Jammu & Kashmir Floods – September 2014
Assessment visit 1stNovember – 10th November to
New Delhi
and
Srinagar
by
Dr Peter Patel – International Project Director
Summary and Key Recommendations
1.0 People of
Jammu and Kashmir
this September witnessed one of the most disastrous flood in their region. Figures for people and villages affected vary according to various reports. However, there is no doubt that around 2 million people have been affected by this disaster, 2600 villages are affected in
Jammu
(1000 villages) and
Kashmir
and 390 villages were completely submerged. A great part of
Srinagar
was transformed into a huge lake. Many parts of
Srinagar
had over 20 feet of water with between 1 to 2 floors of buildings under water for several days. Like any other natural calamity, majority of vital roads were submerged, communication, transport and health services were paralysed.
1.1 In this visit a limited assessment could be made from visit to
Srinagar
from 4th to 7thNovember. This is not meant to be a comprehensive report. Most of the evidence has been gathered by visual review of
Srinagar
, listening to local residents, media reports and information provided by Department of Health. A review of the City confirmed that most of the city areas were submerged under water. The river
Jhelum
spilled over submerging Sonwar, Rajbagh, Jawahar Nagar, Gogji Bagh and Wazir Bagh neighbourhoods of city. The first and the second storey of the houses and hotels in Rajbagh that were packed with tourists were submerged. Not surprisingly, all 4 major hospitals in
Srinagar
were badly affected by the floods and Kashmir Mirror reported that all these hospitals were mostly paralysed with large parts of their ground floors under water. There was huge loss and damage to expensive equipment and complete loss of functionality for weeks.
Recommendation 1:
Undertake a full independent review of Business Continuity Plans of the 4
Srinagar
hospitals. Independent review panel should particularly consider whether there was a Business Continuity or Crisis Management plan. If there was such a plan in place then consideration should be given to:
1. Who was responsible for implementing this plan?
2. Was the plan deliverable and effective? What functions were affected by the
September 2014 floods and what was contingency plan to ensure quick
restoration of these functions?
3. What went right and what went wrong.
4. How many staff were trained and what resources were in place to implement the
plan?
5. What lessons can be learnt from this disaster and what steps will be taken to
mitigate damage in future from similar disasters.
2.0
Srinagar
has a flood spill channel which was constructed in 1904 to relieve the strain on the Jhelum in the City of
Srinagar
. It is supposed to take 2/3rd of the total flow in the river and was designed to help river Jhelum to regulate its water levels while passing through the City of
Srinagar
. There is clear evidence that this flood channel is no longer fit for purpose, badly maintained and poorly dredged.
Recommendation 2:
Serious review should be taken on restoring functionality of the flood spill channel. Visual evidence suggests that this channel and parts of
Jhelum
river has become dumping ground for building material, and commercial and domestic waste. Significant part of the waste is non-biological and non-degradable enabling solidification at the bottom of the river and the channel. Along with this there are building/construction encroachments along the shores. Major efforts should be made to manage these effectively to ensure future risk mitigation from floods.
There is a lot of learning for Disaster Management Leads from this flood. We are not sure if the following areas (see below) were taken into consideration and if yes, why were they not effective.
Mitigation or Risk Mitigation - steps taken to control, reduce adverse effects or prevent a hazard from causing harm and to reduce risk to a tolerable or acceptable.
There are four types of risk mitigation strategies that hold unique to Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery. It’s important to develop a strategy that closely relates to and matches your regional administration and economic profile.
Risk Acceptance: Risk acceptance may not reduce any effects in many cases but in all cases will allow an assessment of the risks, potential harm and damage and enable planning to reduce level of harm, morbidity or mortality. Natural disasters are those where we have to accept unpredictable risks, however there should still be a strategy to mitigate from such disasters. Total risk acceptance as it is done in commercial world is not an option for any government or organisation dealing with disaster management.
Risk Avoidance: Opposite of risk acceptance. Actions that avoids any exposure to the risk whatsoever.
Risk Limitation: Usually should be used along with risk avoidance and in many cases it is impossible to have 100% risk avoidance.
