There are two opposite viewpoints concerning what prompts the military to act:
The military perforce takes over the administration when due to one or other reason the civilian set-up fails to deliver on its promises or to provide good governance and, instead, pushes the country to a point where chaotic conditions prevail and the country’s very existence is jeopardized.
The military has developed vested interests – corporate and others – and, therefore, it does not permit democracy to take roots by interfering in democratic process and by derailing it at crucial moments to protect its interests.
It is also said that whenever military takes over, there is no long-term pre-planned agenda to introduce reforms, rather it acts and frames policies on more or less ad hoc basis with the intention to remain in power as long as possible. The military administration remains preoccupied with the quest for acquiring legitimacy through verdict by superior judiciary, by seeking support of pragmatic, or more truly unscrupulous, political elements and by ultimately getting indemnity for subversion of the Constitution from a pliable parliament that is elected through a dubious electoral process.
In the light of above observations, the purpose of the present article is to examine the circumstances in which military take-overs of 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999 took place in Pakistan.
The Military Coup of 7 October 1958
Between 1940 and 1947, the elitist All India Muslim League turned into an organization that represented the Muslim masses. During this period, the Muslim League hardly did any homework on even the broader outline of the constitutional structure of ‘Pakistan’ that it demanded.
The first Constituent Assembly failed to frame a constitution because of the conflicting views of Punjab and Bengal on a number of issues, including selection of national language/s, limits of provincial autonomy, size of representation of different provinces in the lower and upper houses of the parliament, system of elections i.e., whether with joint or separate electorates for different communities and the role of Islam in the affairs of the state. The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October 1954 by Governor-General Malik Ghulam Mohammad on the ground that it had failed to fulfil its responsibility and had become unrepresentative.
In order to resolve the constitutional tangle, the second Constituent Assembly decided to form a single province or ‘One Unit’ in the western wing of the country, comprising provinces and princely states of the region to counter-balance the eastern wing which had 55% of the total population of Pakistan. The Assembly passed the Constitution of 1956 which was based on the principle of parity i.e., equality of representation between newly created provinces of East and West Pakistan and established parliamentary system of government with considerable provincial autonomy.
The promulgation of the Constitution of 1956 did not give political stability to the country. In between 15 August 1947 and 23 march 1956, Pakistan had four Governors General – Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Malik Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza – and four Prime Ministers – Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra and Chaudhry Mohammad Ali – under the Constitution of 1956, Pakistan had one President – Iskandar Mirza – and four Prime Ministers – Chaudhry Mohammad Ali (who had continued to hold office), Husayn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ibrahim Ismael Chundrigar and Malik Feroze Khan Noon.
Unfortunately the political parties in the arena – be that the Muslim League, the Awami League, the Krishak Proja Party, the Republican Party or the National Awami Party – did not demonstrate the maturity required for the success of the democratic process. The political leaders at times used language unworthy of their status. President Iskandar Mirza often involved himself in the process of making and breaking the governments. The mayhem in assembly sessions promoted disenchantment with the system.
The East Bengal/East Pakistan Assembly, in particular, repeatedly presented scenes of utter chaos and disorder. In-fighting in one of the sessions of East Pakistan Assembly in 1957 caused fatal injuries to the Deputy Speaker.
Barring few, the Bengali politicians wasted no occasion to criticize the ruling elite from the Punjab and used venomous language against West Pakistan. In western wing, the politicians from erstwhile smaller provinces showed dissatisfaction with “One Unit”, claiming it had established hegemony of the Punjab. The rulers of some former Princely States, in particular Khan of Kalat, wanted restoration of their former status.
On external front, with perceived Indian threat looming large, Pakistan aligned itself with the West led by the United States. In the context of the Cold War, the United States needed a politically stable and strong Pakistan and wanted its armed forces to play important role in the decision-making process. There was also this idea that in underdeveloped countries, the armed forces could serve as an instrument of modernization. The United States was, therefore, inclined to support the army if it grabbed power.
