On Wednesday, January 6, 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Regional Integration announced that Ghana has accepted a plea from the International Criminal Tribunal to provide shelter for two cleared terrorist suspects of Yemeni origin who were detained in Guantanamo Bay prison by US authorities.
The two were Khalid Mohammed Salih al-Dhuby and Mahmmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef.
According to Foreign Affairs Ministry, the two Gitmo detainees were unable to “return to Yemen at the moment and we have indicated our readiness to accept them for a period of two years after which they may leave the country”.
Below is how the two Yemeni nationals ended up in the Guantanamo Bay prison:
Khalid Mohammed Salih al Dhuby
Khalid Mohammed Salih al Dhuby is a 34- or 35-year-old citizen of Yemen. As of January 2010, the Guantánamo Review Task Force had recommended him for transfer. He was transferred to Ghana on Jan. 6, 2016.
Note: These documents include some assertions that cannot be independently verified. Many allegations have been contested by detainees and their lawyers, and some have been undercut by other evidence.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
li 27 HEADQUARTERS. JOINT TASK FORCE
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANANIO BAY, CUBA
Avo AE 09360 5_
I TF 25 December 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, (S)
1. Personal Information
Detainee Assessment
0 Reference Name: Mohammed Khalid Salih
al-Dhuby
0 Current/True Name and Aliases: Khalid Muhammad Salih al-
Dhuby, Muhammed Salih al-Thabi
1 Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SAL
Date of Birth:
0 Citizenship: Yemen (YM)
0 Intermnent Serial Number (ISN): U1 O5 2005
Z. Health: Detainee is in good health.
3. Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of
Control (TRO). previously assessed detainee for Continued Detention Under
Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 6 February 2006,
b. Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-
Qaida who utilized the al-Qaida travel-network for access to Afghanistan (AF), and to
receive militant training, Detainee maimed military positions in Tora Bora and probably
engaged in hostile activities against coalition forces. Detainee Withholds information of
intelligence value and has familial ties to extremism. determined this detainee
to be:
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION l.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20311225
SECRE
SECRE
SUBJ ECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
0 A MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
0 A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective.
0 Of MEDIUM intelligence value.
c. F) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's
assessment since the last recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be
annotated by next to the footnote.)
0 previously noted a variant of detainee's name was recovered
from the hard drive of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's aka (KSM), ISN 0024DP
Additional research does not support the assessment that the name
recovered was that of detainee, and the reference to this identification has been removed
from this assessment'
4. Detainee's Account of Events:
The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account.
These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.
a. Prior History: Detainee lived his entire life in Saudi Arabia, though he claims
Yemeni citizenship? Detainee completed eight years of formal education prior to beginning
Koran studies at the Haram al-Makki Mosq?ue in Mecca, SA. Detainee Worked various
menial jobs at the mosque and local hotels.
b. F) Recruitment and Travel: While studying at the Haram al-Makki Mosque,
detainee met Abu Ali al-Yati.4 Al-Yati showed detainee videos of fighting and training in
Chechnya. Al-Yati convinced detainee that the Koran stated all Muslims must know how to
fight; thus, detainee became excited at the prospect, and decided to travel to Afghanistan for
training. Al-Yafi facilitated detainee's travel, including flight arrangements and funds. In
early June 20Ol,5 detainee and al-Yati flew from Jeddah, SA, through the United Arab
Emirates (AE) and Pakistan (PK) before arriving in Afghanistanf'
1 Analyst Note: The material referenced was identified with source document TD 314-13174-03.
2 Analyst Note: Detainee's parents were both from Yemen. Saudi law does not automatically grant Saudi
citizenship to children of foreign national fathers, even if the child is bom in the country.
3 HR 6 034 0686 03
000506 KB
5 000506 SIR EXT
IIR 6 034 0686 03, 000506 302 000506 SIR 000505 SIR
2
SUBJ ECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
c. F) Training and Activities: Detainee arrived in Kandahar, AF, and stayed at the
1-Iajji Habash guesthouse owned by al-Qaida operative Abu Zubayr, but managed by Abu
Khalud.7 At the guesthouse, detainee surrendered his passport and never saw it again?
Detainee studied the Koran for two months while waiting to join a training class. In early
August 2001, detainee began six weeks of training at al-Faruq lmder the tutelage of al-Qaida
trainer, Jouhaina Sabah al-Layl.9 Training consisted of familiarization with the Kalashnikov,
PK (pistol), heavy machine gun, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher, and hand-to-hand
combat techniques, Detainee claimed he never received notice of advanced training
opportunities while attending training at al-Faruq though he did report on two nearby training
camps and stated he heard explosions coming from the direction of those camps. Detainee
claimed no knowledge of the activities conducted at the camps and stated that he was
forbidden to attend them. Detainee also denied awareness that al-Faruq belonged to Usama
Bin Laden (UBL) claiming he had no knowledge of During detainee's time at al-
Faruq, his brother, Salah Muhammad Salih al-Dhabi, ISN visited
the camp.U Detainee denied any knowledge of purpose in Afghanistan. In mid-
September 2001, detainee's trainer informed detainee that he (detainee) was being transferred
to another camp near alalabad, AF, Over the next week, detainee and other trainees slept
outside the camp and were given no reasons for leaving al-Faruq." Detainee arrived in
alalabad and was assigned to al-Qaida commander Abu Thabit's camp. The camp was a
large farm run by a person named Muhjin al-Taiti.l3 Detainee was supposed to receive the
second phase of his training here, which included navigation, tactics, and artillery.]4 In late
October 2001, detainee received a Kalashnikov and 30 rounds of ammunition and was
assigned to Abu Thabit's unit defending the area around Toran Mountain in Tora Bora."
