An ambitious plan to redraw provincial boundaries, control the treasury and conclude mega-deals to keep the ANC under Zuma control was hatched
* Lily Gosam is a pseudonym
INTRODUCTION
In 2009 [president] Jacob Zuma secured the highest office in the land, in large part due to the composition of South Africa’s 1994 provincial map.
And now a provincial power-bloc held by Zuma’s faction within the African National Congress (ANC) is fending off those who want their term in the executive suite.
And yet the instant Zuma came to power, he has attempted to reduce South Africa’s nine provinces, and ultimately wants to disband provinces altogether. The question is why, when he has been the main beneficiary of the country’s provincial structure?
Even more mysterious is that Zuma’s allies who own a treasure trove of provincial power are not only willing, but eager to relinquish their authority to Zuma’s central government and local municipalities. Why? What are they expecting in return for their generosity?
The story of South Africa’s provinces may seem academic on the surface, but beneath is an undercurrent of political intrigue, state capture, and the pillaging of resources.
PROVINCES – WHO NEEDS THEM ANYWAY?
To set the scene, you may be wondering why you should care about how SA’s provinces are drawn up, or – for that matter – erased.
Here’s why:
“Boundaries create the territorial space in which we live, distribute power to people who influence our lives, determine where we vote, create tax bases, construct regional identities, facilitate or impede easy transport, determine access to public services and become blueprints for development planning. Boundaries have enormous social, cultural, economic, and political, ramifications that are felt most deeply in the affected border areas,” wrote Richard Griggs, independent social science research consultant and head of the network organisation – Partner[1].
(For arguments for and against provinces, see Note 1 below.)
SINGULARITY
Apple and honey
In 2005, Mbeki pointed out that the ANC had to deal with the challenges of ‘being in power’. “We have seen these people attracted to join the ANC as a bee is to a honey pot. They come with the view that they will use access to power for personal benefit.”[2]
WARNED OF ABUSEFormer President Thabo Mbeki.
In response, Mbeki proposed altering the provincial structure of SA, to try eradicate the deep seated ineptitude and corruption embedded in government’s “subnational” level. It was hoped that by redirecting provincial powers to national government and municipalities[3], it would tell the patronage networks to ‘buzz off’, so to speak.
And in preparation of that eventuality, Mbeki pursued the establishment of a single public service, where public servants in national, provincial and local spheres of government would be controlled by central authority[4].
But Mbeki’s attempt only resulted in upsetting the ANC apple-cart, providing the bad apple of Zuma the ideal path to roll into power. Yet, ever since Zuma secured the top spot he has persisted in trying to upset that very same apple-cart that up-ended Mbeki, namely to reduce the number and powers of the provinces, starting with the introduction of a single public service.
Sipho Hlongwane wrote in the Daily Maverick in 2012 that the big difference between the original 2007 proposal by Mbeki for a single public service and the one put forward under Zuma’s administration appeared to be that the former was about having a depoliticised civil society, while the latter was about securing central and direct national executive control of public staff[5].
Hlongwane concluded in 2012 that, “the question of whose vision will eventually win out is one that should weigh on everyone’s minds. The future of this country may depend on it.”[6]
The reason for the dire warning – explained Hlongwane – was because a single public service had the potential of effectively making local and provincial elections pointless as far as service delivery is concerned, since this would become the sole responsibility of national government[7].
Despite these concerns, in March 2014, the Public Administration Management Act (PAM) which created a single public service was passed by Zuma’s administration[8] [9] [10] [11]. The main opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), refused to support PAM, saying that it had been rushed through parliament and had major flaws[12].
PAM introduced – along with a single public service – measures against corruption (for example, all public servants must disclose their financial interests). But the anti-corruption clauses of the Bill were seriously diluted in the final draft (and, for those clauses that did somehow sneak through, there followed a lack of political will to properly enforce them[13] [14] [15] [16].)
Heist caper
Apart from PAM having the potential to undermine democracy under Zuma, there was another crucial effect of a single public service. It meant that national government would now manage all public employees’ pension funds and medical aids[17]. This centralised hundreds of billions of rands under one roof in the Public Investment Corporation (PIC).
In the last few years we have witnessed Zuma playing musical chairs over who should be finance minister. But in all the cacophony we may have lost sight of Zuma’s motive
In 2016 the PIC’s annual report stated that, “The PIC can be classified as one of the most influential organisations in the South African economy as it is the largest asset manager in terms of Assets under Management.”[18] As at 31 March 2016, the PIC held R1.857 trillion, which amounted to 45% of SA’s Gross Domestic Product, and is one of the largest investors in South African equities[19] [20].
From 2010 to 2016, during Zuma’s presidency the PIC’s managed assets doubled in value[21] [22].
(Between 2006 and 2015, the number of public servants had swollen by 25%, whereas private-sector employment had fallen [The Economist][23]. In 2015, SA spent 40% of its budget on wages; Gordhan has made a point of reducing what is oft described as government’s “bloated” wage bill[24]. Based on a 2017 Moneyweb article, in comparison with private sector salaries, public workers at State Owned Entities are paid on average 40% more, and Municipal workers are paid on average 50% more – analysis excludes executives[25]. “A large contributor to this difference is that across all occupational levels, public sector employees receive larger benefits as a percentage of their basic salary (cash component of total guaranteed package).” [MoneyWeb][26])
In the last few years we have witnessed Zuma playing musical chairs over who should be finance minister. But in all the cacophony we may have lost sight of Zuma’s motive. If one keeps in mind that the finance minister acts as the PIC’s one and only shareholder and that the deputy finance minister is the PIC’s chairperson, then Zuma’s orchestrations become pin sharp.
