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PART 1: Are escort ships still up to their tasks?
The Seat of Purpose is on the Land. For British maritime power, the real focus of maritime strategy is on what you do once you have control of the sea; ‘the essence of maritime power is the ability to influence events on land’.
This means that while sea control is essential, only the minimum level of effort, commensurate with the acceptable level of risk, should be employed in it. The rest of our resources should be used to influence events on land, both at, and from, the sea. This also requires sea control, of course, which enables the holder to use maritime power and, if required, denies an opponent that same ability. At sea, the military, diplomatic and economic impact will depend upon the opponent’s dependence upon the maritime
environment for its security and resilience; for many states sea dependency is growing. On land, the military, diplomatic and economic impact will depend upon the holder’s ability to influence its opponent from the sea; this influence could take a variety of forms from a low-level focused maritime blockade
(such as one focused on components for weapons of mass destruction), to an invasion of the opponent’s territory.
MOD Joint Concept Note 1-12 (JCN 1-12), dated May 2012
The promised second part of my reasoning on the future "Lighter Frigate" for the Royal Navy, apparently to be known as Type 31. My question, detailed in Part 1, is whether traditional escort designs can still do their intended job. Several developments suggest that they can't, or that at least they will not be able to do it in the near future.
So the question becomes: what should Type 31 be?
The answer, as we saw in Part 1, is "a ship meant to deploy a number of air, surface and sub-surface systems meant to expand its capabilities and allow her to survive, to protect other ships and to contribute to the widest possible range of missions.
Part 2 looks at some ship designs from around the world and details my proposal.
The two extremes
A growing number of designs, either built, planned or simply offered, are meant to embark and employ modular mission payloads. The list would includes vessels such as the American LCS, the Italian PPA, the Damen Crossover, the Black Swan concept, up to the Danish Absalon class.
The first observation to be made is that the importance of the modular payload varies from design to design: the capability of some ships depends almost entirely from the embarked payloads, while other vessels have a wide range of equipment which is only complemented and expanded by embarking payloads.
At the two extremes, we find Black Swan (entirely shaped by payloads) and the Absalom (a fully fledged and well armed warship which also offers a large cargo space).
The Black Swan concept, which caused lengthy debates online when it was revealed a few years ago, was a deliberately provocative proposal which brought reliance on external payloads to the extreme. The briefing paper argues for the construction of “sloops-of-war” costing no more than 65 million pounds apiece; 2000 to 4000 tons in terms of size; built to commercial standards albeit capable of operations in marginal ice; armed extremely lightly, basically like a current River OPVs perhaps with the addition of a CIWS based on laser (once mature); crew as small as 8, with room for up to 60 more; low, extremely modest speed requirements to reduce costs and complexity; diesel-electric propulsion.
The Black Swan sloop is described as a mothership vessel which operates at stand off distances by sending unmanned systems in the contested, denied area. Its capabilities are entirely driven by the payload embarked and the ship is not meant to operate in isolation but in small groups (assumption is that 4 Black Swan plus mission payloads would be built for the cost of a traditional large escort vessel).
The Black Swan Concept
The Black Swan has a very basic sensors fit, and it is even described as having a rather basic communications fit, which feels contradictory and dubious since, depending on the force of the group and having to stay in constant two-way contact with multiple unmanned vehicles, the ship can be expected to have serious ICS and bandwidth needs.
The notional design provided at the end of the briefing paper shows a 95 meters ship, a bit over the 3000 tons, with a core crew of 8 and space for 32 mission specialists, which would all live in SSN standard accommodations (HMS Astute being the benchmark). The payload would reach 400 tons and the requirement is for a volume equal to at least 20 containers. A large hangar (Merlin + rotary wing UAV) and a Chinook-capable flight deck complete the design.
Black Swan Sloop
The design comes with a 600 square meters mission bay and a 370 square meters hangar bay. Each of the 20 containers on the mission deck is individually accessible and can be connected to ship services. A stern ramp for boats is provided aft, flanked by two container positions for modules that require direct access to the water, such as towed array modules.
