Today in CCLKOW we are reorienting you to the homeland and the problems of interoperability between police and the armed forces. Even without the Paris Attacks earlier this month, the subject of mastering the ‘JIIM’ environment is critical, both in military operations at home and abroad. To discuss this, I am very happy to bring to you a special guest writer, Ian Wiggett, recently retired as an Assistant Chief Constable from Greater Manchester Police. It should be understood, then, that this piece is written from the British perspective, which includes a significant difference with respect to the use of force by the police, particularly as concerns the generally disarmed stance. Nevertheless, the issue of integrating a military response to an attack to the homeland matters even to the US. Although the matter of Posse Comitatus would seem to forestall the use of the regular forces domestically, this matter has never been tested against any significant threat. And in fact, even as it was ultimately tabled, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks the military role in homeland defence was put on the table for serious debate. It is also worth noting that the American disdain for soldiers operating in the homeland is a legacy of our British heritage, and so to a similar degree the use of the armed forces in domestic circumstances is discomfiting on this side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, although they come under the control of the Governors, the National Guard formations of the individual states are trained as military, not police, forces. Thus, even in the American setting, how the armed forces will act in support of local, state, or even federal law enforcement remains a challenge. Alternatively, should the terrorist threat upon the European Continent reach sufficient proportions, it is not out of the realm of the possibility for recourse to NATO forces to be contemplated. Finally, as the importance of security and stabilization campaigns rise, the ability to work with civilian authorities will become more important. If the problems have not been hashed out for homeland defence, it is very unlikely they will succeed in foreign contingencies. Thus, the locus of operations of the armed forces has shifted and it is time to give serious thought to the issues. Read the piece, consider the implications and questions posed, and join the conversation on Twitter, at #CCLKOW and, it is hoped, the newly launched hashtag for policing discussion, #WeCops. — Jill S. Russell
First, some history…
Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) – also known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) – has existed for centuries. In the days before a regular civilian police force existed, it was only the military that had the numbers, organisation and capability to restore order and maintain control. That was, indeed, the role of the militia: a body of soldiers that could be raised at short notice to provide homeland defence. It was the militia in North America that provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Army, and after independence, the United States retained the militia as the National Guard.
The original concept of “MACP” was therefore built around the military, either militia or regulars, being the force of last resort to restore and maintain the Peace. Use of force (or at least, show of force) was central to that. Armed soldiers putting down the insurrection – and casualties and collateral damage were expected.
The Peterloo Massacre, Manchester, 1819.
Contemporary cartoon, Cruikshank
The folk memory does not easily or quickly forget the intervention of armed forces. The Peterloo Massacre of 1819 is still invoked to inspire radicalism in Manchester, and the impact of that violent suppression is generally acknowledged as leading to further radicalism and ultimately to wider reform. The Easter Rising in Dublin involved only a relatively small number of republican combatants, but the violence of the military response arguably pushed many towards the cause of independence. In South Wales mining communities Churchill is known not as a wartime Prime Minister, but as the Home Secretary who had sent troops against striking miners in 1911.
Troops deployed in support of local police to suppress striking miners, Rhondda Valley, 1910-11
History therefore suggests that the relationship between the people and the military has to be managed carefully. Too much force, applied clumsily, may achieve its immediate objective of quelling a riot – but the lasting impact may be far more damaging to the established order. The ‘silent majority’ are very grateful that the forces of law and order (whether dressed in blue or green) have made it safe for them to walk the streets and sleep soundly at night. But if too many skulls are cracked, that ‘silent majority’ can quickly change sides.
How does MACP/MACA work today?
Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) falls into three main types. The first is simply about extra manpower and equipment to help deal with emergencies such as flooding, heavy snow, evacuations, etc. The military can bring in large numbers people and specialist equipment or skills at short notice. Filling sandbags to protect critical sites from flooding. Moving people away from flooded homes. Helicopters transporting vital supplies. Building temporary bridges. This is also known as Military Assistance to the Civil Community. The military also step in when critical services are threatened by industrial action. Recent examples include fuel deliveries, firefighting, and ambulances. This is also referred to as Military Assistance to Government Departments.
A second category, closely linked to the first, is the provision of additional or specialist support which may not be available to the civilian authority. Installing communications equipment in remote areas, deploying radar or aerial photography, for example. Both the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games used military staff to provide searching and access control. There are long standing arrangements for handling of explosives and munitions, and until recently the military air sea rescue service worked frequently with local police forces and mountain rescue.
This all has to be paid for, of course. Whilst the military may be very willing to offer their help, the MoD will want to know which authority to recover their costs from. This has caused delays in the past, with civilian authorities sometimes being reluctant to call in military because of the costs, and/or arguing over which authority would be responsible for paying. Somewhat of a challenge if the emergency was due to an act of God!
