(Brig (retd) GB Reddi)
As usual, nature has been blamed for the recent Chennai disaster. As per data available, 400 mm (15.7 inches) of rainfall fell in areas south of Chennai from November 28 to December 4, 2015. The scale of devastation caused by the deluge was unprecedented. Life came to a standstill.
Factually, the recent rainfall or deluge is not without a precedent in the past. The Nungambakkam rain gauge recorded 270 mm on October 27, 2005; 280 mm in 1969, and 450 mm in November 1976. Even in 1976, Adyar overflowed its banks and inundated first-floor houses.
Thus, successive ruling regimes, be it be the Congress Party or the DMK or AIDMK at the State level, and the Central government are squarely responsible for the disaster that shook the people of Chennai.
Kudos to people of Chennai for rallying and mobilizing to rescue people and providing shelter and feeding them. Undeniably, the trail of damage, devastation and devastation of households, particularly the low cost single floor houses in flooded areas is heartrending. All household belongings to include clothes, beds, cooking utensils, refrigerators, coolers, etc, are beyond retrieval and repair.
Many people of low lying areas who have been displaced and whose houses are damaged are bitterly complaining about the lack of assistance from the political and bureaucratic machinery. Even after seven days, roads, streets and inundated houses are littered with silt, garbage and debris all over making it virtually impossible to resettle themselves in their own homes. In fact, the danger of outbreak of epidemics looms large in such devastated areas.
Blaming the nature is an easy escape route for all political parties and even people to escape their responsibility and accountability.
Let none attempt to obfuscate the real issue concerning the Chennai Deluge. It is not a natural disaster; but a manmade disaster. Poor and ineffective urban planning to include execution of anti flood control measures like bunds and drainage works, indiscriminate encroachment over marshlands, indiscriminate and illegal construction activities in flood prone areas by the nexus of real estate hawks-Netas-Babus are the oft repetitive reasons traced to the recent Chennai disaster.
Official claim that Chennai has a disaster management plan. Yet, the city lacks an adequate drainage network. “Despite several crores being allocated (in the Chennai Corporation budget and JNNURM) to the construction of storm water drains (SWD), only a fraction of Chennai’s roads are accompanied by SWD as per independent sources.
Let also none suffer from any illusions on the changing nature of climate and its uncertainty. Divine punishment to those indulging in ‘rape’ of the mother earth – Nature – will be inevitable. Rains due to cyclonic storms are a vital necessity for mankind’s survival.
Tropical cyclones are a regular annual feature along the East Coast. On average severe cyclones occur every five years; very severe cyclones every ten years; and extremely severe cyclones with storm surges occur every twenty years. Meteorologists cannot accurately predict where and when they will strike and in what shape and intensity. One thing is certain, wherever they will strike, they will certainly unleash a trail of devastation and destruction of not only humans, but also animals and crops.
In 2009, an Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology study found an alarming rise in the number and intensity of “extreme point rainfall events” and the 2011 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, too, predicted an increase in the probability of extreme weather events due to climate change.
In the past 15 years, the list of cyclones that hit Tamil Nadu coast alone includes: BOB 09 in 1991; BOB 06 in 1992; BOB 03 in 1993; 08B in 1996; BOB 05 in 2000; Fanoos in 2005; Nisha in 2008; Jal in 2010; Thane in 2011; Nilam in 2012; Madi in 2013. Add to it, the Tsunami in 2004. Two shipwrecks on Marina Beach are a grim remainder of the past: SS Damatis in 1966; and a giant Tanker Ship in 2012. Yet, construction and tourism business activity continues unhindered.
Add to it, the list of very severe to extremely severe cyclones with storm surges that have struck in the neighboring Andhra Pradesh: HudHud in 2014; Phailin. Lehar and Helen in 2013; Nilam in 2012; Leila in 2010; November 1996; May 1990; July 1989; October 1987; the devastating Diviseema storm surge in May 1979(over 14,000 lives lost). In 2009, lives were lost and vast tracts were inundated by floods in Krishna and Guntur districts on account of enormous quantity of water was released from the dams in the upper reach. Furthermore, extremely severe cyclonic storm HudHud in 2014 caused extensive damage and loss of life in North Coastal Andhra Pradesh.
Woe to the State of Andhra Pradesh in posterity and its proposed capital at Amravati that is being constructed to fulfill the grandiose vision Chandrababu Naidu in disaster high risk zone.