Risk Transference: Risk transference is the involvement of handing risk off to a third party. Usually, a local or state government will use this strategy by passing transferring the handling of risks to Central government or a special central unit such as National Disaster Management Centre.
Did the State or Disaster management leads consider lowering of risks by considering and learning from past disasters?:
Reducing the severity of potential consequences;
Reducing the probability of occurrence harmful effects;
§
Reducing the exposure to that risk.
3.0 Several thousands of families have lost their homes, crops and livestock. Significant infrastructure was either disabled or destroyed. Hospitals, schools, shops and local administrative units have also been badly affected by significant damage, and thousands of businesses have lost everything they owned. Poverty and unemployment has returned. There is clearly an economic crisis in the region. People of
Kashmir
are not aware of any support they will get immediately or over period of next 12 months for economic recovery which will enable them to restore their businesses. Those who have become unemployed suddenly are not sure when they will be gainfully employed to support their families. Poverty is setting and there is a big challenge to support these communities through these difficult periods.
Like with any major disaster, water and sewerage systems have been badly damaged. To repair and restore these systems will take several months. The first key challenge for survivors is access to clean water, safe food and sanitation. The second key challenge for the survivors is to survive the harsh winter which has started and will last till end of March 2015. We did not find any evidence for a ‘Winter mitigation and crisis management plan.’
While large part of the country recognised and appreciated the role of Army during these floods, many local communities and commentators were critical of the media’s uneven focus, heavy coverage of Army support and not recognising a great job done by the local people. Overall review based on local people’s comments and media reports indicate possibility of deficiencyin rescuing many stranded communities, very poor support and absence of effective manpower and appropriate resources for distribution of aid. This does not in anyway reflect truth and reality of the situation. Those who would be affected by such calamities will always find few hours let alone few days wait too long and inadequate. It should be recognised that during such mega disasters, it is difficult to map extent of disaster and support needs of the communities over several thousands of square miles of land in absence of communication networks and immobilised infrastructure.
Recommendation 3:
It is important to make clear that this recommendation does not indicate that these steps are not being taken by the State Government. Much of the assessment was limited because of two days of curfew in the region, there by restricting amount of reliable information gathering and evaluation.
a) It is recommended that government officials undertake a rapid review of supply of clean water, safe sewerage and removal of garbage, assessment of contamination of water supply from chemicals and hazardous waste. We did not have any access to reports on assessment of chemical contamination. Regular monitoring of water supplies should continue even when earlier testing indicates safe water. It is important to understand that when such disaster occur, water supplies can be contaminated even at later date because of damaged sewerage and subsequent contamination of water because of poor sanitation facilities. Ensure quick repair and restoration of water and sewerage systems and upgrading of the system instead of use of short term ‘bandaid/sticky plaster’ method.
b) Much work needs to be done to mitigate increase in morbidity and mortality from cold and freezing temperatures of severe
Kashmir
winter. Most affected people who have lost their homes will be living either in over-crowded shared homes or equally overcrowded poor temporary shelters. It is predicted that the winter pressures will increase mortality within the babies, infants the elderly. Winter usually sees an increase of upto 30% in illnesses and many deaths occur as result of respiratory illnesses or heart attacks. Most homes and offices will not have dried completely, and the resulting damp will continue to increase winter related illnesses.
There should be continued needs assessment which could be carried out jointly with NGOs and provision should be made to keep people warm and well with clothing, blankets and nutritious food. The regional commissioner has assured us that large quantities of blankets have been distributed and all the affected communities have adequate supplies. However, anecdotal briefings have suggested that many families who did not stay in camps but went to stay with relatives have not received any aid.
4.0 Jammu & Kashmir State Disaster Management policy makes a good reading along with
Jammu and Kashmir
NIDM publication. These documents while well written raises many questions within the residents of
Jammu and Kashmir
, many Indians and independent NGOs.
The
Jammu
and Kashmir Disaster Management policies states:
a) Area flood mapping using GIS and Remote Sensing will be prepared to make future preparedness plans.
b) Forecast and warning system using modern scientific know-how will be improved.
c) Proper river bank protection by constructing embankments and using anti-erosion measures will be taken up on a large scale. Involvement of PRIs by taking benefit of schemes like MNREGA will be given priority.
d) In flood prone areas, evacuation capabilities should be enhanced.
e) Construction of residential colonies on river banks and flood plains will not be allowed. Offenders will be dealt under law.
