(Sample Material) Online Coaching for Contemporary Issues of
GS: Security & Disaster Management (The Need for Haste on Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir: China Pakistan Economic Corridor Needs a Counter Strategy)
P. Stobdan @ idsa
Snubbing Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism and calling upon
Pakistan to vacate the portion of Kashmir that remains under its illegal
occupation is not new to the Indian policy approach. What is new is the
assertion by the Narendra Modi Government on the need to reverse the game by
shifting the discourse on Kashmir. New Delhi’s new move is accompanied by the
sudden sprouting of videos showing Pakistani atrocities in Gilgit and Baltistan
(GB).
While Pakistan has effectively sustained its Kashmir agenda
for seven decades, India has been defensive and sporadic in its claim over
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Hopefully, the rhetoric this time is not a
propaganda stunt and the policy shift will gain traction. As a step to wreck
Pakistan’s agenda, India has correctly proscribed the Hurriyat factor from the
NSA-level talk – denying Pakistan any leeway on both terror and political
dialogue.
While changing the Kashmir narrative is important, India
needs to pay serious attention to the changing nature of power play that has
brought PoK to the forefront of China’s geopolitical calculations. The region
came under spotlight after Xi Jinping announced plans for developing the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and pledged USD 46 billion for building
transport and energy connectivity to link Pakistan with China’s ambitious
flagship project ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR). The August 2015 “Karamay
Declaration” detailed Pakistan’s role in China’s global scheme. Lately, even
Russia has indicated its interest in joining the bandwagon to prop up Pakistan’s
strategic significance for Eurasian integration.
While the Sino-Pak axis in PoK is nothing new, the sheer
magnitude of the CPEC plan makes it clear that it is not confined to the single
limited objective of boosting Pakistan’s prosperity. On the face of it, CPEC
signifies the laying of a crucial bridge for China to access the Indian Ocean
and conversely for Pakistan to access Eurasia. While the need to capitalise on
their political and geographical proximities explain this logic, this is not the
entire truth. There is far more to China contemplating heavy investments in a
country as perilously poised as Pakistan is.
Significance and Implications of CPEC
India needs to grasp the motivation, significance and
implications of this new China-Pakistan nexus. First, CPEC implies a further
deepening of the Sino-Pak alignment which began to intensify after the Osama Bin
Laden episode. Moving from “all-weather friendship” to “iron brother” status,
China began to liken its ties with Pakistan to the US links with Israel. Xi
Jinping considers Pakistan as a frontline state in the war against terror and is
of the view that “its sacrifices can’t be forgotten” by China. China expects the
CPEC to yield far-reaching economic benefits, and regional security is
instrumental for this purpose.
Second, and related to this, is the strategic intent of
besieging India. The alignment of Karakoram (land) with Gwadar (sea), both
having commercial and military utility, could serve as strategic chokepoints
vis-à-vis India. As Andrew Small notes in his book The China-Pakistan Axis:
Asia’s New Geopolitics, ”Pakistan is both a Chinese pawn (against India) and
platform for power projection…..a long history of secret deals between their two
armies – overrides the problems with Islamic extremism.”
Third, China is mindful of Pakistan’s vulnerabilities and the
latter’s links with terror that could result in unpredicted consequences. The
possibility of the Af-Pak belt becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants once
the US troops leave is very much on Chinese minds. Beijing’s eagerness for
Afghan reconciliation talks explains that. Yet, Beijing will shield Pakistan
while trading on terrorism with terrorists (jihadists, the Taliban and
al-Qaeda), all of whom receive arms in exchange for refraining from exporting
terror into Xinjiang.
Fourth, some analysts view the CPEC in the context of
offsetting the growing US-India intimacy as well as China’s quid pro quo to
counter India’s “Act East” policy. Although such a comparison is nothing but
hyperbole, Pakistan does have utility to China for keeping India always edgy.
This is a China’s nuanced strategy to deter any possible India-US direct prying
in Tibetan and Uighur issues. In reality, China would prefer not to bail out
Pakistan in moments of its peril.
Finally, against this backdrop, Beijing is keen to employ its
prêt-à-porter domestic-external interwoven strategy that had been earlier tested
in the Xinjiang-Central Asia frontier to fix problems at home and abroad.
Therefore, CPEC is a perfect counter-offensive defence strategy for dealing with
threats emanating from the Af-Pak region.
