Robert David Steele
Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Army Operations
Part II in the Reinventing the US Army monograph series.
Robert David Steele
DOC (37 Pages): EIN 7FV42 ERAP Steele Vol 2 Global Reality 1.3
This is the author’s preliminary draft of the second of three monographs focused on the future of the US Army as an expeditionary force in a complex world that is rapidly decentralizing while also facing major development challenges. This second monograph (the first presented a notional Grand Strategy for discussion) presents the holistic analytic model and the resulting strategic generalizations from the Marine Corps’ original study, Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 1990).[1] The model is neither complete nor current – it is a starting point for reflection. A new comprehensive model is needed that supports Grand Strategy not only across the D3 – Defense, Diplomacy, and Development – planning and programming domains, but across Whole of Government (WoG) as well, and ideally, also into the multinational and “eight tribe”[2] conceptual space as well – future operations demand the full integration of both estimative intelligence and operational inclusion of all elements of society, not just government – military.
Table of Contents
Preface. 2
Introduction. 3
Where Are We Going Wrong Now?. 3
The Model in Brief 5
Overview of Degrees of Difficulty. 8
The Findings. 10
The Military Threat 10
The Physical Environment 11
Global Reach – the Mobility Challenge. 12
Limitations of the Original Study and This Monograph. 13
Threat Environment 14
Ongoing Conflicts. 14
Consolidated Unconventional Threats. 15
Military Threat 16
Integrated Military Strength. 16
Ground Order of Battle. 17
Air Order of Battle. 18
Naval Order of Battle. 19
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Order of Battle. 20
Civil-Geographic Environment 21
Cultural Factors: Language and Religion. 21
Critical Weather Factors. 22
General Geographic Conditions. 23
Operational Elevation. 24
Cross-Country Mobility. 25
Intervisibility: Average Line of Sight Distance. 26
Logistics Factors. 27
Strategic and Tactical Lift Capabilities and Constraints. 27
Non-Combatant Evacuation Logistics. 28
Mapping, Charting & Geodesy Shortfalls. 29
Airfields. 30
Ports. 31
Conclusion. 32
Glossary. 33
Endnotes. 35
Preface
This is the second of three monographs focused on the future of the US Army as an expeditionary force in a complex world that is rapidly decentralizing while also facing major development challenges. This second monograph (the first presented a notional Grand Strategy for discussion) presents the holistic analytic model and the resulting strategic generalizations from the Marine Corps’ original study, Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 1990).[1] The model is neither complete nor current – it is a starting point for reflection. A new comprehensive model is needed that supports Grand Strategy not only across the D3 – Defense, Diplomacy, and Development – planning and programming domains, but across Whole of Government (WoG) as well, and ideally, also into the multinational and “eight tribe”[2] conceptual space as well – future operations demand the full integration of both estimative intelligence and operational inclusion of all elements of society, not just government – military.
The author was the primary architect of the original study, and the Study Director. The study was the first and most substantial product from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) of which the author served as founding Special Assistant (civilian) and also Deputy Director (uniformed). It responded to General Al Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, who created MCIA because he felt that he could not relay on the other services with their larger budgets and a lack of focus on the Third World, to design military systems appropriate to the Marine Corps: lightweight and suitable for amphibious transport including landing craft; affordable for a very lean force; and sustainable in the field with minimalist contractor dependency. In other words, it is the only existing analytic model for thinking about expeditionary force structure planning and programming.[3] If the US Army desires to be an expeditionary force[4] with global reach, this model is a starting point. It addresses not only military threat factors, but also civil factors and ground truth factors – the latter are deeply relevant to what we build at what weight.
The findings of the study are not likely to change materially, but can be broadened. Two factors not covered by the original Marine Corps study but vital to reinventing the US Army include aviation climate and bridge loading. The real world aviation day is hot and humid, not – as the US Navy (USN) and US Air Force (USAF) and others embrace, the “standard day” of 59 degrees Fahrenheit (F)with no humidity.[5] This means that aviation as designed today – completely apart from poor design and logistics aspects – will fly half as far, carry half as much, and loiter half as long as “the book” says it will. Similarly, bridge loading (an average top weight of 30 tons) and line of sight distance (generally under 1,000 meters), combined with a lack of cross-country mobility, all suggest that a re-invented Army must think deeply about any platform that weighs more than 20 tons and cannot be moved via a C-130[6] – and must move some armor and artillery functions into the air, suggesting that Close Air Support (CAS) should be organic.
A comprehensive analytic model is the second step toward reinventing the US Army.
Introduction
Where Are We Going Wrong Now?
A quarter-century after General Al Gray, USMC, then (1988) Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) established the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) to serve an a center of excellence for threat support to expeditionary acquisition, we still do not have an adequate joint planning and program process or adequate intelligence support to strategy, planning and programming, or operations.[7] A harsh statement, but reality bats last and reality does not lie.
