Syrians walk among the rumble of destroyed buildings in Aleppo, Syria, October 3, 2012.
(Photo Credit: AP Photo / SANA)
In a June 11 report in the Washington Post, journalist Liz Sly writes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is “emerging as the biggest victor in the wider regional struggle for influence that the Syrian conflict has become” and that “the regional balance of power appears to be tilting in favor of Tehran, with potentially profound implications for a Middle East still grappling with the upheaval wrought by the Arab Spring revolts.”
Despite Ms. Sly’s assertion, which echoes claims made elsewhere in the media, Iran might not be quite the winner she imagines it to be.
Assad’s Victory at Qusair
In presenting her case, Sly notes the enhanced role played by Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war. She writes, “the Assad regime’s capture of the small but strategic town of Qusair last week [early June] — a battle in which the Iranian-backed Shiite militia played a pivotal role,” signals a shift toward increased Iranian influence – perhaps even dominance – in the Middle East.
Sly’s claim is not only exaggerated, it is overwrought. One military victory in a tiny town along the border with Lebanon does not presage an era of Iranian control over the region from the Levant to the Hindu Kush.
At the end of the article, even the author herself questions the validity of the claim, stating “Military analysts caution against overestimating the impact of the rebel defeat in Qusair on what is likely to be a long and unpredictable war.” She continues, “The obscure western town abutting Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon almost certainly offered an easier conquest than other rebel strongholds, such as the city of Aleppo.”
Important though it may have been, exaggerating the significance of a single battle–and extrapolating the meaning of Hezbollah’s victory in terms of Iran’s burgeoning power–seems to have one purpose: encouraging enhanced United States involvement in Syria.
An Interventionalist Iran
Sly argues that Iran will inevitably become emboldened by a rebel defeat in Syria. Readers are left to presume this would ensure Assad remains in power and that Iranian “control” over the Shia Crescent – stretching presumably from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to the southern border of Lebanon – endures.
To justify this point, Sly quotes Mustafa Alani of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Council, who declares, “If Iran wins this conflict and the Syrian regime survives, Iran’s interventionist policy will become wider and its credibility will be enhanced.”
The author, however, fails to address the costs Iran is facing by unconditionally backing Assad, both in treasure and political capital. Once all is said and done, will Iran have any resources—real, political, and social–left over to intervene elsewhere? And where would that be? And why?
These questions are never asked, let alone answered. We are left to assume that Iran is an expansionist power with devious designs on its Arab neighbors. It’s an all too familiar fairytale told by the region’s U.S.-backed dictators to their American benefactors to motivate more military aid and arms sales.
Alani, who specializes in “defense” and “security,” states, “This is an Iranian fight. It is no longer a Syrian one. The issue is hegemony in the region.”
One can almost hear Congress gnashing its teeth.
Sly frames her entire article according to the assumption that the bloody civil war in Syria, with its undeniable sectarian dimensions, is actually just a proxy war between Iran and the United States, and that “we” are being “outmaneuvered.”
“Politically we’re screwed, and militarily we’re taking a pounding,” Sly quotes Shawnee State University history professor Amr al-Azm as saying, implying that the United States is wholly aligned with all rebel groups fighting the Assad regime.
This would place the United States alongside Saudi-backed Salafists and Sunnis inspired by al-Qaeda. It is hardly a compelling argument, let alone a deft understanding of what is actually happening in Syria.
A New Persian Empire?
Sly points to Iran’s resolve in supporting the Assad regime in order to prove Iranian ascendancy on the regional stage. Essentially, she implies, Obama’s hesitancy to provide training and weapons to the opposition has increased the likelihood that Assad—which, apparently, really means Iran—will be able to dictate the terms of any negotiated settlement that may result from upcoming multinational talks on Syria.
Here, Sly is once again off the mark, for she completely ignores the disparate nature of the Syrian opposition. While Assad’s forces are relatively homogenous, the opposition consists of factions with contrasting interests, goals, and ideologies. As such, opposition groups have had trouble organizing and coordinating their efforts.
President Obama would be reckless to fully supply and arm this nebulous and heterogeneous “opposition” and was correct to hesitate in offering support to the rebels.
Sly also quotes al-Arab TV director Jamal Khashoggi who insists, “Syria is the heart of the Arab world, and for it to be officially conquered by the Iranians is unacceptable.”