In May 2014, two months after PAM became law, Zuma announced his new cabinet, which included the parachuting in as energy minister the “political lightweight” Tina Joemat-Pettersson, whose appointment produced a strong reaction ranging from concern to absolute outrage, because of the potential of a 9 600MW nuclear build on the near horizon, involving hundreds of billions of rands in tenders[27]. But equally unsettling was the shock transfer of Pravin Gordhan from finance minister to a lesser portfolio. Gordhan’s replacement, Nhlanhla Nene, however – although having a low profile – was respected[28].
DID NOT PLAY THE GAME Former Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene.
Then, less than one and a half years later, in October 2015 – with Nene refusing to follow Zuma’s nuclear script (and other sitcoms Zuma and his ghost writers had composed) – Zuma’s apparent minister-recruitment officer, Ajay Gupta, allegedly offered deputy finance minister Mcebisi Jonas the post as finance minister, as well as a R600 million incentive package, plus – as a goodwill gesture – a 0.1% upfront cash-and-carry offer[29] [30] [31] [32]. But as it turned out, Jonas refused to sell his soul, and sell out the country.
Consequently, six weeks afterwards, David Des van Rooyen arrived on the scene, dancing Gupta Style into the top spot in Treasury, at the expense of Nene. Just hours before Van Rooyen’s entrance, Zuma’s Cabinet had secretly approved the 9 600MW deal without Treasury sign-off (which was apparently an illegal act[33]). Then, four days later, Van Rooyen was forced to hot-foot out of Treasury by some of the ANC’s top six members, together with business, religious, and trade union leaders.
After Van Rooyen’s 4-day stint as finance minister, he somersaulted into the position of cooperative governance and traditional affairs minister. However, on his way down he passed Gordhan going in the opposite direction.
(Their ministerial switch-a-roo may appear to be an act of convenience, but having Van Rooyen in charge of local municipalities should not be taken lightly – as will be explained in due course.)
RESURRECTED New Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan.
Gordhan’s resurrection as finance minister did not stop Zuma from signing days later the 2015 Tax Laws Amendment Act and the 2015 Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act[34] [35]. The Acts restrict withdrawals of employee benefits upon resignation or retirement, ensuring the PIC remained cash flush for the upcoming nuclear build, and deluge of tenders[36].
(The 2015 Tax Acts are sitting in abeyance, having received strong objections by labour unions[37]. The Acts, however, are likely to be implemented in March 2018[38], which happens to be the time when construction of the first nuclear reactor is expected to get underway. As a further aside, DA’s national spokesperson on health, Wilmot James, said that it is no secret that the Zuma-led government “would love to park the resource-rich medical schemes in the [government’s] NHI [National Health Insurance]”[39].)
As the summary below covering the period 2009 to 2016 shows, Zuma’s actions resemble the world’s slowest but biggest bank heist, with R1.86 trillion at risk. (R1.6 trillion – or nearly 90% – of the money targeted comes from Africa’s largest pension fund, whose members consist of 1.6 million SA government employees and pensioners[40] [41]).
In December 2015, Zuma had well and truly whipped aside his mask as the President of SA and exposed to everyone his true identity. For the sake of the 1.6 million government pension-holders, and the country as a whole, one can only hope that everyone opened their eyes and saw Zuma for who he truly is.
“Parliament must keep the pressure on [the PIC] for transparency, and market players and civil society must challenge it to avoid the fund falling under the influence of cronies becoming vulnerable to capture,” warned a Business Day editorial in October 2016[62].
Now back to Zuma’s provincial plot…
GOVERNMENT: PROVINCIAL POWER
In 2009, upon hearing the Zuma-led ANC was considering eliminated provinces, constitutional expert Pierre de Vos said, “I suspect there will be serious resistance from within the ANC to any move to scrap the Provinces. President Jacob Zuma’s rise to power was partly based on regional mobilisation and promises of decentralising power to provincial ANC structures. This means that provincial ANC structures might well fight tooth and nail to retain the provinces.”[63]
But De Vos was not done. “Add to this the fact that Provinces are important vehicles for dispensing patronage and it becomes clear that there will be serious resistance to the idea of abolishing provinces from within ANC. If provinces are abolished, what would happen to the Premiers and the MEC’s, who earn fat salaries and are allowed to drive around in very expensive cars – with or without blue lights flashing? There are only so many ambassadorships to upper Mongolia up for grabs,” said De Vos[64].
De Vos was proven right, for the process stalled for three years.
GCIS WARNED AGAINST MESSING WITH THE PROVINCES Former finance minister Trevor Manuel and President Jacob Zuma.
In 2012, Zuma tried again, even though Trevor Manuel, the then planning minister reiterated De Vos’ analysis. Manuel said that undoing the provincial arrangement had proven difficult because of the vested interests that had developed around it. “We as the ANC didn’t start off very committed to federalism [versus a centralised, unitary State]. But now we are stuck with it. The premiers and MECs will be the last people to give up power.” [Carol Paton, Business Day][65]. De Vos and now Manuel were proven right, for the process stalled for a further three years.
In 2015, Zuma persisted for a third time, despite the challenges remaining as stark as ever. IOL reported that same year that any proposed restructuring of provinces was likely to be divisive in the ANC, given that provincial and regional politics have become entrenched in the party, and that changes, particularly those aimed at reducing the number of provinces and downgrading their power, could meet with fierce resistance[66].
And that is what one would expect, much like the DA’s fierce defence of the Western Cape since winning the province in 2009.
Yet, in contradiction to the views expressed above and the DA’s response, unfathomably in 2015 some ANC provincial leaders were willing, even keen, to swallow the poisonous fruit of provincial “reform”.
The Free State – a member of the Zuma-aligned premier league – spoke in favour in 2015 of reducing the number of provinces, and ultimately to dissolve all the provinces[67] [68].