Concerns for India
India needs to be concerned about China attempting to
replicate in PoK the well-perfected policy it has applied earlier in Tibet,
Xinjiang and across Central Asia. Beijing would be seeking a historic
opportunity to fill up gaps where India has largely failed. Considering PoK’s
strategic location as a connecting point of South, West, Central and East Asia,
China’s move has implications for limiting India’s outreach to the critical
Eurasian region.
India failed to see the writing on the wall when Pakistan
carried out a series of steps to manipulate the legal and demographic profile,
the last being a change of nomenclature from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan
under the Empowerment and Self Rule Order (2009). An option for incorporating GB
to make it as the fifth province of Pakistan is gaining serious consideration.
There is also speculation that Pakistan could lease additional areas of GB to
China. The opening a Chinese Consulate in PoK is in the offing. One should not
be surprised by Beijing working on a plan to grab the entire GB along with the
5,000 square kilometre Shaksgam Valley held by China since 1963. Academic
writings draw historical antecedent for China’s claims over the Hunza Valley.
For Islamabad, GB’s assimilation would mean quelling popular
sentiment while also deflating India’s objections to Chinese activities. But
this has not gone well with the Kashmiri separatists including the Hurriyat who
are against GB’s incorporation into the Pakistani constitution.
Meanwhile, Chinese activities in GB are in full swing
including the building of hydropower projects at Neelum-Jhelum, Kohala and
Chakothi-Hattian that will generate 2,569 MW of power by 2020. The China Road
and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) recently completed five tunnels over the Attabad
Lake in Hunza Valley. Widening of the Jaglot-Skardu Road is in progress. At the
other end, China has taken 923 hectares on lease in Gwadar for developing a
special economic zone (SEZ).
None of these developments stirred up an adequate Indian
response. In fact, Beijing justified the CPEC as a “livelihood project” when
concerns were raised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his May 2015 visit
to China. Clearly, India’s unhurried stance on PoK explains its unwillingness
for changing the status quo. New Delhi has been making sporadic and pro forma
protests on the PoK issue only for the purpose of countering Pakistan’s raising
of the K word at the UN. And while Pakistan used global forums as the stick to
beat India with on Kashmir, India remains loath to play the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 47 of August 1948 that implicitly recognised Indian
“sovereignty” over J&K and urged Pakistan to vacate territories under its
“illegal occupation”.
The nature of developments taking place around PoK is too
serious for India to ignore. With CPEC coming into effect, Pakistan has gone on
a diplomatic spree offering to shape a “New Central Asia” through CPEC, asking
the landlocked Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members to use Pakistani
ports. Pakistan is gaining greater credence in Eurasia as a possible partner.
Kazakhstan has already expressed its desire to join the corridor. Renewed
efforts are being made to reboot the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement
(QTTA) with Central Asian states. Pakistan joined the Central Asia Regional
Economic Cooperation (CAREC) in 2010 and it separately seeks Transit Trade
Agreement (TTA) with Afghanistan for access to Central Asia. To further boost
intra-regional connectivity, Pakistan has recently acceded to the TIR
Convention.
Involving Iran in the corridor is another ambition. With the
current financial down turn in China, it is hard to predict whether CPEC will
actually come to fruition. However, the trajectory and even a partial success
would be consequential for limiting Indian influence in BRICS and SCO.
Opportunity for India
Modi’s government is apt in retrieving the PoK agenda.
Placing GB along with Ladakh (82 per cent of J&K) on the political centre stage
could easily undermine the Pakistani rhetoric on the Kashmir issue. Mere
murmuring is not enough; India needs to start working on Pakistan’s domestic
resistance i.e. in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and GB over CPEC. The “Modi
effect” is already working after he offered help to the people of PoK during the
2014 floods. GB is now abuzz with pro-freedom slogans as the people are fed up
with decades of Pakistani atrocities, terrorism, and sectarian killings.
Options for India
India should stop making intermittent and tentative overtures
and instead adopt a robust policy on PoK. A counter strategy should go beyond
building partnerships with the US in the Asia-Pacific. Quite clearly, India’s
non-endorsement or indifference to China’s Silk Road proposal appears to be
short-sighted thinking, perhaps stemming from suspicion and insecurity.
In any case, India’s options are limited. In contrast to the
Asia-Pacific, the US is not alarmed at Beijing’s push; instead it has been
seeking convergence with China perhaps necessitated by the need to share the
burden of containing terrorism in Afghanistan. In fact, Washington’s own New
Silk Route initiative has fallen short perhaps due to shifting priorities and
its inability to commit adequate funds. Geopolitically, China too is not risking
a zero-sum game with the US in Eurasia. To be also sure, China also knows that
the current priority of the West is to break Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia
rather than to counter China’s move.
