Sceptical theism and a Lying God – Wielenberg’s argument defended and developed
Stephen Law
Department of Philosophy, Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W5 8HX UK
s.law@heythrop.ac.uk
Abstract: Sceptical theists attempt to block the evidential argument from evil by arguing that a key premise of that argument – that gratuitous evils exist – cannot reasonably be maintained. They maintain that, for all we know, our knowledge of reasons God may have to permit such evils is radically incomplete. Thus the fact that we cannot identify reasons for God to permit the evils we observe does not allow us reasonably to conclude that no such reasons exist. Erik Wielenberg points out what appears, for many sceptical theists, to be an unfortunate further consequence of their position. It appears that, if sceptical theism is correct, then, similarly, the fact that we cannot identify reasons why God would lie to us does not allow us reasonably to conclude no such reasons exist. But then, for all we know, God’s word constitutes not a divine revelation but a divine lie. This paper examines sceptical theist responses to Wielenberg’s argument to date (from Segal, and McBrayer and Swenson) and develops two new Wielenberg-style arguments for the same conclusion.
Sceptical theism
Here is a simple evidential argument from evil:
If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist
Gratuitous evil exists
Therefore, God does not exist
Gratuitous evils are evils for which there is no sufficient God-justifying reason. Why suppose the second premise of the above argument is true? Proponents sometimes offer a ‘noseeum inference’[1]in its support: If, after thinking hard, we cannot think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some evil, then it is likely no such God-justifying reason exists.
Sceptical theists attempt to block this noseeum inference. According to sceptical theism, those goods, evils, and entailment relations between them that we know of may, for all we know, constitute the unrepresentative tip of a vast, largely hidden iceberg of goods, evils and entailment relations. The latter, if they exist, will be known to an omnipotent God, and may, for all we know, justify him in allowing those evils we observe.
Thus (call this the anti-noseeum argument): If sceptical theism is true, then the fact that we cannot think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some evil does not justify us in concluding that no such reason exists. If by inscrutable evils we mean evils for which we can discern no sufficient God-justifying reason, then what the anti-noseeum attempts to block, in effect, is the inference from inscrutable to gratuitous evils.
Analogies are often used to explain and justify the sceptical theist’s scepticism regarding the noseeum inference. The fact that we cannot detect any insects in the garage (when taking a look from the street) does not allow us justifiably to conclude that there are no insects in the garage. The fact that chess novices cannot think of a good reason why a chess Grand Master made a particular move does not allow them justifiably to conclude that no reason exists. Similarly, given our ignorance concerning the completeness of our knowledge of goods, evils, and the entailments relations between them, the fact that we can’t identify a reason why God, if he exists, would allow some real and terrible evil does not allow us justifiably to conclude that no such reason exists. We cannot yet reasonably assign any probability to the second premise of our argument from evil: neither high, nor low, nor middling. The probability is, in that sense, inscrutable.
Wielenberg on divine lies
In his paper ‘Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies’ (2010), Erik Wielenberg points out what appears to be an interesting and, for many theists, deeply worrying, consequence of sceptical theism. If the fact that we cannot think of a divine justification for a given evil fails to justify the belief that no such justification exists, then, presumably, the fact that we can’t think of a justification for God lying to us fails to justify the belief that no such justification exists. So, if the sceptical theist is to apply their scepticism consistently, they should acknowledge that the probability that God is lying to us is similarly inscrutable. But then, according to Wielenberg, sceptical theism has the consequence that we cannot know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. If the only reason I have for believing that p is that God asserts that p, but for all I know God is lying to me, then I do not know that p. Sceptical theism, according to Wielenberg, is thus
at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us they are true. (2010, 509)
Such claims appear to include, for example:
(L) All who believe in Christ will have eternal life.
A Christian who, in response to the problem of evil, expresses scepticism about our ability to discern what reasons God might have to allow some evil, but, in response to God’s utterances, fails to be similarly sceptical about our ability to discern what reasons God might have to lie to us about (L), would appear to be employing their scepticism selectively - in an inconsistent and partisan way. Once a theist employs sceptical theism to deal with the evidential problem of evil, it appears they cannot also rationally maintain belief in propositions that have word of God justification only, including (L). If, on the other hand, they drop the sceptical theism to avoid this unpalatable consequence, they again face the evidential problem of evil.