Many lessons have been learnt from various natural disasters in the past two decades: Super Cyclone in Orissa in 1999; Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004; Barmer Floods in Rajasthan in 2006; Kosi Floods in Bihar in 2008; Cyclone Aila in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh in 2009; Cloudburst in Leh in 2010; and Thane Cyclone in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry in 2011.
Of course, none can deny that the NDMA has comprehensive plans with a path breaking vision initiative: “To build a safer and disaster resilient India by developing a holistic, pro-active, multi-disaster and technology-driven strategy for disaster management through collective efforts of all Government Agencies and NGOs”. Its focus is to usher a paradigm shift from relief-centric approach to a proactive regime that lays greater emphasis on preparedness, prevention and mitigation. Has anything changed?
In reality, we are brilliant in making plans; but very poor in implementation Political leadership blames administrative machinery; and bureaucracy blames people. And, together they all conjointly blame the nature. The usual blame game is played out to obfuscate the real issues.
Viewed in such a background context, the recent Chennai deluge has mercilessly exposed the tall claims of NDMA that it has made a paradigm shift – a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology driven disaster strategy reinforcing traditional 4Rs – Rescue, Relief, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. Had the focus been really on prevention, mitigation and preparedness, the Chennai disaster should have been avoided.
De facto, the latest Chennai Deluge exposes mercilessly the false claims of focus on prevention, mitigation and preparedness. What preventive and mitigating measures did they implement like constructing retaining walls and bunds? Did they channelize the water flowing into the two rivers? Why did they allow construction activity adjacent to the sea coast?
Why the Second Master plan prepared by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority glibly authorized built-up spaces with utter disregard to hydrology. In the Ennore region, the authority has reclassified water bodies, intertidal zones and mangrove swamps as “Special and Hazardous Industries” and handed it over to the Kamarajar Port Ltd.
Surely, Tamil Nadu, particularly after the Tsunami 2004, should have proactively acted upon not only in Chennai, but also in Nagapatnam and Cuddalore to effectively enforce the lessons learnt.
In particular, the lessons of Indian Ocean tsunami highlighted the following: need for risk assessment of disaster prone areas (complete east coast); minimize building in “Highest Risk Areas”; designate low lying areas for low-density uses such as public parks or nature reserves and agriculture; encourage construction of houses on higher elevations away from the sea coast; redevelop new built up areas in safe areas; enact and enforce building codes and laws and enforce them strictly; and construct “High Walls/Bunds/Dikes” along the river line and the seacoast where considered necessary.
Today, Chennai is on the edge of creating a “Make in Chennai” boom – a brand-new (though leaky) airport built on the floodplains of the River Adyar, a sprawling bus terminal in flood-prone Koyambedu, a Mass Rapid Transit System constructed almost wholly over the Buckingham Canal and the Pallikaranai marshlands, the expressway and buildings on the Old Mahabalipuram Road abutting the sea coast, MRC Nagar built on the Adyar estuary, bypass roads, IT corridor and a Knowledge Corridor consisting of engineering colleges constructed on water bodies, and automobile and telecom SEZs and gated residential areas built on important drainage courses and catchments with utter disregard to natural drainage systems, water flows and the two rivers – Adyar and Cooum rivers.
Yet, 90% of the marshland in the Velacherry area adjacent to Pallikaranai marshland gets flooded almost every November is lost to IT corridors, gated communities, garbage dump, sewage treatment plant, etc. Who is to be blamed for such large scale devastation?
Not long ago, the Pallikaranai marshlands were a 50-square-kilometre water sprawl in the southern suburbs of Chennai draining water from a 25-square kilometer catchment. Now, it is 4.3 square kilometers – less than a tenth of its original. Garbage dumps and two major roads cut through the water body. On its boundary, institutes like the National Institute of Ocean Technology and the IT Corridor have come up.