000506 SIR EXT Analyst Note: Abu Khalud was a known al-Qaida member linked to the
guesthouse. A variant of Khalud is Khaloud.
8 Analyst Note: This was nomaal procedure for checking into a guesthouse, Recruits would surrender passports
and all valuables for safekeeping while they conducted training or were attached to combat units.
9 Variants for Sabah al-Layl include: Sabah Alil, Sabaa Llail, Saba al-Leyl, Sabaa al-Waile; also
refer to IIR 2 340 6120 02, IIR 2 340 6302 02, and 000506 SIR EXT
[0 000506 302 000506 SIR 000506 SIR IIR 6 034 0686 03
ll IIR 6 105 0106 05, Analyst Note: DNA analysis on detainee and indicated that the two were "very
likely" to be close biological relatives full siblings brothers).
Analyst Note: Al-Faruq was evacuated due to expected US retaliation for the 9/ 11 attacks.
13 000506 302 000506 SIR EXT Analyst Note: Variants for Muhjin al-Taifi
include: Majin al-Taefi, Abu Majin Abu Mahjin, Abu Mehjen, Abu Mahjan, Abu Mehgan, Abu Muhjan,
Abu Mahjen, Abu Muhaj an, and Abu Mihjan. Abu Muhj in is aka (Muhjin al-Sharif) aka (Abu Muhjid al~Taifi)
aka (Salih Husayn Ali Ahmad) and his true name is believed to be Marwan Muhammad Naman Mujahid; see CIR
316/07159-04, Abu Muhjin is discussed further in Paragraph 7b below.
000506 sm EXT
15
7
000506 302 IIR 6 O34 0750 03, IIR 2 340 6373 02, IIR 2 340 6384 02
3
SE
SECRE
TF
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
The coalition bombing campaign intensified against Tora Bora positions, so detainee's unit
retreated and fled toward Pakistanm
5. Capture Information:
a. According to detainee, Ramadan in 2001,'7 detainee surrendered to Afghan
forces after the majority of his traveling party was killed or seriously injured by an
explosion." This event probably describes the attack on al-Qaida forces in Tora Bora in
mid-December 2001.19 Detainee managed to make it to a nearby village with others from his
group." The villagers tumed the group over to Afghan Commander Hajj i al-Qadir Harp"
Detainee was reportedly transferred to the control of US forces on 18 December 2001.2
b. (S) Property Held: None
c. (S) Transferred to 5 May 2002
d. Reasons for Transfer to To provide information on the
following:
0 Personnel and training at al-Faruq
I The Zubair safe house in Kandahar
0 A1-Qaida recruitment and ingress routes to Afghanistan
6. Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has provided a logical timeline but
he has introduced intelligence gaps and contradictions through the lack of detail in his account of
events, Detainee has withheld information concerning guesthouses, safe houses, training
facilities, and his specific activities and associates in Afghanistan. Detainee spent two months in
Tora Bora, but provides only a vague and benign description of his activities, claiming to have
hidden in a cave.
IIR 6 034 0686 03, 000506 sm EXT
17 Analyst Note: Ramadan 2001 was from 17 November to 16 December 2001.
18 000502 KB Analyst Note: Detainee and share the same capture events.
19 Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis
2? HR 6 034 0893 04
IIR 7 738 0070 02, 000506 302 000506MFR IIR 6 034 1332
03, IIR 6 034 0893 04, IIR 6 034 1480 03, Analyst Note: In January 2002, Hamid Karzai appointed Qadir as
Kandahar Province Governor. Qadir was assassinated on 29 July 2002 by HIG operatives,
IIR 6 034 0686 03
21
4
SECRE
SUBJ ECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
7. Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to
the US, its interests and allies.
b. Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a probable
member of al-Qaida who utilized its travel network for access to Afghanistan and to receive
militant training. Detainee manned military positions in Tora Bora and probably engaged in
hostile activities against Coalition forces. Detainee has familial ties to extremism.
0 Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of al-Qaida who trained at and
occupied al-Qaida facilities in Afghanistan.
Detainee was recruited through the al-Qaida network. Abu Ali al-Yati
recruited and facilitated detainee's travel to Afghanistan." (Analyst Note: Abu Ali
al-Yafi is the alias for al-Qaida and Taliban recruiter Marwan arwan" who is linked
to several other I TF detainees. Al-Yaflm, a veteran ofthe Chechen and
Afghan conflicts used videos and stories to persuade young men to pursue militant
action in support of Islam. Al-Yafi was reportedly killed during a coalition raid in
Kandahar,Z5)
Detainee received approximately one and a half months of training at the
al-Qaida al-Faruq Camp under ouhaina Sabah al-Layl. Training consisted of
familiarization with the Kalashnikov, PK (pistol), heavy machine gun, RPG, and
hand-to-hand combat techniques,26 (Analyst Note: Al-Layl, a senior weapons
trainer, worked directly for senior al-Qaida operatives Abd al-Qadus and Muhammad
al-Masri.27) Detainee believed he was to receive the second phase of his training
consisting of navigation, tactics, and artillery in Tora Bora."
