Speech of the Reichsführer-SS at the SS Group Leader Meeting in Posen on 4 October 1943.
Ceremony in Honour of the Fallen
In the months which have past since we last met in June of 1942, many comrades have fallen and given their lives for Germany and for the Führer. Before them, in the forefront — I ask you to stand in their honour, and in the honour of all our dead SS men and dead German soldiers, men and women — in the forefront, from our ranks, our old comrade and friend, SS Obergruppenführer Eicke. (The Group Leaders rise from their seats). I ask you to sit.
The situation in the fifth year of the war
I have considered it necessary to call you all together, the High Leadership Corps of the SS and Police, now at the beginning of the fifth year of the war, which will be a very difficult year of the war. Hard-headed, as we always were, in a spirit of respect for the truth with regards to ourselves, there are several things which we wish to discuss at this Troop Leadership Conference. Just as I was accustomed to do in long years of peace, I wish to describe the situation as I see it, in as few words as possible, with regards to our responsibilities and that which we have already achieved and accomplished, as well as with regards to that which stands before us to be accomplished in the future.
The Russian leadership
First, the military situation. I will begin with Russia. When — I believe it was in 1937 or 1938 — the great show trials were being held in Moscow, and the ex-Czarist officer and later Bolshevik general Tuchachevski and other generals were shot, we were, at that time, all over Europe, even in the Party and the SS, of the opinion that the Bolshevik system, and therefore Stalin, had made one of its most serious mistakes. We were absolutely mistaken in this judgment of the situation. We can state this, once and for all, in a spirit of full respect for the truth. I believe that Russia could not have withstood the two years of war — it is now in the third year of war — had it retained its ex-Czarist generals. It turned — I'll discuss this first of all — its political commissars into generals, it sought out those who had grown up through the Red Army as commanders, as generals, so that they could simultaneously act as political commissars. The stubbornest bearers of the will of the Bolshevik... doctrine, I should like to call it, not an ideology ... is, in Russia, simultaneously a commander and leader.
The Attack of 1941
In 1941, the Führerattacked Russia. That was, as we may well say today, shortly, perhaps a quarter or half year before Stalin's enveloping movement prior to his great thrust into Central and Western Europe. I can sketch out this first year with very brief strokes. The attack was effective. The Russian army was driven together into great pockets, destroyed, taken prisoner. We did not then value the mass man as we do now, as raw material, as manpower. Which is not a shame in the end, if one thinks in terms of generations, but it is regrettable today due to the loss of manpower: the prisoners died by the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands from exhaustion, from hunger.
The winter of 1941-1942
Then came the summer and autumn of 1941, the flush of victory which led us almost to Moscow, the winter of 1941-42. The winter of 1941-42, with its consequences, was, on the one hand, the work of Fate, which hit us hard for the first time; on the other hand, however, it was the work of the political commissars, the "politruks", whose severity and relentlessness, whose fanatical, brutal will drove the raw material of the Slavic, Mongolian mass man to the front, and didn't let him get back out again.
The year 1942
In early 1942 then came our attacks in the Crimea, over the Donetz to the Don and to the Volga. The bow of the German front and its allies was drawn taut. The war could have been brought to a close for Russia in 1942 if all had held out. Since according to all calculations, and in all probability, which must not be left out of consideration in war, with which one must still reckon after all, the Caucasus would have fallen into our hands sooner or later. Russia would have been cut off from its chief sources of petroleum, and hunger would have handled its people even more roughly than is the case today. Then came the collapse of our allies. First came the breakthrough among the Rumanians, then the breakthrough among the Italian Army, which was already of very little value even then, then the breakthrough and retreat of the Hungarian units: the total loss of approximately 500 km of front. This loss required the withdrawal of the German front, in order to be able to close it again at all. This loss made the sacrifice of Stalingrad necessary from the point of view of Fate. It is not our intention to reflect upon every detail here today. I am personally convinced that this sacrifice — that sounds dreadfully harsh when I say so now — was necessary, since, without the link-up of enemy forces around Stalingrad, it would no longer have been possible to close the German front. That will, I am convinced, be the finding of military historical research 10, 15, or 20 years after the war. At the same time, a very late consolation.
The year 1943.
The first great battle for Kharkhov then came early this year. Kharkhov was evacuated under sometimes — this is known to every one of our units out there — very peculiar circumstances. At the right time, then, upon the order of the Führer, the tank corps arrived in Kharkhov under the leadership of our old comrade, SS ObergruppenFührerHausser. The deliberate evacuation of Kharkhov was also carried out by Hausser using the tank corps. A glorious campaign of several weeks then began, carried out by this corps in an unusually mobile manner in the open field, a manner I consider truly correct and downright true to type for motorized and tank units. Our tank corps drove the enemy; Sepp Dietrich was the first to break into Kharkhov with his Leibstandarte. Kharkhov was retaken, and the German front was reestablished.
In late spring and summer of this year, we replied to the attacks of the Russians with a big counterattack at Bielgorod. We can report with pride that the only corps which really penetrated the deeply entrenched system of Russian positions was our SS Tank Division, with the Standarte "Deutschland" in front of the old Division "Das Reich". The Russians had built a position 7 km deep, a model and an example such as we Germans ought never to forget: to work hard, to dig in, and build positions. Because the hard work, the sweat poured out in so doing, will save the lives of tens of thousands. We Germans have still not really learned this after four years of war. If we had to give a grade for this like in school, the best the Germans could get for building their positions would be between 4 and 5 . I must acknowledge one thing here: our SS Divisions have learned a great deal over the past 2 years, and generally build their positions very assiduously.
In the middle of this operation on the eastern front came the necessary withdrawal of a great number of divisions to Italy. That was why we could not counter as forcefully as necessary the Russian attack, which we could have terminated with a catastrophe for the Russians if we had had ten more tank divisions, purely on the grounds of strength.