In 1988 there were five specific substantive short-falls and five specific process short-falls that have still not been corrected.[8] They are listed below as originally written.
Substantive Short-Falls
Concept development that ignores threat and terrain generalizations, in many cases through reliance on outdated and implausible scenarios ignoring emerging non-state actor threats and ground truth determinations.
Mission need statements (MNS) or Required operational capabilities (ROC) that go “worst case” automatically without examining what the average threat is likely to be, or the actual trafficability, hydrography, and weather in the most likely regions where the systems will be deployed.
MNS or ROC, including those that are joint, that do not address Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, and Interoperability (C4I2) support – it makes no sense to build expensive sophisticated military platforms if they cannot receive near-real-time targeting intelligence essential to their effectiveness in fast-moving threat environments.
MNS or ROC that never ask for updated threat support – or updated ground truth, e.g. the aviation day getting hotter and more humid as global warming advances – once the Milestone 0 threat “ticket” has been punched.
MNS or ROC that neither request nor receive logistics sustainability intelligence, nor test and evaluation with or without foreign materiel support and unconventional threat scenario development – for example, all systems “assume” that bandwidth and fuel will be available as needed.
Process Short-Falls
Intelligence support to strategy and acquisition defaults to the Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) despite the fact that most Program Managers (PM) want nothing to do with classified information – their spaces are generally not cleared for storage of TS/SCI.[9]
Intelligence support to acquisition provides “one size fits all” products, and does not distinguish between the needs of strategic, operational, tactical, and technical program managers and commanders. The threats – and the sustainability of a capability – change depending on the level of analysis.
Intelligence does not “do” strategic generalizations – PM’s and commanders can get country profiles, weapons system studies, weather studies, but they cannot get a single integrated intelligence product that covers military, civil, and geographic factors all together, inclusive of Red on Blue sustainability and lethality trade-off matrices in a concise readable form that can be shared.
Terrain analysis and “go/no go” studies are out of touch with reality. Other than the Marine Corps study in 1988-1990, there does not appear to have been a comprehensive integrated survey of tactical mobility factors including bridge loading, tunnel clearance, road width, off-road gradients, and more. Bits and pieces are available, but this is not an integrated product offered by the intelligence world, in part because we still do not have – a quarter-century after the Marine Corps and the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) asked for it – updated 1:50,000 combat charts with contour lines for every corner of every country in the world in a form useful to acquisition or operations.[10]
Counterintelligence is not allowed to look at or promulgate our known deficiencies. Individual system vulnerabilities are classified and restricted – commanders themselves are not informed of known and often potentially catastrophic deficiencies in weapons and mobility and communications systems. At the strategic level, no one subjects the Services to scrutiny in relation to their joint responsibilities – budget-share and “go along to get along” rule. Most Operational Plans (OPLAN) are unrealistic.
All of the above are short-falls within the Department of Defense (DoD) alone. In contemplating D3 – Defense, Diplomacy, and Development – it is clear there is still no intelligence support suitable for justifying “peaceful preventive measures” as called for by General Gray in 1989.[11] Properly and comprehensively done, national and defense intelligence should show the Return on Investment (RoI) for major diplomatic and development investments, while also showing the true cost of major mis-steps in commercial and financial plans and programs – those that export jobs, import illegal immigrants, poison land, and ultimately destroy entire communities or countries. We lack “central” intelligence, and we lack integrity in how we “do” the craft of intelligence as a foundation for creating a strong prosperous America at peace.[12]
The Model in Brief
The model’s greatest value is in producing unclassified strategic generalizations across all relevant military, civil, and geographic mission area factors (MAF), such that we can plan and program the force as a whole (or even better, if expanded, Whole of Government – WoG). While many helpful products have been available in the past, including the Country Studies that were produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US Army, and the Federal Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress (LoC), they generally suffered from over-classification; remoteness from mission area factors to include no distinctions from a war-fighters perspective of whether a specific threat or specific terrain condition was low, medium, or high; and a lack of an integrative overview: the strategic generalizations across all countries or across a region, for each mission area specifically.[13]
The single most useful important innovation introduced by the Marine Corps study was the engagement of all of the Mission Area Program Managers who provided their specific parameters for classifying a country capability as low, medium, or high. Below is one example.
THREAT
MISSION AREA: ARTILLERY
HIGH
Self-propelled (SP) or towed, with rockets & missiles, NBC, range 30K+
MEDIUM
SP or towed, some missiles, bio-chem, less than 30K range
LOW
Towed artillery with less than 30K range and/or mortars
Figure 1: Example of a Mission Area Threat Definition by the Program Manager
PM’s played a vital role in defining civil and geographic factors at multiple levels of difficulty as well – more needs to be done to integrate PM’s into analytic endeavors. The “plans/reality mis-match” that put Chuck Spinney on the cover of TIME Magazine in the 1980’s is still with us[14] – planning and programming for expeditionary operations requires both sound intelligence about the real world and sound engineering parameters from the mission managers.