This paper examines responses made by defenders of sceptical theism to Wielenberg’s argument. To my knowledge, the only published responses are to be found in McBrayer (2010), McBrayer and Swenson (2012) and Segal (2011). I argue that all these responses either fail or else are easily sidestepped by making minor modifications to or clarifications of Wielenberg’s original argument, modifications or clarifications I therefore recommend. I begin with Segal.
Segal’s response to Wielenberg
The sceptical theist argues that if sceptical theism is true, then we cannot know, for any existent evil, that there is not, or is unlikely to be, a good God-justifying reason for it. In Theism and Divine Truths (2011), Segal reads Wielenberg as presenting a parallel argument for the conclusion:
LIES: If sceptical theism is true, then we do not know any proposition p which is such that the only reason we have for believing that pis God asserted that p.
As Segal interprets him, Wielenberg central point is that the premises of his parallel argument for LIES are just as plausible as the premises of the anti-noseeum argument. Thus, if the sceptical theist accepts the conclusion of the noseeum inference, then they should also accept LIES. But, Segal goes on to argue, Wielenberg has not
given any argument whose premises are as plausible as the premises of the anti-noseeum argument. So sceptical theists need not choose between their argument … and their knowledge of propositions that have word-of-God justification only. They can have both. (Segal (2011), 93)
I begin by noting that Segal’s conclusion in the above quotation does not follow. It may be that, even if Wielenberg’s parallel argument involves premises slightly less plausible than those of the anti-noseeum argument, nevertheless Wielenberg’s premises are eminently plausible. In which case Wielenberg might still have established beyond reasonable doubt that sceptical theists must choose between their argument and their knowledge of propositions having word-of-God justification only.
However, perhaps Segal has shown not just that the premises of Wielenberg’s argument are less plausible than those of the anti-noseeum, but also that they are dubious or implausible. Then the sceptical theist might employ their sceptical theism to deal with the problem of evil even while rationally maintaining that they know propositions having word-of-God justification only. But has Segal established that Wielenberg’s premises are dubious or implausible?
Segal’s first criticism
In ‘Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies’, Wielenberg outlines his argument as follows:
(1) If Skeptical theism is true, THEN, for any given divine assertion D, we have no good reason to deny that God’s act of intentionally speaking falsely in making D has beyond-our-ken justification.
(2) IF, for any given divine assertion D, we have no good reason to deny that God’s act of intentionally speaking falsely in making D has beyond-our-ken justification, THEN we do not know any proposition that has word of God justification only.
(3) Therefore, skeptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word of God justification only.
Segal considers the above presentation ambiguous and provides two readings. Here I consider only the second reading (that which Segal acknowledges is the more likely). Segal’s presentation of the argument involves the following predicates ‘Axp’ = a is a divine assertion that p; Lxp = x is a divine lie that p; ‘LJGx’ = there is some good g, such that if x were a divine lie, g would justify x. Let ST = sceptical theism. Then Segal’s presentation of Wielenberg’s argument runs as follows:
(1b) If ST is true, then for any x and p such that Axp, we lack justification for believing that Pr(LJGx/Axp) is low.
(2b) If for any xand p such that Axp, we lack justification for believing that Pr(LJGx/Axp) is low, then for any divine assertion that p, we do not know that p if p has word-of-God justification only (unless we have good reason for thinking that, even if God has some justification for lying about p, God doesn’t act on that justification).
(3) So, if ST is true, then we do not know any proposition p that has word-of-God justification only (unless we have good reason for thinking that, even if God has some justification for lying about p, God doesn’t act on that justification).
(4) For any divine assertion that p, we do not have good reason for thinking that, even if God has some justification for lying about p, God doesn’t act on that justification.
(5) Therefore, if ST is true, then we do not know of any proposition that has word-of-God justification only.
Segal targets premises (1b) and (2b) of the above argument. I turn first to Segal’s claim that (2b) is implausible.