The human potential of the Russians
Here I would like to say a few words on evaluating the total strength of the Russians. An element basic to an overall evaluation is the question of Russian population figures. That is the great riddle. Population estimates for that country, which has been hermetically sealed off for decades, range from 170 to 250 million. I have taken a lot of trouble with this question, and have had studies prepared starting with the first Czarist censuses, that is, the first censuses ever carried out in Russia. At that time, the Bolshevik tendency to conceal everything from Europe and the world — from the building of a street which is not indicated on any map, to the concealment of large industries manufacturing tanks and airplanes, and which are shown to the European Info-tourist as "tractor factories", while tanks are built in the next hall — did not yet exist. I had census figures brought to me which were not gathered under this law of camouflage and concealment, decades before the Bolshevik administration. These figures enable one to perceive a certain increase, a gradual growth. We came to the conclusion through our calculations that Russia must have two hundred people, maybe two hundred twenty million at the very most. To describe the calculations in detail at this time would take too long and might also be too boring. I came to the conclusion that the Russians, in addition to the divisions on their Western front, that is, the divisions standing directly opposite us today, have squeezed an additional 4 million soldiers out of the body of their people early this year and over the course of the year. That means 400 times 10,000 men, or 400 new divisions. I calculate this in approximately the following manner: the Russians have already drafted all men born in 1926, and some of the men born in 1927. It is a tragedy according to the laws of nature that Russian men born in 1925 to 1927 amount to 1.5 and 1.8 men respectively, while our men born in the same years amount to only 500,000 to 600,000 , that is, a third of the Russian number.
In addition, the Russians have no doubt added a lot of people to their companies by drafting even younger men, men born in 1928. The Division "Das Reich" reports that, in some cases, the divisions opposing us contained whole companies consisting of 14 and 15 year olds. That is entirely indifferent to the Russians; to them, only the masses count; the masses must be trampled, stuck, and slaughtered. They are — to use a really brutal expression — like a pig which has been stuck and must slowly bleed to death. The Russians have doubtlessly further reinforced their army by an additional 1 million men through the incorporation of auxiliary forces, that is, chiefly women and boys in the military and supply units, general staffs, and as auxiliary machine gunners. The Russians have apparently not received any Chinese. They have, however, recruited another 1 million men from their small splinter nationalities, such as the Afghans (2 to 3 million people), Mongols from Outer Mongolia (2 million people), and Kirghis; these people are perhaps not yet exhausted in terms of military purposes. I believe that all in all they have raised another 4 million men for their offensive army.
With regards to the situation as a whole, I am, as you know, an optimist. I know that we will win the war. That is a law of nature. But I have always been rather conservative in my calculations, and I think I can show that I have never made a mistaken prophecy in these matters. I therefore believe that the Russians have lost approximately 2 million men in dead, prisoners, and disabled. We must therefore expect one more desperate total offensive of the Russians in winter, with a strength of 200 divisions, that is, approximately 2 million men. We must and will hold off this attack and this clash.
Absolutely nothing is endless on this earth; the potential of the Russians is not endless either. When these Brussilov offensives, to use the expression, are finally over, the potential of the Russians will therefore be approaching its natural end. Hunger is a serious problem among the Russians. It is interesting that the Russians consider it correct, with the mass man, to keep the officers and commissars physically strong and in a good mood by feeding them an American diet, while little Ivan is fed very shabbily with a bit of bread or similar rubbish. They are fighting the whole war through their brutally trained leadership strata of political officers; officer-comissars or commissar-officers; politruks or subordinate officers; subordinate officers or politruks; it has gradually come to be all one and the same.
The partisan war
Now I come to another aspect of the war in Russia, of which there is so frightfully much talk. When you arrive in the East, in the high staff headquarters, a map on a scale of 1 to 1 million is usually spread out in front of you. Every mine found on a certain date anywhere along railroad tracks thousands of kilometres long is diligently entered with a squiggle on this map on a scale of 1 to 1 million. Every attack, whether an attack on a munitions transport or a cattle theft usual in the district, is entered with a cross or something similar. The result is that a map like that looks all red.
You're tempted to say: "It's hopeless! Give up! There's nothing we can do". But if you transfer the same data to a map on a normal scale, and compare it to the criminal cases in our sheltered German fatherland, still richly supplied with policemen even today, then it sinks to an unpleasant minor matter. But they all tell you — if you will listen to it — all the lowest ranking staff members, especially in the communications zone, "It's dreadful! The Central Army Group is cut off from the fatherland for 400 kilometres by a belt of partisans."
When somebody tells you that, just hand him your hanky so he can dry his tears. I always ask such people the question: "Has the Central Army Group suffered from hunger so far?" Answer: "No." "Has their ammunition been cut off?" "No, they've received everything." Of course, the trains are delayed for hours, half a day. "Have their supplies been interrupted then?" "No, the Army Group is receiving its supplies."
The Vlasov ballyhoo
Then you hear the next prayer. This goes: "We were wrong about the Russians." This song is usually sung by men from some Eastern province, who were over there in their youth, some of whom have written very good books and had a Russian mother, too, and now they tell stories. It is also sung by the little political vagabonds whom we first came to know in the eastern struggle against Poland, whom we rejected at home, and who have now been drafted as soldiers, officers and majors, and are still peddling their intellectual poison under cover of the uniform of our decent German army. Goaded on by this propaganda tendency — I can't call it anything else — they tell you so many stories, or write them home by military post (and the stories then trickle down from top to bottom): "Yes, we were wrong about the Russians. The Russians are not at all the robot" (this is the expression used most frequently) "that we thought they were in 1941. Now that we're over here in the East, our eyes have been opened. The Russians are a noble people, and so on and so forth, a collection of all virtues. We just have to educate them as National Socialists, the best thing would be to create a NSRAP or something similar. Then they would" — this is the next bit — "form the army of liberation under General Vlasov". Then comes the following, which is a constant claim of General Vlasov: "Russia can only be freed by Russians. Germany has so far never been able to defeat the Russians". So give Vlasov 500,000 or 1,000,000 Russians, arm them well, train them insofar as possible according to German principles, and Vlasov is so noble, that he'll go off against the Russians and kill them for us.
People can blow off a great deal of stuff and nonsense; that wouldn't be so dangerous. But when a piece of nonsense like this has the end effect that a glorious army, looking back on hundreds of years of tradition like the German one, begins to doubt its own strength due to the gossip of politically untrained little officers of higher or lower service grades — the little bundle of proverbs who talks like this doesn't even notice how devastating it is when he says: "We cannot beat the Russians, they can only do that themselves" — then that is dangerous. Everybody you ask, "How's the Russian infantry?", will tell you, with pathetic thoughtlessness (since the two things don't go together logically, after all): "The Russian infantry is garbage. We are vastly superior to them." But: Russians can only be defeated by Russians.