General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s armed forces, had very negative opinion of the politicians and considered them as mischief-makers. He became upset with perennial political instability and growth of provincialism. Being an army man, he had limited understanding of complicated political issues that needed to be resolved for strengthening the social contract between ethnic entities in Pakistan. In his view, Pakistan faced threats from its mortal enemy India and required a strong, centralized government to deal with internal and external threats.
In this backdrop, President Iskandar Mirza was waiting for his moment to strike. On 7 October 1958, Mirza proclaimed martial law throughout the country, abrogated the Constitution of 1956, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies, banned political activities and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administration, citing threats to the country as justification for his action.
The Supreme Court Judgment in the Doso Case granted validity to martial law, virtually giving recognition to the principle of might is right. Perhaps this encouraged General Ayub Khan to compel President Mirza to resign on 27 October 1957 and assume all powers.
In order to gain legitimacy, Ayub Khan held elections of what he called ‘Basic Democrats’ and then got himself ‘elected’ in a presidential referendum in February 1960 in which only the Basic Democrats cast their votes. In June 1962, he promulgated the Constitution of 1962 and lifted martial law.
Political activities were allowed to resume within certain limits and Ayub Khan managed to form the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) with the help of the politicians who were prepared to work with the military ruler.
General Ayub Khan was perhaps the only coup-maker who had given some serious thought to what he would do after the take-over. He believed that the politicians and journalists were the principal cause of most of the problems and needed to be reined in. Even after lifting the martial law, he did not allow full freedom to press and retained many curbs on political activities. His idea was that the people primarily wanted political stability, continuity of policies and economic development.
Under Ayub Khan’s government substantial progress was achieved in agricultural and industrial sectors. There was marked improvement in the country’s over-all infra-structure with building of dams, canals, roads and electrification of villages etc.
However, his policy of free-market economy led to regional disparities and widening of gulf between haves and have-nots, although some trickle-down effects of economic development did reach the lower strata of the population.
Ayub Khan had interests of the armed forces personnel at his heart. During his period the armed forces gained stakes in the corporate sector of Pakistan and had a taste of power, which proved ominous for the future of democracy in Pakistan.
The Military-Coup of 25 March 1969
Ayub Khan’s expectations that the economic development would satisfy the people and they would not clamour for political rights did not fulfil. He virtually presided over a bureaucratic state apparatus. The system of Basic Democracy failed to give the people sense of participation in governance, although the very purpose of this system was to associate the masses in the process of solving their problems at the grass-roots level. The reason was, perhaps, the centralization of government structure under the Constitution of 1962 with the office of the President as the repository of ultimate power.
Ayub Khan received first major set-back when the opposition parties joined hands to form an alliance called Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to contest the elections of Basic Democracy in late 1964 to be followed by the presidential election in January 1965.
The leaders of the COP succeeded in persuading Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah to contest presidential election as COP’s candidate. Although Ayub Khan was declared as having won the election, apparently the election was not fair and transparent.
The Pakistan-India clashes in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 and then the Pakistan-India War of September 1965, a consequence of Pakistan’s interference in Kashmir, boosted the popularity of Ayub Khan.
However, it nose-dived in January 1966 when Pakistan and India signed the Tashkent Declaration. Not privy to actual situation, the people thought that what had been achieved at war front had been lost at the diplomatic front. In fact, Pakistan was not in a position to take-over Kashmir through military means and defending the country after Indian invasion was itself a major achievement.
The Tashkent Declaration ignited anti-Ayub demonstrations in West Pakistan, in particular by the student community. In February 1966, the opposition parties met in Lahore where Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman, the leader of the Awami League, unveiled his Six-Point Formula that inter alia called for grant of complete autonomy to East Pakistan and introduction of parliamentary form of government with distribution of seats in federal legislature according to population, and general elections on the basis of one-man one-vote.
The Six-Point Formula immediately captured the imagination of the Bengali. After anti-Tashkent agitation in West Pakistan, the government got subdued and clamped down on the Awami League leaders and arrested Sheikh Mujib.