THE TERM “UNITARY STATE” IN SUPPORT OF PROVINCIAL ABOLISHMENT WAS USED IN 2015 BY THEN ANC WESTERN CAPE LEADER MARIUS FRANSMAN – A STAUNCH ZUMA SUPPORTER – AND IN 2012 BY THE THEN EASTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL SECRETARY
Equally puzzling, the ANC’s KwaZulu-Natal region threw their weight behind a province reduction as well, saying they want the government to start a 10 year programme that would culminate in the culling of provinces and devolving their power to the municipalities. “We must have a unitary state where we must have central and strong local government,” ANC’s provincial secretary Sihle Zikalala said[69] [70].
The Free State is a member of the pro-Zuma premier league, while Zikalala of KwaZulu-Natal is considered to be aligned with the premier league and hence a Zuma-man as well[71] [72].
Which makes one wonder why provincial leaders aligned with Zuma would be prepared to voluntarily surrender their seat of power? What do they expect in return for their sacrifice?
In contrast, the ANC in Limpopo resisted the idea of a province reduction, and in 2015 proposed that the ANC withdrawals its 2012 resolution to reduce the number of provinces[73]. Gauteng, too, appeared unconvinced[74].
Gauteng has been a long-time critic of Zuma[75], while Limpopo has recently hinted its support for deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, the rival to Zuma’s heir-apparent[76].
As to the ANC’s Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Northern Cape leadership, in 2015 they spoke in favour of province reduction[77] [78]. This, though, has proven true ever since the DA won the Western Cape. So their motives are not hard to fathom: it could be explained simply by political expediency[79] [80].
STAUNCH ZUMA SUPPORTER Marius Fransman.
The term “unitary state” in support of provincial abolishment was used in 2015 by then ANC Western Cape leader Marius Fransman – a staunch Zuma supporter – and in 2012 by the then Eastern Cape provincial secretary[81] [82].
Business Day, in 2015, noted that, “those who do support the concept of fewer provinces cannot agree on why.”[83] Zuma said on the subject that the number of provinces would have to be reviewed, in order to strengthen “the democratic state” [IOL][84].
Well that definitely cannot be the real reason.
Re-solve
In October 2015, ANC’s national general council (NGC) made resolutions that read like a wish-list of any self-respecting dictator-wannabee: censure media freedom and transparency; undermine human rights and the organisations that defend them; force the (Johannesburg) public to comply with unfair and unpopular policies of e-tolls; treat municipalities and provinces as if they were pieces in a war game (examples to follow); and position the country internationally for political gain of the elite – and to the detriment of the citizens – while cloaking the deceit behind the nebulous refrain “national interest” (such as withdrawing from the International Criminal Court)[85] [86] [87]. (To play spot-a-dictator-a-mile-off, read Alec Hogg’s list of dictatorial attributes here at Fin24[88])
Those in the ANC who were not in on Zuma’s constitutional gag in October 2015, were at that stage so power-drunk at the wheel of government that they blindly followed Zuma’s GPS instructions at the NGC, without considering that he was steering the country’s Constitutional democracy off the cliff.
To better understand Zuma’s determination in becoming the undisputed King of SA’s kleptocracy, one must recognise that he divides his workload into three categories: Irrelevant, Do Nothing, and Fast Track
It must be said, though, that Zuma did not get it all his own way. The ANC’s Integrity Commission was strengthened by making its decisions binding; and, the formulation of lobby groups and promotion of slates were made disciplinary offences. But, to-date, the implementation of both these reforms have been found wanting. (Like a drug-addict driving drunk ‘wants’ to be pulled over at a police road-block.)
At the same time, the NGC issued a call to review the number of provinces (as it had done previously in 2007, 2009, and 2012)[89] [90]. Furthermore, the NGC resolved, amongst others, that a presidential review committee of provinces referred to in 2012 but never realised was finally to be established, with the task of “fast tracking” the process of reducing the provinces[91] [92].
Coincidentally, Zuma’s desire to “fast track” provincial borderline alterations made a splash within the same month as the alleged meeting between Jonas and the big silver fish of the Guptas.
Undivided attention
To better understand Zuma’s determination in becoming the undisputed King of SA’s kleptocracy, one must recognise that he divides his workload into three categories: Irrelevant, Do Nothing, and Fast Track.
In the ‘Irrelevant’ pile is all that we as citizens hold dear, namely employment, education, wealth-creation, health, safety, the National Development Plan… The only time these subjects enter Zuma’s mind is when he is forced to read speeches about them. (And, yes, he is as bored reading them as we are listening to them.)
As to the ‘Do Nothing’ pile – some commentators have interpreted it as proof of Zuma’s lame-duck status, but this would be making a grave error. For Zuma ‘doing nothing’ is not a sign of powerlessness, it is a deliberate strategy, with a specific goal in mind – to obfuscate, frustrate, weaken, and buy time.
To illustrate: for the violent Fees Must Fall student protests, Zuma has personally exhibited not an iota of urgency in resolving the matter.
It took him months to act, eventually establishing a Fees Commission after the fact, which – according to students, educators and opposition parties – is unnecessary because the solutions are already known – and the commission’s final report is only expected in June 2017, after being extended to cover a total of 18 months[93] [94] [95] [96] [97] [98].
It also took Zuma three weeks after violent protests broke out in September 2016 for him to establish a ministerial task team, which is littered with his securocrats and lackeys. Furthermore, the ‘team’ initially excluded the most obvious member (considering the student movement’s name, Fees Must Fall), and that was finance minister Gordhan, who on that exact same day had been charged by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for fraud and corruption[99]. So it is little wonder Zuma – also on that precise day – was dancing away at a Kenyan banquet without a care in the world[100] [101], while South African universities were burning and the rand tanking[102].