I wouldn't have had any objections, if we had hired Mr. Vlasov and every other Slavic subject wearing a Russian general's uniform, to make propaganda against the Russians. I wouldn't have any objections at all. Wonderful.
Brig. Fegelein and the Russian general
Our comrade Fegelein once captured a Russian general like that. Look, they're cheap. They're Slavs. Full of humour, as Fegelein is, Fegelein told his staff: "We'll treat this one real good. We'll act like we're going to recognize him as a General. So, when he comes in, stand up, stand at attention, keep quiet, say 'General Sir, this' and 'General Sir, that', show him how much respect you have for him". Of course, this worked. You don't need to give a Russian general any political ideas, political ideals, or political plans for the future. You can get them cheaper than that, gentlemen. The Slavs are known for that.
The Slav is never able to build anything himself. In the long run, he's not capable of it. I'll come back to this later. With the exception of a few phenomena produced by Asia every couple of centuries, through that mixture of two heredities which may be fortunate for Asia but is unfortunate for us Europeans — with the exception, therefore, of an Attilla, a Ghenghis Khan, a Tamerlaine, a Lenin, a Stalin — the mixed race of the Slavs is based on a sub-race with a few drops of blood of our blood, blood of a leading race; the Slav is unable to control himself and create order. He is able to argue, able to debate, able to disintegrate, able to offer resistance against every authority and to revolt. But these human shoddy goods are just as incapable of maintaining order today as they were 700 or 800 years ago, when they called in the Varangians, when they called in the Ruriks .
Every Russian, every Slav, likes to hear himself talk. An old story. If you encourage them: "Please tell us, we place the highest value on your opinion. After all, we can only learn from you", then you won't find a single Russian commissar who won't fall for this; it's like tickling them with a peacock feather, just like this. Our Fegelein treated his general that way, and his general told us everything that such a brave, courageous commander really shouldn't ever tell at all, everything from his battery positions to his divisional marching plans and orders (he had a whole offensive army). He gave us everything ripe for the slaughter. It was clear in his mind that after all his blabbering — he was never asked anything directly, not with a single word — that he really couldn't go back to Little Father Stalin, even though he wore the Order of Stalin number seven hundred and something, a sort of Great Knight's Cross from over there, which he then gave Fegelein as a gift. Fegelein gave the medal to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer gave it back to Fegelein in a very nice silver box. Just thought I'd mention it.
Vlasov again
When Fegelein told me the story of the general, I said, "Sure, we can do everything. The man gets promised everything and he'll get it, too. He gets the pension of a German lieutenant general (he's a Russian lieutenant general). He gets good food, liquor, women."
That's really disgustingly cheap. A torpedo costs, what do I know, 10,000 marks, as soon as we fire it. The preliminary concentrated artillery fire for a single division or corps costs many hundreds of thousands. We don't even know whether the fire will be as effective in every case as when we buy just one cheap Russian general.
Of course, it doesn't go like that formally; you don't say, "You get 100,000 marks down, now betray everything to us". Of course, he won't do it. Comrade Slav has a few points of honour here. You have to go about it differently. Let's figure it out. How much pension does he get? 1,500 marks a month, that's 18,000 marks a year. Let him live 10 years, that's 180,000 marks. Miscellaneous expenditure is 20,000 marks. That's 200,000 marks total. It's really cheap if you get a Russian offensive army for it. You can do that with every Russian general, every one. We really shouldn't take them so seriously. If we could do that, then things would go right. But we Germans handle it so badly, I must say, in the state and the armed forces, that even many a Party comrade has walked on that bird's lime and gotten stuck.
Mr. Vlasov has made speeches in Paris, in Brussels, in Berlin. At his feet sat astonished members of the German leadership corps; their mouths hang wide open, their noses fall right down into their mouths out of sheer astonishment: "Golly! That Bolshevik can do simply everything". And they let that butcher's assistant tell them so. I took the trouble to read his whole speech once. I'll write an opinion on this speech, and send it to you in the near future. Mr. Vlasov says: "It's a shame how the Germans treat the Russian people. We Russians abolished corporal punishment decades ago". (Sure, they abolished it. That's why they shoot them now instead. That's just another kind of incentive.) "You Germans re-introduced corporal punishment, oh, how barbarous, how low-down." Everybody in the audience feels ashamed. A few minutes later he claims: "How nationalistic the Russians are, you must appeal to their nationalistic soul". Can't you just see how the victor over Field Marshal Paulus, General X (I no longer recall his name), who was locked up by the GPU for years, beaten, whipped, and tortured, so that he suffers from hip pain even today and has a severe head injury, was victorious over Paulus at Stalingrad out of pure nationalism?
Nobody contradicts him. I though the Russians had abolished corporal punishment. Apparently, among the Russians, only the generals are beaten, to get better results out of them. This Vlasov ballyhoo has gone around Germany without contradiction. Instead of skilfully making propaganda out of it, to disintegrate the Russian army, this propaganda has been turned against us, and has to some extent paralysed the strength of resistance and the will to resist of our own ranks through errors and false notions.
Ruling with a minority
I have felt obligated here to speak of these things quite openly here, with absolutely no rancour against anyone. All the things that we are still doing wrong, that we still can't do right, that is, how to act with regards to foreign peoples, the domination of masses of foreign blood by a small minority of the upper crust, all these things just have to be learned. We of the old Reich, I'm speaking of little Germany, have only been a Reich for 70 years. We have not yet had the opportunity to rule large political minorities, or even majorities, with a German minority, like the Ostmark in Old Austria, with its minority of 12 million Germans, ruling 40 to 50 million members of foreign races in the Balkans. Nor have we had the opportunity to learn to rule millions, hundreds of millions, with a minority, as England does, having learned how for 300 years.
We must take things as they are. We will learn that too; and if we could rise from the dead again in 100 years, we would see that our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will already be better at it than we are. I wish to instruct the SS in all these things. I believe that we are best protected from error through our self-assured racial attitude. We must also learn a great deal ourselves. We'll do it, I believe, to put it modestly for once, the least badly, relatively speaking, and with the fewest mistakes.