Detainee claimed he stayed at the Haj ji I-Iabash guesthouse aka (Zubair's
for three months." The Hajji Habash guesthouse served as an
administration facility for newly arrived recruits bound for the al-Faruq training
23 000506 KB 000506 sm EXT IIR 6 034 0686 03, 000506 302
000506 SIR 000506 sm Analyst Note: A variant ofYati is Jan,
2* HR 6 034 0109 O2
25 IIR 6 034 0686 03,
2? IIR 2 340 6120 02, IIR 2 340 6302 02, 000506 sm EXT
ll IIR 2 340 6120 02, IIR 6 034 0741 02, IIR 2 340 6302 02, Analyst Note: Both Qadus and Masri had significant
roles as al-Qaida commanders in the Tora Bora.
2* 000506 SIR EXT 2
2? 001457 SIR 20 OCT 2004
IIR 6 034 0686 O3
5
SE
RE
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
camp." (Analyst Note: A three month wait for a training class at al-Faruq is
assessed to be excessive. Detainee may claim this excessive time period to hide other
activities including completion of training)
Al-Qaida facilitator Zubayr al-Haili was the Hajji Habash
Guesthouse administrator." Zubayr reportedly had prior knowledge ofthe
September 2001 terrorist attacks and is linked to attempts to destroy US and
British ships in the Straits of Gibraltar. Zubayr was reportedly convicted in
Morocco in 2003.33
0 Detainee occupied al-Qaida positions in the Tora Bora Mountains in support
of hostilities against coalition forces.
Al-Qaida member Abu Thabit commanded detainee's unit. which was
responsible for defending Toran Mountain in Tora Bora. Abu Thabit also ran a camp
which supported and defended retreating Taliban and al-Qaida forces."
Detainee admitted receiving a Kalashnikov and 30 rounds of ammunition
and being assigned to Abu Thabit's unit defending the area arotmd Toran Mountain."
Assessed al-Qaida member Mohammed Nasir Yahya Kazaz, ISN
000509 verified detainee carried a Kalashnikov and reported that detainee
used a Yemeni passport. (Analyst Note: Detainee stated he last saw his passport at
the Hajj i Habash Guesthouse, but neither nor detainee identifies each other
from the house, indicating detainee may have had his passport in Tora Bora.)3?
Detainee reported serving under Abu Muhjin in Tora Bora." Abu Muhjin was
Marwan Muhammad Naman Mujahid." Abu Muhjin al-Taiti was ktnown to be in
Tora Bora where he served as a messenger for UBL and was reportedly killed while
walking with
IIR 6 034 0459 02, HR 4 2012565 O4
32 IIR 6 034 0580 04, IIR 6 034 0838 04
33 JTSM Ghost Detainee Report 25-Sep-2006
34 000506 302 000506 SIR EXT IIR 2 340 6334 02, Analyst Note: A series of
sixteen or seventeen rear-echelon camps were established to support and defend retreating Taliban and al-Qaida
terrorist forces. Camps were named after their commander except for Camp Torarma, which was led by Abd al-
Qadus. For more information on Abu Thabit see IIR 6 O34 0924 02.
35 000506 302 Analyst Note: Toran Mountain also contained a tunnel-like cave which was used as a
staging area for those individuals getting ready to-leave Afghanistan. Variants of Qadus include Qaddus, Qadous,
Qadoos, and Kadoos. Abd al-Qadus, the former commander of al-Faruq Camp, was in charge ofthe Toran tunnel.
See IIR 6 034 0750 03, IIR 2 340 6373 02, and IIR 2 340 6384 02
3? 000509 MFR 21-May-2002
000506 302 000506 sin Exr
3" Cuz 316/07159-04
39 IIR 6 034 0265 05, Analyst Note: The exact details of Abu Muhjin's death and the proximity
to UBL at the time have not been verified,
6
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
UBL's 55'h Arab Brigade member Arkan Muhammad Ghafil al-Karim,
ISN photo-identified detainee as being in a group that was
captured in Tora Bora and transported to a prison in Kabul, AF .40 (Analyst Note:
This group was reportedly captured with a significant amount of foreign money, to
include 10,000 Spanish Pesos, $5,000 USD, and an unknown amount of German
Marks and Pakistani Rupees. Group members attempted to hide the money in the
hollow legs of their prison bedsf" Detainee`s links to the money are unknown.)
0 Detainee's brothers are also affiliated with extremism.
Detainee saw his brother 72 at the al-Faruq training camp."
572 was a close associate with al-Qaida operative Zubayr al-Haili, having met him in
approximately l999 in Kabul, and lived with Zubayr for approximately one year."
On 7 February 2002, was captured at an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, PK,
with senior al-Qaida facilitator Abdu Ali al-Hajj Sharqawi aka (Riyadh the
Facilitator), ISN (Y (Analyst Note: Though detainee
admits to having a brother with name who detainee saw in Afghanistan,
detainee has denied, as late as April 2006, knowing DNA testing has
confirmgd detainee and 72 are likely to be full brothers (sharing both mother and
father.)