Clearly, Segal’s presentation of Wielenberg’s argument is more complex than Wielenberg’s. Most obviously, Segal’s version involves more premises. Segal acknowledges in an endnote that he has indeed made changes to Wielenberg’s argument, ‘but’ he says, ‘only ones, as far as I can tell, that strengthen and clarify it.’ (2011, n7, 94)
The most obvious change made by Segal is the introduction of clauses concerning whether, if God has reason to lie, God acts on that reason. Notice that no such clauses appear in Wielenberg’s original presentation. Interestingly, Segal’s first criticism of Wielenberg’s argument exploits his own introduction of these additional clauses. According to Segal, (2b) is implausible. Why? Because it requires:
CLAIM: If for any divine assertion p, if we lack justification for believing that the probability of there being a lie-justifying good is low and, for any divine assertion p, we do not have a good reason for thinking that if God has some justification for lying about p, God doesn’t act on that justification, then for any divine assertion, we lack justification for believing either that the probability of there being a lie-justifying good is low or that even if God has some justification for lying about p, God does not act on that justification.
But CLAIM, says Segal, is implausible. It is an example of the schema: if we lack justification for believing that pand we lack justification for believing that q, then we lack justification for believing either p or q. But this schema obviously has false instances (given I lack justification for believing p and also lack justification for believing not-p, it does not follow that I lack justification for believing either p or not-p). So, says Segal, Wielenberg cannot rely on CLAIM.
As I say, the above criticism exploits complexities not present in Wielenberg’s original presentation. Of course, Segal’s criticism might be justified if he could show that such a complexities are at least implicit in Wielenberg’s original argument or else are necessary additions if the original argument is to have any chance of success. However, Segal makes no attempt to show this (indeed, that he has introduced these changes is acknowledged only in an endnote). Perhaps that is because Segal thinks it obvious his additions are either implicit in the original or at least necessary if the argument is to have any chance of success. If that is what Segal thinks, he is mistaken.
Of course, Segal might point out the following apparent lacuna in Wielenberg’s original argument. Even if we have no reason to deny with respect to any divine assertion that p that, were p a lie, there is a God justifying reason for it, it doesn’t follow that we cannot know any proposition that has word of God justification only. For perhaps we can know (because God is a morally perfect being) that, even when God is justified in lying, he rarely if ever does so. Segal’s additions to Wielenberg’s original argument are indeed fairly obviously designed to plug this gap.
However, notice that there are, crucially, other ways to plug the gap. Perhaps the most obvious is to narrow down on the class of reasons God might have to lie. Some reasons may be reasons it is by no means likely God will act on. Others reasons may such that, if they obtain, it is highly likely - even guaranteed - that God will act on them.
Notice that the thought that there are reasons of the latter sort was assumed in setting up the problem of evil in the first place. The first premise of our argument from evil assumes God will act to prevent gratuitous evils. God has reason to prevent such evils, reason he is presumably guaranteed to act on given his morally perfect nature. That is why the existence of gratuitous evils guarantees there’s no God. Call reasons such that God is guaranteed to act on them AG reasons (act-guaranteeing reasons).
Now presumably, Wielenberg will say that if sceptical theism is true, then not only can we not justifiably conclude that there are no reasons for God to perform a given action a given only that we cannot think of any, neither can we justifiably conclude that there are no AG reasons for God to perform action a given only that we cannot think of any. But then surely, given sceptical theism, there may, for all we know, be not just reasons, but AG reasons, for God to lie to us on a regular basis. It seems plausible that it is on such AG reasons that Wielenberg intends to focus. In which case the gap in Wielenberg’s argument is obviously and easily plugged without Segal’s added complications. Here is my suggested reading of Wielenberg’s argument:
Let ‘LAGRGx’ = there is some good g, such that if x were a divine lie, gprovides God with an AG reason to assert x.Then Wielenberg’s argument might perhaps be rendered thus:
(1c) If ST is true, then for any x and p such that Axp, we lack justification for believing that Pr(LAGRGx/Axp) is low.
(2c) If for any xand p such that Axp, we lack justification for believing that Pr(LAGRGx/Axp) is low, then for any divine assertion that p, we do not know that p if p has word-of-God justification only.
(5) Therefore, if ST is true, then we do not know of any proposition that has word-of-God justification only.