Psychology of the Slavs
& Now, back to the Slavs! I consider it necessary to speak to each other about this once again. Whether it's Peter the Great or the late Czars, whether it's Lenin or Stalin, they know their own people. They are perfectly well aware that the concepts of "loyalty", "never betraying", "never conspiring", have no place in the Russian vocabulary.
Whatever people may tell you about the Russians, it's all true. It's true that some of the Russians are fervently pious, and fervently believe in the Mother of God of the Khasans or someplace else, it's absolutely true. It's true that the Volga boatmen sing beautifully; it's true that the Russian of today, in modern times, is a good improviser and good technician. It's true, for the most part, that he's even a lover of children. It's true that he can work very hard. And it's just as true that he is stinking lazy. It's just as true that he is an uninhibited beast, who can torture and torment other people in ways a devil would never permit himself to think of. It's just as true that the Russian, high or low, is inclined to the perversest of things, even devouring his comrades or keeping his neighbour's liver in his lunch bag. It's all part of the scale of feelings and values of the Slavic peoples. It's often purely a matter of chance which lot he draws; and to people who don't know the beast, he is often a very great riddle: what is the fellow up to now?
The Russians themselves know each other very well, and have invented a very practical system, whether it was the Czars with the Ochrana, or Mr. Lenin and Mr. Stalin with the GPU or the NKVD. When four Russians get together, with little father, little mother, and their little children, not one of the 4 or 5 knows who is betraying whom at the moment: which one is the informer betraying the father now: is it the mother, or the daughter? And who, in return, is betraying them? In doubtful cases there may be two, even three, informers in this family. I am not exaggerating. This remark is entirely accurate with regards to the city. In the countryside, our comrades who have been over there in the East can confirm that there are still 20 or 30 NKVD informers and agents in every village, even after the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks. This ensures, to an absolute certainty, that no conspiracy can get started, because everything will still be reported to the top by means of this informer apparatus. Then comes the pistol or deportation, and that is how this entire people must be governed.
Heart in the wrong place
It is basically wrong for us to project our whole harmless soul and heart, all our good nature, our idealism, onto foreign peoples. This applies to Herder, who wrote the "Voices of the Peoples", probably in a drunken hour, and caused us, in later generations, such boundless suffering and misery. That applies to the Czechs and Slovenes, to whom, after all, we brought their national feeling. They themselves were absolutely incapable of it; rather, we invented it for them.
For the SS Man, one principle must apply absolutely: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood, and to no one else. What happens to the Russians, the Czechs, is totally indifferent to me. Whatever is available to us in good blood of our type, we will take for ourselves, that is, we will steal their children and bring them up with us, if necessary. Whether other races live well or die of hunger is only of interest to me insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise that doesn't interest me. Whether 10,000 Russian women fall down from exhaustion in building a tank ditch is of interest to me only insofar as the tank ditches are finished for Germany.
We will never be hard and heartless when it is not necessary; that is clear. We Germans, the only ones in the world with a decent attitude towards animals, will also adopt a decent attitude with regards to these human animals; but it is a sin against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, so that our sons and grandchildren will have a harder time with them. When somebody comes to me and says, "I can't build tank ditches with children or women. That's inhumane, they'll die doing it." Then I must say: "You are a murderer of your own blood, since, if the tank ditches are not built, then German soldiers will die, and they are the sons of German mothers. That is our blood." That is how I would like to indoctrinate this SS, and, I believe, have indoctrinated, as one of the holiest laws of the future: our concern, our duty, is to our people, and to our blood. That is what we must care for and think about, work for and fight for, and nothing else. Everything else can be indifferent to us. I wish the SS to face the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, particularly the Russians, with this attitude. Everything else is moonshine, a fraud against our own people, and an obstacle to earlier victory in the war.
Russian soldiers on our side
One thing is a matter of course in this war: it is better for a Russian to die than a German. If we use the Russians, then they must be mixed with Germans in a ratio of 1:2 to 1:3. The best thing is to use individual Russians; then you can drive with them in a tank. One Russian with 2 or 3 Germans in a tank, magnificent, nothing wrong. But you must never let one Russian meet other tank-driving Russians, otherwise the boys will conspire. But if you wish to have Russian-only companies for some reason, then be careful, gentlemen — and that is not just a thought, gentlemen, that is an order, gentlemen — they must have their informer apparatus, their NKVD, in this company. Then you can sleep in peace. Otherwise, this is one of the earliest warnings I've issued, take care that these sub-humans always look at you; they must always look their superior in the eye. It's like with animals. As long as an animal looks his tamer in the eye, he won't try anything. But have no doubt about one thing: he is a beast. We will able to utilize the Russians with this attitude; with this attitude we shall be superior to the Slavs at all times. But not with any other attitude.
The Russian theatre of war today
Now back to the military situation! We are in a foreshortened position today. It is a shame that we had to give up the Donetz Basin. We have given it up. That will in no way decide or influence the outcome of the war at all. It is advantageous to us to have a short, straight front in this way; it will be extended, and must be extended, with all our strength; it will then form our East Wall with the shortest, straightest connections to the rear. All in all, this offers one very great advantage. The enemy has now regained the great area which we previously had to conquer, large expanses of which we seriously damaged. I view the offensive of the Russians this winter with calm. I am convinced that we can hold off this last great lunge of the desperate beast. And then, he wouldn't be a Slav if he didn't suddenly show signs of very severe exhaustion, and I mean intellectual exhaustion.
The Italian theatre of war
Now for Italy, the other theatre of war! There must be no doubt in our minds that the weakness of this people lies in their blood, in their race. In considering this problem, we must distinguish between that which is comfortable or uncomfortable for us today, and that which will be comfortable or uncomfortable for us in the future. Italy was a weak ally, beginning with Greece and Africa, and ending with Russia. There is, after all, no nation which hasn't thrashed the Italians, from whom the Italians haven't taken a beating. The Italians, we can see this right now, will be considered the most contemptible people in the world; no one, no Albanian, no Montenegrin, no Frenchman, no American, no Englishman, no Russian, no German, will have any respect for them, since they have proven themselves everywhere to be cowards, as soldiers, as men. That is the most contemptible judgement that one can hand down against a people and a race. We must therefore distinguish between that which is comfortable for us today and that which would be comfortable for us in the future. If the Italians were a neighbour truly related to us in terms of inner qualities, then it would be magnificent if Italy had remained strong. But with a consistently weak neighbour who has no resistance to anything, the situation as it is, I must say, is much better. It is considerably better. At the moment, it is uncomfortable; it came at an inconvenient time. If the betrayal had come a quarter of a year later, it would have been better for us. But you can't hope for that in war. Fate simply doesn't ask what you want. It throws you heavy punches. In the long-distant future, we will be thankful to Fate and to God that it happened as it did.