Things have moved on considerably in recent years, with a much wider understanding that protecting life and property is far more important than petty turf wars or arguments over bills. However, there has a growing tendency over the past decade for political leaders to want to do ‘something’ when faced with a crisis. This has led to the Army being ‘ordered in’ to ‘sort out’ emergencies such as the foot and mouth outbreak, or the Somerset Levels flooding. The mission may be loosely defined, and the intervention options may be limited – but it’s ok, the army’s here! In these situations it’s important that the military recognise local sensitivities. The civilian authorities will have been working hard for some time, and will feel that military intervention represents a criticism of their efforts. The Army will also feel uncomfortable about being drawn into incidents that inevitably have political ramifications.
The third category is the use of force – Military Assistance to the Civil Power. This is the most difficult aspect of MACA. The military are trained to fight wars, not to be police officers. It is many decades since the military was deployed to restore order on the streets of the mainland UK, although of course they spend several decades supporting the RUC in Northern Ireland. That deployment still has a painful legacy.
In more recent years, the capability, training and tactics of police and special forces have transformed in response to the changing terrorist threat. For obvious reasons, little of that is seen outside of the counter-terrorist functions. There is a lot of catching up to be done by politicians, communities and those police and military leaders not directly involved in this specialist area of policing in relation to how the police and military will work together – and what this means for constitutional arrangements, and the longer term impact on the police-military-public relationships. The maintenance of the Queen’s Peace remains a policing mission, even if it is carried out by the military on the police’s behalf.
How MACA/MACP works
In simple terms, the civil power requests the assistance of the military. The advice to the civil authority is to ask for the ‘effect’ desired, not to specify the resource required. The military cannot deploy without the authority of the minister of defence. This is an important constitutional check which we perhaps fail to recognise the significance of in the UK. In countries where there have been instances of military coups, civil war, or military government, the deployment of the military into the civil space can be highly politically charged and in some cases even outlawed.
In the UK, the civil authorities are used to operating on their own initiative, without ministerial or political involvement. Consequently, the MACA/MACP approval can be seen as a bureaucratic process, mainly to allow the costs to be recharged. For more sensitive deployments, the request to deploy military assets will require approval from both the minister overseeing the requesting civil power, and the minister of defence. This ministerial approval process still applies in critical, fast moving incidents. There are arrangements to ensure the decisions are made quickly, but the process of contacting ministers and completing paperwork will inevitably introduce some degree of delay.
Use of military force in support of police
Churchill directing troops at the Sidney Street Siege, 1911.
The dividing line between police and military used to be clear. Police forces simply did not have the capability to take on a well armed terrorist cell. That was the job of Special Forces. Once the civil police could no longer cope, the incident was handed over to the military and special forces neutralised the threat. The most famous example is the Iranian Embassy Siege. Civilian police surrounded the embassy, but at the point when it was decided a forced conclusion was required, a handwritten note on a scrap of paper allowed the police commander to hand the incident over to the military commander. Once concluded, control was handed back to the police.
Planning for a long time since was based on that premise. The incident would be defined and contained. When the point was reached that an intervention was decided, this would be conducted by special forces. Police handed control to the military until the incident was resolved. The scene would then be handed back to police. But the world has changed.
So what’s changed?
Alongside the changing nature of terrorism, from 9/11 to lone actors and suicide bombers, the attacks that prompted the most rethinking have been Mumbai and Westgate in Nairobi. Marauding terrorists, well armed, attacking crowded places pose real challenges for the conventional police armed response. Police firearms officers are trained to contain the threat and make considered decisions whether to open fire. They should use the minimum force necessary – and indeed, rarely open fire, looking to use less lethal options whenever possible. Once contained, they negotiate a resolution, again avoiding the use of lethal force as far as possible. Each decision has to be individually justified and will always be subject to intense scrutiny afterwards, particularly if there has been a fatal discharge.
Terrorists intent on killing as many people as possible require very different concept of operations in response. Armed officers need to respond quickly and take on the terrorists in order to minimise the loss of life. Negotiation is likely to be pointless (but cannot be discounted, regardless of what has happened). Police forces will need to bring as many armed officers together as quickly as possible. They will work as ad hoc teams, put together as they arrive. This has led to common training, tactics, and weaponry. The fast response also includes Special Forces, mobilised quickly by air. As the military component will be arriving alongside the civilian police response, the training includes shared and flexible command models. The priority is to save life, and they will need to get in quickly and resolve the incident, using whatever resources are available.
Depending where and when the incident occurs, command structures and ministerial involvement may be ‘in flux’. MACP/MACA will still be needed. But the situation on the ground will be developing rapidly and is likely to be confused. There are a number of possible scenarios, ranging from police dealing with the situation themselves through to a full handover to SF. The priority will always be saving life.
But the threat continues to change? What about other scenarios?