Really? “Officially conquered?” This would imply Iran invaded Syria or that Iran was not there before the civil war and has somehow managed to become involved without being invited.
Khashoggi’s statement is indicative of the cynical calculus of those wishing to push the United States to expand its involvement in Syria. Their claims, however, ignore history.
If Assad retaining power is synonymous with complete Iranian control, what was Syria before the civil war? Wholly absent from this determination is any mention of the role of Russia and its continued support for Assad, which is arguably a far more essential and influential factor in Assad’s ability to stay in power.
Going further, the idea of a new Persian Empire would be presumptuous even without the civil war raging in Syria. Other countries in the supposed Iranian-controlled Shia Crescent are experiencing upheaval and turmoil. Lebanon is on the precipice of another sectarian conflict. Iraq, on the other hand, has never quite managed to overcome the sectarian rifts that plagued U.S. rebuilding efforts. Much of the violence is aimed at the Shia-led Iran sponsored government in Baghdad. This doesn’t sound much like a ruler in control of his empire.
Could Iran Be The Loser?
Viewed with a more critical eye, it appears that Iran is being forced to throw its full support behind Assad. Tehran needs the Assad government to remain in power, so that Syria continues to be a conduit for influence in Lebanon.
To defeat the rebels, however, Iran will have to spill huge amounts of blood and spend monetary treasure, which it does not have as a result of Western-imposed sanctions and persistent economic mismanagement.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and newly elected president Hassan Rouhani will be hard pressed to convince the Iranian population that this war is indeed worth the continued costs.
This isn’t the Iran-Iraq War when the newly formed Islamic Republic was forced to fight off Saddam Hussein’s invasion for national integrity, pride, and survival. Rather, this is a foreign entanglement that is draining an already strained public coffer.
Rouhani’s election was due, in part, to people’s desire for a stronger economy and improved relations with the West. A protracted Syrian struggle may very well be anathema to this goal.
Beyond economic concerns, even if Assad survives a civil war that has cost at least 93,000 lives on both sides, overarching Shia-Sunni, Iranian-Arab rivalry will still exist and potentially worsen.
Iran will be hemmed in by nations outside the borders of its supposed area of influence, the “Shia crescent”, such as the Sunni-ruled Gulf states and Turkey. (To be fair, Sly does begrudgingly acknowledge these last points later in her own article.) These states will never acquiesce to Iranian hegemony—especially when Iran may very well be coming hat-in-hand seeking better trade deals to blunt U.S.-led sanctions. Some reports suggest that this is already happening, as Iran is being blamed for increasing sectarian divides and for being a “troublesome attention seeker.”
Furthermore, the Iranians even stand to lose support among their major power base in Lebanon. Rank and file Hezbollah members have already voiced their opposition to the group’s growing involvement in the Syrian conflict. “Why fight our Arab-Muslim brothers in Syria, when our enemy is south of the border in Israel?” the argument goes.
Despite scoring a strategic victory against the Syrian opposition in Qusair, mounting casualties pose a setback for Hezbollah at home. Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual and political leader of Hezbollah, will be forced to balance the interests of his benefactor Iran with those of his constituents.
Conclusion
The final outcome in Syria remains, at the minimum, many months away. It is likely that Assad will be able to overcome the rebellion. But victory for Assad and Iran is likely to be a Pyrrhic one. The Syrian president and his Iranian benefactors will have spent much of their already scarce resources in order to win, and may not be able to exploit this supposed momentum for long-term gain. All the talk of an ascendant Iran will be for naught as the Iranians and Assad will be focused on recovering rather than expanding their influence.
Sly and other journalists who are forecasting an Iranian power grab should look beyond the surface, as well as the kneejerk alarmism that encourages treating the Syrian civil war as a new “Great Game”— this time between the United States and Iran.
These perspectives plainly advocate for further military escalation on all sides. They’re being fertilized by the machinations of interventionists and driven by the simple idea that “something must be done.”
This is misguided and we should expect more from our journalists. After all, this isn’t a game.
*David Shams holds a BA in Political Science from Murray State University and an MA in Diplomacy from the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. He is currently a freelance journalist and comments frequently on events in the Middle East. He tweets @kypersian.