A number of people is
Srinagar
and
New Delhi
I talked to were clearly not convinced that these policies have either been implemented or if implemented were effective during the floods of September 2014. Most people in
Srinagar
confirmed that there had been adequate warnings about impending floods. However, most residents chose to ignore these warnings. We could not establish whether the whole of region was adequately informed. There was some confusion between the people providing the warnings and those receiving the warnings. Most people I talked to stated that there was absence of clarity regarding which areas were safe areas, inadequate information on how long and how bad the floods were going to be and poor support for people to move from their homes to a safer areas.
Most importantly, we have identified absence Community Disaster Preparedness Strategy and Management plan. Every person we talked to in
Srinagar
or in
New Delhi
had never heard of Community Disaster Preparedness and had little understanding of their (communities) responsibility for disaster preparedness and limiting harm or damage from such crisis.
The NIDM Jammu and
Kashmir
plan published in 2012 is a good starting document along with the J & K Disaster Management Policy 2011 document. Both documents show that the officers of the State have an excellent understanding of Disaster Management. However, there are indications that the operating structures are ‘silo’ and ‘role’ culture based systems and likely to fail because of bureaucratic nature of command control, responsibilities of the nodal officers and compartmentalised structures. It is possible that the challenges faced during the September floods were as a result of these plans and consideration should be given to finding an integrated approach (both vertical and horizontal integration) in future.
There is evidence that areas listed in c), d) and e) need strengthening and implementing. Visible evidence around
Srinagar
also indicated that a large proportion of housing built in the region which was badly damage was of very poor standard. Many new or recently build properties also appeared to be of similar lower quality. It is no surprise that these buildings could not withstand the September 2014 floods. Considering the impact of the floods, the key concern for Disaster Management Authority should be whether these buildings will be able to survive a moderate earthquake.
This should not be taken a blame apportioning but lessons to be learnt.
Recommendation 4:
1. Review information gathering as stated in a) and b) above and improve planning for mitigation, improve community communications and effectiveness for community preparedness.
2. Reconsider logistics and implementation of purpose stated in d) above.
3. Ensure early implementation of purpose state in c) and e) above.
4. Strengthen building regulations to ensure that all new buildings and reconstructions are built to appropriate specifications to reduce serious damage from floods and earthquakes.
5.00 Review of Health Needs – A significant part of our assessment and review was facilitated by Mr G H Kaloo, President of J & K Press Association. I would like to acknowledge full open and transparent process of providing information by the Directorate of Health - Kashmir, extensive discussions with doctors of the Directorate of Health Services, Kashmir, Mr Rohit Kansal, Div Commissioner and Dr Saleem-ur-Rehman, Director Health Service Kashmir.
We would like to commend the Directorate of Health –
Kashmir
for their robust understanding of health needs and public health risks following major floods. A Crisis Management Centre was set up at Division of Epidemiology and Public Health. Evidence was presented through discussions, documentation and visit to Crisis Management Centre. The Centre was well prepared to gather and analyse information they were receiving from the region. Team led by Dr Rehana Kousar along with Dr S M Kadri, Dr Ijtaba Shafi and Dr Rashid Para shared all requested information on disease monitoring and management of post-floods immunisation programme.
Displacement related Health Problems:
After any disaster there is significant risk of communicable disease transmission to the displaced population. The risk is higher when large population is affected such as in
Kashmir
floods and non-availability of safe water, food or sanitation over several days.
Additional risks are associated with nutrition status, age of the population and level of
the level of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles and access to healthcare services.
Risk Factors for Communicable Disease Transmission.
Effective response to health needs of any disaster affected population requires a robust communicable disease risk assessment. We believe that the Directorate of Health –
Kashmir
had this in place. There was evidence that the key staff in the Directorate had taken into consideration to identify endemic and epidemic diseases that are common in the affected area. In its post flood support delivery they had taken into consideration living conditions of the affected population, including number, size, location, and density of settlements and availability of safe water and adequate sanitation facilities. Reports presented by the Directorate also show that they had taken into consideration degree of access to healthcare and functionality of healthcare infrastructure under their control.
