Shahbaz’s Sharif’s meeting with Manmohan Singh in the Indian capital last Thursday was the second by a leading Pakistani official with the Indian prime minister in the three months that have passed since the New York meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries at the end of September. The last one was a ‘courtesy call’ by Sartaj Aziz on November 13 while on a visit to India for an ASEM foreign ministers’ conference.
Shahbaz was visiting India as chief minister of Punjab at the invitatiWith the 18 Div failing to create the necessary breakthrough in the Rajasthan Desert to exploit, the 33 Div’s mission was drastically changed. We (initially HQ 33 Div and 60 Bde only) were ordered on Dec 7, 1971 to move post-haste from our concentration area in Tarinda near Rahimyar Khan to reinforce the 18 Div’s beleaguered 55 Bde at Chor and Umerkot in the Thar Desert 400 miles south.
With Hyderabad in danger, the urgency forced road and rail movement during daylight. We faced sporadic air attacks. However, we took the full brunt of relentless Indian air assault bent on stopping us on the road from Mirpurkhas to Umerkot and Chor throughout the day on December 12.
55 Bde’s covering forces failed to effectively delay the Indian advance on Chor. With full air cover, the Indians were moving another two Infantry Bdes along with another tank regiment to reinforce the two infantry brigades and two tank regiments with full complement of the Corps artillery already facing Chor. Not quickly exploiting their initial success, they missed a golden opportunity. By the evening of Dec 12, we had stabilised 55 Bde’s forward defended localities (FDLs) from Chor to Umerkot and inspite of the fatigue were preparing to carry out local attacks all along the front. Waves of PAF aircraft appeared early on Dec 15, 1971 to launch effective low-level attacks on the Indians up and down the railway line.
Our Commanding Officer (CO) 44 Punjab (now 4 Sind) Lt-Col (later Brig) Mohammad Taj, SJ & Bar, was simply magnificent during battle. Oblivious to everything else he would simply get on with the business of taking the war to the enemy. Sent to recce the Indian flank near Goth Akhraj, the Unit Intelligence Officer (IO) 2/Lt (later Maj) Hanif Butt (nickname ‘Singhawala’) drove his jeep, as subalterns without a care in the world are apt to do, wireless antenna and moustache waving, back through the Indian positions.
We held our breath but the Indians were too surprised to react, “the shortest route”, Hanif explained. He reported no movement beyond Goth Akhraj to the Chor-Khokhrapar railway line. A wonderful host, Hanif owns a few gas stations in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA.
Col Taj’s plan, duly endorsed by the newly arrived GOC Lt-Gen Sharif (Maj Gen Naseer was wounded on Dec 12), was simple. Two rifle companies riding a squadron of Guides Cavalry tanks commanded by my good friend Maj Fahim Attaullah Jan (now doing business in Canada) were to cut across the desert on Dec 16 from Goth Akhraj and hit the Indian position astride the Chor–Khokhrapar railway line. The rest of the battalion was to follow mounted on trucks. Once astride the railway line, we were holding the blacking position. Cut off from their logistics, particularly water and ammunition, the Indians would have to dislodge us.
The news about the surrender in East Pakistan early in the evening of December 16 was taken to be deliberate disinformation meant to affect our morale. At first many refused to believe it. When it did sink in there was a stunned silence. Despite the cacophony of battlefield noises, officers and men openly wept. The war remained still very much on for us in the desert, the night sky alight and aflame with artillery shells and tracer bullets. When the GHQ cancelled our intended attack the enormity of it all set in, many giving vent to their feelings of frustration – universal grief turned into desperate rage.
Col Taj gave us a severe dressing down, “Concentrate on what will happen here. The lives of your men depend on you”, or words to that effect. This was no time for reflection or analysis; our immediate future was not very bright. Lifespan in the battlefield is difficult to predict beyond a few hours. What is real is how to keep your men alive, do the task given to you and in the process try and stay alive yourself. While the smell of cordite cannot wipe out the smell of defeat, in the battlefield you tend to shut out what’s happening elsewhere.
Late 16th evening, the CO called to ask if I had any contact with Captains Naseer Tariq and Fahim. Close to our left flank, I found Fahim (later Maj Gen) and Tariq (later Maj) forming up their rifle companies to attack the Indians on their own. When I asked them what in the name of God they were doing, I was told, “better to die today than feel the shame for the rest of our lives”. Using my best sales pitch to talk them out of this madness, they were finally convinced it was better to let their men live – to die another day for their country.