The Black Swan is an extreme concept, which tries to ensure a large number of ships can be built, and that, however cheap, each is flexible and precious even in a high end warfighting scenario. However, the reliance on external systems is pushed to the extreme, and is arguably excessive. It will be very challenging (both technically and financially) to ensure that the Black Swan can constantly keep UAVs in the air to have sensors coverage and firepower at the ready. Costs will merely shift from the mothership to the vast array of UAVs and USVs and UUVs needed, especially since the authors seem to envisage particularly capable unmanned systems, able to strike enemy targets deep into contested space in a high end warfighting scenario.
Other evident bottlenecks are:
- Power generation and supply. It is one thing to trade speed off to lower costs, but the mothership will have to provide power to its modular payloads, and this might require substantial amounts of electricity. It might be impossible to cut down the power generation.
- Space. The tyranny of space imposes the choice of submarine-like accommodations for the crew, and reduces the space available for the specialist teams accompanying the unmanned systems. While they have no men in the cockpit, unmanned systems to this day remain far from “unmanned”, requiring a substantial crew back at the base for maintenance and mission control. We can assume that the systems will become more and more autonomous, but betting that 32 men will be enough for everything and specifying an 8 men core crew is very likely to lead to trouble. It will also put greater pressure on the unmanned systems, which will need to be much more autonomous and much more reliable, making their development riskier, more demanding and, inexorably, more expensive.
Of course, part of the Mission Deck could be used to add accommodation modules for extra personnel, but then the space for the systems is reduced, and finding the good balance might rapidly become challenging.
The Black Swan, in my opinion, chooses the wrong hull. I’d rather have fewer but larger motherships, individually more capable, than groups of small sloops. This because the availability of great space and weight margins greatly eases integration of new systems and evolution through life.
The LCS is just one step above the Black Swan, since it has relatively little capability unless it is carrying a specific mission package.
Much has been said of the LCS, a program which has repeatedly encountered serious difficulties and has thus gained a vast armada of haters which have by now poisoned the whole debate about their merits and shortcomings.
The critique I move to the LCS is that they are trying to be two things that do not mix too well: nimble, ultra-fast littoral “street fighters” and, at the same time, motherships.
The LCS ended up absorbing features of the “Street Fighter” ship envisaged in the 90s by Vice Adm. Art Cebrowski, head of the Naval War College. The “Street Fighter” was going to a cheap, small (less than 1000 tons), extremely fast and nimble, disposable ship meant to go in the littoral and fight off FACs and other anti-access threats in the challenging brown waters were, it was felt, the big Burkes would struggle badly.
In the early 2000s, under the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, small ships and “transformational” approaches to warfare gained traction. The LCS was born, and the navy began to work on a mission and on a design for them. The LCS grew quickly as a result, to over 3000 tons, and the requirements piled on it included replacing minesweepers and Perry frigates as well as fighting back FACs in the littoral by means of speed and maneuver. It is not what the original Street Fighter was meant to be, yet it insists on extremely high speed (even if a lot lower than what was wanted from Street Fighter). The compromises that have had to be built into the design as a consequence are the root cause of most of the trouble and of the skepticism that surrounds the ships.
They have large mission bays, but the mission package must weight no more than 105 tons, which is proving difficult. Growth margins are almost inexistent. Accommodations have had to be expanded as more men are required to accomplish the missions. Autonomy is not very good, as the ships are thirsty race horses. And their armament, EW and sensors fit limits their warfighting capability.
The LCS ASW module. Ship-mounted torpedo tubes are not included. Even the Type 26 might not have ship-mounted torpedo tubes, but there is no definitive confirmation.
Somewhat predictably, the US Navy is now working to make some of the modular payloads permanent components of the ships, particularly in the “Fast Frigate” evolution of the LCS which will represent the last batch of ships to be built. Anti-ship missiles will be added, as will a proper EW outfit. The Fast Frigate will also permanently sport light guns and a towed array, instead of having to add them as modules.