As of late July 2002, the Yemeni Political Security Organization (PSO)
held detainee's youngest brother, Ahmad al-Dhuby, in custody for alleged links to
terrorism and extremism. It is unknown if al-Dhuby is still in custody. 7
Analyst Note: The noted familial ties to extremism may indicate
additional ties originating from detainee's immediate family. As such, detainee's
family would be assessed to serve in a supportive function to detainee's
reengagement with extremist elements, should he be released.
c. Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MEDIUM threat from a
detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile
toward the guard force and Detainee currently has 3 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction
UR 6 034 1332 03
000653 MFR 28-Apr-2003, Analyst Note: Other members ofthe group included:
000499DP,
and
'2 000506 302
43 000572 FM40 19-Jul-2004
4* HR 2 340 6330 02
000506 SIR 07 Apr 2006
HR 6105 0106 05
47 TD 314/30682 02, Analyst Note: Detainee stated that his brother Ahmad had moved to Yemen in 1999, but
claimed that he had no infomation on Ahmad's activities in Yemen. A variant of Dhuby is Dhubee. See IIR 6
034 0686 03.
7
RE
.T TF
SUBJ ECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 28 October 2006, when he attempted to
assault a guard while participating in a mass disturbance. Other incidents for which detainee
has been disciplined include failure to follow instructions and camp rules and possession of
food type contraband. Detainee has no Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault in 2006.
F) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:
a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's
most recent interrogation session occurred on 20 .I une 2006.
b. F) Placement and Access: After detainee was recruited, he traveled to
Afghanistan, where he stayed in the al-Qaida affiliated Hajji Habash guesthouse. Detainee
had direct access to residents and training conducted in the al-Qaida al-Faruq training camp.
During detainee's attempted escape through Tora Bora, he had contact with al-Qaida military
leadership and occupied defensive fighting positions under their command. Detainee has
familial links to extremism, Detainee was reportedly captured with a group which carried a
large sum of money.
c. F) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided minimal reportable
intelligence and is routinely non-cooperative, His relationships with his older brother,
572, and younger brother, Ahmad require further investigation, especially with respect to
their collective ties to al-Qaida in Afghanistan and other coutries. Detainee has information
on al-Qaida guesthouses including managers, operations, and especially other residents.
Detainee can provide first-hand information on the events that occurred during his time in
Ialalabad and Tora Bora including actual hostilities, leadership, and activities of other
personnel. Corroborated reporting regarding the relatively large quantity of money at the
time of detainee's capture may tie him to al-Qaida's financial network.
d. Areas of Potential Exploitation:
0 Al-Qaida's Saudi Arabia recruitment network
0 Al-Faruq and Hajji Habash guesthouse
0 Tora Bora
Detainee's familial links to extremism
0 Money source and intended use
8
SE
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: (S)
9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 29 October 2004, and
he remains an enemy combatant.
HARRY B. S, IR.
Rear Admiral, Navy Commanding
Mahmmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef
Mahmmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef is a 35- or 36-year-old citizen of Yemen. He was transferred to Ghana on Jan. 6, 2016.
Note: These documents include some assertions that cannot be independently verified. Many allegations have been contested by detainees and their lawyers, and some have been undercut by other evidence.
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360
JTF-GTMO-CDR
28 December 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN USYM-000202DP (S)
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
1. (S) Personal Information: o o JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mahmud Omar Ben Atif Current/True Name and Aliases: Mahmoud Omar Muhammad Bin Atef, Mahmud Umar Bin Atif al-Halali, Attef al-Makki, Abu al-Walid al-Makki, Mahmoud Omar Attef, Mahmamod Omar Majid Bin Ataff, Mahmoud Omar Muhammed Awad Bin Atef, Fowaz Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date of Birth: 1979 Citizenship: Yemen (YM) Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000202DP
o o o o
2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 16 December 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a fighter in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) former 55th Arab Brigade and is an admitted member of the Taliban. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and continues to
CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20321228
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) demonstrate his support of UBL and extremism. 1 Detainee accepted recruitment and facilitation from a known al-Qaida member in Saudi Arabia, and acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan (AF) to participate in jihadist combat. He is assessed to have stayed at al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses and admitted receiving militant training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee's name was found on an al-Qaida affiliated document, and he has threatened to kill US citizens on multiple occasions including a specific threat to cut their throats upon his release. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o o o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value
c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) o Attributed al-Halali alias to detainee through exploitation of a letter he sent home 2 o Included additional reporting of detainee's presence on the front lines o Added corroboration of detainee's training at al-Faruq Training Camp o Added assessment detainee utilized the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse o Added detainee's leadership activities during detention and threats against US citizens o Added detainee's possible travel to the US 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born in Saudi Arabia, but claims to be a Yemeni due to his father's Yemeni citizenship. Detainee only completed the first year of high school in Saudi Arabia, and held a job as a driver in Mecca during the hajj period. 3
Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field. 2 GUAN-2006-T00769-HT, Analyst Note: Initial research on this alias provided no additional information. AlHalali is family name more commonly associated with Yemeni citizens. 3 000202 302 13-FEB-2002, IIR 6 034 0382 02, Analyst Note: Saudi citizenship is not granted based simply on place of birth. Yemeni's born in Saudi Arabia retain Yemeni citizenship. The hajj is the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, SA.