Call this the LIES argument. Notice that the LIES argument looks structurally much more like Wielenberg’s two-premise original than does Segal’s version. I suggest it is a much better candidate than Segal’s for being what Wielenberg intends. And, crucially, premise (2c) of the LIES argument is immune to Segal’s first criticism.
To summarize: Segal’s first criticism of Wielenberg’s argument targets complexities not present in Wielenberg’s original presentation, complexities that Segal himself introduces. There is a more plausible reading of Wielenberg’s argument that is both free of such complexities and immune to Segal’s attack. In short, Segal’s first criticism would appear to target a straw man.
Segal’s second criticism
I turn now to Segal’s second, more substantive criticism. It turns on the thought that the sceptical theist’s justification for believing what God asserts need not be rooted in any noseeum inference. The sceptical theist need not infer that, because they cannot think of a reason why God would lie about p, therefore there is unlikely to be a reason for God to lie about p. True enough, sceptical theism would indeed block thatinference, and thus that way of justifying belief in God’s pronouncements. But perhaps the sceptical theist might offer some other, independent justification for believing that p given only that God asserts that p? Segal illustrates as follows:
Suppose we have justification for believing – regarding a particular divine assertion athat p, where p has word-of-God justification only – that Pr (p/Aap) is high. What are our justificatory grounds? Perhaps induction over all assertions; perhaps induction over divine assertions; perhaps the fact that lying is prima facie wrong and God is a morally perfect being; or perhaps some combination of these. If we do have such justification, and we believe that p based on these grounds, then we know that p. Or suppose Reid’s non-reductionist account in the epistemology of testimony is correct, and no independent positive reasons are required for believing that the testifier’s assertion is true. If so, and we believe that p based on the divine assertion (and there are no undefeated defeaters), then we know that p. (Segal (2011), 92)
Segal then points out that, if we do know that p, then, assuming premise (2b) is sound, we can use this knowledge to infer that either the justification for believing Pr (LJGa/Aap) is low or that we have justification for believing that God would not lie about p even if he had a justification. But given premise (4) of Segal’s version of Wielenberg’s argument, we lack justification for believing God would not lie about p even if he had justification. So we can in turn infer that premise (1b) is false.
This is an ingenious move. If we can know, for something like the reasons Segal outlines, that p based on no more than the divine assertion that p, then we can use other premises of Wielenberg’s argument to infer that (1b) is false. I note a similar and more direct inference might be made to refute premise (1c) of the LIES argument: if I know that pgiven only that God asserts that p, then I can infer that the probability God has AG reason to lie about p is low. (Incidentally, I note that Beaudoin (2005) made much the same criticism of the ‘divine lies’ type objection to sceptical theism before the publication of either Wielenberg’s paper or Segal’s response. Segal may here be drawing on Beaudoin.)
Segal concludes that, before Wielenberg is entitled to hold (1b), he needs to justify the claim that, if sceptical theism is true, then none of these suggested accounts of how one might know p given only the divine assertion that p are adequate. And this is something Wielenberg has not done or even attempted to do.
As I explain below, this second criticism overlooks that fact that Wielenberg presumably considers sceptical theism to supply a defeaterfor beliefs having word-of-God justification only. Moreover, even if Segal’s various suggested justificatory grounds are invoked, this defeater remains effective.
Testimony and defeat
Consider the following simple principle of testimony. For any testifier tand proposition p:
(PT) if tasserts that p, then, ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to believe both p and that one knows that p.
This is a plausible principle. Perhaps it might be justified by induction over all assertions. Or perhaps, even if no justification can be provided, it constitutes a basic Reidian principle to which we are properly entitled. Perhaps (PT) is a principle of ‘common sense’ epistemology we can rightly just take for granted. Given (PT), does it follow that I can consider myself to know some proposition given only that someone – such as God – has asserted it?
Not necessarily. (PT)’s ceteris paribusclause is obviously intended to cover situations in which one has a defeater for ones beliefs that p and that one knows that p. So, for example, if I know, in a given instance, that t has both a track record of dishonesty and excellent reason to lie to me, then it is no longer reasonable for me to suppose I know that p given only that tasserts p. Under these circumstances, I possess a defeater both for the belief pand the belief that I know that p.
