In 1944, the Army’s Ordnance branch (via the War Production Board) had mobilized the factories of industrial America to previously unimaginable levels of production, and arms flowed out of the factories and the warehouses in an iron river to the war fronts. Not just the American ones, either: vast quantities of armaments went to our British and Commonwealth allies, we fully armed the Free French, and Lend-Lease equipment was shuttled past the U-Boat threat to Russia via Murmansk, and end-run via Iran. While the Soviets also produced prodigial quantities of high-quality armaments themselves, they welcomed the Sherman tanks, White halftracks, Studebaker and GMC trucks and other hardware from America’s smokestack cities, and sent them into combat in the hands of young Russian and Soviet soldiers.
The US kept developing its weapons, but wanted to know: how good is our stuff, up at the sharp end? Since we couldn’t very well send officers to grill front-line Britons and Russians, we sent a commission to Europe to see how our troops were getting on with our ordnance equipment. The board stood up on 14 Jan 44, flew to North Africa, England, and Italy, and turned in their report on 27 April 44.
The mission of the board was to: 1. Disseminate among the theaters information concerning successful solutions to problems encountered in the theaters; 2. Obtain advice concerning the performance and suitability of standard weapons and equipment now in use in the theaters and assist in on-the-spot corrections of defects; 3. Introduce and demonstrate in the theaters new standard weapons and equipment which are available but are not in the theaters and new items which may be available within the following eight months, and to determine the requirements for the various items and; 4. Assist in increasing the effective use of weapons and equipment now in theaters.
The original report is available at the Combined Arms Research Digital Library (click the Download button, at eye level on the right; the downloaded file will be named 3351.pdf and will open automatically if your system allows it).
By and large, the Report shows an Army satisfied with its weapons. The section on small arms is brief; there was no controversy, and no suggested improvements, to the M1 rifle.
To date, all small-arms items have been in limited use in the North African theater and have been used only in training in the European theater. The extent to which small arms are being used is reflected by the ammunition expended. Based on a recent 30-day period, the following was the average expenditure per day per active weapon in the Fifth Army:
(note: we replaced the inline small-arms only numbers with ones from a more thorough appendix. In January, 1944, ).
Conversely, the M1 carbine got decidedly mixed reviews.
The opinion as to the worth of the carbine is divided. Many officers expressed a high regard for this weapon, whereas others look upon it more or less as a toy with insufficient striking power. The officers in this latter group would rather carry a rifle or a submachine gun, and a few prefer the pistol. It is believed that more information on the striking power and accuracy of this weapon should be supplied the theaters. The adjustable rear sight was immediately popular in both theaters, and a large demand for this item was established.
…The carbine is not popular with the infantry units in Italy. The main reason for this is that the personnel authorized the carbine are subject to fire chiefly from snipers, against which the carbine is ineffective. No solution or suggestions for a substitute were offered.
But one of Ordnance’s home-grown projects, the M1 Carbine bayonet, got thumbs down from the carbine’s foes and fans alike. Three different types of carbine bayonet were shown to troops in the North African and European theaters (the T4, T5 and T6 designs), and none were desired (Ordnance went on to make them anyway). There are several references to the desirability of a trench knife, and positive references to the new, short M1 rifle bayonet.
Little interest was shown in any type of bayonet for the carbine in either theater, although a request was made by the North African theater for the knife, T8, which is a combination trench knife and carbine bayonet. The new, short M1 bayonet for the rifle is preferred to the old, long bayonet. No breakage difficulty with this bayonet was reported. It should be remem- bered, however, that this bayonet has not seen extensive use in either theater, as there has been very little hand-to-hand combat.
Pistols are not a factor, except to note that some officers preferred them to carbines whilst others preferred rifles. Two new weapons, though, were a hit right off:
A real demand exists in both theaters for the M1919A6 machine gun. This weapon is entirely acceptable as a light machine gun until such time as a weapon meeting all the requirements of a light machine gun is available.
and:
The simplicity, reliability, and ease of operation of this weapon [M3 .45 submachine gun] were recognized immediately. A real demand was submitted by NATO; in the European theater this weapon is now arriving with troops. This submachine gun should be a real answer to the German Schmeiser [sic].
NATO in this case means the North Africa Theater of Operations, which requisitioned 7,300 of the M3 submachine guns. The ETO didn’t request them because M3s were already being pushed forward to those units, with no requisition necessary. The biggest problem with the 1919A6 was that previous promises hadn’t been kept, and the ordnance board was asked to expedite deliveries.
An inordinate amount of space is spent, by modern standards, on rifle grenades and gadgets for launching them. There’s also a discussion of the logistics of spare barrels and artillery tubes, and whether the burden can be reduced by using chrome plating to extend the heat rejection and durability characteristics of barrels.
The report also goes into heavy equipment. It has become conventional wisdom among historians that the M4 Sherman was badly outclassed by its German opposite numbers, so it’s surprising to see the glowing report about it:
The tanks of the M4 series are well liked by the using personnel, and they do not want a new tank unless it will offer very greatly improved military characteristics. There are, however, a number of components, such as tracks, suspension, and armament, that should be given immediate attention to improve combat efficiency. The using troops desire the following improvements in tank characteristics, listed in order of importance:
(1) Fire power.