The failure of the Italians
I've already said that the Italians have failed everywhere. Pantelleria, to take only one characteristic example, capitulated with 12,000 men after the loss of 36 killed and 120 wounded over the course of six weeks. They had enough water — the report of the honourable commander of Pantelleria was not true — for the garrison of 12,000 men, probably for another 10 to 12 days. I personally believe they had enough water for even longer. The island could simply not be taken, every expert says so; even the airplane hangars were underground, built into rock casemates. They simply couldn't be gotten out of there. Something must be said here: the surrender of Pantelleria was tragic insofar as the Duce consolidated the island, exactly as he built the Italian air force, exactly as he created the Italian navy. That navy was his work, his navy. But these people, one can really say, are still Italians after all; the Duce is the only one who embodies and bears in himself the great Roman tradition.
The Italian army in Sicily didn't defend itself. It showed the white flag everywhere, right away. Then came the betrayal. That was very hard for us, since we were in the midst of transporting our divisions. Based on news reports, I was already convinced of the disintegration of Italy one and half years ago. The army was infected with Communism and was sympathetic to the Anglo-Saxons. We couldn't carry out the counter stroke before enough German divisions were over the Alps.
The liberation of the Duce
Next came the real implementation of the armistice. And then came the — how should I say — bold stroke of our SS men and the men the Luftwaffe, the liberation of the Duce. I was very happy that the work of the Security Service could be mentioned for once, after all these years, since it is precisely the task of the Security Police and Security Service to work in silence. Their work is never mentioned, cannot be mentioned. Their men die as bravely as our men do at the front, but their work must not be mentioned. That which they provide in terms of important information and documents, the importance of that which they do, can never be mentioned. Thus, it pleased me greatly that the Security Service — the work of our friend Heydrich, which is being carrying on in a dignified and forceful manner by his successor Kaltenbrunner — was able to show for once, in public, that it is strong and gets results.
The liberation of the Duce, insofar as I could tell everywhere, met with an unprecedented response in our people, and gave them an unprecedented boost. But it was also interesting because it was taught us that virtues like loyalty and comradeship are values of the mind which are profoundly rooted, not only in the German people, but in the entire European group of peoples. Let us never underestimate the value, the unique eternal value, of this ideal. The manner in which our people reacted to this act of comradeship and loyalty was therefore a shining example and a gleaming proof of this fact.
The Balkans
I will briefly list the individual nations of the Balkans. Croatia, for the moment in serious disorder, is a state made up of 6 1/2 million men, of whom 3 1/2 million are Croats. 2 million are Bratislavs, that is, a kind of Serb, and 1 million are Bosnians. It is a state with very large minorities. Its national leader, Poglawnik, entered office as a result of the difficult conditions imposed upon him by the Italians, and placed at a disadvantage by the fact that he was forced to renounce the largest and most valuable parts of his country. It was obvious that he not enjoy any authority in this manner. Most of the country was occupied by the Italian army. The bands under Mr. Tito — he has become a sort of popular hero there — and Mr. Draha Mihailovitsch — Tito is the Communist man, Draha Mihailowitsch is the Yugoslavian-English-American man — dominated the situation.
The situation in Slovenia is similar. Albania's independence was now recognized by us. Serbia is naturally the hotbed of conspiracy in the Balkans, yet it is relatively quiet. Greece is also somewhat quieter for the moment.
It is clear that we must concentrate large numbers of troops to the Balkans in order to shield and protect this part of Europe exposed by the collapse of our ally. We must expect attacks there by the Anglo-Americans.
It is naturally of interest that the Balkans are one of the principal objects of strife between Russia and the Anglo-Americans. Russia says: that's my sphere. And the Anglo-Americans say: that's our sphere. The best fruits for us will grow out of the perpetual strife between our noble allies.
The other occupied territories
France, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Bohemia, and Moravia — the situation is known. We must be on the lookout everywhere, that is clear. We must expect acts of sabotage, paratroop attacks, minor rebellions, strikes, insubordination, and irresolution everywhere, even among the favourably-minded elements of the population. In the germanic countries, one thing is quite clear to me: the majority of the people in these germanic countries, in the bottom of their hearts, will only be won over when the die has been cast in the present struggle between the two germanic Empires, that is, the German and British empires, when it is seen who is the stronger. They will then fall to the stronger. It is disagreeable to us that they do not come to us with open hearts. But it cannot be denied that the political preconditions for this did not exist.
There were no great figures — this is the tragedy of the renewal movements in Holland, in Flanders, in Norway, and in Denmark — able to win their people over to us and lead them into the germanic political community today, according to their own political laws. It is perhaps — even probably — best, from a historical point of view, that this is so difficult. The select few who come to us, and fight in our germanic volunteer units, in our germanic corps (such as the 3rd SS Tank Corps) are naturally some of the most valuable members of the germanic nations. These men, who fought their through to us from out of 30 million germanic people, who were trained among us, will be the old fighters of the greater germanic community.
The sabotage war
We must, of course, anticipate an increase in the most unpleasant forms of sabotage, the use of poisons, explosives, briefly, with everything. These are things that we have to pay attention to, which must be taken seriously down to the minutest detail, but whose objective — wearing down our nerves and spoiling our good humour — must never be permitted to succeed. I say this in full awareness that every detail must be taken seriously in this war. But we must consider nothing a tragedy, since all these things do not kill us. They cannot kill us; they are pinpricks, they are unpleasant, they hem us in here and there; but they cannot wound us mortally. Mortally — I would like to emphasize this here for the first time — there is only one thing that can hurt us: a weakening of our will to resist. He who, in spirit and determination, refuses to give in, cannot be defeated, unless he can be starved out, which is not the case with us, if he stays strong, as a man and as a soldier, if he has his weapons, and cannot be overcome with these.