1
2 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228
S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad after watching several propaganda videos. Detainee discussed the events in the videos with several individuals including Muhammad Saad al-Lahibi, aka (Muthana alMakki), who approached detainee at the al-Shinqiti Mosque in Jeddah, SA. Al-Lahibi persuaded detainee to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, 4 and made detainee's travel arrangements using detainee's money to buy tickets. In June 2001, detainee traveled with Abu al-Bara al-Jeddawi from Jeddah to Karachi, Pakistan (PK). Detainee phoned al-Lahibi, who in turn called Abu Dullah Bin Jaibi, a Pakistani, to meet detainee and al-Jeddawi at the airport. 5 Jaibi took them to a bus stop where detainee and al-Jeddawi boarded a bus to Quetta, PK, and then continued to Afghanistan. Al-Jeddawi and detainee arrived in Kandahar, AF, and stayed in a guesthouse managed by Muaz aka (Abu Maaz). 6 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: At the Kandahar guesthouse, detainee expressed his desire to participate in jihad. Muaz took detainee's passport and told detainee he had to attend one of the training camps before he could fight. Muaz vouched for detainee and coordinated his entry into the al-Faruq Training Camp. In July 2001, detainee traveled to alFaruq and trained for three weeks on the AK-47, rock et-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher, and pistol. While at al-Faruq, detainee saw UBL who visited the camp to speak to the trainees. Detainee's trainer, Jarah al-Madani, asked detainee to swear bayat (an oath of loyalty) to UBL, but detainee refused (no further reason for refusal noted). 7 After completing the three weeks of training, detainee was assigned to the Talha Unit in the Khwaja Ghar area in northern Afghanistan, under the command of Abd al-Salam. 8 Detainee first heard of the 11 September 2001 attacks while in Khwaja Ghar. 9 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) Detainee reported the Northern Alliance forces attacked detainee's unit in Khwaja Ghar. 10 By mid to late November 2001, during hostilities with US and Coalition forces, detainee's commander, Gharib al-Sanaani, ordered the unit to withdraw to Konduz,
4 5
Analyst Note: Variants of al-Lahibi include al-Lehaby and al-Lahabi. A variant of al-Shinqiti is al-Shanqity. Analyst Note: Variants of al-Jeddawi include al-Jidawy and al-Jedawi. Al-Jeddawi is an alias assumed by individual from Jeddah, SA; al-Jeddawi means the person from Jeddah. Variants of Abu Dullah Bin Jaibi include Abdullah Bin Jaibi, Abdallah Bin Jaibi, and Abdallah Bin Jaybi. 6 IIR 6 034 0382 02, 000202 302 13-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Variants of Muaz include Maaz, Mouad, and Muath. 7 IIR 6 034 0764 02, IIR 6 034 0382 02 8 IIR 6 034 0382 02, 000202 KB 10-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: The Talha unit was also known as Markez Talha, part of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and one of four fighting positions on the front lines of Khwaja Ghar. See IIR 2 340 6400 02 for information on the front lines. 9 IIR 6 034 0680 02 10 000202 302 13-FEB-2002
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) AF. 11 On approximately 24 November 2001, Northern Alliance forces captured detainee and retreating Taliban and al-Qaida affiliated forces and transported them to the Qala-i-Jangi prison. The following morning (25 November 2001), the prisoners revolted, resulting in a protracted firefight against US and Coalition forces at the prison. Surviving prisoners took cover in the prison's basement. After seven days, the surviving prisoners surrendered and were taken to the Sheberghan Prison. 12 Detainee was then transferred to US custody in Kandahar no later than 1 January 2002. 13 b. (S) Property Held: o Miscellaneous personal items including unidentified pills and a bag with an unidentified white powder c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 21 January 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o o o Al-Faruq Training Camp Konduz frontlines Qala-i-Jangi prison uprising in Mazar-e-Sharif
6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's timeline is credible and consistent with known events with minor discrepancies such as his claim of training at al-Faruq in June 2001 and additional claims that he traveled to al-Faruq in July 2001. Detainee has attempted to minimize his involvement in front-line combat. Although detainee has denied shooting at anyone, 14 he admitted traveling to Afghanistan to participate in jihadist combat and was present on the front lines during hostilities in November 2001. Detainee withholds information about his associates and activities in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, including his training. Detainee has
