A debate is going on in Washington and elsewhere on the issue of contemporary political Islam. The debate, organized by the Brookings Institute, is timely and helpful. Yet, some important facts seem to have been missed in the in-depth-approach of the academics and researchers who provided us with a better overall understanding of this phenomenon.
Political Islam has always been there, in a form or another, in the history of the Middle East. The twentieth century rise of this phenomenon was tied to the popular move to end colonialism and the rise of nationalism. In Libya, it was a tribal-religious leader who led the fight against the Italian occupation. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was born only after 8 years of the 1919 revolution of the rising nationalist middle class. In Algeria, it was the Quran that provided the proper vehicle to resist the Francization of the local identity and cling it to its Arab-Islamic identity, etc.
The main question remains unchanged after the extremely helpful papers prepared for the debate of this initiative from our colleagues in Brookings: Why the national-secular identity failed to digest the supra-national essence of political Islam and was unable to unleash a profound reform in the text-oriented approach to Islam or replace it with an essence-content oriented interpretation of religion?
The underlying ideological structure of political Islam did indeed change with Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh. Their approach, if compared to what happened after their generation, was revolutionary. But it came to a near halt later due to lack of self-generated energy to carry on towards adopting an essence-oriented anti-dogmatic approach.
Theological criticism, as a theoretical-philosophical school, cannot be found in any effective form after the nationalism-generation forged by the impact of the 1919 revolution in Egypt. This left political Islam with only political doctrines to develop. So long as political views were deprived of any ideological, philosophical and theoretical depth, they tended to be more vulnerable to their political-social environment and dogmatism.
Increasingly, we saw policies forged on the bases of political and social expedience and the preservation of the religious organization as the highest goal and regardless of its ideological content. As the need for theological justifications for political stances were still present, by the nature of the political Islam movement itself, and as the dogmatic-text-based approach was left undeveloped, we saw often ridiculous interpretations of texts and verses, conflicting views of what “true Islam” is, and more dogmas growing of a dogmatic paralysis to look differently at texts and teachings.
Curiously, the modern version of political Islam tells the story of the rise of nationalism, independence, and in certain cases (Egypt) the indigenous middle-class aspirations to reduce the power of colonial hegemony and its feudalist allies. In certain cases it was a backward reaction to secularism and modernization, in others it was an ally to feudalism. But in all cases, it was an anti-colonial movement albeit based on supra-national ideology and beliefs like “the land of Muslims should be ruled be Muslims”, and “Non-Muslims conspire to enslave Muslims”. It never moved to the category of a traditional nationalist movement raising the national flag and accepting other religious minorities within a comprehensive “national identity”.
As such, political Islam not only remained and even grew more dogmatic, it was always, in its essence, an anti-nationalist movement, even when it was playing a role in fighting colonial powers and “cleansing” the “land of Muslims” from the “evils of non-Muslims”.
Fast forward to the current phase of political Islam, we clearly see that the lack of cohesive reformist schools in Islamic modern thought allowed the general movement of political Islam to slide into more radical and violent interpretations. Obviously, this should not be understood as an exclusively ideological shortcoming due to excessive dogmatic interpretations. It has genuine social and political roots. But that will not change what we believe to be at least the immediate cause of the growth of more radical violent versions of political Islam, which is the profound absence of a continuation of the reformers of the early twentieth century.
We see, even in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an evolution, still based on dogmatic interpretations, of their policy on violence. Few years ago, one of the most notorious “theoreticians” of the MB, Imam Yusuf al-Qaradawi, responded to a question about either suicide attacks are a righteous action or not by saying the following (literal translation):
Question: Is it religiously allowed, particularly in the case of Syria, that someone explodes himself to target a gathering of followers of the oppressive regime (of al-Assad), even if that will lead to casualties among civilians?
Al-Qaradawi: The religious source in such issues is that it is not allowed unless it is prepared collectively (by the Jama’a or the “group”). The norm is that one fights, kill and get killed. But to explode himself necessitate that the Jama’a decides that it needs such an act. And if the Jama’a decided that it needs such an act, that someone will explode himself in a group of others, and if it is required and prepared by the Jama’a, in the minimum losses possible, and sparing the life of the one who does the act if it is possible, it is allowed. But this should not be left to the individual’s decisions alone. One should not act by himself. He should rather do what the Jama’a decides. The one should surrender himself to the Jama’a, and the Jama’a should allocate the individual according to its needs and requirements”.
The statement, which is considered a Fatwa (religious ruling) dates back to last spring. Qaradawi was repeating what he previously wrote in his book “The Jurisprudence of Jihad”, in which he states bluntly that “suicide attacks are acts of heroism”, though he qualifies those attacks as the ones targeting Israelis by the Palestinians of Gaza who face deliberate suffocation by the Israeli siege. He stated later that when Gazans got the missiles they have, that negated the need for suicide bombings. The statement is strikingly similar to a similar statement by Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasr Allah few years ago.