The air war
Since the Luftwaffe, which possessed an absolute mastery of the air in the first years of the war, has had to stretch itself out to great theatres of war all over Europe, and it has naturally had to be spread thinner. Since we had to intervene in Italy in battles involving the heaviest sacrifices to protect the security of our supply lines, since neither the Italian fleet nor the Italian air force could protect our supply lines to Africa to any significant degree, we have suffered much attrition in Italy.
The terror attacks on our country have doubtlessly hurt us badly in many places. I am firmly convinced, I would like to say that I can state definitely, that the worst is over, that we have found a tactic to break these air attacks, that, through work, we can multiply our aircraft production and improve our weapons. I am firmly convinced that we will have overcome the chief dangers of the situation by the end of this year or the beginning of the next year, that we will be active again during the coming year.
The naval war
We really had some bad days for a time this year. Fate tested us once again. Just when problems were appearing on the eastern front, just when treason was raising its ugly head in Italy, when the air attacks were getting terrible, the U boat war was interrupted, too.
As always in war, things go back and forth. Sometimes offensive weapons are stronger, sometimes defensive weapons. We just went through a period during which the defensive weapons of the English were stronger, were technically superior to ours. For months, therefore, the U boat war had to be restricted to a minimum. As you have seen from the reports of the last 14 days, we are now active again. Offensive weapons have once again recovered and surpassed the enemy's technical lead, and offensive weapons are now once again at an advantage. That is an example and a lesson that one must never give up, that a cause is only lost — technically, militarily, spiritually — when one gives up. If the Reichsmarschall in the air force or marines, if Grossadmiral Doenitz in the navy, had said, after the low point, "There's no point, the others are too powerful, they're better equipped technically, the U boat is out of date, or our air force, or some technical development or other, is out of date", then the enemy would have triumphed. When one does not give in, but rather, as happened here in both cases, gives the order: "Ready for action!" — then, this example, in both the Air Force and the navy, shows that things can also go right on ahead again. You just have to have the nerves for it.
The domestic front
I now come to another aspect of this war, the domestic front. Some of the German people, namely the older men drafted, are now doing their second four-year world war. The German people were already very tense , years before the war, because of the armaments, the Four Year Plan , the recovery of Austria , the Sudetenland , and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.
There can be no doubt that hostile propaganda is now streaming and trickling into the German people from many sides. We are unfortunately unable to screen off hostile broadcasters entirely, or in any manner worth mentioning. The temptation has grown to listen to hostile broadcasters, who achieve better psychological effects than we do, sometimes, unfortunately, very good ones.
As in all cases in which a prohibition or law cannot be given the emphasis of enforcement by executive authority and punishment, the effect of the prohibition is harmful to authority; that is true in this case as well. We have, of course, prohibited listening to hostile broadcasters, but we were not, and are not, able to punish violations of this prohibition in any meaningful way. Today we pay somewhat more attention to it to some extent, since, when Mr. Badoglio committed his piece of piggery, when treason ran amuck in Europe, the result was naturally a wave of defeatism in Germany. Shortly before, after the air attacks on Hamburg, a mood of crisis prevailed in many cities, which were, particularly our beloved capital of Berlin, almost panicky for days, until the mood calmed down and levelled off again.
As a result of listening to foreign broadcasters, talk then circulated through the channels which always exist, even in a great people, "Oh God, we can no longer win the war. Wouldn't it be better therefore", etc. etc. Then came this highly interesting remark: "Ah, a Duce can be arrested, how interesting". When the Duce was arrested I said to myself, now we've really got to watch it. The people who think that's so interesting, they interest me.
Since that time, as you may note from the reports from the Reichsministry of Justice, and you will continue to note over the coming few weeks, Mr. Administrative Advisor so and so, and Mr. Factory Owner so and so, and Mr. Waiter, and Mr. Chauffeur, and Mr. Plumber, and Mr. Employee, have all had their pretty little heads cut off and placed between their feet for damaging the morale of the German people as defeatists, for disintegrating the powers of resistance of the German people, and for treason. It's really not important for us to kill anyone. If we really had to shoot as many people as all that, or as many as I'd have to, it would get increasingly difficult to sign a death sentence.
When I was appointed Reichsminister of the Interior, everybody said (since it's so awfully easy to say), "Mister, hit hard, stay tough. The German people expect terrible severity from you". I'm already severe, I don't need any admonitions. It's very easy to say something like that, but: a death sentence means eternal misery for a whole family; it means bringing shame on a name which was once honourable. Imagine for a moment what it will mean to the children and grandchildren of that family, when it is later said (you must always visualize these things as they will look 10 or 15 years after the war): "The father of this family was beheaded for high treason during the Great War, which involved the fate of the germanic nation". (In the distant future, everything we do today will look heroic. Human weaknesses will then be forgotten. All the cowards will have died off in the meantime, and in the end everybody will be considered a hero). Such a family will be shamed for all time. I know all that. I know how hard it is; and I therefore try to restrict the necessary educational measures.
I know that there's a great deal of theft in Germany, that the concept of private property has been much weakened by suffering, and by the relaxation of all moral standards such as always happens in war, or due to a poor upbringing of the German people in this regard. I can't catch every thief, I'll never catch them all. I don't even want to catch them all, otherwise I'd have to arrest too many thousands of people. I'll never catch every defeatist. I'm perfectly well aware that, in one or two years, when the divisions and regiments withdraw into their garrisons — some of the older veterans having been wounded up to 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 times, while the rest no longer march with us because they lie under the grass; when, I hope, a still decent part of the old SS once again marches back to Germany, I know that many thousands will applaud us then, and perhaps feel themselves to have been much more heroic than we were, or — we don't think of ourselves as heroic — more decent than we were.