This is all a deliberate “Do Nothing” strategy – whose purpose will be explained in Part 2 of Zuma’s Masterplan.
As to Zuma’s third category – ‘Fast Track’: now there’s the real give-away. Whenever you see that, it means Zuma’s plans are afoot.
Which means, in this case, the position of finance minister is tied in with not only a heist of the PIC, but also somehow with provincial “reform”, which Zuma was determined to “fast track” in 2015.
More will be revealed below.
ANC: NEC FAIRY TALE
In June 2012 during the ANC’s national policy conference, Ranjeni Munusamy wrote in the Daily Maverick that it was resolved to reduce the size of the ANC’s decision-making body, the National Executive Committee (NEC), from 80 to 60 members[103]. It was further decided, according to Munusamy, that provinces would have to reach some broad consensus on candidates for the NEC before the elective conference in December 2012, to prevent any untidy scrap over a reduced number of positions[104].
The desire to reduce the size of the NEC could have been an attempt to purge the NEC of the anti-Zuma faction. But it may also have been a pre-emptive strike in preparation of Zuma’s ultimate plan for a provincial reduction. This is because altering the number of provinces not only affects government; it has ramifications for the composition of the ANC NEC as well.
NEC members are elected based on paid-up members in a particular province, who then – through branches – mandate delegates to vote on their behalf for new party leadership. Anthony Butler (who teaches politics at the University of Cape Town, UCT), wrote in a paper that in provinces where Zuma’s allies controlled senior ANC positions, they may have used their influence to undermine anti-Zuma branches[105]. This in turn skewed delegate voting in favour of Zuma.
In 2012, when Zuma was re-elected as ANC president for a second time, the voting was skewed by 17% in Zuma’s favour in provincial delegate representation, if one compares it to the ANC’s electoral support by province in the 2011 local government election.
But, as with all the resolutions relating to Zuma’s provincial ambitions, his attempt at reducing the NEC’s size also failed to gain traction.
WANTED NEC RESTRUCTURE DANC Youth League president Collen Maine.
In August 2016, the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), considered by the SACP as Zuma’s storm troopers, resurrected the call to alter the composition of the NEC. “The ANC Youth League believes that the structure of the NEC must be revised. [We] believe that there is a need to reduce the size of the NEC to make it more efficient and effective and allow space for it to take decisions with speed and reduce bureaucratic behaviour,” said Njabula Nzuza, ANCYL secretary-general [IOL][106].
Nzuza was asked whether this was not a way to purge the ANC’s national secretary –general, Gwede Mantashe, from his position. (Mantashe maintains that a person elected as ANC and SA deputy president is the natural successor of an out-going president; such an argument is in favour of Zuma’s main rival Ramaphosa to succeed him or his heir apparent[107].) In his response, Nzuza said the narrative that the ANCYL was hostile to Mantashe was a “fairy tale” [IOL][108].
BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES
So how does Zuma and his faction ultimately intend redrawing the map of South Africa?
Cape-land
Mega-merge
According to two senior party leaders in 2012, the ANC’s legislature and governance commission had agreed to merge the Northern Cape, Western Cape and some parts of the Eastern Cape[109] – which altogether will, for our purposes, henceforth be called “Cape-land”.
“All indications are that the ANC has made up its mind about the future of the Provinces. The only question is whether it wants to reduce their number or abolish them altogether. Either way, it has one objective in mind: to oust the DA from power by undemocratic means,” Helen Zille said in a 2010 speech, as then-leader of the main opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and premier of the recently-won Western Cape province[110].
In protecting the DA’s turf, Zille warned that the DA would fiercely resist the ANC’s “gerrymandering proposals”[111]. Zille’s contention that the ANC’s provincial agenda was for nefarious purposes was later reiterated by DA’s new leader, Mmusi Maimane, in 2015, who said that, “the ANC is now forced to consider undemocratic measures to try reclaim the [Western Cape] province”[112].
So, are the fears of the DA justified in believing they will be forced out of provincial power if Cape-land became a reality?
If one treats the 2016 local government elections as national elections, which the electorate seemed to have done, then the combination of the Northern Cape, Western Cape and (the whole) of the Eastern Cape would have resulted in the ANC obtaining 47% of the vote, the DA 41% and the remaining parties 13%. Thus, the ANC and the DA would likely need to form a coalition with smaller parties in order to win Cape-land. (On the whole, smaller parties avoided the ANC in support of the DA after the 2016 local elections).
However the picture is greatly altered if one subdivides the Eastern Cape.
For the 2016 local government elections, the ANC achieved an average of 66% for the whole Eastern Cape, but within the province the ANC’s support ranged from 50% to nearly 90% in some regions. Thus, electoral “gerrymandering” which Zille and Maimane of the DA warned about, is a distinct possibility, to tip the scales in the ANC’s favour.
But the DA is not the only ones who should be concerned about Zuma’s provincial border “gerrymandering”.
Find the leader
If the Western Cape, Northern Cape and parts of the Eastern Cape were joined, the question arises of whom Zuma would choose as the premier, assuming the ANC won the new mega-province in elections?
In November 2016, Zuma’s office refused to confirm or deny claims of an imminent Cabinet reshuffle [News24][113]. The Sunday Times reported that Zuma planned to restructure his Cabinet after the ANC’s birthday celebrations in January 2017 in an attempt to side-line his opponents [News24] [114].
The Sunday Times claimed that Zuma had already consulted over plans to remove some of the premiers[115]. One of those set to go was Eastern Cape premier Phumulo Masualle[116].
One month before the claims were circulated, Masualle expressed his support for Gordhan, calling him a man of integrity[117]. (At the time, Gordhan was being attacked incessantly by the Zuma-aligned Hawk and NPA Medusa heads). At the time Ramaphosa, too, publically announced his “moral and political support” for Gordhan[118].