However, in the TV show broadcasted by Aljazeera, he was talking about Syria in “particular”. He said to BBC something similar back in 2004. When asked about suicide bombings he said “It’s not suicide, it is martyrdom in the name of God, Islamic theologians and jurisprudents have debated this issue, referring to it as a form of jihad, under the title of jeopardizing the life of the mujahedeen. It is allowed to jeopardize your soul and cross the path of the enemy and be killed”. (Quoted from the full transcript of the interview with Qaradawi as posted on BBC site on July 8 2004).
Is it Syria? Or is it Gaza? Or is it what the Jama’a sees fit?
Here, we see but one sample of the principle Imam of the MB, (the very group assisted by the US and Western countries in order to achieve democracy in the Arab World) legalizing the total submission of one’s own life to the group, which is reduced at the end to a narrow band of Sheikhs on top of the organizational hierarchy, to the point of killing himself or killing presumed enemies even if innocent people die in the middle.
The story of Qaradawi is significant not in and by itself, but in its profound reflection of the limit that ethics could be sacrificed for the sake of what the Imams see righteous. This could be harmful in ordinary conditions but it is more so in the case of politically active groups.
In terms of essence, political Islam could be reduced to two inter-connected elements: a promise of a “righteous” identity when all other available identities (nationalism or pan-Arab nationalism) are questioned, and a promise of a better future and of vague but bright days to come only if the true Muslims rule their land. And in general, it is divided into two major categories: Revolutionary-violent and militant groups that seek to control Muslim societies, and politically passive groups which limit their mission in the Islamization of personal behavior of the people and communities among which the live.
Since the demise of Arab Nationalism in the seventies, the activist Islamists wing started spreading in phenomenal speed. The reason was the double dynamic that was generated by the bankruptcy of Arab nationalism. First, decades of political oppression against any and all political views and the rule of the Arab nationalist juntas in many Arab countries that deprived their societies of any independent political life and left the field to the handy ideology, that of popular religion and the need of traditionally oppressive state machines for allies to control the population in times when the national accomplishments of these states were virtually non-existent.
Second, economic deterioration which excerpted the spread of the militant political Islam. The population was suffering while deprived of any ability to understand the real reasons of their hardships. The “return to the word of God”, as presented by the Islamists, was one way to mitigate their pain coupled by a hope to return to the old days of milk and honey of some 1400 years ago.
Yet, the Arab Spring was the trigger that completed the shift of political Islam since its birth during the politically active years of the rise of nationalism in the beginning of last century. The Arab Spring was a manifestation of two parallel trends: The first was that which expresses the population’s anger against the old structure of the state and the second was that of economic hardships. The collapse of the state structures left the road wide opened to the militant political Islam. The opportunity of moving towards a full control over political power was made possible by the previous political structure which prevented anyone from free speech or political activism.
Eighty years after its establishment, the MB found the political power in Tunisia and Egypt within grasp. And it did grab it without hesitation. However, it failed tragically to adapt to its new role as an organization in power rather than an organization in militant opposition. The reason of its success in opposition – the absolute rule of the leaders and the principle of “Listen and Obey” –was the very reason of its failure in governance.
However, the MB, or any other militant Jihadi group, cannot give up its hierarchical and bureaucratic nature without giving up its own identity. Qaradawi’s Fatwa about “submission” of individuals’ lives to the group (read: the leaders) speaks volumes in this regard.
Political Islam will not evolve to a modern political movement without general reform of the theological interpretations, and methods of readings and understanding, the texts of Islam and defeating its narrow definition of “true religion”. This will not happen without providing reformer minds among Muslim scholars with a platform to group and formulate a critical trend to tear down the current dogmatic interpretation of that religion and adopt a more cerebral approach to spiritual and practical issues. We see sign of this happening spontaneously here and there. This should be encouraged and helped to organize and move the debate to the general public.
It is indeed striking, and scarcely noted by scholars, that Islamic clergy and traditional theoreticians declared war centuries ago on philosophy in general. They consider reason an enemy and insist on intuition as a base of faith. This rendered the thought-base of the faith vulnerable to deeply pessimist and nihilist views of self, others and life. A proper approach to the true essence of faith must be encouraged to surface as a constructive thought-base revolving around reason, acceptance of others and the respect of life.
If ISIL uses social media so successfully, one wonders why a platform of that kind is not provided and managed in a way to guarantee the spread of a reformist message as actively. It better be established in Europe so it can act free of fear and political oppression. And it should be managed to pump the reformist debate in the widest possible ways to reach the intelligentsias of all Islamic countries.