It will always be like that. I don't mind. We shouldn't mind either. We should never lose our sense of humour. It is, however, necessary to set an example for the number of cowards who can be found among every people. It is, God knows, unfortunately true that these cowards are always found in the upper, rather than the lower or middle, ranks of a people. Intellect obviously ruins the character in some manner, at least as regards the formation of will and energy. It's enough for me, for such education, if I always grab one out of 100 of the defeatists who later cry "hurrah", and lay his head between his feet. Then the others will shut up for a quarter of a year. Then all the little mommies will say, "For God's sake, don't get yourself killed, don't make us unhappy. Somebody we know was recently beheaded. It's in the newspapers. So just keep quiet, cry 'hurrah' very loud".
Good, let him; we've achieved our objective. We could never storm a fort or a front line position with a person like that anyway. We know that anyway. But the main thing is to keep them from hurting our decent people. Insofar as is necessary, action will be taken brutally and mercilessly. None of us enjoys that. Although we don't like it, you must act mercilessly, gentlemen, without regard to family relationships, or acquaintance, or class, or possible previous earlier service; without regard to whether he is a party comrade or not, when the fate of the nation so requires. Always go after a big fish rather than a little one who's stupid and has been fooled. The domestic front will always be in order if we have the nerve to keep it in order, although it gives us no pleasure to take action personally.
Foreigners in the Reich
We must be also clear in our minds that we have 6 or 7 million foreigners in Germany. There may even be 8 million. We have prisoners in Germany. They are not all dangerous, as long as we strike hard at the smallest minor problem. It's a small matter to shoot 10 Poles today, instead of maybe having to shoot tens of thousands in their place later, and compared to the fact that shooting those tens of thousands would also cost German blood, too. Every little blaze must be immediately stamped out, smothered, extinguished; otherwise, just as in a real fire, a veritable prairie fire, politically and psychologically, may break out among the people.
Communists in the Reich
I don't believe that the Communists will try anything, because their leaders, just like most other criminals in our country, are in concentration camps. Something must be said here: only after the war will it be seen what a blessing it was for Germany — all humanitarian drivel to the contrary notwithstanding — that we locked this whole criminal underclass up in the concentration camps — I'll take care of that myself. If they were running around loose, it would be much harder for us. Particularly since the subhumans would then have their subordinate officers and commanders; they'd have their workers' councils and soldiers' councils. But this way, they're all locked up, and are making grenades, artillery shells, or other important things, and are very useful members of human society.
The situation on the enemy side
Now I would like to give a short overview of the other side. We Germans always see-saw between extremes. Either we are totally exhilarated and applauding enthusiastically, and we can't wait until we have reached all our objectives in a lightning war of 18, 16, or even 15 days; or we let our jaws hang down and whine: "Yes, the enemy is wonderful in everything. The English are doing great. The Russians are doing great; we're the only ones that aren't". At the same time, we completely forget that, on the other side, like everywhere else, they can't do the impossible either.
Russia
I would like to list our various enemies quite briefly. Once again, Russia. Here, I can sum up quite briefly. Russia will, in my opinion, when the next great offensives are over, have just about exhausted its human potential. One can, of course, draft sixteen year olds, they can make an early grab at fifteen year olds — I am absolutely in favour of us doing the same, if the fate of the nation so requires, since it is better for fifteen years to die than for the nation to die — but one cannot continue endlessly in this direction, since, in the end, with thirteen year olds and twelve year olds one can no longer wage war. Human potential is, in my view, one of the weakest points of the Russians, although it was once their greatest strength. In addition, in my conviction, unprecedented famine now prevails among the Russians, something which can never be correctly evaluated by us. The front line is, however, still better fed than the people behind the front. Nevertheless, it is still very bad in many cases even at the front. The Russian has had great transport difficulties for a long time. These, too, are not yet overcome. I don't believe that the Russians are weak in a material sense; rather, I believe that they will die of hunger and loss of blood.
England
England has been waging war for four years now. So far, it has suffered no very great losses in blood. In England, however, the constant fear — the very correct fear — prevails that, when the U boat war sets in again with full force — and it will do that for months now, in my view — the whole equilibrium in food, supplies, and landing possibilities will fall to pieces. Since all the military operations that England and America wish to carry out, will stand or fall on tonnage. The landing operations that they carried out at Salerno doubtlessly cost them half a million tons. I very much doubt whether England can permit itself many such landing operations over the long term. I nevertheless believe that England will undertake landing operations, perhaps even this fall — they don't have much time left for this — but certainly early in the year. But there is another thing I believe: when the war for England — and this applies even more so for America later — really becomes a matter of the blood of their sons, the war in England and America will be more unpopular that it is already.
America
America is waging a war on two fronts, even more than England: the Pacific war against Japan, which, fortunately, is a stronger, more warlike ally ; and the war in Europe, or the Atlantic. I do not believe that the conditions in America are for the best. One must keep in mind that America still has a great number of Jews, and a brutally plutocratic form of economics. It is hardly conceivable how they push and shove in America. I believe we were still babes in the woods by comparison in 1918. The difficulties and misery gradually appearing before the population in America are furthermore inconceivable. In addition, we have taken Mr. Roosevelt's best electoral propaganda point — he will certainly be reelected next year — away from him through the liberation of the Duce.
A "show trial" of Mussolini and fascism was in fact intended to be the central point of his electoral propaganda.
The following applies, however, to both countries: the war will become fearfully unpopular in England and America the moment England and America have to fight somewhere in Europe, whether in Italy, the Balkans, or even France, Denmark, or Norway. This applies especially to America. England fought the last world war using its own people. America, on the other hand, had, I believe, 60 to 70,000 dead in the World War. That was, unfortunately, far too few. I am convinced that if the Americans had suffered 500,000 dead in the World War, they wouldn't have entered the war this time. It will be a difficult psychological point for those gentlemen when the number of dead exceeds that of the World War. Once the number reaches the hundred thousand mark or climbs into the hundreds of thousands, then enormous difficulties will set in for the Americans. The Americans are in fact by no means as brave as they act. On the contrary: the American is by no means a brave soldier; he is well armed, he has very strong artillery, he is well equipped in all things, but he is not a good infantryman.
Political problems on the enemy side
Now come the great political difficulties. England and America are not united. England says: "America, you must help me more in Europe". Naturally, in doing so, each swindler wants to cheat the other. Each is seeking to exploit the strength of the other. America wants England to help defeat Japan. England is trying to exploit the Americans in order to defeat Germany. England is in a situation which is becoming increasingly difficult. Mr. Churchill can't hide this from his countrymen. What is England really fighting for?