The Eastern Cape ANC is said to be in favour of Ramaphosa taking over the reins as leader in 2017[119], (but this is not across the board[120] [121]).
Zuma’s motivations thus seem simple enough. If you are with Gordhan and /or Ramaphosa, then you are against me.
In 2012, Zuma and his supporters began suffering from buyer’s remorse, saying that the ANC’s decision in 2007 to strip the president from directly appointing premiers was an “emotional” move taken out of anger with Mbeki
The obvious choice for Zuma as premier of Cape-land would have been Marius Fransman, who as leader of the ANC Western Cape was a fierce defender of Zuma, and a loud proponent of province reduction, and ultimately a “unitary state” devotee[122] [123].
(In November 2016, Fransman was found guilty by the ANC’s Integrity Commission for abusing his office by attempting to obtain a sexual favour from a junior worker, and for making statements which brought the ANC into disrepute [EWN][124] [125]. His ANC membership was suspended for five years[126]. This has likely dented Zuma’s plans for Cape-land. In the meantime, Fransman has initiated a fightback, challenging the Integrity Commission’s process [Daily Maverick][127].
After Fransman’s departure, the Western Cape ANC resolved that the Integrity Commission must also probe all ANC leaders who were implicated in the former public protector’s “State of Capture” report, which includes Zuma [Business Day][128]. There are also reports that the Western Cape ANC is throwing its support behind Ramaphosa for president[129].)
With Masualle of the Eastern Cape set to go, while Fransman of the Western Cape was that time Zuma’s first choice for Cape-land premier, this then leaves the premier of the Northern Cape, Sylvia Lucas.
The Northern Cape under Lucas has seen a boon in renewable energy projects[130] [131]. This cannot be sitting well with Zuma, considering renewable energy is nuclear’s nemesis, and by extension a threat to Zuma’s pet-Frankenstein project, the 9 600MW nuclear deal. In addition, some reports intimate that the Northern Cape ANC supports Ramaphosa’s bid as president[132] [133] [134] [135].
Yet, despite this, Lucas is not on Zuma’s to-fire list (at least for now, anyway).
Why Zuma did not target Lucas seems odd on the surface, until one discovers that Lucas may be a premier, but she is not an ANC NEC member, so Zuma can easily discard her when the time is right[136].
(The Northern Cape’s renewable energy drive has since stalled because, according to the Zuma-skewed department of energy under Joemat-Pettersson, the electrical grid in the province had reached full utilisation in December 2016 and so independent producer projects had to be rejected[137]. They said that investment was needed for more transmission lines to allow for uptake in renewable connections[138]. However, this may be a form of sabotage by the Gutpa-tainted Eskom board[139], to allow the power utility to put aside money for the nuclear build at the expense of renewables projects[140]. See Part 3 of Zuma’s Masterplan for more on this subject.)
On the subject of Zuma hiring and firing premiers unilaterally; it happens to be unconstitutional, so said Loammi Wolf, a constitutional law specialist [PoliticsWeb][141] [142]. This is because it usurps the power of the provincial government[143] [144]. But when did that ever stop Zuma? Even Mbeki used to do it, but the practice proved so unpopular that in 2007 when Zuma was appointed, it was resolved to strip the ANC president of such powers. Instead the ANC restored the power to the ANC’s provincial leadership, who would forward three candidates to the ANC’s national executive committee (NEC)[145].
However, in 2012, Zuma and his supporters began suffering from buyer’s remorse, saying that the ANC’s decision in 2007 to strip the president from directly appointing premiers was an “emotional” move taken out of anger with Mbeki [IOL][146].
So apparently what’s good for the cooked-goose of Mbeki, isn’t good for the “gerrymandering” Zuma.
North-Teng
It was further described in 2012 that the North West would disappear, as it would merge with parts of Gauteng[147].
PREMIER LEAGUE CAPTAIN North West Premier Supra Mahumapelo
If the North West – which is lorded over by Zuma-supporter and premier-league member, Supra Mahumapelo – is combined with the City of Johannesburg (anti-Zuma) and the West Rand (pro-Zuma)[148], it would devastate not only the now DA-governed metro of Johannesburg, but also the ANC of Gauteng, who the Financial Mail described as being at the forefront of the urban, pro-good-governance crowd, and so consequently want to “lynch” Zuma[149].
The ANC Gauteng is in favour of Ramaphosa taking over the reins as ANC leader in 2017[150] [151].
Although the senior leaders described the North West as ceasing to exist after the proposed border changes, it is more apt to say that it is the Gauteng province that would vanish from the SA map, with the five Gauteng metro’s torn asunder. As to the provincial ANC of Gauteng, it would cease to exist. Which would explain their opposition to province “reform”.
This may have been Zuma’s original intention in 2012, but with the DA (with smaller parties) taking control of the Johannesburg and Tshwane metros in 2016, as well as having a credible chance of winning the Gauteng province as a whole in the 2019 national elections, the DA would be on the receiving end of Zuma’s manoeuvres, equally as much as the Gauteng ANC.
This may explain why Gauteng premier David Makhura warned about the dangers of wanting to remain in government at all costs. “If we [ANC] are preoccupied with remaining in government we can do wrong things… Whether we get elected in 2019 [or not], at least we can say we did a good job. I don’t mind sitting in the opposition benches. We would have left something for the people of Gauteng,” Makhura said[152]. Makura went so far as to say that loyalty to the country was more important than loyalty to the ANC[153].
Clearly Zuma does not share Makhura’s vision, or his ethics.