The US Navy so far is refusing to accept the evidence that, if the LCS is to become more fighting capable, it needs a capable lightweight anti-air missile fit. They are putting considerable effort into adapting a vertically-launched Hellfire missile variant as an anti-FAC weapon instead, but if the Pentagon was a bit more open to adopting foreign products they could just buy into Sea Ceptor and use it to give the LCS both decent local area air defence and anti-surface strike capability. The impossibility to mount bulky MK41 launchers would not be a problem with Sea Ceptor…
From LCS to "Fast Frigate", several bits cease to be add-ons and become permanent features.
The rest of the problems with LCS are due to the immaturity of the modular payloads. The development of the payloads started after that of the ship, and in a period in which unmanned vehicles were still somewhat primitive. But developments in the unmanned world are becoming faster and I’m convinced that the mission bay will allow the LCS to stay relevant in all missions.
The lack of weight margin, though, is a problem. It goes to reinforce my belief that if you are going to build a carrier, you must make sure it is actually built to carry stuff.
The Italian PPA (Pattugliatore Polivalente d’Altura, which could be translated as Multimission Oceanic Patrol) is a completely new design produced by the Italian Navy’s own projects office in collaboration with Fincantieri, that will build them. The PPA is an innovative ship, introducing new systems and new concepts and it is meant to replace several classes within the Italian navy, from the 2 Durand de la Penne destroyers (due to be de-classed to frigates due to the removal from service of their old air area defence weaponry, still using the Standard SM-1) to the Minerva class corvettes, the Soldati-class “patrol frigates”, the Minerva-class corvettes and the OPVs of the classes Costellazioni and Comandanti.
The ship is required to carry out a wide range of tasks which go from disaster relief to warfighting, and will be procured in multiple configurations. Curiously the expectation is that there will be 3 levels of fitting-out: Light, Light+ and Full. The Full will, obviously, be fitted at build with all sensors and weapons, while the Light+ will have an intermediate fit and predispositions to accept the missing systems as required. The Light will have no missiles and will come fitted-for-but-not-with only in some areas.
The PPA will be a large vessel with an empty weight just short of 5000 tons, 143 meters in length, but slender due to a beam of “just” 16.5. They are also required to be pretty fast: a maximum sustained speed of 35 knots was originally envisaged, although it seems the requirement has been relaxed to 32.
The PPA is equipped with a complex propulsion system, in an “evolved” CODLAG arrangement: at slow speed, two electric motors will give a silent, fully electric propulsion up to 10 knots; the use of one Diesel will allow cruising up to 18 knots, while adding the second Diesel is meant to give a speed of 25 knots. Engaging the gas turbine allows to keep speeds higher than 31 knots. General Electric MV300 drives will be installed on the ships, allowing them to generate and send ashore 2 MW of power when stationary in port, converting the frequency from 50 to 60 hertz to allow smooth shore connections whatever the location. The capability to generate electricity and potable water are part of the requirements for Disaster Relief: it is intended that one PPA will be able to cater for the immediate needs of a disaster-struck town of 6000 people.
The autonomy figure seen so far merely says that 5000 nm is the minimum required, but the information available is still incomplete and sometimes uncertain as the design is still being finalized.
PPA Full, profile. Copyright team Forum Difesa (http://difesa.forumfree.it)
In terms of sensors, the PPA is intended to carry a newly-developed Dual Band AESA radar by Selex, employing two sets of 4 fixed faces: one set, in C band, works as the long range volume search radar while the other set, X-band, tracks surface and air targets for engagement. At the moment it is expected that only the Full variant will have both installed.
A new IFF with a fixed, circular array for 360° coverage is part of the design as well as a 360° IRST.
The ships will be armed with a new variant of the 76/62 mm gun, the “Sovraponte”, a non-deck penetrating CIWS turret containing its own ammunition. It will fire the DAVIDE / Strales guided shells for anti-missile, anti-aircraft and anti-surface self defence. The main gun will instead be a 127/64 with a fully automated magazine and Vulcano guided, long-range ammunition.
Two 25mm light guns are provided for close range engagements.
The ship comes with two Sylver A50 modules giving 16 cells for Aster 15 and 30 missiles. The Full variant should come with space reservation for 16 more cells and the possibility of installing the A70 launchers in place of the A50, enabling the use of cruise missiles.