And then come the difficulties with Russia. Stalin, a brutal, ice-cold, power politician, says: "I am bearing the chief brunt of the war. Therefore, I want to have the say in Europe. Poland, the Balkans, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, are in my spheres of interest. Germany, when it is defeated, will also be in my sphere of interest". Now they are starting to have a hard time on the other side. The war with Germany really started because they gave guarantees to Poland. That's why Mr. Sikorski had to die too, I believe — because he clung to this old fairy tale. This naturally caused frightful difficulties for England. So England has now issued an Atlantic Charter as well. But England is in even greater need of Russia as an ally. It is, in fact, its strongest ally on the continent. So while Bolshevik Russia wants to have the say in Europe, England would dearly like — as it is so beautifully called - to maintain the "balance of power" in Europe, and not let the Bolsheviks into Europe, for God's sake.
It is a chaotic jumble of interests and views, of intentions and plans. Each one wants to exploit and swindle the other for his own plan, and then bring home the harvest for himself. That is a system which will, of course, hold together for a while, but which will certainly collapse one day. The moment the alliance collapses, the power of our enemies will, of course, still be considerable, but not threatening.
The war will be won by the side that continues to hit back, and keeps hitting back, who never surrenders. For us, the end of the war — once Russia is exhausted and drops out one day, and the war becomes a burden for England and America, will bring us confirmation as a world power . Because we can really say by comparison — though there are problems with every comparison — that the Seven Years War brought Prussia's confirmation as a great European power. That war was carried on for seven years to ensure that the already conquered province of Silesia would remain part of Prussia. This war will ensure that everything annexed to the German Reich, to Greater Germany, and then to the Germanic Reich in the years since 1938, will remain ours. This war is being carried on to keep the path to the East open; so that Germany may be a world power; to found the Germanic World Empire . That will be the meaning of this war, whether it lasts 5, 6, perhaps even 7 years. We don't know how long it will last. We don't even even ask how long. It will be carried on by us for as long as it lasts, and it will be carried on with determination and good humour by us for as long as it lasts. It will be won by the side that stands, that doesn't give up or give in , even in the most difficult situations. To ensure that this never happens, is our principal task.
The SS in the war
Now I come to our own development, to the development of the SS over the past few months. The development was, when I look back over the entire war, unprecedented. It has gone ahead at a truly astonishing pace. Let's take a look back at the year 1939. Then we were a couple of regiments, 8 to 9,000 men in police units. We were armed, of course, but only received our artillery regiment as the heavy branch of service to all practice purposes two months before the start of the war. Let us recapitulate the tasks, duties, and missions entrusted to us over the past 4 1/2 years. First, however, I would like to list and once again describe some still further external changes.
Personnel changes
The following changes have been made in the Main Offices:
The successor to our fallen comrade and friend Heydrich is our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner. He is unfortunately sick today. He has phlebitis, but it is not, however, dangerous, thank God. That is why he could not come.
Our old friend Daluege has such a serious heart problem that he is taking a cure, and must now withdraw from active service for 1 1/2 to 2 years. I would like to send a teletype or telegram this evening to our two friends, namely Daluege and Kaltenbrunner, on behalf of all of us. We hope that Daluege will be well again and able to go into action on the front line again in, as I say, approximately 2 years.
On his behalf, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wuennenberg, who previously led the Police Division, and was then designated to lead the 4th SS Tank Corps as Commanding General, who is a General in the Waffen SS and the Police, while heading the Order Police as Chief of the Order Police.
Gruppenfuehrer Breithaupt, as the Chief of the SS Court, has succeeded our old comrade and friend, Scharfe of the SS.
SS Obergruppenfuehrer Hofmann has changed posts. He has given up the Race and Settlement Main Office, and has become the Higher SS and Police Leader Southwest.
SS Gruppenfuehrer Hildebrandt has given up his Upper Section Weichsel and has become Chief of the Race and Settlement Main Office.
SS Obergruppenfuehrer Schmidt has given up the Personnel Main Office at his own request, and has entered my personal staff for Special Tasks. His successor is SS Gruppenfuehrer von Herff.
On of my closest and oldest associates, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, after a severe illness which seriously endangered his life (operation for kidney stone) has, thank God, gotten well again, and is now — it is the first time anyone has held this position — the Highest SS and Police Leader for all of occupied Italy. He is therefore responsible for a region with 25 to 30 million inhabitants. SS Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik as the Highest SS and Police Leader for the littoral, as well as several other SS and Police Leaders, will be subordinate to him. He could not come today.
Higher SS and Police Leaders have since then been assigned as follows: in Croatia, Kammerhofer, who, at the request of the Croats, is not called Higher SS and Police Leader there, but rather the Representative of the Reichsfueher SS; this was formerly Meyszner's title in Serbia; it is now Stroob's title in Greece — I would like to say right away that I am reassigning him to Schimana. You will become the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece; you will not, therefore, lead the SS Volunteer Division for Galicia. SS Gruppenfuehrer Hanke will become Higher SS and Police Leader in Denmark.
The corps and brigades
In the Waffen SS, since we saw each other last, we have progressed to the next stage of organizational development. At that time, 1 1/2 years ago, we were just forming the 1st SS Tank Corps led by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Hausser, who is now leading operations on the Italian littoral.
In the meantime, the following corps have been created or are being formed:
the 1st SS Tank Corps under SS Gruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich, consisting of the SS Tank Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and the SS Tank Division "Hitler Youth", which is now being formed;
the 2nd SS Tank Corps under SS Obergruppenfuehrer Hausser, consisting of the SS Tank Division "Das Reich" and the SS Tank Division "Death's Head";
the 3rd SS Tank Corps, the germanic one, under SS Gruppenfuehrer Steiner, consisting of the Tank Division "Viking", now in the East, and of a new unit now being formed, the SS Volunteer Tank Grenadier Division "Nordland", and the SS Volunteer Tank Grenadier Brigade "Nederland".
the 4th SS Tank Corps under SS Gruppenfuehrer Krueger, who previously led the Division "Das Reich", consisting of two new divisions, namely, the existing SS Tank Division "Hohenstaufen", which were recruited by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Berger from the 9th Division, together with the 10th Division, in February of this ye