a third term for the PLN, and Araya’s result seems to mean that he likely won those three in ten but little more. Like his brother in 2002, Araya could lose the runoff by a wide margin. Solís is in a position to reap the support of voters who voted for Villalta, Guevara, Piza and other candidates in the first round. While some of those candidates’ more ideological voters might choose not to vote, many will likely opt for the candidate of ‘change’ over that of liberacionista continuity. In terms of formal alliances between the PAC and its rivals, we should probably not expect anything formal. José María Villalta, on election night, said that the runoff opposed two right-wing parties – but, significantly, he distinguished them (without explicitly saying which was which) as the ‘right who steals’ and the ‘right which doesn’t steal’. Some interpreted that as meaning that he was willing to entertain at least an informal deal with the PAC, but others took his statement as a sign of potential difficulties in any PAC-FA deal. As far as Solís is concerned, he has said that his only alliance is with Costa Rica. Neither Villalta or Guevara have signaled any clear willingness to enter into a formal alliance with the PAC (or the PLN obviously).
In an interview with the Spanish daily El País, Solís clearly laid out the reality of the situation: “now there is no other alternative than the PAC or Araya” and “it is continuity [...] versus change. It is the continuation of the current economic model versus the reactivation of the internal market. It is ethics against a party which promotes corruption.” We can expect that Solís will be hammering this simple and clear message all the way to April 6: it is change, or continuity with the unpopular PLN. Araya’s message will likely consist of continue promises for change and a better PLN, combined with a focus on him being a ‘safe choi