In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, had become very popular during the 1965 War due to his hard-hitting speeches against India in the United Nations. He was disappointment with the Tashkent Declaration as if it amounted to surrender before the enemy. Under Ayub Khan’s pressure, he defended the Tashkent Declaration but after some time had to leave the government.
In November 1967, Bhutto formed Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that had a centre-leftist programme. He came out in open against the Tashkent Declaration, claiming that he would share the whole truth with the people at proper time.
The 1965 War had some important consequences. It raised the honour and prestige of the armed forces sky-high, at least in West Pakistan. Simultaneously the War adversely affected the economy because Ayub Khan’s development agenda suffered as more funds had to be allocated to defence. This meant increase in the rate of inflation and greater stakes of the armed forces in resource distribution at the cost of social sector. This also led to the army’s greater say in defence and foreign policies and development of vested interests in maintaining perpetually tense relations with India to permanently justify larger share for defence in annual budgets.
In 1967, the government came to know of a plot for secession of East Pakistan with Indian assistance. For investigation purpose, an estimated 1500 people were arrested. In January 1968, the public was officially informed about what came to be known as the Agartala Conspiracy.
The charges of conspiracy were brought against several Bengali politicians, civilian officers and armed forces personnel, including Sheikh Mujib. This instantly made Sheikh Mujib popular as a crusader for the rights of the Bengali people.
In February 1968, Ayub Khan suffered from cardiac problem that made him inactive for about three months. During this period, Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan increased his say in the governance of the country. It seemed he was waiting for an opportune moment to justify army’s direct intervention.
By the time Ayub Khan returned to work, the political storm had taken shape. The Awami League was clamouring for complete autonomy to East Pakistan on the basis of Six-Point Programme, the National Awami Party (Wail Group) was in the forefront in demanding the dissolution of the ‘One Unit’ of West Pakistan and Pakistan People’s Party was demanding restructuring of the economy on the principles of socialism, simultaneously inciting the students and workers for active agitation against the incumbent government.
As if Ayub Khan’s misfortune was not enough, the government decided to celebrate the ‘Decade of Development’ on completion of ten years of Ayub Khan’s rule. The opposition parties seized the opportunity to launch the final onslaught against Ayub Khan. Led by Bhutto in West Pakistan, the popular agitation gathered momentum and was soon joined by political forces in East Pakistan with greater fervour.
As a last resort, Ayub Khan agreed to hold talks with the Democratic Action Committee (DAC), an alliance of the opposition parties. He also wanted to talk to Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib. Ayub Khan lifted the emergency and announced that he would not be a candidate in the next presidential election due in early 1970. Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto, who had been arrested sometimes earlier, were released to create conducive environment for talks.
In the Round Table Conference with the leaders of the DAC and Sheikh Mujib, Ayub Khan showed readiness to introduce parliamentary system of government with adult franchise. However, Sheikh Mujib insisted on acceptance of his Six-Point Formula, which demand Ayub Khan was not prepared to concede. Bhutto did not bother to participate in the Round Table Conference. Perhaps, he had established secret contacts with some generals and wanted nothing short of immediate resignation of Ayub Khan.
Unable to resolve the crisis that had paralysed the civil administration and plunged the country into chaos and disorder, Ayub Khan handed over power to General Yahiya Khan on 25 March 1969.
Yahiya Khan abrogated the Constitution, imposed martial law and dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies. In March 1970, he issued a Legal Framework Order which inter alia provided for grant of representation to each province according to its population in the Constituent-cum-National Assembly that was to be elected on the basis of adult franchise. The LFO also provided for abolition of ‘One Unit’ with effect from 1 July 1970.
In December 1970, general elections were held in the country in which the Awami League secured absolute majority whereas the Pakistan People’s Party emerged as the second largest party, but both were confined to East and West Pakistan respectively.
The unnecessary delay in the holding of Assembly session and transfer of power to the elected representatives due to the army’s reservations about the Awami League created a crisis situation. There was a popular uprising in East Pakistan, which Yahiya Khan sought to suppress through military action but failed to control the situation. The success of Bengali people’s war of liberation, duly assisted by India, led to the surrender of Pakistan Armed Forces and emergence of Bangladesh on 16 December 1971.
