A masked Kurdish demonstrator holds a PKK flag next to a portrait of Abdullah Ocalan, the group’s jailed leader [EPA]
In Turkey, the decades long conflict between Turks and Kurds kicked off after the Turkish War of Independence in the early twentieth century.
The Kurds, who were defending Anatolia side by side with the Turks, claimed an autonomous region in the southeastern part of present-day Turkey, in return for rallying in support of Turkish autonomy after World War I.
After the establishment of the Turkish state in 1923, relations between Turkey and the Kurds were destroyed by nationalist interests on the two sides.
Since Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s current president, came to power in 2002, relations between the Turkish government and the Kurds seem to be improving.
Today, many inside Turkey credit the Erdogan government for creating “a democratic opening” to resolve the “Kurdish problem.”
What this problem signifies and how it is being solved are outlined below.
The Ottoman Empire and the Early Years of the Turkish Republic
The majority of Kurds in the Middle East live in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, such as Iraq and Syria. In Turkey, they are the second largest ethnic group.
During the times of the Ottomans, the Kurds held a unique position.
As Muslims, they were treated as equal to their fellow Muslim Ottoman citizens, whatever their ethnic origin.
At the same time, they enjoyed a measure of self-government, with tribal leaders ruling over large Kurdish groups in southeastern Anatolia.
By and large, during the Ottoman Empire, Kurds and Turks lived peacefully, side by side. Discrimination and conflict based on ethnic origin was rare.
But, with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the rise of Turkish nationalism, the Kurds lost their special status.
Ostensibly to achieve political and social stability, Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, introduced radical modernization reforms, which were intended to bring Western culture and sensibilities to Turkey.
As a part of this new orientation, the Turkish government attempted to separate the state from the old Ottoman traditions and policies.
For example, the government abolished the concept of a state religion (which had been designated as Islam under the Ottomans) and eschewed any desire to bring about a new Islamic caliphate, the highest form of state authority in the Muslim world.
By eliminating these two elements of the Ottoman era, Turkey distanced itself from some of the most important features common to Muslim-majority countries.
In their place, the government exalted Turkishness and Turkification, which were meant to create a homogeneous Turkish nation, without regard to the ethnic origin of various indigenous population groups.
This attempt to create a homogenous Turkish nation, in which Turkish was the official state language, dissolved the old alliance between Turks and Kurds.
While the statement, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene” (English: how happy is the one who says I am a Turk) was intended to weld together the monolithic Turkish nation, it instead prepared the ground for disputes and violent conflict in the years to come.
The Kurdish Revolts and the PKK
Dissatisfied with Atatürk’s Turkification policies, and fueled by their own growing sense of nationalism, Kurdish leaders staged a series of uprisings in the 1920s and 30s.
Viewing the riots as separatist movements, the government brutally suppressed the Kurdish revolt in the name of protecting and preserving the Turkish nation-state.
It was not until the 1950s, when Turkey transitioned to a multiparty system, that Kurdish citizens were able to participate, to a limited extent, in the country’s political life.
Toward the end of the 1970s, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, English: Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an armed separatist group considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish government, was established by Abdullah Öcalan to realize the dream of Kurdish self-determination.
The PKK quickly began to use violence to create an independent Kurdish state, Kurdistan, in southeastern Turkey. It even established training camps in the mountains where terrorist attacks were organized.
The PKK found broad support in the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq, which was created by an international military operation during the Gulf War in 1990-91, to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein and to relieve Turkey of incoming Kurdish refugees.
Thanks to the PKK’s violent activities, over the last few decades, thousands of people have died, and the “Kurdish question,” which ought to have defined the circumstances and rights of the Kurdish population, has become the so-called “Kurdish problem.”
Turkey’s southeastern region has particularly felt the bitter effects of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military.
No investment in infrastructure, industry and education took place in the region because of the unstable situation. As a result, a big socio-economic gap was created between Western and Eastern Turkey.
Turgut Özal’s Reform Attemptsin the 1980s
Until the 1980s, sustained discussion about the Kurdish issue did not take place within Turkish society.
Upon coming to power, Turgut Özal, who became Turkey’s prime minister in 1983 and president in 1989, began a series of vocal efforts to solve the “Kurdish problem.”
Holding a moderate attitude toward minority groups, Özal began to openly discuss minority rights and problems facing minority communities in Turkey.