Makhura is a vocal critic of Zuma’s administration, including criticising the “recklessness” displayed in regards to the treatment of Gordhan by Zuma’s securocrats[154] [155]. Nonetheless Makhura was not on the rumoured November 2016 list of premiers to be removed. As with the case of Northern Cape premier Lucas, this seems odd, until one discovers that he too is not an ANC NEC member. (Lucas and Makhura are the only two ANC premiers who are not NEC members.)
Dictators survive by weakening the organisation. They attack the organisation where it is strong…That’s how dictators work
Senior Gauteng ANC leader
But unlike Lucas, Makhura has the strong backing of the ANC’s proactive executive in Gauteng, led by Paul Mashatile. So, for Zuma to remove Makhura he would have to employ a more sinister plan to install a compliant (but temporary) premier. However, this would not be the first time Zuma has played dirty with the Gauteng leadership.
In 2009, the Gauteng ANC put forward three names for the premiership, as required, but all three were rejected and the Zuma-controlled NEC selected its own candidate[156] (which was in contravention of the ANC’s 2007 resolution). In all likelihood this was in retaliation for the Gauteng ANC not supporting Zuma in his bid as ANC president against Mbeki in 2007[157].
But, in 2014 the Gauteng ANC finally got its way, with the appointment of one of its candidates, Makhura as premier[158] [159]. Except, IOL reported that this may also have been a deliberate “ploy” by the Zuma-dominated NEC.
With Makhura as Gauteng premier in government there was the potential for conflict between him and the Gauteng ANC leader Mashatile, because it created two centres of power, one in the ANC and the other in government [IOL][160]. The Gauteng ANC can only be represented by one person on the ANC’s NEC of provinces. IOL said Makhura defied the alleged attempts to drive a wedge between them, and by extension the province, by not standing against the ANC provincial leader for a seat on the NEC, and to become Mashatile’s deputy in the Gauteng ANC[161].
In the lead-up to the ANC elective conference expected in December 2017, attempts to pit Mashatile and Makhura against each other resurfaced[162]. A slate containing the names of Mashatile and Makhura for the single ANC NEC position started doing the rounds in November 2016[163]. The Gauteng secretary called the list malicious[164].
A senior ANC leader in Gauteng said, in reference to Zuma, “Dictators survive by weakening the organisation. They attack the organisation where it is strong…That’s how dictators work.”[165]
Gau-popo
The remainder of Gauteng is anticipated to be conjoined with Limpopo[166].
If the metros of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni – whose ANC structures are said to be sympathetic to Zuma[167] – (and possibly, Sedibeng, which is anti-Zuma[168]) are loped on to the Limpopo province, Zuma’s faction in the metros would overwhelm the Limpopo ANC, while the ANC Gauteng would cease to exist.
As an offshoot, it would harm the DA’s governance of the Tshwane metro.
The ANC in Limpopo have hinted their support for Ramaphosa as president in 2017, as opposed to Zuma’s heir-apparent[169] [170] [171]. And as stated previously, the province’s ANC executive committee are not supportive of provincial reduction.
The premier of the Limpopo, Stan Mathabatha, was named in Zuma’s alleged November 2016 plans for recall[172].
Untouchables
The Eastern Cape’s northern remnants would be incorporated into KwaZulu-Natal[173].
The Eastern Cape province is said to be divided between supporting Ramaphosa and Zuma[174] [175] [176]. Thus it is conceivable (but mere speculation) that the northern parts of the Eastern Cape that are to be incorporated into KwaZulu-Natal are the areas that do not support Zuma, which would ensure they are overwhelmed by the move[177] [178].
The Zuma faction won control of the ANC’s executive committee in KwaZulu-Natal in 2015 after the holding of a highly divisive election, in which there were accusations of electoral fraud, unlawfulness, irregularity, and more besides[179] [180] [181].
KwaZulu-Natal appears to be split 50-50 between support for Zuma’s appointee and Ramaphosa, with increasing support by the party’s provincial bigwigs lining up behind Ramaphosa [City Press][182].
As for the Free State and Mpumalanga – both of which are members of the premier league – they are expected to remain unmolested by the provincial reduction process[183]. That is, until the “unitary state” is achieved, where all provinces are abolished, giving the Zuma-faction total centralised control over the country.
Thus in summary, the new provincial smorgasbord could potentially oust the DA from the Western Cape. But more importantly for Zuma, it would strengthen his faction of the ANC in the Free State, North West, Mpumalanga, 50% of KwaZulu-Natal, parts of the Eastern Cape, and bits left in the Western Cape (after Fransman’s departure). It would also devastate Zuma’s enemies of Gauteng, Limpopo, Northern Cape, the seeming majority of the Western Cape (which has become bolder and more unified against Zuma since Fransman’s departure), parts of the Eastern Cape, and the remaining 50% of KwaZulu-Natal.
Furthermore, with less provinces, the ANC NEC would not only shrink in size, but Zuma’s enemies would lose their seat at the party’s highest decision-making table, making Zuma its absolute head.
URBAN VS RURAL
Power play
As shown, Zuma’s megalomaniacal map-making can be understood from the perspective of the internal politics of the ANC. But Zuma’s desire to shift and shaft provinces is determined by another aspect, namely the rural-urban divide.
“The ANC is trapped between ruralism and urbanism. These two forces are fighting for the soul of the party, and currently ruralism is the strongest force in the ANC,”[184] wrote Prince Mashele in the Sowetan, a few months before the 2016 local elections.
The pro-Zuma premier league members like to refer to themselves as the “maize corridor” [185], which attests to their rural status. Zuma’s provincial border-mangling is an attempt to ensure these rural provinces become unassailable.
The battle between ruralism and urbanism within the ANC is best illustrated by Zuma’s plans to tear apart the Gauteng province – the heartland of urbanisation. Mashing the City of Johannesburg and the West Rand with the North West tries to disenfranchise the urban population in favour of the rural dweller. The same goes for the formation of Cape-land, where the metro-containing Western Cape is lost in the rural provinces of the Northern and Eastern Cape.