In the last few years we have seen: the two Paris attacks; a shooter on a train in France; an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen; incidents in Belgium; the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway; car bombs in Glasgow and London; lone actors attacking Parliament and the military in Canada; the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby; several attacks and plots in Australia; the downing of civilian jets over Egypt and Ukraine; the attack on tourists in Tunisia. In the meantime, counter terrorist police and the Security Service have continued to disrupt attack plots in the UK. The threats range from multiple and coordinated attacks with automatic weapons and explosives, unsophisticated attacks by individuals or groups with knives, to bombing plots with homemade explosives. The targets could be military personnel, police, crowded spaces, sensitive religious locations or communities, high profile individuals, or representatives of particular countries and communities.
The range of possible attack scenarios is endless. The greatest unknown, however, is the number of threats/incidents that have to be confronted at the same time. One attack is bad enough, but several happening simultaneously and/or lasting over a long period will stretch the available specialist capacity. The threat level in the UK is already at severe, the second highest level. If the threat increases, we are entering unprecedented territory for the UK in peacetime.
The recent Paris attacks could have conceivably happened in the UK. The response in France and Belgium was a massive armed military presence on the streets. An incident in the UK or overseas could lead to our government deciding to deploy armed soldiers (other than SF) across the UK. There may or may not be intelligence to inform the specific response required. Whilst planning has already envisaged this sort of event, the questions remain – what are they going to do? What is their role? What are they expected to deal with?
An incident (or incidents) in the UK may require extra numbers to be drawn in beyond the current planning assumptions.
For police forces, there have been further changes in planning assumptions and responses brought about by the 7/7 and 15/7 bombings, the riots of 2011, the 2012 Olympics, and Austerity. In short, even the largest forces cannot deal with major incidents without support from other forces. If there are multiple major incidents happening simultaneously and/or for extended periods, police forces may struggle to cope without assistance. The most likely, if not only source of assistance is the military.
The progressive increase in the threat level in the UK has also brought into question whether police in the UK can remain unarmed for much longer. There are only a few countries in the world where the police are unarmed. Whilst a lone officer with a handgun may have limited impact against a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons, routinely armed police have options which are not available in the UK. There are between 5,000 and 6,000 armed officers available in the UK, many being committed to protection of vulnerable sites or high profile individuals. Multiple and protracted incidents could require additional armed resources, which could only come from the military. But the way police operate with firearms is very different to the way soldiers are trained for combat.
What are the likely scenarios?
The various terrorist attacks around the world show the range of possible scenarios. The unknowns as ever are the where and when. But the issue for planning are the assumptions about the scale of the attacks and the number of simultaneous attacks (or other incidents). For the purpose of this paper, the assumption has to be that additional military support has been requested because events are beyond the capability of police and SF capacity.
Without examining each possible scenario, there are are some key considerations that the military need to prepare for:
Command and Control. It is likely that the incident will remain under civil police command. Are these arrangements understood? Does the military understand the police organisational structure?
Can the military operate effectively within civil police communication systems? What if those systems break down?
Concept of Operations. Is it clear what the role of the military is? Is this understood by all agencies? Is there a mutual understanding of each other’s roles, constraints, and ‘red lines’?
Use of Force. What authority is required? What are the rules of engagement? What options are available, including less lethal? What risks and contingencies are envisaged? What guidance and instructions have been given to the those deployed? Is the guidance fit for purpose? Who carries the responsibility if soldiers end up in a situation where they have to defend themselves?
Locality and Community. How does the local context affect decision making and the options available? What information is needed, and how does that get relayed?
Beware of linear assumptions
Planning in the past has been based on a phased, incremental escalation of a single incident. As the incident escalates, military assistance is engaged. The mission is relatively clear, and the military resources required are self-selecting.
Planning and preparation are no longer so easy. It is not inconceivable that the military is deployed for a general security and reassurance presence. Presumably, though, they will need to react or respond if something happens.
The support requested may be for a specific purpose or role. Perhaps the civil police need additional explosives officers, or logistics, or certain technical skills to deal with the incident, but the military will not be engaged in tackling the threat directly.
There may be a general emergency which requires additional security presence, perhaps for guarding and searching, or to support and work alongside civil police, or even to replace civil police if they are not available or not able to deal with the threat.
And there may be a need for additional armed resources to be deployed quickly to tackle an armed threat, and the current police armed capability may not be available or sufficient.
National Security Strategy 2015
The new Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the need to strengthen domestic resilience, and the need to tackle the terrorist threat at home and abroad using the ‘full spectrum of capabilities’. Ten thousand military personnel will ‘be available on standby to support the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts’.
MACA is now a central part of domestic security policy and planning.
There is much in the piece to contemplate, and so rather than limiting the discussion to answering a few questions, what I prefer to do is merely set the big issues up as areas of primary concern for debate. To my mind these are very broadly in two categories:
first, the Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement for the armed forces upon the civilian streets; and,
second, the differences between police/law enforcement and the armed forces across the universe of tactics, doctrine, language, etc., for as certainly as ‘secure the house’ means something different between the services (we all know the joke, right?), so too does the same issue apply in this case.
Specifically for the Americans, I would be interested to hear your thoughts as to what level of threat or incident would alter the political calculus on Posse Comitatus.
Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW and #WeCops.