My close friend Capt (later Maj and IG Police) Mian Zaheer commanding Delta Company 48 Punjab (with two tanks of 29 Cav) beat off an Indian Bde attack three miles south of Rangpur (than East Pakistan) with great élan and spirit throughout Dec 16. Sub Karam Dad (29 Cav) was killed late that day when his tank was directly hit. Just before establishing contact with 22 Marathas on the orders of his Bde Comd Brig Naeem at about 5 pm, Mian Sahib met another good friend Capt (later Brig) Yasub Dogar (SSG) who told him about the surrender.
Of the three dozen plus infantry, armour and artillery units fighting in East Pakistan, only the HQ element of one infantry unit actually surrendered before Dec 16, 1971. All were not only fighting but willing to fight on when the orders of surrender from the Eastern Command finally filtered through. While unfortunately not born every day, this country has been blessed with men like Taj, Naseer Tariq, Fahim, Hanif, Fahim Ataullah Jan, Mian Zaheer, Yasub Dogar etc. Siachen, Kargil, Swat and Fata etc have shown that the Pakistan Army is lucky to have such soldiers in its rank and file.
The army in West Pakistan was mostly oblivious to what was happening in East Pakistan, all information being screened through government filters presenting a one-sided picture devoid of reality. The country’s physical separation took place on December 16, 1971, but after March 25 it was only a matter of time. Anybody who said otherwise was considered a traitor. Not many (Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Lt-Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan being honourable exceptions) stood up then to be counted by that special description of ‘traitor’. The ultimate irony – four decades later that divorce from reality in favour of perception not only persists but is pervasive.
Because we failed to treat our own people as equals, the finest experiment in nationhood in its time came to grief and became two countries. Some days in your life never go away. While one may not actually remember what one was doing on that day, what happened leaves an indelible mark in your memory. One cannot look back at such history without emotions. December 16, 1971 simply added a permanent scar on one’s psyche.
Tariq and Fahim were right, some of us will live and die with the anguish of that the hardest day of our lives.on oThis is the third and final part of the prophecies made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in an interview to Shorish Kashmiri in Delhi in 1946 about the creation of Pakistan.
“Muslims have every right to demand constitutional safeguards, but partition of India cannot promote their interests. The demand is the politically incorrect solution of a communal problem.
“In future, India will be faced with class problems, not communal disputes; the conflict will be between capital and labour. The communist and socialist movements are growing and it is not possible to ignore them. These movements will increasingly fight for the protection of the interests of the underclass.
“Muslim capitalists and the feudal classes are apprehensive of this impending threat. Now they have given this whole issue a communal colour and have turned the economic issue into a religious dispute. But Muslims alone are not responsible for this. This strategy was first adopted by the British government and then endorsed by the political minds of Aligarh. Later, Hindu short-sightedness made matters worse and now freedom has become contingent on the partition of Indian.
“Jinnah himself was an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. In one Congress session, Sarojini Naidu had commended him with this title. He was a disciple of Dadabhai Naoroji. He had refused to join the 1906 deputation of Muslims that initiated communal politics in India. In 1919 he stood firmly as a nationalist and opposed Muslim demands before the Joint Select Committee.
“On October 3, 1925, in a letter to the ‘Times of India’, he rubbished the suggestion that Congress is a Hindu outfit. In the All Parties Conferences of 1925 and 1928, he strongly favoured a joint electorate. While speaking at the National Assembly in 1925, he said: ‘I am a nationalist first and a nationalist last’ and he exhorted his colleagues, be they Hindus or Muslims, ‘not to raise communal issues in the House and help make the assembly a national institution in the truest sense of the term.’
“In 1928, Jinnah supported the Congress call to boycott the Simon Commission. Until 1937 he did not favour the demand to partition India. In his message to various student bodies he stressed the need to work for Hindu Muslim unity. But he felt aggrieved when the Congress formed governments in seven states and ignored the Muslim League. In 1940 he decided to pursue the partition demand to check Muslim political decline…
“Q: It is clear that Muslims are not going to turn away from their demand for Pakistan. Why have they become so impervious to all reason and logic of arguments?
“A: It is difficult, rather impossible, to fight against the misplaced enthusiasm of a mob, but to suppress one’s conscience is worse than death. Today Muslims are not walking, they are flowing. The problem is that Muslims have not learnt to walk steadily; they either run or flow with the tide. When a group of people lose confidence and self-respect, they are surrounded by imaginary doubts and dangers and fail to make a distinction between right and wrong…
“Q: But Hindus and Muslims are two different nations with different and disparate inclinations. How can unity between the two be achieved?