By focusing on “most likely” instead of “worst case” employment scenarios, the Marine Corps sought to overcome the long-standing bias in both the intelligence world and the acquisition world, in favor of training, equipping, and organizing – at great expense – against the few peer competitors and without regard to the constrained utility of “worst case” systems in lower tier countries where civil and geographic factors are vastly more challenging than the “open spaces” characteristic of the German plains or the Arab desert.
The M1A1 tank is a good example. This tank is designed to reach out with precision over 2,000 meters, and to be superior to the best tanks that the Chinese and Russians can produce. It also created the concept of gallons per mile and displaces an entire truck company when embarked on Navy ship constructed years if not decades before this behemoth. It turns out that the Third World has an average line of sight distance of under 1,000 meters, extremely constrained cross-country mobility, and – while included in the original model but only studied in passing – an average bridge-loading limit of 30 tons. The M1A1 weighs 68 short tons or 62 metric tons. It also will not fit (when loaded on trains) through many European tunnels.
Apart from studying each of the countries on the delimited list (the Army needs to create its own list) – a helpful alternative perspective that called into question the long-standing DoD acquisition requirements process focused on “worst case” instead of “most likely” threats – the model assured for the first time a comprehensive look at each of twenty-eight operational geography factors, and each of thirty-five civil factors. Those two tables are provided below.
BASIC TOPOGRAPHY
GROUND ASSAULT
ASSAULT HYDROGRAPHY
AERONAUTICAL CONDITIONS
OPERATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
BASIC WEATHER
Surface Configuration
Cover
Beaches
Operational Elevation
Port Access
Temperature
Surface Vegetation
Concealment
Naval Gunfire
5 fathom line
Aerial Visibility
Port Utility
Windspeed
Surface Materials
Intervisibility (Line of Sight)
Surf Conditions
Aerial Ceiling
Air Terminals
Precipitation
Surface Hydrology
Landing Zones
Approach Conditions
Road/Rail Networks
Humidity
Man-Made Features
Drop Zones
Riverine Network
Bridges
Light Data
Figure 2: Expeditionary Operations – Operational Geography
POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ECONOMIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
NATURAL RESOURCES
Allies
Religion & Language
Strikes & Riots
Key Facilities & No Fire Areas
Contiguous Hostile Area
Opposition
Group Divisions, Customs, Taboos
Black Market, Corruption, & Military/Police Crime
Urbanization & Population Issues
Water Supply
Intelligence
Myth/Identity, Media Themes, View of USA
Unemployment & Inflation
Disease & Public Health Resources
Food Supply
Government
Education
Basic Civilian Staples/Supply
Public Voice/Print Media & Telecommunications
Energy Supply
Human Rights
Intellectual
Garrison State
Public Works (Power & Water)
Strategic Minerals & Raw Materials
Public Form, Franchise, & Opinion
Censorship
Foreign Capital & Capital Flight
Public Transportation Assets
Production Base
Legal Codes
Violence
Research & Development (R&D) Progress
Electronic Computing & Storage
Land Tenure
Figure 3: Expeditionary Operations – Civil Factors
Below is the model at its highest level of conceptualization.
Click on Image to Enlarge
Figure 4: Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model for Services & Theaters
The most nuanced finding to emerge from the original Marine Corps study was that the threat changes depending on the level of analysis. This finding was inspired by a community-wide discussion of the Libryan main battle tank, at the time the T-1 from the Russia.
Level of Analysis
Threat Grade
Comment
Strategic Sustainability
Low (2.0)
Not sustainable for more than two weeks.
Operational Availability
Medium (3.0)
Many of them scattered around.
Tactical Reliability
Low (2.0)
Cannibalized parts, stored in open, poor crews
Technical Lethality
High (4.0)
Best tanks money could buy; official threat grade
Average Threat
<Medium (2.75)
Proper analysis informs each level of commander
Military Difference
1.25 (31%)
The IC does not do nuanced multi-level analysis.
Figure 5: Threat Changes at Each of the Four Levels of Analysis
If the US Army is to re-invent itself, and do so affordably and sustainably, it must recognize that both national and defense intelligence today have limitations – we must literally re-invent intelligence if we are to re-engineer US defense and the US Army. The final monograph in this series will reinventing the US Army, DoD, and WoG – specific recommendations will be supported and explained, focused on both the US Army, and necessary joint accommodations – in the context of a new Grand Strategy and respect for Global Reality.
Mission area factors were developed by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Integration Section, Proponency and Requirements Branch of the USMC Warfighting Center to show the various threats and conditions that may be encountered by warfighters when operating the countries of the expeditionary environment. The following charts depict the mission area factors and outline the criteria for levels of difficulty (thresholds) within each factor.