The military defeat of Pakistan against India and Bangladesh’s Mukti Bahini turned the people of West Pakistan against Yahiya Khan, who stepped down on 20 December 1971, transferring power to Bhutto as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Bhutto lifted martial law on 21 April 1972, when an interim constitution became operative.
As long as Yahiya Khan remained in power, his martial law was not challenged in any court of law. After his resignation, the legality of martial law came into question in Asma Jilani Case and the Supreme Court declared Yahiya Khan a usurper.
The Military Coup of 5 July 1977
Believing that the opposition stood divided and the position of the Pakistan People’s Party was quite secure, Bhutto decided in the first week of January 1977 to hold elections on 7 March for the National Assembly and on 10 March for the Provincial Assembles. As soon as the existing Assemblies were dissolved and the dates of general elections announced, nine opposition parties representing a broad spectrum of political views joined hands to form Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and declared to contest the elections under a single banner and a common symbol.
Although Bhutto had many achievements to his credit, including return of the Pakistani POWS from India, vacation of nearly 5000 sq. miles of territory from Indian occupation, land, labour, administrative and educational reforms and the framing of the Constitution of 1973, there were many reasons for the dissatisfaction of the masses.
The common man was mainly concerned with the high-rate of inflation. The industrialists and businessmen, whose interests had been adversely affected by Bhutto’s policy of nationalization, were against him. The petty-bourgeois and madrassa people with their religious mind-sets were in the forefront of his opposition. The intelligentsia, political workers, journalists and students had developed resentment over Bhutto’s autocratic style of government.
During the election campaign it became evident that the PNA had a strong base of support, in particular in the urban areas. The PNA exploited the sentiments of the people by promising them to introduce ‘Nizam-i-Mustafa’ and bringing the prices of commodities back to the level of 1970. It had a very large number of madrasah students available to it as workers and its processions and public meetings drew huge crowds.
Bhutto’s support base was in rural areas where landlords and peasants had benefitted from his policies. Since the rural areas accounted for most of the constituencies, it seemed that the PPP would secure a simple majority without much difficulty. However, Bhutto had a different plan. Perhaps, he wanted to ensure two-third majority for the PPP so that the Constitution could be amended at will.
The credibility of the general elections was marred even before the polling day. Bhutto and the four Chief Ministers, all belonging to the PPP, got themselves ‘elected unopposed’ by physically preventing the opponents from filing their nomination papers. When the last date of filing nomination papers passed, it became known that some 25 candidates of the National Assembly and 69 candidates of the Provincial Assemblies had returned without contesting for their seats.
The PNA had decided to boycott the elections in Balochistan because of the on-going military action, but it resolved to give tough fight to the PPP on remaining seats.
The polls for the National Assembly took place on 7 March 1977. The results showed that the PPP had won 154 seats with the PNA lagging much behind with 38 seats only. This was unbelievable. It is said that even Bhutto was surprised at the over-kill.
The PNA announced the boycott of the elections for Provincial Assemblies scheduled for 10 March. On that day, the polling stations wore deserted look. The general elections had lost their credibility.
Now the PNA made three demands: the resignation of Bhutto as Prime Minister, the holding of fresh general elections under the supervision of the judiciary and the army, and the formation of a new Election Commission. From 14 March, the PNA launched a country-wide movement for the acceptance of its demands.
The PNA movement did not prevent the inauguration of new Assemblies. But all efforts by the government to suppress the agitation failed. Incarceration of the PNA’s top leadership and thousands of its workers caused no let-up in the movement. The calling of the army and imposition of curfew in disturbed areas did not work. As agitation continued unabated, the PPP government agreed to negotiate with the PNA on its demands. The leaders of the PNA were released to facilitate the talks.
Any swift development in the negotiations would have averted military take-over. However, Bhutto adopted dilly-dallying tactics to defuse the situation and have a favourable bargain.