The missiles will be carried by the Full and Light+, while the Light will be fitted for but not with.
All ships will be able to accept 8 Teseo anti-ship missiles, although they are not expected to be installed at build, not even on the Full.
The schemes as shown on television by the italian navy. The scheme suggests that 16 A50 cells and 16 A70 cells could be installed at the same time.
The PPA will have two mission spaces: one is located in the stern, under the flight deck, and includes one launch ramp for a boat, flanked by two spaces for container-sized payloads. On the Full, these two spaces will be used for a towed array sonar and for two 533mm Heavy Torpedo Tubes facing aft.
There is space for 5 containers or mission modules and two side openings are also part of the design: these doors will add flexibility to the procedure to deploy unmanned vehicles and will also serve as Rescue Zones for taking aboard shipwrecked migrants, a task which unfortunately is a daily occurrence for the Italian navy these days.
Another modular space is located amidship, on the weather deck, and can take another 8 containers and/or RHIBs and boats up to 15 meters. A powerful crane is provided to handle the boats and containers.
The crew varies from 90 in Light configuration to 171 for a Full with complete crew and embarked force element.
The PPA will have an innovative cockpit, similar to that found on aircraft. Sitting two men side by side, and using augmented reality in the glass windows, it is meant to ensure unparallel control over the platform, enabling the ship to be fought by as few as 4 men on bridge.
The large hangar can take one AW-101 or two NH-90 helicopters.
Towed array module and Heavyweight torpedo tubes plus RHIBs and potentially unmanned ASW vehicles give the PPA Full a powerful array of anti-submarine capability. Heavyweight 533mm torpedoes are increasingly common in industry offers (see also the DAMEN CrossOver): looks like an admission of the fact that ship-launched 324mm light torpedoes are not a credible ASW weapon anymore.
The Italian navy has signed a contract for the construction of 7 PPA, with another 3 options to be exercised within 2021. The 8 ships on order are expected to be Light, Light, Light+, Full, Light+, Light+, Full. The options are for a Full, a Light, a Light+.
The Italian Navy has expressed a requirement for 16 PPA in total, which in addition to the 10 FREMM frigates would make for an impressive fleet. Whether so many will ever be effectively procured is far from certain. The PPA is not exactly cheap, although the first 7 vessels are expected to cost no more than 4 billion euro, including a 10-year logistic support contract. They come as part of a massive 5.4 billion “Navy Law” which the current chief of Navy staff, admiral De Giorgi, has been able to obtain by campaigning tirelessly for new ships to replace the aging equipment of the navy. Intended as merely the first step in the renewal programme, the Navy Law funds 7 PPA, 1 LHD (costing over one billion) and 1 Logistic Support Ship (around 400 million), plus two small, fast special forces support boats.
The Augmented Reality cockpit with HUD functions
The PPA clearly leans more towards a traditional frigate, putting a lot of focus on the ship’s own sensors and weapons rather than on modular payloads. This is to be expected, since the Italian navy still hasn’t put much work into those. Cost is contained by realizing variants with a simplified combat system.
The approach of multiple sub-variants is not what the Royal Navy needs, but the ship remains a very interesting product in its own way.
The Absalon is the hybrid of a frigate and an LPD, so much so that the danes gave her a L rather than F or D pennant. It was not really thought out for operating with modular ASW systems, but rather to transport troops and vehicles, or modular hospitals or headquarters. The vast space available could be exploited with future systems of unmanned vehicles if a suitable launch and recovery system can be installed in the stern. The current gauntry crane for boats is just a beginning. It has an excellent fit of sensors and weapons but commercial standards and CODAD propulsion have allowed the danes to keep the costs down.
The large door has a ramp which can take even the weight of MBTs like Leopard 2. The smaller door allows a gauntry crane to launch and recover large boats.
The Damen Crossover is a proposed design that mates frigate and LPD, offering more flexibility than the Absalon in terms of embarking and deploying offboard equipment, thanks to a stern ramp and side doors.
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