Overview of Degrees of Difficulty
Below are the degrees of difficulty as established by Marine Corps mission area managers in 1988-1990. Army-based updated definitions are needed.
MAF
Criteria (Levels of Difficulty)
Drugs
Terrorism
Gray Arms
Consolidated
Ground OOB
– Infantry
– Armor
– Artillery
Air OOB
– Air OOB
– Close Air
– AAW(IAD)
Naval OOB
– Naval OOB
– S/S MSIS
– Patrol Craft
NBC
Ongoing Conflicts
Low
Low
Low
Negligible
Draft/No TR
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
No Conflicts
Draft/TR
M-48/T-54/LAV
Mortars
DC-3/Props
Props
Early AAA
Small Surface
HE
Speed Boats
Chem/No Deliv.
PM/No Exp
M-60, AA
How/SP
Day/VFR Jets
Day Jet Atk
Hand-Held SAM
DEST/FRIG
Multi-Warhead
Small Gun Boats
Chem w/Delivery
1 of 3
PM
T-62E/MOD 55
>30K Range with FASCAM/TGM
Early Radar
Early Smart
EW Radar
ASUW/Air/ASW
High/Flex Traj
Large Gun Boats
Chem Have Used
2 of 3
Reg/TR
T-72/M1
>30K Range NBC
3rd Gen Radar
STD-OFF PGM
3rd Gen SAM
F/W Carrier
Countermeasures
ASU/Antiair
Chem/Bio Used
High
High
High
3 of 3
Reg/Exp
T-80/64B
BLOC
BLOC
NT/AW
BLOC
NT/AW
BLOC
BLOC
Nuc/Chem Avail
In Conflict
Abbreviations can be found in the Glossary.
Figure 6: Provisional PM Criteria for Defining Threat Degrees of Difficulty
MAF
Criteria (Levels of Difficulty)
US Equities
Culture
– Language
– Religion
Weather
Gen Geo Cond
OP Elevation
X-Country Mob.
Intervisibility
Hydro-NGF
Hydro-Coastal Threat
Low
English
Christian
Dry/Warm
Urban
<2000 FT
Gen. Suited
>2000 Meters
Good
US NGF Advantage
Spanish/French
Christian Orthodox
Wet/Warm
<4000 FT
Fair
Mixed
Desert
<6000 FT
US NGF and Threat Equal
Dry/Hot
Jungle
>6000 FT
Partially Suited
1000-2000 Meters
Arabic
Eastern/Tribalism
Wet/Hot
>9000 FT
Poor
High
All Others
Islam
Wet/Cold
Mountainous
>12000 FT
Gen Unsuited
<1000 Meters
Unsatisfactory
Threat Advantage
Abbreviations can be found in the Glossary.
Figure 7: Provisional PM Criteria for Defining Environmental Degrees of Difficulty
MAF
Criteria (Levels of Difficulty)
MC&G Coverage
Airfields
Ports
Key Installations
MEU Response Time
NEO
– Embassy Staff
– Evacuees
– Inland Obj NM
1:50 New
>1/C-5
Wide Harbor/ >50’ Depth
None
<2 Days
<25
None
Coastal
1:50 Old
1/C-5
Wide Harbor/ >40’ Depth
Few Sites
<50
<100
<100 NM
Some 1:50
>5/C-130
>40’ Depth
Multiple Sites
>2 <4 Days
<100
<200
<300 NM
MSI Avail
2-4/C-130
35-39’ Depth
Pipeline
<250
<300
>300 NM
1:250 New
1/C-130
25-34’ Depth
Oil Field
>4 <6 Days
<500
>300
>500 NM
None
None
None
NBC
>6 Days
>500
>500
>999 NM
* For the purposes of this study 500 evacuees was used as a threshold. Anything above 500 would probably require consideration of other options, i.e. evacuation by airlift or sealift.
Abbreviations can be found in the Glossary.
Figure 8: Provisional PM Criteria for Defining Logistics Degrees of Difficulty
These mission area factors define the critical conditions, situations, threats, and logistical constraints which, when taken together with the countries identified, show various levels or thresholds of difficulty for conducting expeditionary operations. This product represents a totally new approach to intelligence for warfighters because it evaluates and classifies countries in relationship to mission area factors and levels of difficulty assigned by warfighters themselves and provides an integrated appraisal of a specific country with a specific combination of threat, terrain, and logistics challenges. The mission area factors do not represent a “fixed” list but constitute a “snapshot” based on their initial development in 1989 and 1990. The way in which thresholds between levels of difficulty for each factor are defined can be expected to change over time. The intent – then and now – is to inform, to provide a useful reference that does not need to be locked up, and to establish an introductory baseline from which more detailed and precise factors and thresholds of difficulty can be developed.