Additionally, if Russia moves closer to Pakistan, India’s
reliance on Moscow for protecting its interests would become less salient.
Against the looming threat of terrorism and extremism, any prospect for joining
the Silk Route dynamics could open up an opportunity for India to cooperate in
soft political areas including greater understanding of the Uighur problem that
we know little about. Another equally important challenge is to break the
current tight geopolitical spot India finds itself in, wedged between a wall of
Pakistani hostility and the fear of cooperating with China.
Also, India can do little to stop OBOR or scuttle the CPEC.
Almost all the countries in the subcontinent are excited about the project.
India’s non-participation would lead to isolation and loss of clout at the
regional level.
Being the world’s second largest economy and India’s largest trading partner,
New Delhi is unable to ignore China anyway. To be sure, OBOR may be carrying
security undertones but India also requires massive infrastructure investment
and only China seems to have the surplus capital. Without partnering with China,
India’s integration in Asian regionalisation would be less than smooth. Chinese
companies are building infrastructure in India and there is little difference
whether one gains by helping or limiting China’s influence. It cannot be in
India’s interest to support the project and not reap all the economic benefits
of those projects. It is important to establish a fine balance between economics
with security.
India also cannot ignore the significance of the symbolism of
history. After all, it was the Silk Route on which Indian trade and philosophy
(Buddhism) travelled to the rest of Asia. Modi himself showed an inclination
towards and confidence in dealing with China for building an Asian century. At
Ufa, Modi displayed pragmatism by seeking convergence with China and Russia. As
China is fast transforming internally, the imperatives of cultural affinity will
demand closer propinquity between India and China.
Thus, staying outside cannot be to India’s advantage. New
Delhi needs to re-conceptualise and seek new realities on the ground. China has
called upon India to join the Silk Route and India should respond positively
while accepting a trade-off here and there.
A wise approach would be to join the regional networking
process just as India joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
There is nothing wrong in exploring OBOR as an alternative as long as India’s
security interests are not compromised. Remaining disconnected would only instil
greater insecurity and fears of Chinese encirclement. What Modi requires is a
policy that would help to overcome predicaments that have thus far stymied
India’s role in Asia.
A Counter Strategy
India needs to work on its own counter strategy by offering a
plan for a direct India-China Silk Route Corridor (ICSRC) that could run along
the traditional Ladakh-Xinjiang axis. A shift in thinking can no longer be put
off, for it would mean not just about breaking the connectivity bottlenecks but
about finding interlocking economic interests between its northern states and
the Eurasian growth story.
The ICSRC could provide an alternate transport, energy,
trade, fibre optics and communication highway that could originate from a port
in Gujarat run across northern India to connect with Kashgar in western China
through the Indus Valley in Ladakh. The initiative would have multiple
advantages for both India and China without compromising on their respective
security concerns. These include:
1. The corridor could bring massive Chinese investments for building
infrastructure in India that would boost the economy and generate greater
employment opportunities.
2. India could earn billions as fee from pipeline transit.
3. An energy corridor would help India gain a durable guarantee against any
Chinese misadventure across the border.
4. There could be a trade-off here in terms of India possibly getting
long-distance transport and energy pipelines from Russia through western China.
5. ICSRC would blunt the impact of the CPEC.
6. For China, ICSRC would be more reliable and less hazardous than risking
investments in terrorism-plagued Pakistan.
7. ICSRC would open a historic opportunity for India to physically connect with
markets in China, Eurasia, Europe, and beyond. And,
8. India could offer several other alternate outlets for China through the
Northeast or Sikkim that are nearer to Chinese growth centres.
If the idea were to be pushed forward, it could become a
grand announcement indicating India’s willingness to deepen economic engagement
with China and would be something akin to how Russia and China started two
decades ago. ICSRC could help revive the shared legacy of a common history and
culture enriched by the trade in silk and spices. The development could pave the
way for strengthening trust between the two countries and eventually contribute
to the solution of the boundary problem.
ICSRC could prove to be a masterstroke of a counter-strategy
in India’s long-term domestic and foreign policies. It would be a coup de maître
for India in dealing with multiple challenges of countering an expansive Chinese
foreign policy, aggressive Pakistani designs, the growing threat of extremism,
and addressing the connectivity issues.
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