(2) Mechanical reliability.
(3) Armor protection.
b. It should be noted that American troops are not particularly interested in thicker armor or in protected ammunition stowage, as it is generally felt that complete protection cannot be obtained and that the price to be paid for more protection would be undesirable from a standpoint of maneuverability.
And the newest version was even more enthusiastically awaited:
Tank, medium, M4E6.-This vehicle was accorded the most enthusiastic reception of any vehicle shown. General Eisenhower and General Devers both expressed a high regard for it and desired that it be supplied in quantity. This vehicle does not appear on the requisitions made from either theater, because plans for its supply were under way prior to the arrival of the Board and in ETO the exact number desired had not yet been determined and was awaiting General Eisenhower’s decision.
According to Green and Brown, M4 Sherman at War, p. 116-119, the M4E6 was the best of several ways of mounting a 76mm gun, with which the Ordnance experts promised Tiger kills at 2,000 yards. It used a completely new turret that was originally designed for a completely different prototype tank. The 76mm gun began to be used across the board in all Sherman variants (a different suffix A1, A2, etc. usually signifying a different engine). Within a few months of this report, the 76mm gun’s penetration would turn out to be seriously oversold.
The tank crews knew that the Germans had better tank guns:
ll the tank crews and armored battalion officers feel that the German tank guns are superior in all respects and particularly in their muzzle velocities. They believe that the 75-mm PAK 40 has more than double the muzzle velocity of our 75-mm gun, M3. There is an overwhelming request for increase in tank-gun muzzle velocities and for installa- tion of 76-mm guns in medium tanks of the M4 series.
One battalion engaged at Monte Cassino reported that most of its tank losses came from that PAK 40 gun, particularly in armored self-propelled versions. They also lost guns to 50mm PAK, Panzerschreck bazookas, and simple breakdowns, thrown tracks, and plain dumb getting stuck in places where enemy fire didn’t allow recovery.
This is what the board said about the troops’ desires vis-a-vis tanks:
Combat troops have definite ideas as to what improvements should be incorporated in tank design. First, the Board inquired as to what they considered the most important features in a tank. The replies were unanimous: the gun was of first consideration; second came dependability; third — whatever armor they could get after the first two requirements weremet; fourth — nothing was to be introduced in stowage or otherwise that would interfere in any way with carrying the maximum amount of ammunition.
With respect to the gun for the medium tank, they demand larger caliber and higher velocity. The T25 and T26 tanks with the 90-mm gun meet the requirement for more gun power, as does the M4 tank with the 76-mm gun. With respect to ammunition, they want nothing to interfere with ready rounds and they are willing to forego watered ammunition containers if this additional protection involves reducing the number of rounds of ammunition that can be carried.
The M4 tank is good and is well liked by everyone. However, the fact that the M4 is the outstanding tank of the war to date should not deter us from giving them a better one, especially when a tremendous improvement in battle efficiency may be attained.
There are also numerous specific And finally, there is a little bit of D-Day foreshadowing in “Weapons for Assault of Beaches.”
It was gratifying to note the progress that has been made in ETO in developing the use of weapons for landing operations. Although considerable progress has been made in the United States and in the theaters in providing fire power for landing operations, much remains to be done. The work done in the United States in developing floating tanks and gun motor carriages is outstanding. A few of these devices have been furnished ETO and arrived the day the Board left. The outstanding characteristic of these devices is that the guns may be used during the landing operation. The M4 tank gun with its stabilizer is one of the most accurate weapons for this purpose.
That is, of course, a reference to the famous Duplex Drive (DD) Sherman tanks of D-Day, many of which wound up on the bottom of the sea.
Full opportunity is being utilized to fire self-propelled and tank guns from landing craft. Rocket ships developed by the British and those of our Navy provide a lot of fire power on the beaches.
Those rockets would also be a D-Day flop, not because they didn’t work but because they fell into empty dunes between German fortifications and German reinforcements.
The addition of the self-propelled mounts recommended in this report will materially increase fire power in landing operations. This type of operation affords an outstand- ing use for all tanks and self-propelled mounts. Standard artillery is difficult to use and materially slows up unloading unless it can be fired from the traveling position. The Navy was contacted in Italy and England. It is wide awake to the situation and is making every effort to provide the required fire power. During landing operations naval and aerial bombardment of obstacles and offshore mine areas is essential. These types of bombardment will extend to landing areas on the beaches.
In light of all a German intelligence officer might have been able to deduce from this document, it’s hardly surprising that it was originally classified SECRET. Now it’s unclassified, and free for you to download.
(If you’re more interested in the tank firepower situation, and how the high confidence of January-April 1944 fared when the Shermans hit a peninsula full of Panthers and Tigers in June, here is a pretty well documented blog post on the subject. It turns out one reason the US overestimated its firepower is that the Germans used armor of greater hardness, face-hardened in addition; the US used homogeneous armor, and valued ductility more. The German armor may also have been of uneven quality).