The following two charts provide a consolidated overview of selected mission area factors for those countries that represent the greatest combination of threat, terrain, and logistic challenges to the US force. Such countries would be good candidates as models for the testing of expeditionary scenarios used to develop strategy, force structure, and operational campaign plans. In the two charts below, 1 is the lower degree of difficulty, 4 is the highest degree of difficulty.
REGION
COUNTRY
DRUGS
TERROR
GRAY ARMS
GND
AIR
NAVY
NBC
Americas
Cuba
Mexico
3
4
3
3
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
3
1
Middle East
Iran
Iraq
Libya
Syria
4
1
1
3
4
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
3
3
Africa
South Africa
1
2
3
3
4
4
4
Asia/Pacific
India
Indonesia
Japan
North Korea
Pakistan
PRC
Thailand
Vietnam
3
3
1
1
4
3
4
1
4
1
3
4
3
1
1
3
4
1
4
4
2
4
1
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
4
4
3
4
Europe
Greece
Italy
Turkey
3
1
3
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
Figure 9: Hardest Expeditionary Countries (Threat Perspective)
REGION
COUNTRY
CULTURE
WEATHER
TERRAIN
NGF
MC&G
FACILITIES
LIFT
NEO
Middle East
Iraq
North Yemen
Oman
Saudi Arabia
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
3
4
2
2
3
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
2
1
2
1
1
3
4
4
4
Africa
Madagascar
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Zaire
3
4
3
1
2
4
3
3
2
4
4
1
4
3
4
3
2
2
4
1
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
2
3
4
4
4
Asia/Pacific
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Burma
Pakistan
PRC
Thailand
4
4
3
4
3
3
2
4
4
3
2
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
4
2
2
3
4
2
3
4
4
3
3
3
4
3
4
3
2
3
4
3
3
2
3
2
4
4
2
4
4
4
Figure 10: Hardest Expeditionary Countries (Environmental Perspective)
The Findings
For planning and programming purposes, the “expeditionary environment” is not, as some tend to assume, “every clime and place” (although all our Services must be able to fight anywhere), but rather a fairly well defined list of specific countries, comprised of those countries where there is a high probability of employment – and within those countries, specific “Main Supply Routes (MSR) as well as off-road maneuver zones where usable. It differs from the traditional DoD planning environment because it is almost totally comprised of Third World countries with very high mobility obstacles and represents challenges calling primarily for Operations Other Than War (OOTW)[15] and non-state actor interdiction.
Below are some strategic generalizations that emerged from the original Marine Corps study of the expeditionary environment published in 1990. Although they were promulgated at the time, and the current Expeditionary Factors Study is in general use (but lacking the summary section), no one in DoD appears to have made the connection between these strategic generalizations and how we train, equip, and organize ourselves for the future.
The Military Threat
Our world is a violent and unstable. Expeditionary operations must not be mis-construed as “lite” operations.
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) without benefit of an accompanying Carrier Battle Group are very vulnerable to significant coastal defense missile capabilities as well as submarines, frigates and corvettes.
On the air side many of our countries have night time/all weather capabilities and early if not third generation radar, stand-off munitions, and integrated air defense systems.
The ground threat is complex and lethal, with trained experienced infantry, modern armor, relatively sophisticated artillery including scatterable mines, and some smart or stand-off munitions as well as surface-to-surface missiles.
Of the sixty-nine countries examined in the prototype study, seventeen possess or have used nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and fully forty-one of the countries had active on-going insurgencies, drug wars, civil wars, severe instability, or a regional war in progress.
In our present configuration we are too expensive, too heavy, too slow, too few, and severely vulnerable in rear areas, bridgeheads, and across our communications grid.
The Physical Environment
In considering the physical operational environment, stark distinctions emerged between the real-world expeditionary environment, and the current planning model used by the Navy (which designs our aircraft) and the Army (which designs our major ground systems).
We found our countries equally divided between mountains, deserts, jungle, and urban environments—our ground and aviation assets must be able to operate in all four environments.
Thirty-nine of our countries were hot, defined as a sustained heat index of 80° F (and many were very humid as well) suggesting that our aviation systems will always be forced to operate at the outer edge of their performance envelope—delivering half the planned and programmed performance.
Cross-country mobility was a showstopper—we could not get from the beach to the capital city off-road in 60% of our countries, and would have trouble in an additional 20%.
The average line of sight distance throughout our world was less than 1,000 meters—only eight countries offered stand-off engagement ranges over 2,000 meters where the M1A1 offers value.
Although not documented in the study, the average bridge-loading limitation in the Third World appears to be 30 tons, with many areas limited even more, to 10 and 20 tons.
Hydrography was not a practical constraint to naval gunfire but the Navy’s 5″ is out-gunned by thirty-one of our countries’ coastal defense systems.