The Department was more than adequately prepared for monitoring water-borne diseases, such as typhoid fever, shigellosis, cholera, leptospirosis and hepatitis A & E (through jaundice monitoring) and vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever.
It is commendable that the Directorate had also taken into consideration spread of most flood borne diseases and there was good evidence of mass immunisation programmes for measles. More than 9.37 lacs of measles vaccinations have been administered in
Kashmir
valley.
Floods have certainly resulted in power cuts and this would have resulted in affecting functioning of health facilities. Consideration should be given to damage to vaccine/drugs cold chain and any vaccines or drugs affected by this should be destroyed. We understand that the Directorate of Health has already taken appropriate steps in this area. Furthermore they have also advised people not to purchase or use medicines affected by floods. Retail pharmacies in the region have been instructed to destroy all medicines affected by floods.
Most of the data gathered was raw figures of recorded infections or symptoms from different districts. The information was well mapped. Despite of huge risk factor posed by this major flood, raw data available on reported and diagnosed infection indicated no significant increase in enteric/diarrheal diseases or jaundice symptoms as compared to previous year’s figures. The medical team attributed this low rate to rapid distribution of over 11 lacs of chlorine tablets, provision of health education on water and food safety in camps and most affected regions. The change in weather to lower temperatures also contributed to reduction and limiting of many traditional enteric infections. It was recommended that in future the team should analyse the data on the basis of per 1000 population and also record age of the patients. This would enable identification of clusters/pockets of infection(s) at either camp sites or overcrowded localities where there may have been breach of sanitation and water or food pollution or rise in acute respiratory infections. Recording of age would also enable whether babies/children or old people were mainly affected as compared to young healthy adults.
Non-epidemic diseases: We did not discuss or review other areas of increased risk of infection of water-borne diseases contracted through direct contact with polluted waters, such as wound infections, dermatitis, conjunctivitis and ear, nose and throat infections. Limitations of resources, diverse provision of health care through private and public sector, limited access to health care and challenges of recording and gathering data for all health care needs from a population dispersed over a large geography is a very complex and difficult task for any developing country.
Infectious disease risks from dead bodies:
There is always a potential for spread of infection from dead bodies post disaster. An increase in large number of dead bodies post any disaster may increase concerns of disease outbreaks. It is important to understand risks of epidemics as result of dead bodies post disaster. In majority of the cases the deaths post natural disasters are as a result of trauma or drowning. In such instances, the human remains do not pose a risk of epidemics. Dead bodies do pose a risk when the death(s) are as a result of infections such as cholera, typhoid or haemorrhagic fevers. We do not have accurate figures for number of deaths in
Jammu and Kashmir
floods. Media reports indicate over 300 people were dead by mid-September
Dead bodies do pose significant risk to persons who are involved in close contact with the dead. Such personnel in
Kashmir
floods could be military personnel, rescue workers, volunteers, health care workers and others involved in recovery of the bodies and post death funeral management. These personnel are at risk of being exposed to chronic infectious agents (Table 1).
Table 1 – Infectious Agents linked to dead bodies post natural disasters
Bloodborne
Hepatitis B
Hepatitis C
HIV
Gastrointestinal
Rotavirus diarrhoea
Campylobacter enteritis
Salmonellosis
Enteric fevers (typhoid and paratyphoid)
Escherichia coli
Hepatitis A & E
Shigellosis
Cholera
Respiratory
Tuberculosis
·
Tuberculosis can be acquired if the bacillus is aerosolized (residual air in lungs exhaled, fluid from lungs spurted up through nose/ mouth during handling of the corpse).
·
Exposure to bloodborne viruses occurs due to direct contact with non-intact skin of blood or body fluid, injury from bone fragments and needles, or exposure to the mucous membranes from splashing of blood or body fluid.