Within the PNA also there were elements like Asghar Khan, the leader of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, who wanted the army to intervene. There was also mistrust between the two sides. The negotiations dragged on for more than two months. By early July the draft of agreement was in final stages. But it was too late. The army had become restive as the negotiations were lingering on while the country remained unstable.
In the early hours of 5th July the army launched its ‘Operation Fair-play’ to seize power. The prominent leaders of the PPP and the PNA, including Bhutto and the heads of the nine component parties of the PNA, were taken into custody. Chief of the Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq proclaimed martial law, put the Constitution into ‘abeyance’ , dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies and promised to hold fresh general elections within 90 days.
No one knows what the real intentions of the army were. However, it is said that during Zia-ul Haq’s first meeting with Bhutto who was under detention, the deposed Prime Minister reminded Zia-ul Haq that he was guilty of committing high treason within the meaning of Article 6 of the Constitution. Perhaps, Zia-ul Haq sensed the danger and decided to get rid of Bhutto. He released Bhutto for a few days and then arrested him again to face ‘accountability’. The general elections were postponed indefinitely.
Zia-ul Haq’s martial law was validated by the Supreme Court Judgment in the Nusrat Bhutto Case as constitutional deviation under the law of state necessity. Bhutto was prosecuted on the charge of murder and after a trial that lacked fairness was executed on 4 April 1979.
Zia-ul Haq used the fair name of Islam to strengthen his position. After the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in late December 1979, the United States developed interest in Zia-ul Haq’s continuity in office.
In March 1981, Zia-ul Haq promulgated a Provisional Constitutional Order that replaced the Constitution of 1973. This was the time when several political parties, including the PPP and some of its former opponents, had formed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). In response to the challenge posed by the MRD, Zia-ul Haq announced to hold general elections latest by March 1985.
In December 1984, he got himself ‘elected’ as President in a farcical referendum and then in February held non-party general elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies, followed by election to the Senate.
After protracted debate, the Parliament passed the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution and Zia-ul Haq lifted martial law on 30 December 1985, without shunning his uniform.
The Eighth Amendment inserted article 58 (2) (b) in the Constitution which empowered the President to dissolve the National Assembly if in his opinion the government of the federation was not being carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate was necessary.
Under the Eighth Amendment President assumed many powers which are exercised by Prime Minister in a parliamentary democracy.
Having developed differences with Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, Zia-ul Haq dissolved the National Assembly on 28 May 1988 under Article 58 (2) (b) but was killed in a mysterious plane crash on 17 August the same year. Before his death, he had virtually converted Pakistan into a garrison state where the military establishment and military controlled agencies had the final say in all matters, domestic or external.
The Military Coup of 12 October 1999
After Zia-ul Haq’s exit from political scene as a result of C-130 plane crash, an informal troika system came into operation under which the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff shared power.
In this system the Prime Minister did not have a free hand; he was closely monitored and was at the mercy of the President who could exercise his power under Article 58 (2) (b) to dissolve the National Assembly, dismiss the Prime Minister and call fresh general elections.
If the Chief of Army Staff was not satisfied with the policies of the Prime Minister, he could rely on President to pressurize the Prime minister for course correction. Obviously this was a semblance of parliamentary democracy in which the Prime Minister, enjoying the support of the majority in the parliament, calls the shot. Rather served during the pleasure of President.
The presence of Article 58 (2) (b) was a safety valve that averted the direct military take-over. It is now a proven fact that the military controlled agencies manipulated the results of the general elections and had a role in making and breaking of governments.
This all changed abruptly after the general elections of February 1997 which gave Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (N) a ‘heavy mandate’. Equipped with two-third majority, the government introduced the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution that, inter alia, repealed Article 58 (2) (b) and Fourteenth Amendment that, inter alia, established tight control of the party high command over the MNAs. If an MNA violated party’s instruction on voting, he or she could be unseated.
In short duration, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had confrontation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. The PML (N) workers stormed the Supreme Court. Soon there was a rift within the Supreme Court as to whether Sajjad Ali Shah was qualified to remain the Chief Justice and he had to leave the august post.