The lack of adequate 1:50,000 map coverage in usable shareable form[16] of our world is still a problem although much improved in the past twenty-five years. This deficiency impacts not only on ground maneuver and fire support coordination, but also on aviation mission planning and precision-munitions targeting. This is the single most urgent constraint on military effectiveness in the near and mid-term future. As General Bob Scales has documented in his own book, we still cannot do intelligence support in limited war scenarios.[17]
Our “cultural terrain” included 40 countries whose primary language was Arabic or other than English, Spanish or French (most practicing Islam or an eastern or tribal religion), and 22 Christian/orthodox countries where Spanish and French were the most common language.
In other words, in virtually our entire expeditionary environment, our aviation assets—both fixed wing and helicopter—are severely constrained in terms of lift and range (or loitering capability) at the same time that we have virtually no cross-country mobility and our most expensive ground assets are next to useless.
It is at this point that the Navy and Marine Corps as well as the US Army must be driven to question the viability of USAF aircraft designs that are distant from the real world of hot and humid atmospheres; and reconsider the roles played by artillery and armor – we must evaluate how some functions might be down-sized (if left on the ground), realigned (if moved to aviation or naval gunfire) and/or enhanced (if augmented with C4I2 assets able to better orchestrate a mix of ground-based, air-based, and theater precision-munitions resources).
As noted before there is much that is wrong with the current “joint” system for defining MNS/ROC. To reinvent the US Army we need to radically enhance how we do MNS/ROC, not only at the service level, but across DoD and WoG.
In our present configuration we are too expensive, too heavy, too slow, too few, and severely vulnerable in rear areas, bridgeheads, and across our communications grid.
Global Reach – the Mobility Challenge
“Getting there” is half the challenge. When we looked at various parameters for naval deployment and employment, the following emerged:
Forty-two percent of our countries could not be reached in less than six days with existing ARG deployment patterns.
Half of our countries did not have usable ports and would require in-stream off-loading of amphibious and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS).
Most of our world can accommodate strategic airlift (but only one or two major lift aircraft at a time – the C-130 remains the best platform for rapid broad access to any country).
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) logistics presented some real difficulty—capital cites beyond the round trip range of a CH-46 (i.e. requiring forward refueling points), very hot aviation temperatures and very large numbers of Embassy personnel as well as U.S. citizens.
What does this all mean? Our environment is lethal, but much of that lethality is static. We need to trade-off mobility in both services against firepower, lift against weight, communications and intelligence against weapons systems—and at the strategic level, we need to take a very hard look at the possibility of trading off or integrating maritime mobility with air transport mobility. An improved understanding of our cultural and physical environment, increased emphasis on lift and logistics as well as the communications and intelligence architectures to support our operations are our best means of maintaining capabilities in the face of a reduction in force.
The time/distance/weight/lethality/energy challenge must be rooted in global reality if we are to make the most of our limited resources and be able to put exactly the right mix of capabilities anywhere in the world in the shortest possible time and the greatest likelihood of success in mission accomplishment.
In our present configuration we are too expensive, too heavy, too slow, too few, and severely vulnerable in rear areas, bridgeheads, and across our communications grid.
Limitations of the Original Study and This Monograph
The original Marine Corps study did not examine all elements of the model, only 24 elements across the military, civil, and geographic bands of the model. The US Army could usefully validate and modify both the model and the list of countries that define the “alternative reality” universe to the prevailing DoD approach, and then research every element of the model. This monograph does not cover all of the elements of the USMC model (naval hydrography, for example). It seeks to provoke and inspire a fresh and complete US Army look at the real world.
Most countries where the USA might intervene do not require all of the US forces that would normally be committed to a Major Theater War (MTW). A balance needs to be struck – one that the National Military Strategy has always refused to consider – between “most likely” contingencies in the low threat – small force domain, and “worst case” contingencies that automatically assume we will be confronting one of our two peer competitors: China or Russia. Such a balance would radically ease the time/distance/weight challenge for most contingencies.
This model also does not address the foreign factor – both the degree to which other countries can and should be expected to bear a major portion of the burden for any operations in their defense or in defense of their expeditionary interests, and the degree to which we must be trained, equipped, and organized to do “by, with, and through” operations with indigenous forces. US Special Operations Forces (SOF) should not be the only Army units fully capable of “by, with, and through” operations – this must become an Army-wide standard capability – if it does, it will have substantial C4I2, combined arms coordination, and training implications, including a need for major increases in our foreign language proficiency and foreign cultural understanding, across no fewer than 33 languages, all of which will require sustainment, not our present “hit and run” approach that combined cursory training with one language tour, and on.