Suppose Sally tells me that p. (PT) says that, ceteris paribus, it is now reasonable for me to believe both that p and that I know that p. But of course, I might yet come to possess a defeater for these beliefs. Suppose I go on to discover that Sally’s assertion that pwas a result of the following process. Sally drew a ball randomly from an urn. I have no idea whether or not all the balls in the urn are black, or none are black, or some fraction between 0 and 1 are black. What I do know (perhaps because I know Sally is currently involved in a some elaborate game of dare) is that if Sally’s ball was black, she told me a lie and if it was not black, she told me the truth.
So, setting aside the fact that Sally did in fact assert that p, the probability that Sally lies on this occasion is otherwise inscrutable to me. I cannot otherwise reasonably assign any probability to the claim that Sally lies – neither high, nor low, nor middling. Given this information, can I still reasonably believe both p and that I know that p given only that Sally asserts that p?
Surely not. Why not? Because for all I otherwise know Sally lies when she asserts that p. The fact that the probability that Sally lies is otherwise inscrutable to me provides me with a defeater for both those beliefs.
But now suppose that, in response to the above objection, I attempt to defend my claim to know that p in the following manner. Given (PT) plus the fact that Sally asserts that p, it is reasonable for me to believe I know that p. But then (given that I do know that p, and that I cannot know that p if the probability that Sally lies is not low) I am entitled to conclude that the probability Sally lies is not inscrutable, but low.
Clearly, such a response is muddled. It overlooks the fact that it is a condition of my knowing that p given only that t asserts that p that the probability that tlies is not otherwise inscrutable.
Consider a similar condition. It is intuitively obvious that, notwithstanding (PT) and the fact that t asserts p, if I know the probability that t lies on this occasion is otherwise high, then I can’t reasonably believe I know that p (given only that t asserts p). For I now possess a defeater for that belief. Notice that I certainly can’t reasonably infer that, given both (PT) and that t asserts p, then the probability tlies is actually not high but low.
But then it is also intuitively obvious that, not withstanding (PT) and the fact that t asserts p, if the probability that tlies on this occasion is otherwise inscrutable to me, then, again, then I can’t reasonably believe I know that p (given only that t asserts p). Again, I possess a defeater for that belief. That’s why my discovering the backstory to Sally’s assertion provides me with a defeater for what she asserts.
Now consider God’s divine assertion that p. Does (PT) allow me reasonably to believe that I know that p given only that divine assertion? Not, it seems, if I also know that sceptical theism is true. For then I know that the probability that God has AG reason to lie on this occasion, and thus lies, is indeed otherwise inscrutable. If my only reason for believing p is that God asserts that p, then sceptical theism provides me with a defeater for both my belief that p and my belief that I know that p.[2]
So, even if (PT) can be justified by induction over all assertions and/or even if (PT) can rightly be accepted with justification, it appears that, given sceptical theism, I can’t reasonably believe propositions having word-of-God justification only.[3]
Note that the above point concerning defeaters for beliefs that would otherwise be justified by (PT) suggests an alternative argument for Wielenberg’s conclusion. The following principle concerning defeat appears intuitively correct: For any proposition p and testifier t:
(D): If tasserts that p, and t’s asserting that p is one’s only justification for believing that p, then the fact that the probability that t lies on this occasion is otherwise inscrutable provides one with a defeaterfor the belief that p.
I take it that something like (D) was presupposed by Wielenberg even in his original presentation (presumably, something like (D) lies behind Wielenberg’s premise (2)). (D)’s role can be made explicit in a Wielenberg-style argument by combining it with (as a second premise):
If ST, then (except when there is some independent reason to think that what is asserted is true) the probability that God lies on any given occasion is otherwise inscrutable.
In the absence of any defeater-defeater, Wielenberg can now conclude:
Thus, if ST, one does know that p given only that God asserts p.
The second premise can, in turn, be supported by:
If ST, then (except when there is some independent reasons to think that what is asserted is true) the probability God has AG reason to lie on any given occasion is otherwise inscrutable.
Call this the DEFEATER argument (n.b. the parenthetical clauses are required because, of course, if we have independent reason to think p is true, then we have independent reason to think God does not lie, and thus independent reason to think God lacks an AG reason to lie).