He advocated for tolerance toward the Kurdish language and the recognition of Kurdish identity. In advocating for these changes, Özal often made sure to mention that his grandmother had been a Kurd.
Özal had contacts with Kurdish politicians in Turkey and the leaders of the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq. Leveraging these relationships, he called on the PKK to stop its terrorist activities and participate in politics.
Through these various efforts, Özal doggedly pursued one goal: the cessation of violence between Turks and Kurds.
For Özal, it was clear the solution to the Kurdish problem could only be achieved by ensuring the rights of minorities and creating dialogue between Turks and Kurds.
Although his efforts were not necessarily successful, Özal was one of the most important Turkish politicians to work on solving the Kurdish problem.
The AKP Government and the Democratic Opening in 2009
The Kurdish problem and terrorist activities of the PKK also posed an important challenge for Erdogan’s party, AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, English: Justice and Development Party).
Upon coming to power in 2002, the AKP government behaved much like its predecessors, and responded to PKK terrorist attacks with military action.
But, a very comprehensive and interesting survey from 2009 revealed that the majority of respondents (both Kurdish and Turkish) believed a solution to the Kurdish problem would come not through the military, but rather through the Turkish parliament and government.
In August of that year, the AKP introduced the so-called “democratic opening” to end the vicious cycle of violence between the two sides, at least temporarily.
The AKP’s approach presented the Kurdish issue as a multidimensional political and cultural, rather than security, phenomenon.
As was the case during the Özal government, the Kurdish issue was now openly discussed and a political solution actively sought.
At the AKP’s annual Congress in 2009, the motto was “Biz Birlikte Türkiye’yiz” (English: Together we are Turkey), which was a reference to the democratic opening.
The AKP called for the recognition of different minority groups and described the heterogeneity of Turkish society as an asset.
By 2009, the first features of the democratic opening began to be revealed.
Turkey’s state-run radio and television network, TRT, launched the first state television network in the Kurdish language, TRT 6, lifting the decades old ban on Kurdish television stations.
The country’s electoral law was changed so that politicians could run election campaigns in Kurdish.
For the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic, Kurdish was allowed to be taught in schools, and was soon introduced in various educational settings, including universities.
The Peace Process and the Withdrawal of the PKK
At the beginning of 2013, the Turkish government began speaking of a peace process to resolve the Kurdish problem.
In January, The Turkish intelligence agency MIT negotiated possible solutions to the Kurdish question with incarcerated PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan.
In March 2013, the first stages of the peace process were publicly announced and Öcalan called on the PKK to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw from Turkey into Northern Iraq.
The withdrawal process lasted until September 2013. According to the Turkish Interior Ministry, the initiative remains moderately successful with about 20% of PKK members withdrawing from Turkey.
During the retreat, sporadic clashes occurred between the PKK and the Turkish military.
Together, the ceasefire and withdrawal of the PKK complete the first stage of negotiations between the two sides, with the second stage providing for various constitutional amendments and the guarantee of minority rights.
The Democratization Package of September 2013
On the September 30, 2013, the AKP government began the second stage of the peace process, and published the contents of its democratization package.
The main points can be summarized as follows:
- the use of certain letters like q, w, x, which are especially necessary for Kurdish Romanization, would no longer be prohibited
- different languages and dialects would be taught in future in private schools
- a discussion would take place about the ten percent hurdle for participating in parliamentary elections, which may be reduced to five percent or even completely abolished
- financial support for campaigns would be extended to parties that receive at least three percent of the vote.
- parties would administer election campaigns in various languages throughout the election season
- further reforms would be made in the area of rights to demonstration and protections against discrimination
Conclusion
While the AKP’s democratic opening is far from perfect, the initiative reflects an interest in solving the Kurdish problem and guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Turkey.
The repeal of the ban on teaching the Kurdish language, the creation of a state television network in Kurdish, and the recognition of Kurdish identity are particularly noteworthy milestones.
Only time will tell whether the contents of the newly released democratization package will be implemented and the extent to which additional reforms will be made.
Whether the Kurdish side will be satisfied with these reforms also remains to be seen.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the first steps toward reconciliation are under way. Both sides must now act constructively to achieve a complete guarantee of minority rights and realize a sustainable ceasefire.
*Ferhat Demirel is a PhD student in Political Science at University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. He is also the Middle East Program Associate of STRATIM in Ankara, Turkey.