For the rural state of Limpopo, its power is usurped by the pro-Zuma faction of the two metros of Gauteng (and possibly, Sedibeng[186]). However, that does not mean the urbanite takes precedence over the rural Limpopo population.
As a rural traditionalist, Zuma’s end goal is to control the country via the rural communities, many of who reside in the former homelands[187]. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that Zuma wishes to bolster the human rights of the rural population; rather it is to strengthen his hold over the traditional leaders, by overriding Constitutional protections.
Law of intent
Zuma’s strategy is evident in the highly controversial Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill (TKLB), which is yet to be signed into law.
Clive Kronenberg (senior researcher and lead co-ordinator, Cape Peninsula University of Technology) lambasted the Bill, saying, “It upholds historically-disjointed, traditional governing structures. It undermines equal citizenship in a unified South Africa. It bolsters notorious, outdated apartheid practices. The bill poses a flagrant threat to the code of cohesion as well as constitutional democracy” [The Conversation][188].
A GOOD LAW GIVETH MORE RIGHTS THAN IT TAKETH AWAY
Spelling out the Bill’s true purpose, land issue expert, Aninka Claassens (director of Land & Accountability Research Centre) wrote, “Behind the smoke screen that the TKLB is about rights for the Khoi-San is a last ditch attempt to bypass key constitutional protections in respect of land rights, to subvert customary law requirements in respect of consultation, and to undermine administrative justice and public finance bottom-lines. Traditional leaders are not the primary culprits here. Instead we must look to the politicians who benefit from opaque mining and tourism deals in former homeland areas.”[189]
The chairperson of parliament’s portfolio committee on traditional affairs, Richard Mdakane, admitted that, “we have to relook at the entire Act in processing this issue”[190].
Then there is the Traditional Courts Bill, that since 2009 – according to Khulekani Magubane in Business Day – has been rejected by provincial legislatures and interest groups out of fear that it gives too much power to traditional leaders in former homeland areas, undermines the legal rights of women in rural communities and creates a segregated judicial system for rural communities and other South Africans[191].
The Bill would thus override the powers of the third tier of government – the Judiciary, giving Zuma and his cronies free reign and ultimate power over people living in the rural areas via the bound traditional leaders.
A good law giveth more rights than it taketh away.
GIVEN A NEW JOB Des van Rooyen.
During Des van Rooyen’s long and illustrious four days as finance minister, his first message to staff members was, “Treasury will be accessible to rural areas.”[192]
And that is why Van Rooyen’s transfer from being a 4-day accidental finance minister to that of minister of cooperative governance and traditional affairs (COGTA) minister should not be seen as a move of convenience. The COGTA ministry is responsible for the relationship between national, provincial and municipalities, and for overseeing the traditional leadership of SA’s indigenous communities [Wikipedia][193].
Ground zero
Embroiled in all of this is Zuma’s drive for “land reform”, encapsulated in yet another controversial piece of legislation, the Expropriation Bill.
“Basically, [the Expropriation Bill] means that any member of state can take what they want, when they want it, as long as it sits in the camps of ‘for public purposes’ or ‘in public interest’ – as defined by… well, the government,” stated an article from the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR)[194] [195].
The “property” at risk for expropriation by Zuma’s government (or his 2017 appointee, should it come to it) includes mining and agricultural land, as well as commercial property, shares, intellectual property, pensions, and property of ordinary people such as peoples’ homes[196] [197] [198].
The Bill has met with stiff resistance from opposition parties and civil society groups for its unconstitutionality, in particular the endangering of property rights and the right not to be evicted without an order of the court[199] [200]. Zuma has not yet signed the Bill into law[201].
At the risk of being lynched, tarred and feathered by ideologues, I will posit that South Africans have very little interest in land… Should we be expending so much energy and effort on land redistribution when the instinct of rural South Africans is to head for the city and seek employment and upward mobility there?
Mondli Makhanya
In Zuma’s January the 8th Statement of 2017, he announced that government was going to use expropriation legislation to pursue land reform and land redistribution with “greater speed and urgency”[202] [203].
One could argue that Zuma is just doing what the people want, right? Wrong.
In regards to “land reform”, between 73% and 90% of land reform projects had failed, so said the 2013 minister of rural development and land reform, Gugile Nkwinti[204].
As to “land restitution” – where individuals and communities are given back land they once owned – Anthea Jeffery, head of policy research at the Institute for Race Relations (IRR), said that 92% or 71 000 successful land claimants in 2013 chose cash over land [Fin24][205] [206].
And finally, for “land redistribution” – in 2009 Mondli Makhanya wrote in the Sunday Times, “At the risk of being lynched, tarred and feathered by ideologues, I will posit that South Africans have very little interest in land… Should we be expending so much energy and effort on land redistribution when the instinct of rural South Africans is to head for the city and seek employment and upward mobility there?”[207]
Makhanya further observed that, “We have formulated policies and development plans around this distorted notion of what South Africans want.”[208] [209]
In 2014 Max du Preez pointed out in the IOL that only about one in three black adult South Africans actually wanted agricultural land, and most of those only a few hectares[210].
“The simple fact is that South Africa is the most urbanised society in Africa and most urban people want better jobs, better homes and better education for their children rather than to go and struggle on a farm. This is why land reform in South Africa simply cannot be compared to that in Zimbabwe,” said Du Preez[211].
YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED ZUMA’S DESIRE FOR “LAND REFORM” IS IN HIS “FAST TRACK” PILE, WHICH MEANS ONLY ONE THING: A PLAN IS ON THE MARCH
Speaking of Zimbabwe, in 1997 Jan Raath wrote in the Mail and Guardian, “It’s official. The people [of Zimbabwe] don’t want land. They want jobs in a market economy, and an opportunity to work for a decent living.” [212] (Raath and two other international journalists were forced to flee Zimbabwe prior to elections in 2005 due to harassment and intimidation by [president] Robert Mugabe’s regime[213] [214]. In 2016, it was reported that Zimbabwean journalists were ordered to get police clearance to gather and discuss politics, as well as the disappearance, detention, and beating of journalists had become “terrifyingly commonplace”[215], thus painting a bleak future for free and fair journalism in Zimbabwe [CNCAFRICA][216].)
Raath based his above statement on a comprehensive study on poverty that was released two weeks prior by the Zimbabwean Ministry of Social Welfare, where 18 000 rural and urban households were interviewed and asked, amongst other things, what they believed were the main causes of poverty and how they could be combated[217]. One percent of the respondents said poverty was caused by a shortage of land, and only two percent said poverty could be resolved by the provision of land[218].
Yet this did not deter Mugabe from instituting “land reform” in 1997, by listing 1 471 white-owned farms for expropriation, while he only had a budget to pay for 10 farms[219]. Added to that, Mugabe promised the political elite who supported him with R1.4 billion generous benefits, as well as farms[220]. (In total, about 4 000 white commercial farmers were evicted from their farms[221].) Zimbabwe’s government land reform thus mainly ended up delivering land to private hands that were well-connected, and thoroughly greased. (Including, reportedly, 14 farms to Bob himself[222].)
SHOWED HOW IT’S DONE Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe.
In 2007, ten years after Mugabe’s “land reform” policy, the inflation rate of the Zimbabwe dollar passed 50% PER MONTH. In 2008, inflation hit 3 500 000%. One egg cost 50 billion Zim dollars [IOL][223].
At the end of 2016, about 1 in every 3 Zimbabweans were estimated to be in need of food aid, that is 5 million people in total, according to Beverly L Peters (Assistant Professor Measurement & Evaluation School of Professional and Extended Studies, American University) [The Conversation][224]. Which would likely be higher had approximately 600 000 Zimbabweans not crossed the border into South Africa[225].
So the formula is simple: 1 471 farms confiscated — 10 farms budgeted = the eventual death of a currency, loss of food security, and the implosion of the economy.
You may have noticed Zuma’s desire for “land reform” is in his “fast track” pile, which means only one thing: a plan is on the march.
Zuma is using the highly emotive subject of land dispossession for his own ends.
Zuma’s actual ‘intentions’ must be studied, not the issues themselves. When there is a lack of genuine engagement with all interested parties to find the best solution, it means other interests are at work. (“Radical” land reform proposals are included in the National Development Plan, which Du Preez described as “making a lot of sense”[226].)
There is little wonder why Zuma wants the land process to be “radically accelerated”[227], when one considers the infrastructure build planned for Zuma’s 9 600MWs of nuclear energy, and the landing of tenders. Zuma and his cronies want to get in on the action at ‘ground-zero’.
Land ownership is a delicate subject, which flies in the face of Zuma’s devil-may-care attitude.
The real challenge of land reform – as with any program to effect positive change – is to redress past injustices without sowing new ones. This can be achieved if the intentions are honourable, and the policies are judicious, transparent, and constitutionally sound. None of which describes Zuma, or his Expropriation Bill.
BEING RESOURCEFUL
There remains one final reason why Zuma is so determined to change the face of South Africa’s internal borders, besides using it to destroy his enemies within the ANC’s NEC and provincial leadership, as well as overpower the DA, and subjugate the urbanite and enslave the rural dweller.
And this reason trumps all others.
Much has been made of how Zuma will not relinquish his power because he risks going to jail; he even said so himself[228]. But that explanation only focuses on Zuma’s fears. It fails to account for his greed.
KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY
Puppet on a string
It is no secret that Zuma wants Gordhan gone as finance minister. One need only watch Zuma through his puppets, as he pulls strings at SARS, the Hawks, the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority), lackeys in his Cabinet, board members of SOEs (State Owned Enterprises), the ANCYL (ANC Youth League), the ANCWL (ANC Women’s League), and the ANC MKMVA (ANC uMkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association).
And Zuma is not short-changed for reasons why: R1.857 trillion in government pensions, a +-R1 trillion 9 600MW deal, state tenders in the hundreds of billions, and more besides, all of which Gordhan stands in the way of.
But there is something peculiar about Zuma’s pursuit of Gordhan.
Malicious persecution
Between May 2014 and December 2015, when Gordhan was neither finance minister nor SARS commissioner (he was in fact minister of co-operative governance and traditional affairs), Gordhan was still being pursued by one or other of Zuma’s henchmen; the minister of state security, David Mahlobo; Hawks head, Berning Ntlemeza; and NPA head, Shaun Abrahams.
SECURITY HENCHMAN David Mahlobo.
This assertion is extrapolated from the writings of Johann van Loggerenberg who headed the National Research Group (NRG) at SARS and Adrian Lackay, the former SARS spokesperson, from their book, Rogue: The inside Story of SARS’s Elite Crime-busting Unit.
In February 2007, Mbeki announced that the government would start the process of further modernising the systems of the South African Revenue Service [SARS], especially in respect of border control, improving inter-departmental co-ordinating structures, and intensifying intelligence work with regard to organised crime. [Daily Maverick][229]
This resulted in the establishment of what would be called the National Research Group (NRG) at SARS; later to be falsely accused of being a SARS “rogue spy unit”[230] [231].
The NRG had presidential and ministerial approval, enjoyed cooperation with the National Intelligence Agency, and was implemented and supported by the then SARS commissioner and current finance minister, Pravin Gordhan[232]. SARS under Gor