“A: This is an obsolete debate. I have seen the correspondence between Allama Iqbal and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni on the subject. In the Quran the term ‘qaum’ has been used not only for the community of believers, but also for distinct human groupings generally. What do we wish to achieve by raising this debate about the etymological scope of terms like ‘millat’ (community), ‘qaum’ (nation) and ‘ummat’ (group)? In religious terms, India is home to many people – Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Sikhs, etc…..
Muslims must realise that they are bearers of a universal message. They are not a racial or regional grouping in whose territory others cannot enter. Strictly speaking, Muslims in India are not one community; they are divided among many well-entrenched sects. You can unite them by arousing their anti-Hindu sentiment, but you cannot unite them in the name of Islam. To them, Islam means undiluted loyalty to their own sect.
Apart from Wahhabi, Sunni and Shia, there are innumerable groups who owe allegiance to different saints and divines. Small issues like raising hands during prayer and saying ‘ameen’ loudly have created disputes that defy solution. The ulema have used the instrument of ‘takfeer’ (fatwas declaring someone an infidel) liberally. Earlier, they used to take Islam to the disbelievers; now they take away Islam from the believers….
“But today the situation is worse than ever. Muslims have become firm in their communalism; they prefer politics to religion and follow their worldly ambitions as commands of religion. History bears testimony to the fact that, in every age, we ridiculed those who pursued the good with consistency, snuffed out the brilliant examples of sacrifice and tore the flags of selfless service. Who are we, the ordinary mortals; even high ranking Prophets were not spared by these custodians of tradition.
“Q: You closed down your journal Al-Hilal a long time ago. Was it due to your disappointment with the Muslims who were wallowing in intellectual desolation, or did you feel it was like proclaiming azan (call to prayer) in a barren desert?
“A: I did not abandon Al-Hilal because I had lost faith in its truth. This journal created great awareness among a large section of Muslims. They renewed their faith in Islam, in human freedom and in consistent pursuit of righteous goals. In fact, my own life was greatly enriched by this experience and I felt like those who had the privilege of learning under the companionship of the Messenger of God.
“My own voice entranced me and under its impact I burnt out like a phoenix. Al-Hilal had served its purpose and a new age was dawning. Based on my experiences, I made a reappraisal of the situation and decided to devote all my time and energy for the attainment of our national freedom. I was firm in my belief that freedom of Asia and Africa largely depended on India’s freedom and Hindu-Muslim unity is the key to India’s freedom.
“Even before the First World War, I had realised that India was destined to attain freedom, and no power on earth would be able to deny it. I was also clear in my mind about the role of Muslims. I ardently wished that Muslims would learn to walk together with their countrymen and not give an opportunity to history to say that, when Indians were fighting for their independence, Muslims were looking on as spectators.
“Let nobody say that, instead of fighting the waves, they were standing on the banks and showing mirth on the drowning of boats carrying the freedom fighters.”
(Taken from ‘Maulana Abul Kalam Azad – The Man Who Knew the Future of Pakistan Before Its Creation’, courtesy Covert Magazine)f his counterpart from the Indian state of Punjab, but he met Manmohan effectively as a special envoy of Nawaz and in his informal capacity as the country’s de facto deputy prime minister. The diplomatic nature of Shahbaz’s mission was underlined by the fact that he was accompanied by Tariq Fatemi, the prime minister’s closest and most trusted foreign policy adviser. In addition, the presence of Minister of State for Commerce Khurram Dastagir at this meeting and Shahbaz’s discussions a day later with the Indian commerce minister signal the keenness of the Nawaz government to move forward on the trade issue.
At his meeting with Manmohan, Shahbaz delivered a message from Nawaz to the Indian prime minister reaffirming Pakistan’s desire for the resumption of the suspended bilateral dialogue, the resolution of disputes over Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek and water issues and for the expansion of trade. Shahbaz also conveyed the prime minister’s wish that Manmohan Singh should visit Pakistan before next year’s parliamentary elections in India.
Not surprisingly, the Indian prime minister was noncommittal on a visit to Pakistan. Its chances have in fact been diminished further by the drubbing which the ruling Congress Party received at the hands of the BJP in four of the five state elections held during the past month. Following its rout in these four states, which lie at the heart of the all-important Hindi belt, the Manmohan government has become even more wary of making any diplomatic moves which could open it to the charge that it is ‘soft’ on the country’s ‘archenemy’.