At one point during confrontation between the government and Chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah, the Supreme Court had suspended the Thirteenth Amendment to provide chance to President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari to exercise power under Article 58 (2) (b) and send Nawaz Sharif home; but it seems the army was reluctant to support the President.
Now next to go was President Leghari who resigned when threatened with the prospect of impeachment proceedings against him.
The military establishment was watching these developments with grave concern. It was also mindful of security threats that confronted the country. Expressing the military establishment’s viewpoint, Chief of the Army Staff General Jahangir Karamat proposed creation of a National Security Council in a speech. This was not acceptable to Nawaz Sharif who prevailed upon the COAS to submit his resignation and appointed General Pervez Musharraf in his place.
Nawaz Sharif also adopted confrontational posture towards press. He provided names of journalists to the Jung Group who were to be fired or stopped from criticizing the government. When the Jung Group failed to oblige, its news print was seized at the port and income tax notices of huge amounts were issued.
Under the Nawaz Sharif government, the stories of corruption, financial mismanagement and favouritism also abounded.
However, the development that greatly disturbed the military establishment was Nawaz Sharif’s initiative to normalize relations with India.
This was the time when Pakistan-sponsored jihadi outfits, with sizeable indigenous freedom Fighters, were fully active in Indian occupied Kashmir, at least to keep the Kashmir Issue on the burner.
In February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to Pakistan on board a bus. The Lahore Declaration issued at the end of his visit pledged to normalize Pakistan-India relations. Hardly any time had lapsed after the Lahore Declaration that General Musharraf without fully informing Nawaz Sharif embarked upon his Kargil misadventure, while the government was talking peace.
Although Nawaz Sharif’s diplomatic efforts averted another Pakistan-India War, the peace process got derailed and trust was shattered. It was this event which created unbridgeable rift between Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf and both began to distrust each other.
In this backdrop, on 12 October 1999, Nawaz Sharif dismissed General Musharraf as COAS and appointed General Ziauddin Butt in his place while Musharraf was in Colombo about to board a PIA plane for return journey. His orders were not carried out as the GHQ declined to accept summary, surreptitious, unsavoury and not lawful decision to sack the Army Chief. Dismissal of Musharraf, subsequently was held to be unlawful and void.
Instead, the army generals toppled Nawaz Sharif, claiming that the PIA flight had been diverted to prevent Musharraf from landing in Karachi.
On return, General Musharraf was taken to Islamabad where as the Chief of Army Staff he proclaimed so-called ‘emergency’ and assumed power as ‘Chief Executive Officer’ of the country. Corporate Coup had arrived.
The action of the Corps Commander in staging coup and of General Musharraf in assuming power after that action amounted to subversion of Constitution. General Musharraf also promulgated a Provisional Constitutional Order which replaced the Constitution of 1973.
The ‘emergency’ of Musharraf was validated by the Supreme Court in the Zafar Ali Shah Case. The Supreme Court gave Musharraf three years to hold general elections. In 2001, Musharraf prevailed upon President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar to step down and himself became President. As the deadline to hold general elections was drawing nearer, in April 2002 Musharraf got himself ‘elected’ as President in a referendum for a term that was to begin after the general elections.
With Nawaz Sharif sent into exile to Saudi Arabia under a deal after he was sentenced to life imprisonment, Musharraf managed to get another PML (Quaid-i-Azam) formed as the King’s Party.
In October 2002, general elections, lacking transparency, were held after which the PML (Q) formed a coalition government. The new Parliament passed Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution that, inter alia, granted immunity to Musharraf for his action of 12 October 1999 and validated his ‘election’ in referendum of April 2002. The Seventeenth Amendment also restored the Article 58 (2) (b) to the Constitution. Once constitutional structure was in place, the ‘emergency’ was lifted.
Also Musharraf had pledged to shun uniform latest by 31 December 2004, he did not. Musharraf’s proclamation of ‘emergency’ a second time on 3 November 2007 was necessitated to remove legal challenge to his‘re-election’ as President in October 2007 while still in uniform. In a way it was the next phase, extension or continuity of the military take-over of 12 October 1999.