As per environmentalist, the vast network of water bodies that characterized Chennai has just vanished. Of the 16 tanks belonging to the Vyasarpadi chain downstream of Retteri, none remain,
As per confirmed reports, virtually every one of the flood-hit areas can be linked to ill-planned construction. The Chennai Bypass connecting NH45 to NH4 blocks the east flowing drainage causing flooding in Anna Nagar, Porur, Vanagaram, Maduravoyal, Mugappair and Ambattur. The Maduravoyal Lake has shrunk from 120 acres to 25. So also the case with Ambattur, Kodungaiyur and Adambakkam tanks. The Koyambedu drain and the surplus channels from Korattur and Ambattur tanks are missing. Sections of the Veerangal Odai connecting Adambakkam tank to Pallikaranai are missing. The South Buckingham Canal from Adyar creek to Kovalam creek has been squeezed from its original width of 25 metres to 10 metres in many places due to the Mass Rapid Transit System railway stations. Important flood retention structures such as Virugambakkam, Padi and Villivakkam tanks have been officially abandoned.
Before political rivalry between the two Dravidian parties brought it to a midway halt, an ill-advised Elevated Express freight corridor from Chennai harbor to Maduravoyal had already reclaimed a substantial portion of the Cooum’s southern bank drastically reducing the flood-carrying capacity of the river.
In Ponneri, a town in a rural part of Chennai Metropolitan Area, developers are executing Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority-approved plans with no regard to drainage. Last weekend, Ponneri received 370 mm of rain – 135 mm more than Chennai did. While it suffered from flooding, damage to property and life was not high. Ponneri is slotted to be developed as a Smart City. But will our dumb engineers be able to build a smart city?
So, “Chennai Deluge” was unavoidable due to vested interests and conceded by town planners, bureaucrats and politicians in the face of wiser counsel. Ironic, but true, that the causes for the “Deluge” were listed out by the government’s own officials at a seminar on waterways organised by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority in 2010.
The previous UPA regime sanctioned Rs 633 crores under JNNURM to improve macro drainages in Chennai as part of flood alleviation program. The flood protection schemes were envisaged in ten packages along South Buckingham canal, North Buckingham canal and Central Buckingham canal.
The shortcut diversion channel from Buckingham canal near Okkiyum Maduvu to the sea, as originally proposed in 2009, would have drained flood water (3,500 cubic feet per second) in no time and saved south Chennai from floods. Currently, the flood water from Velachery, Madipakkam, Ullagaram, Puzhuthivakkam, Pallikaranai and Kovilambakkam is discharged into Pallikaranai marsh and Okkiyam Maduvu, from where it flows into Buckingham Canal and finally into the sea. The ‘in fall’ point in the backwaters of Muttukadu Lake is 16 km from Okkiyam Maduvu, and the time taken to discharge flood water is more than 10 days.
In the past five decades, more than Rs 5,000 crores was pumped into projects to revive the Cooum. And all it took was two weeks of rain to naturally flush out the muck in this river-turned-drain. The 65-km-long Cooum, the city’s worst scar, is now a sparkling picture of a flowing river. But the state government had dropped the work due to increase in land acquisition cost involving Rs 100 crores, said a CAG report. Citing lapses in several projects, the report said defective planning of flood control projects in Chennai led to delay and increased cost, thereby defeating the very objective of the scheme formulated to avoid flooding in Chennai. “The fact remains that alleviation of inundation of flood water in Chennai city remains largely unachieved,” the CAG report said, adding that the state had incurred an expenditure of Rs 394.53 crores.
Even the release of 36,000 cusecs of water from the Chembarambakkam Lake on December 2 and 3 without issuing a proper warning has become a controversial issue.
One need go on foreign jaunts to learn from lessons from other nations. Go to Marine Drive in Mumbai and learn from the high wall/bund running along the length of the road with large ‘cement blocks’ serving as high sea waves breakers during monsoon seasons. Unfortunate, but true, that the height of the wall has not been raised over the past six decades although water overflows on to the road during high tide period of monsoons. Finally, if SEZ and IT are considered along the sea coast lines are considered an imperative, implement the lessons of Netherlands and create dike systems by using sand replenishment to broaden the coast and allow it to impede the ‘storm surge’. A pro-active and pre-emptive step would be to increase the safety norms ten-fold and increase its height appropriately.
Also, created check dams in catchment areas as ‘retention water’ bodies to balance the water flows into existing water bodies in Chennai. If imaginatively exploited, the two rivers – Adyar and Cooum – can be developed as attractive navigable channels for exploiting tourism potential.
Are we going neither to learn lessons for posterity at least now; nor never to reconfirm the lesson of mankind’s history that “None learns from its lessons.” Yet another wake up call for states on the Eastern Coast!