Threat Environment
Ongoing Conflicts
CRITERIA FOR LEVELS OF DIFFICULTY
LOW
LOW-MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM-HIGH
HIGH
Repression
Drug conflicts
Insurgencies
Civil war
Regional conflict
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
The total number of countries engaged in some level of conflict is 67, and the total number of individually-identified conflicts is 715.[18] Apart from conflicts, there are secessionist movements: 8 in Africa, 20 in Asia, 12 in Europe, 2 in the Middle East.[19] Ranked in terms of cumulative violence, the top on-going conflicts include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria including spill-over effects from Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Conflicts that have causes over 1,000 deaths but fewer than 10,000 deaths in the current or past year include (in order of duration of the conflict) the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, the Somali Civil War, the war in North-West Pakistan, the Mexican Drug War, the Libyan Civil War, the Yemeni Civil War, the Sinai insurgency in Egypt, the South Kordofan conflict in Sudan, the South Sudanese Civil War, and the war in Donbass, Ukraine.[20] Other conflicts not acknowledged by mainstream authorities but considered significant by Global Security, an alternative source, include Algeria (insurgency), Angola (Cabinda), Burkina Faso (state failure), Burundi (civil war), Colombia (insurgency), Georgia (civil war), Indonesia (Papua, West Irian), Kyrgyzstan (civil unrest), Laos (Hmong insurgency), Namibia (Caprivi Strip), Peru (Shining Path), Philippines (Moro uprising), and Uzbeckistan (civil disturbances).
SELECTED “HARD” COUNTRY IN EACH REGION
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe
Middle East
Nigeria
Mexico
Afghanistan
Turkey
Syria
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS
The expeditionary environment is a violent one with numerous existing conflicts and high likelihood of increased instability In the future. The threat is predominantly non-governmental, non-conventional, dynamic or random, nonlinear, and without rules of engagement or known doctrine. This threat is also difficult to guard against because our national intelligence community does not have an ‘indications and warnings’ capability against these ‘type’ threats, while the emerging enemy, by contrast, has a virtually unlimited source of drug addicts and related criminals that can be mobilized to compromise our own operational security. The emerging threat has added ‘worst case’ scenarios, including the threat of nonconventional attacks. such as biochemical attacks against concentrations of U.S. citizens overseas.
Consolidated Unconventional Threats
CRITERIA FOR LEVELS OF DIFFICULTY
The most difficult countries are those that are heavily engaged in all three of the environmental threat issues – drugs, terrorism, and gray arms/technology transfer.[21]
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
All three of the unconventional threat domains – drug trafficking, organized terrorism whether state-sponsored or non-state in nature, and gray arms trafficking – are outside the domain of conventional military planning and programming. They are at the intersection of diplomacy, development, economic sanctions, law enforcement, and special operations with or without covert operations by the secret intelligence services. In combination with the on-going conflicts that are virtually all internal wars rather than wars between sovereign nations, the consolidated unconventional threats appear to demand a hybrid military-civilian planning and programming capability that does not exist today.
SELECTED “HARD” COUNTRY IN EACH REGION
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe
Middle East
South Africa
Mexico
India
Turkey
Syria
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS
Questionable sales of restricted systems and material to unstable Third World countries are occurring largely through third party transfers. Such transfers often involve at least one Third World transit point. Included in this threat is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and manufacturing capabilities. as well as the marketing of ‘Blue’ (allied) weapons systems, which cannot be countered without adverse impact on friendly forces. Many of the industrialized countries of Europe as well as emerging Third World countries are showing growth in arms and technology sales in the international market. While efforts are being made by cooperating countries to prevent illegal or questionable sales, they are frequently unsuccessful. Involved countries may not yet be aware of impending sales or may disagree with a U.S. view against a sale. Gray arms trafficking and technology may generate requirements for the employment of forces to destroy arms factories and storage depots, neutralize stocks of bio-chemical weapons, or confiscate stolen materials. Drugs, terrorism, and gray arms ‘targets’ and scenarios require a different force structure, different organization and equipment, and different concepts and capabilities in C412. Force planners must also focus on the unique challenges of Third World environments and logistics requirements where U.S. Army forces must operate without being able to turn on the conventional warfare “pipeline.