Analyst Note: Gharib al-Sanaani took over command of Markez Talha when Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami was killed by a US air strike. Gharib al-Sanaani reportedly died in the Qala-i-Jangi uprising. See IIR 6 034 0382 02 and IIR 6 034 0692 02. 12 IIR 6 034 0382 02, Analyst Note: Numerous JTF-GTMO detainees surrendered to General Dostum's troops in late November 2001. Dostum's forces took the prisoners to the Qala-i-Jangi prison located outside Mazar-e-Sharif, AF, on 24 November 2001. After one night in captivity, the prisoners revolted leading to the deaths of a number of soldiers of the Northern Alliance and CIA operative Johnny "Mike" Spann. Those who survived the assaults, including a majority of JTF-GTMO detainees, as well as American citizen, John Walker Lindh, hid in the basement until re-captured and transferred to Sheberghan Prison, located approximately seventy-five miles due west of Mazare-Sharif. Sheberghan primarily held Taliban and Afghani prisoners, until after the uprising when a majority of the non-Afghani's arrived from Qala-i-Jangi. See Deception at Qala-i-Jangi Prison - USSOC - May 2005. 13 000202 Initial Screening 01-JAN-2002 14 000202 302 13-FEB-2002
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) provided conflicting information regarding his personal background and reasons for traveling to Afghanistan. Detainee is not responsive to direct questioning and withholds information of intelligence value, indicating his continuing support to extremism. 15 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee served as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and admitted being a member of the Taliban. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee's name was found on an al-Qaida affiliated document. Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan to participate in jihadist combat and admitted receiving training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp Detainee admitted al-Qaida facilitator Muhammad Saad al-Lahibi recruited him for jihad and is assessed to have used al-Qaida and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee was present during the uprising at Qala-i-Jangi and may have information on the events surrounding the death of a CIA agent. Detainee has been a key leader for 2007 detainee unrest, has made multiple threats to kill guard force personnel, and has demonstrated support for UBL. o (S//NF) Detainee served as a fighter in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and admitted being a member of the Taliban. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces while serving with the Talha Unit on the front lines. ? (S//NF) Detainee stated he desired to fight on the front lines with the Taliban following completion of his training. 16 Detainee traveled to Northern Afghanistan and fought on the front lines in Konduz under Abd al-Salam until detainee's capture in November 2001. 17 (S//NF) Abd al-Salam is assessed to be Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami aka (Muammar Said Abbud Dayan), a known al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator. Abd al-Salam served as a 55th Arab Brigade commander directly subordinate to IZ10026. 18 Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami was killed during a US air strike during
15 16
000202 SIR 03-Oct-2007 000202 302 01-MAR-2002 17 000202 KB 10-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Though detainee has stated his capture occurred in December, timeline events show he was captured in November. 18 IIR 2 340 6400 02, IIR 6 034 0837 02
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) Operation Enduring Freedom. 19 IZ-10026 was closely associated with UBL and was in charge of non-Afghan Taliban troops and al-Qaida fighters. 20 ? (S//NF) Detainee stated he considered himself a member of the Taliban and noted he fought for them on the front lines. Detainee reported he was a member of the Talha Unit. 21 The Talha Unit was one of four fighting positions of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade on the front lines in Khwaja Ghar. 22 ? (U//FOUO) John Walker Lindh identified detainee as Abu Walid, and stated he saw detainee on the front lines and during the retreat to Konduz. 23 (Analyst Note: Detainee admited meeting Lindh while they were imprisoned at Qala-i-Jangi, but has not identified him from the front lines.) 24 ? (S//NF) Muhammad Hussein Ali Hassan, ISN US9MO-000123DP (MO-123), identified detainee as Fowaz. TZ-123 added he saw detainee on the frontlines at Khwaja Ghar and in Mazar-e-Sharif. 25 ? (S//NF) Fawaz Naman Hamoud Abdullah Mahdi, ISN US9YM-000678DP (YM678), identified detainee as an RPG operator in the Talha Unit on the front lines in Khwaja Ghar. 26 (S//NF) Detainee's name and alias were noted on an al-Qaida affiliated document. ? (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name Mahmoud Omar Attef, aka (Atteff alMakki), was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered during raids against al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi on 11 September 2002. The document listed detainee as a Yemeni who surrendered his passport and plane ticket for safe keeping in trust account number 10230-225. 27 ? (S//NF) Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.
o
IIR 6 034 0077 03, See IIR 6 034 1474 03, IIR 6 034 0675 02 and TD-314/49402-01, among other reporting, for additional details on Abd al-Salam. 20 IIR 2 340 6093 02, IIR 6 034 1301 04, IIR 6 034 0913 03 21 IIR 6 034 0382 02(b) 22 IIR 2 340 6400 02, Analyst Note: "Markez" is Arabic for center. 23 IIR 4 201 3149 05 24 000202 302 01-MAR-2002 25 IIR 4 201 0816 06, Analyst Note: MO-123 is erroneously identified with the ISN US9TZ-000123DP in the report. 26 000678 302 18-Aug-2002 27 TD-314/40693-02, AFGP-2002-905527