Of course, in response to the DEFEATER argument, the sceptical theist might attempt to supply some defeater-defeater. Perhaps there is some consideration they can point to that has the consequence that the defeater generated by their sceptical theism for propositions having word-of-God justification only is itself defeated. But the onus is now very much on the sceptical theist to supply some such defeater-defeater. Until they do so, their belief in propositions having word-of-God justification remains defeated. But then, given a plausible no-defeater condition on knowledge, sceptical theists do not know, and cannot reasonably maintain that they know, any propositions having word-of-God justification only.[4]
Induction over divine assertions
What of Segal’s suggestion that we might still justify belief in God’s assertion that p by induction if not over all assertions then over at least over divineassertions? Of course, this would require we have grounds for believing God tells the truth on at least some occasions. But where we have independent reason to believe that what God has asserted is true, we do possess such grounds. Arguably, this is the case for some, perhaps even many, divine assertions. So, if we know that God has not lied when it comes to those assertions we can independently verify, then we know God lacks AG reason to lie on those occasions (for he would otherwise have lied). And if we know God lacks AG reason to lie on those occasions, why can we not inductively generalize and justifiably conclude that he is unlikely to possess AG reason to lie on those occasions when he makes assertions the truth of which we cannot independently verify?
Unfortunately for the sceptical theist, this inference is also blocked by sceptical theism.[5]
Suppose God makes ten assertions of which we are able independently to verify that seven are true. Given God’s established track record of honesty, are we not justified in believing his remaining three assertions? Not, it appears, if sceptical theism is true. For consider the possibility that God has AG reason to deceive us by lulling us into a false sense of security, much as confidence tricksters do. Given sceptical theism, it won’t do to argue that if we are unable to think of an AG reason for God to engage in such deception then there’s unlikely to be such a reason. But then how are we able reasonably to believe that the probability that such an AG reason exists is low?
Suppose Bert makes ten assertions, seven of which I am able independently to verify are true, the remaining three of which I am otherwise in the dark about. Can I reasonably believe the remaining three assertions? Ceteris paribus, of course. But now suppose I discover that, for all I know, Bert is a scammer engaged in a confidence trick of which I am the unwitting victim. For all I know, my verification of Bert’s other seven assertions is intended by Bert to play a confidence-building role in his deception. The probability that Bert is engaged in such a deception is otherwise inscrutable to me. I can reasonably assign no probability to Bert’s thus deceiving me: neither high, nor low, nor middling. Surely, given the inscrutability of this probability, I possess a defeater for those remaining three beliefs, notwithstanding the fact that I have independently verified the truth of Bert’s other seven assertions.
But then similarly, given the inscrutability of the probability that God has AG reason to engage in a similar deception, we possess a defeater for those of God’s assertions we have not independently verified, notwithstanding the fact that we have been able to verify some or even most of God’s other assertions.
The relevance of God’s moral perfection
Segal makes one other suggestion regarding how we might come to know that p given only that God asserts that p. As Segal points out in the above quotation, God is not any old testifier. He is a morally perfect testifier. But then, given the wrongness of lying, perhaps the sceptical theist can still reasonably believe God is unlikely to lie even when he has reason to? And thus the sceptical theist can still reasonably believe propositions having word-of-God justification only?
There may be some plausibility to the suggestion that, when it comes to non-AG reasons to lie, a morally perfect God is unlikely to act on them. However, the LIES and DEFEATER arguments are both immune to the above line of attack. That is because (unlike Segal’s version of Wielenberg’s argument) both arguments focus not on any divine reasons to lie, but specifically on AG reasons to lie. Perhaps the fact that God is a morally perfect being should lead us to assign a low probability to God’s lying when he has non-AG reason to lie. However, that same fact should vastly increase our confidence that, if there is a reason for God to lie such that lying is morally the right thing to do, then God will act on that reason. We can be confident God acts on such reasons not in spite of but because of his morally perfect nature. Indeed, trivially, if there are AG reasons for God to lie, then he is guaranteed to lie. And it appears that, if sceptical theism is true, then (except when there is some independent reason to think that what is asserted is true) the probability that there exist AG reasons for God to lie is inscrutable. But then, given (D), sceptical theism provides a defeater for propositions having word-of-God justification only, notwithstanding God’s moral perfection.