Although Musharraf stepped down as Army Chief after getting validity for his election as President from the Supreme Court that was formed after proclamation of ‘emergency’ of 3 November, he lost control of the situation.
The Assemblies elected in the general elections of February 2008 threatened him with impeachment proceedings if he did not resign. In August 2008, Musharraf resigned as President and left the country. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution not only declined to validate the proclamation of ‘emergency’ on 3 November but removed the legal cover given to the action of 12 October 1999 by Supreme Court too.
Conclusion
There should be hardly any doubt that the conduct of politicians was primarily responsible for the imposition of martial law on 7 October 1958. The political parties were not well-organized and lacked discipline. The political leaders had scant regard for dissenting opinion. They did not realize that pluralism was essence of democracy.
The First Constituent Assembly failed to frame a constitution in more than seven years of its life. No general elections were held in more than eleven years before the martial law was imposed. Although it was hoped that general elections would be held in February 1959, there was no guarantee that they would actually take place or they would take the country out of crisis situation.
If the United States encouraged the armed forces of Pakistan to take-over power, it was because of perennial political instability in which it could not have worked with the civilians.
As regards the martial law of 25 March 1969, one has seen that during the Round Table Conference, Ayub Khan had conceded the demand for establishment of parliamentary democracy with adult franchise. However, Sheikh Mujib was adamant that the future constitution should be based on his Six-Point Formula which provided for an extremely weak and ineffective federal centre. Bhutto was not even prepared to talk with Ayub Khan. This virtually closed doors for any change through constitutional amendments.
There was no assurance that had Ayub Khan stepped down and the Speaker of the National Assembly assumed power as Acting President, the tricky constitutional issues would have been resolved under civilian administration or transparent, fair and peaceful general elections for a Constituent Assembly would have been held after necessary constitutional amendments to pave the way for them. Here too we find that ultimately it was disunity among the politicians that made army intervention indispensable.
Coming to the martial law of 5 July 1977, perhaps the army was not comfortable with Bhutto’s populist and civilian government after having remained directly or indirectly in power for more than twelve years. Probably some generals had reservations about the way Bhutto had removed General Gul Hasan and Air Chief Marshal Abdur Rahim. However, the Chief of Army Staff decided to act only after Bhutto failed to resolve the crisis created by the rigging of the general elections of 1977.
General Zia-ul Haq left a legacy in which the civilian-democracy became a façade with real power in the hands of the military establishment. The first two stints of Benazir Bhutto and the first stint of Nawaz Sharif amply demonstrated how their hands had remained tied.
When Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) secured two-third majority in February 1997 elections, he went berserk. Had he moved with caution to assert civilian authority and given good governance to the people, the army would have thought twice before toppling him.
That said one can’t absolve the army Generals of their responsibility in the failure of democracy. Instead of adopting a stand on principles and focusing on institution-building, the military rulers from Ayub Khan to Musharraf, promoted political corruption by providing benefits to turn-coats and weather cocks who joined their band-wagons. The manipulation of general elections by the military-controlled agencies also prevented growth of healthy democratic traditions.
Let us hope someday our state institutions would learn to function within the parameters of the Constitution.
If we look back at last 60 years, the question arises, what Pakistan as a nation state has achieved so far? More than half a century after independence, the conditions of Pakistan are more miserable than they were at the time of partition. There are countless failures of independence.
The litany of failures includes the inability to have a functional parliamentary system, failure either to sustain economic development or meaningful redistribution of wealth to the impoverished masses.
On this first anniversary of Second Elections since Musharraf, things seem to have come full circle and again people are anxious, apprehensive that the Political Leadership has not thrown up any Messiah or an Statesman and they may again have to look elsewhere for their redemption from their sufferings in terms of dignity, bruised and battered self-respect, economic vows, security of Life and Property, even playing field, justice and deliverance from the verbose and holier than though politicians, Media and judiciary.