Military Threat
Integrated Military Strength
The Global Firepower (GFP) ranking makes use of over 40 factors to determine each nation’s Power Index score. It is a starting point for more accurately contemplating the conventional military firepower and strength of all other countries in relation to the USA.[22]
Americas
Middle East
Africa
Asia-Pacific
Europe
USA (.090)
Russia (.096)
China (.098)
India (.166)
France (.199)
Turkey (.262)
Japan (.247)
South Korea (.262)
UK (.216)
Germany (.264)
Italy (.272)
Brazil (.336)
Canada (.419)
Mexico (.628)
Argentina (.707)
Peru (.750)
Colombia (.750)
Venezuela (.788)
Chile (.828)
Ecuador (1.16)
Bolivia (1.55)
Guatemala (2.16)
Paraguay (2.22)
Uruguay (2.23)
Egypt (.301)
Israel (.359)
Iran (.407)
Saudi Arabia (.434)
Syria (.708)
UAE (.930)
Iraq (.934)
Yemen (.968)
Jordan (1.24)
Oman (1.42)
Kuwait (1.46)
Bahrain (1.88)
Qatar (1.90)
Lebanon (1.92)
Algeria (.451)
Ethiopia (.762)
Nigeria (.786)
South Africa (.825)
Angola (.888)
Morocco (.901)
Sudan (1.24)
Libya (1.32)
DRC (1.34)
Kenya (1.37)
Tunisia (1.41)
Zimbabwe (1.55)
Zambia (1.65)
Chad (1.83)
Uganda (1.88)
Tanzania (1.96)
South Sudan (1.98)
Ghana (2.05)
Cameroon (2.24)
Mozambique (2.31)
Niger (2.47)
Pakistan (.325)
Indonesia (.335)
Vietnam (.368)
Taiwan (.396)
Thailand (.407)
Australia (.421)
North Korea (.444)
Myanmar (.658)
Malaysia (.668)
Uzbekistan (.838)
Philippines (.866)
Bangladesh (.868)
Kazakhstan (.872)
Azerbaijan (.935)
Singapore (1.02)
Afghanistan (1.06)
Georgia (1.51)
Sri Lanka (1.63)
Turkmenistan (1.67)
Mongolia (1.80)
Cambodia (1.82)
Poland (.391)
Spain (.491)
Greece (.515)
Ukraine (.587)
Czech Republic (.638)
Switzerland (.711)
Netherlands (.718)
Romania (.774)
Belarus (.845)
Denmark (.845)
Austria (.914)
Hungary (1.00)
Portugal (1.02)
Belgium (1.04)
Bulgaria (1.07)
Croatia (1.07)
Slovakia (1.37)
Serbia (1.59)
Albania (1.96)
Lithuania (1.96)
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS
The USA has only two peer competitors, China and Russia, neither of which is likely to do anything remotely requiring a MTW. A nuclear exchange is more probable but we do not know if our nuclear weapons will work as advertised or their delivery vehicles function reliably. If the USA embraces a grand strategy that demands that allied nations provide for their own primary defense, the reinvention of the US Army will focus on middle-weight contingencies and a role as a reserve force and “hub” for allied coalition endeavors. Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey are interesting as “notional” countries against which to design and then measure our over-all capabilities outside of a peer to peer engagement with China or Russia.
Ground Order of Battle
CRITERIA FOR LEVELS OF DIFFICULTY
LOW
LOW-MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM-HIGH
HARD
VERY HARD
Infantry
Armor
Artillery
Draft/TR
None
None
Draft/TR
M48/LAV
Mortars
PMN/No Exp
M60/AA
How/SP
PM
T62E/MOD55
>30K FASCAM
Reg/TR
T72M1
>30K NBC
Reg/Exp
T80/64B
BLOC
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
Granting an advantage to indigenous troops fighting on their own ground, there are simply no real competitors to the USA outside of China and Russia, provided that the USA is politically committed to full utilization of the combined arms capabilities within which the US infantry is second to none. It may, however, be time to evaluate “the soldier’s load” and reflect on how the Eastern way of war, with no body armor and very limited logistics support, is more sustainable over time and space.
SELECTED “HARD” COUNTRY IN EACH REGION
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe
Middle East
Algeria
Cuba
China
Turkey
Iran
PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS
Besides Chinese and Russian proxies with advanced weapons systems, the conventional threat includes Third World countries using systems sold to them by allied or nominally friendly countries, and relatively sophisticated systems developed by regional powers. The proliferation of allied systems complicates our electronic warfare planning, signal intelligence, and communications; for in some instances we cannot jam them without jamming ourselves, because of shared frequency spectrums. The expeditionary environment is complex and lethal. The US Army can expect to meet trained and experienced infantry, modern armor, relatively sophisticated artillery including scatterable mines, as well as smart or stand-off munitions. Some countries have sophisticated surface-to-surface missiles and other advanced coastal defense systems. Depending on intelligence and threat country force disposition, a US force could easily conduct raid-type operations against the larger and stronger countries, contingent on air support. Such missions as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and other limited objective operations could be conducted with a reasonable chance of success provided there was adequate preparation and both naval and air support. In deciding how to train. equip, and organize our ground forces planners must begin with the larger context of supporting capabilities not controlled by the US Army: satellites, aviation, and sea-based support. We urgently need to revisit “the soldier’s load” and our over-reliance on electronics and heavy armor.
Air Order of Battle
CRITERIA FOR LEVELS OF DIFFICULTY
LOW
LOW-MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM-HARD
HIGH
VERY HIGH
Air OOB
Close Air
AAW(IAD)
None
None
None
DC-3/Props
Props
Early AAA
Day/VFR Jets
Day Jet Atk
HH SAMs
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