If Manmohan has not made a trip to Pakistan so far, it is certainly not for any lack of importunateness on our part. All Pakistani leaders who have been in office since Manmohan became prime minister in 2004 – Musharraf, Zardari, Gilani, Parvaiz Ashraf and Nawaz – have been pressing him repeatedly and persistently to give them the honour of a visit.
With the exception of Nawaz, all of them also invited themselves to India on one pretext or the other. The favourite excuse used by our leaders is some sports event in India and, failing that, a visit to the shrine of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer. This tradition was started by Ziaul Haq and has been continued by his successors. Following in his footsteps, Musharraf and Gilani undertook visits to witness Pakistan-India cricket matches, while Zardari and Ashraf used the pretext of a trip to Ajmer to pay respect at the shrine of the Sufi saint. Shahbaz has now chosen the ‘World Kabaddi Championship’ final in Ludhiana in Indian Punjab for the same purpose. There is a possibility that after the Indian elections, Nawaz might also follow this well-trodden path for a trip to India.
While our leaders have always responded with alacrity to any hint from the Indian side of a willingness to host their visit, India has been taking the position that a visit by their prime minister to Pakistan could only be considered if the ground has first been prepared for a substantive and significant outcome. What that means in plain language is that there must be a prior assurance of a tangible gain for India – a ‘deliverable’ in the language of Indian diplomacy – that serves to advance the country’s foreign policy and security interests. This is nothing unusual. Other countries also follow the same approach. It is only Pakistan that makes a high-level visit an end in itself.
There are three concrete concessions that India is seeking from Pakistan that could possibly tempt Manmohan Singh to pay a visit to Pakistan: the grant of MFN status; overland transit facilities for India to Afghanistan and Central Asia; and the reactivation of the dialogue on Kashmir started by Musharraf for an ‘out-of-the-box’ solution.
There is also possibly a fourth ‘deliverable’ that could prompt a visit by the Indian prime minister: an acceptance by Pakistan of the Indian offer to sell electricity and Qatari gas, which Delhi has for months been pressing Islamabad to agree to. This issue was brought up with Shahbaz by Sharma and the press release issued by the Indian commerce ministry on their meeting states that the two sides agreed on the need to “revitalise” the ongoing technical talks for an electricity transmission line and the export of power and gas from India to Pakistan.
As regards trade, the Zardari government made a commitment in 2011 to grant MFN status to India without taking into consideration its negative impact on Pakistan’s industry and without demanding from India that it should dismantle the massive non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which form an invisible wall to the export of Pakistani goods to India. While the Nawaz government strongly favours the expansion of trade with India, its public statements on the MFN status have been inconsistent.
Last Monday, Dastagir said that Pakistan had already given India 82 percent benefits attached to MFN status and that the remaining 18 percent benefits were not being granted because of “political differences”. Then, in reply to a question by the press last Thursday, Shahbaz said that Pakistan has proposed a non-discriminatory trade agreement which India has accepted. But the silence of the press release issued by the Indian commerce ministry’s on this proposal suggests that India intends to keep pressing its demand for MFN status without linking it to the removal of NTBs.
The plethora of contradictory statements by the government on the question of trade is a reflection of muddled thinking, lack of input in policymaking from state institutions and experts, and the whims of party leaders with a narrow or distorted vision. It is not of course confined to the MFN issue. It can be seen equally in the confusion in other areas of our India policy.
On the grant of transit rights to India, the PML-N election manifesto promises the opening of land routes through Pakistan to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran. Now that this party is ruling the country, this commitment has become official policy. Khurram Dastagir said last Monday that the grant to India of a trade passage to Afghanistan via the Wahgah border was under consideration. One day later, Railways Minister Khwaja Saad Rafique, also declared that Pakistan is ready to offer its road and rail routes to all regional countries, including India. Amazingly, and shockingly, there has been no government or expert study as yet of the strategic, political and economic consequences of such a far-reaching concession to India.
Earlier this month, Sartaj Aziz pointed to the serious environmental and ecological consequences of Indian military deployment in Siachen and called for the withdrawal of its troops from the area. That demand was predictably and promptly rejected by India. If we are serious about this matter, we must forcefully bring it to the attention of the international community, backed by scientific data.
Sartaj Aziz last week expressed the view that if there is to be any breakthrough in Pakistan-India relations, it will be after next year’s elections and the formation of a new government in India. That hope is unlikely to be fulfilled if Pakistan continues to rely exclusively on the bilateral approach or on its invitation diplomacy.
It is time to reverse the Musharraf era policy of not raising our disputes with India in international forums. That approach has failed and Pakistan must make use of all such forums and diplomatic channels to mobilise international support.
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