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) o (S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan to participate in jihadist combat and receiving training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp. 28 ? (S//NF) Detainee reported he traveled to Afghanistan to fight jihad against the Northern Alliance. 29 ? (S//NF) Detainee acknowledged receiving three weeks of training on the AK-47, RPG, and pistol at the al-Faruq Training Camp. 30 Detainee identified his trainers as al-Jarrah al-Madani and Abu Hurayrah. 31 (S//NF) Al-Jarrah, a known al-Qaida trainer, oversaw detainee's training and asked detainee to swear bayat to UBL. Detainee claimed he refused to swear bayat. 32 (S//NF) Abu Hurayrah is assessed to be Qasim Yahya al-Rimi aka (Abu Hurayrah) aka (Dr. Hurayrah), an instructor at the al-Faruq Training Camp. Abu Hurayrah taught combat, explosives, typography, and light arms. 33 ? (S//NF) Richard Dean Belmar, ISN US9UK-000817DP, (UK-817, transferred), corroborated detainee's mid-2001 training at al-Faruq. UK-817 received training at al-Faruq in July to September 2001. 34 UK-817 reported detainee received training at al-Faruq and last saw detainee at a hospital in Kandahar. 35 (Analyst Note: The approximate period for basic training at al-Faruq was eight weeks. Though possible, it is unlikely detainee only received three weeks of training. Multiple classes, with staggered starting dates, trained at al-Faruq. UK-817 does not place detainee in UK817's training group and detainee may have been in an earlier class which graduated prior to UK-817.) ? (S//NF) Detainee reported UBL visited al-Faruq during detainee's training in June 2001. 36 All weapons at the camp were secured except for those carried by UBL, his bodyguards, and the camp commander Abd al-Qadus. 37 After al-Faruq closed in the fall of 2001, Abd al-Qadus fled into the Tora Bora Mountains where he commanded Camp Torrana. 38
000202 FM40 07-APR-2005, 000202 302 01-MAR-2002 000202 KB 10-FEB-2002 30 000202 302 13-FEB-2002 31 000202 302 13-FEB-2002, IIR 6 034 0382 02, Analyst Note: A variant to al-Jarrah is al-Jarah. A variant of Hurayrah is Huraira. 32 000202 302 01-MAR-2002 33 TD-314/36314-03, TD-314/14472-04, TD-314/00363-04, Analyst Note: US9YM-000167DP (YM-167) is Abu Hurayrah's brother. 34 IIR 2 340 7140 02 35 IIR 6 034 0420 05 36 000202 KB 10-FEB-2002 37 IIR 6 034 0382 02, Analyst Note: Variants of Qadus include: Qaddus, Qadoos, and Kadus. Abd al-Qadus, a Bahraini, was the area commander and the commander of al-Faruq prior to its evacuation. 38 IIR 2 340 6334 02
29
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) o (S//NF) Detainee admitted al-Qaida facilitator Muhammad Saad al-Lahibi recruited him for jihad in early 2001. 39 ? (S//NF) Al-Lahibi persuaded detainee to travel to Afghanistan for jihad, 40 and made detainee's travel arrangements. In Karachi, detainee phoned al-Lahibi, who directed Abu Dullah Bin Jaibi to meet detainee and al-Jeddawi at the airport for further travel coordination. 41 ? (S//NF) Ayman Muhammad Ahmad Mahmud al-Shurfa, ISN US9SA-000331DP (SA-331), also identified Muhammad al-Lihabi as a Saudi who recruited him (SA331) for jihad in Afghanistan. 42 Lahibi, aka (Muthanna al-Jeddawi), was reportedly killed in Tora Bora in 2001. 43 (Analyst Note: SA-331 reported traveling to the Nibras Guesthouse from Jeddah in July 2001, at approximately the same time as detainee. Due to similar timelines and shared recruitment experiences, it is probable they are associates.) o (S//NF) Detainee used al-Qaida and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ? (S//NF) Detainee probably stayed at the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse in Quetta, PK; a known transit facility for al-Qaida recruits en route to Afghanistan. Detainee reported traveling to Quetta, PK and then continued to Kandahar, AF. 44 (Analyst Note: A stay over of a few days to several months at the Daftar Taliban was normal while the recruits waited for their beards to grow in and arrangements were made for their transportation to Afghanistan.) ? (S//NF) Detainee's Kandahar guesthouse is assessed to be the al-Qaida affiliated al-Nibras Guesthouse. Detainee stayed at the guesthouse prior to entering al-Faruq Training Camp. At the guesthouse, detainee filled out paperwork with basic biographical information and turned over his passport to Abu Maaz as instructed. Abu Maaz vouched for detainee and coordinated detainee's entry into the camp. 45 (Analyst Note: The Al-Nibras Guesthouse was a key al-Qaida facility processing and housing recruits prior to and following training at al-Faruq. UBL is known to have visited the guesthouse on many occasions.) (S//NF) Abu Maaz is probably al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Hasana, aka (Abu Muaz al-Jeddawi), though it is unlikely Muaz was the operator of the guesthouse, and detainee's affiliation with him remains
IIR 6 034 0382 02, 000202 302 13-FEB-2002 Analyst Note: Variants of al-Lahibi include al-Lehaby and al-Lahabi. A variant of al-Shinqiti is al-Shanqity. 41 IIR 6 034 0382 02, 000202 302 13-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Variants of Muaz include Maaz, Mouad, and Muath. 42 TD-314/41672-02, IIR 6 034 0161 07, Analyst Note: Spelled with the variation Mohammad al-Lohiebie in the IIR. 43 TD-314/17125-03, number 163 44 IIR 6 034 0382 02, 000202 302 13-FEB-2002 45 000202 302 01-MAR-2002, IIR 6 034 0680 02, TD-314/02747-03, Analyst Note: Detainee's statement was probably in response to the question asked of all mujahideen candidates beginning their stay at al-Nibras.