Conclusions regarding Segal’s critique of Wielenberg
I draw the following conclusions regarding Segal’s objections to Wielenberg’s argument (as Segal presents it above).
Segal’s first criticism targets premise (2b). But in targeting (2b), Segal targets his own idiosyncratic presentation of Wielenberg’s argument, a presentation Wielenberg is under no obligation to accept. There exist other readings of Wielenberg’s argument that are, I suggest, more plausibly attributed to Wielenberg and that are immune to Segal’s first criticism.
Segal’s second criticism involves his outlining various justifications that may be open to theists for believing propositions having word-of-God justification only – justifications Segal believes Wielenberg must rule out before he can claim to have shown that sceptical theism undermines knowledge of such propositions. This second criticism also fails. Segal’s suggested justifications all run into the same fundamental problem: that, even granted (i) the plausibility of (PT), (ii) God’s supposed track record of telling the truth, and (iii) the fact that God is morally perfect, etc., sceptical theism nevertheless supplies a defeater for propositions having word-of-God justification only. That sceptical theism supplies such a defeater is, I take it, Wielenberg’s point. In which case, Segal is missing that point.
Perhaps many theists do reasonably believe propositions possessing word-of-God justification only. Perhaps they do quite properly justify their belief in such propositions in the ways sketched out by Segal. However, if such a theist goes on to embrace sceptical theism in order to try to deal with the problem of evil, then, notwithstanding the fact that they happen to employ one or indeed all of Segal’s various suggested justificatory grounds, their sceptical theism nevertheless supplies them with a defeater for beliefs having word-of-God justification, just as Wielenberg maintains. Indeed, it appears that, given this defeater (and, of course, no defeater-defeater) it is irrational for such a sceptical theist to continue to maintain they know propositions having word-of-God justification only.
My LIES and DEFEATER arguments are immune to both Segal’s objections. Both arguments might, I think, be plausibly attributed to Wielenberg. Of course, it remains open to Segal to argue that the premises of the LIES and DEFEATER arguments are implausible, or at least not as plausible as those of the sceptical theist’s anti-noseeum argument. But, as I noted above, even if Segal could show that the premises of these two arguments are not as plausible as those of the anti-noseeum, Wielenberg might still successfully press his case. Suppose it is highly plausible that the premises of either the LIES or DEFEATER argument are true. Then, even if those premises happen not to be as plausible as those of the anti-noseeum, it remains highly plausible that sceptical theism generates a defeater for propositions having word-of-God justification only.
The McBrayer/Swenson response to Wielenberg
I turn now to the criticism of Wielenberg’s argument presented in McBrayer (2010) and then McBrayer and Swenson (2012). McBrayer and Swenson maintain that, for religiously mainstream monotheists who employ sceptical theism to deal with the problem of evil, Wielenberg’s argument ‘is not as scary as it first appears’ (McBrayer and Swenson (2012), 148). They begin by acknowledging that the sceptical theist should grant the possibility of divine lies:
(o)ther things being equal, God would, of course, tell us only what was true. This isn’t an all-things-considered judgement but a ceteris paribus one. Only the former is off limits according to sceptical theism. But since we’re in no position to determine whether or not the ceteris paribus clause is met, we should allow that it is possible that God is lying to us. (McBrayer and Swenson (2012), 148)
McBrayer and Swenson suggest that, given that we at least know that, ceteris paribus, God would tell us the truth, we can remain justifiably confident about the truth of his pronouncements, just as we can remain justifiably confident about the pronouncements of other people even while acknowledging the possibility that they are lying:
People have deceived us in the past. And in many cases, we simply can’t tell whether they are being deceitful in any given instance. And yet we think it’s perfectly rational to accept the testimony of such people. Thus it is appropriate to accept testimony in general even though we know that it is possible the testimony is misleading. Given this epistemic fact, it is also appropriate to accept the testimony of God even though we know that it is possible that God is deceiving us. (McBrayer and Swenson (2012), 148)
Why the McBrayer/Swenson response to Wielenberg fails
This response to Wielenberg also fails. To begin with, let’s unpack McBrayer and Swe