40 39
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) undefined. Al-Jeddawi was a key UBL associate and facilitator; he was believed to have been involved in al-Qaida operational planning. Al-Jeddawi operated in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Al-Jeddawi is currently imprisoned in Jeddah, SA. 46 (S//NF) Detainee stated the guesthouse was for new Afghanistan arrivals prior to their training at al-Faruq. 47 Others staying at the guesthouse with detainee included Abu Khalid al-Tabuki, Abu Ammar al-Mekki, Abu Dujana, and Salah al-Din. 48 ? (S//NF) Abu Khalid al-Tabuki is assessed to be Tawfiq Nasir Awad alBayhani, ISN US9SA-000893DP (SA-893), brother of al-Qaida trainer and facilitator Mansur Nasir Awad al-Bayhani aka (Abu Asim al-Tabuki). 49 ? (C//REL USA, GCTF) Ghalib Nasir al-Bihani, ISN US9YM-000128DP (YM-128), identified Abu Ammar al-Mekki as another student in his (YM128) training class and a fighter on the front lines in Afghanistan. 50 (Analyst Note: YM-128 is the brother of SA-893). o (S//NF) Detainee was present during the uprising at Qala-i-Jangi and may have information on the events surrounding the death of a CIA agent. ? (S//NF) Detainee has refused to discuss his experiences at Mazar-e-Sharif with interrogators. 51 However, in earlier interviews detainee stated he saw a Muhanad alTaizi at Qala-i-Jangi. Detainee stated al-Taizi, who specialized in video photography, had been injured. 52 ? (S//NF) Said Ibrahim Ramzi al-Zahrani, ISN US9SA-000204DP (SA-204), stated during the Qala-i-Jangi uprising, a Yemeni videographer, who was known to all the prisoners, led a group of three prisoners who overpowered an American photographer. Al-Taizi wrestled the American's pistol away from him and shot him. 53 (Analyst Note: The American was CIA Agent Johnny Spann.) o (S //NF) Detainee has been a key leader for 2007 detainee unrest in his cell block through attempted organization of a hunger strike and surveillance against the guard force. Detainee has made multiple threats to kill guard force personnel. Detainee has demonstrated support for UBL and deceased al-Qaida in Iraq leader, Abu Musab alZarqawi attacks on US forces and stated, "All Americans shall die because these were the rules of Allah." Detainee also stated, upon release, he would research guard force
TD-314/48966-02 IIR 6 034 0680 02 48 000202 302 13-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: Variants of Din include Deen, Dien and Dein. Variants of Mekki include Makki and Maky. A variant of Tabuki is Tabooki. 49 TD-314/50144-02, TD-314/48158-02, CIR 316-07534-06, CIR 316-18867-06 50 IIR 6 034 0064 06 51 000202 302 21-APR-2003 52 IIR 6 034 0382 02 53 IIR 6 034 0402 02, IIR 6 034 0016 02
47 46
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000202DP (S) personnel's names and faces on the internet and sneak into their homes to cut their throats like sheep. 54 o (S//NF) On 9 August 2007, detainee made the comment, "I lived in America and I know about Americans." When questioned about this, detainee corrected himself stating he lived in the United States of Cuba for five years. Although he may have meant JTFGTMO as noted in his correction, the possibility of previous travels to the US requires further investigation. This is the first time detainee has mentioned living in the US. 55 c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a High threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been noncompliant and semi-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 125 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 15 October 2007, when detainee was reported for placing toilet paper inside the vents. Detainee has six Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 13 June 2007, when detainee was reported for throwing urine and feces. Other incidents for which detainee was disciplined include participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, assault, and possession of food type contraband. In 2006, detainee had a total of 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 45 so far in 2007. 8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 3 October 2007. b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was exposed to al-Qaida training methodologies and personnel at al-Faruq and at the conflict at Khwaja Ghar. Detainee was present during the prisoner uprising at Qala-i-Jangi and can probably provide information on related events and status of personnel. Detainee probably resided at an al-Qaida sponsored guesthouse prior to his training at al-Faruq. Detainee possibly has information regarding the potential terrorist plots developed at the Kandahar guesthouse. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee initially cooperated with interviewers, relating an account assessed as plausible, fairly accurate, and complete. Aside from a few minor exceptions, he has refused to answer questions since approximately April 2003. Detainee has withheld information on his training at al-Faruq. Detainee also has not been entirely forthcoming with information related to his activities during the Qala-i-Jangi
JDG INTREP: 23 Jul 2007, 21 Jun 2007, 16 Apr 2006, 21 Sep 2005, 29 Jun 2005, 1 May 2005, 20 Apr 2005, 16 Apr 2005, 24 Aug 2004, 24 Jul 2004, 4 Jan 2004, 55 000202 SIR 09-Aug-2007
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s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20321228 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Detainee,ISN US9YM-000202DP(S)' Guantanamo uprising. Detaineeis unlikely to cooperatein the near future, but probably holds unique intelligence information. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o o Command and control at Khwaja Ghar, including personneland events Kandaharguesthouse o Personnel- identities and current locations o Personnel- activities and intentions Qala-i-Jangiuprising o Death of CIA agentJohnny "Mike" Spann Al-Faruq training and command Terrorist biographical/psychologicalinformation Terrorism RadicalizationFactors Terrorist Operationsin the CENTCOM AOR Communications
o o o o . o
on 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed 4 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.
T.* MARK H. BUZBY Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding
-can Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology.
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Credit: Nytimes.com