·
Gastrointestinal infections are more common as dead bodies commonly leak faeces. Transmission occurs via the faeco-oral route through direct contact with the body and soiled clothes or contaminated vehicles or equipment. Dead bodies contaminating the water supply may also cause gastrointestinal infections
Source: WHO Flooding and communicable diseases fact sheet
We were unable to establish whether suitable precautions for these persons were in place from our discussions or from copies of reports we received. We recommend that Disaster Management Plans and Directorate of Health should include mandatory training in appropriate use of body bags or recovery and storage materials, use of disposable gloves, good hygiene practice and vaccination for hepatitis B and tuberculosis. Disposal of bodies should respect local custom and practice where possible. However, it would be very difficult to monitor the whole region effectively, as many dead bodies would be handled by relatives without adequate protection or knowledge and the need for immediate or early burial because of religious and cultural considerations. Consideration should be given to protecting individuals and volunteers from mohollas and educating mohalla committees of potential risks posed by dead bodies. This could form part of Community Disaster Preparedness education.
Tetanus booster should be considered for all personnel involved in rescue and those injured people with open wounds or serious cuts. Director of Health should also consider use of passive tetanus vaccination for appropriate personnel and wounded people. The above recommendation does not in any way imply that this has not been considered or is not in the disaster management plan.
Vaccination against Hepatitis A:
Generally mass immunisation for prevention of Hepatitis A is not recommended. However, this is a recommendation only and should be reviewed on the basis of local situation. All personnel involved in management of drinking water, food chain, waste management, contaminated water or sewerage management, sewerage should be considered at high-risk and should be offered hepatitis A vaccination. Where an outbreak of hepatitis A is confirmed, than hep A immunisation of all contact is strongly recommended.
Other considerations - Moulds and mildews
We did not discuss longer term implications to health resulting from damp accomodation and its impact. As a result of rapid change in regional weather there has been very little time for most buildings to dry. Therefore we anticipate health problems arising from dampness where there could be heavy exposure to moulds and mildews. The key health consideration should be given to those suffering from allergies and asthma. There is significant risk of contracting upper respiratory diseases with cold-like symptoms. People affected would present with wheezing and difficulty in breathing, dizziness, soar throats etc. Babies/infants, children, elderly people, pregnant women and immunocompromised are some of the groups who are at risk from damp and mould related triggering of health problems.
Other Diseases Associated with Crowding:
In most natural disasters crowding is a key factor for the displaced population. It is not usually the disaster itself but the collateral impact from crowded living created as a result of the disaster which responsible for spread of many communicable diseases.
Kashmir
floods are no exception to this. Crowding in most conditions is responsible for the transmission of several communicable diseases. Directorate of Health –
Kashmir
has already dealt with managing risks of measles outbreak through mass immunisation programme and other water borne transmission of infections.
This part of the report will deal with potential of other communicable diseases which are not considered as immediate risk and should be considered as part of on going diseasecontrol programmes.
A large number of homes were destroyed during the floods. As a result of change in the weather conditions majority of the displaced and affected population will not be able to rebuild their homes this winter. This has resulted in continued crowded living conditions in temporary shelters and shared homes with relatives and now provides major challenges for
Kashmir
healthcare providers.
It is recommended that the Health Directorate also focuses on spread of respiratory pathogens in post-disaster settings including those referred to as Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI) in many reports. These would include viral (influenza, RSV, adenoviruses), bacterial (Strep pneumoniae, pertussis, tuberculosis, Legionella, Mycoplasma pneumoniae), and diseases transmitted via the respiratory route (measles, varicella, Neisseria meningitides). C. Sandrock (Infectious Diseases After Natural Disasters.
California
Preparedness Education Network. A program of the California Area Health Education Centers. March 7, 2006.) has reported an increase inillnesses after Hurricane Katrina. The proportion of ARI was 12% four days after the levee overflowed and 20% during the next four weeks.
Tuberculosis: Most people do not associate Tuberculosis (TB) with natural disasters. However, this is a misplaced thinking and there is good evidence that TB does spread among displaced populations. Most infectious disease experts recognize that because of Inadequate access to healthcare, nutrition deficiency and overcrowding among refugees has led to in an increased spread of TB within this group ( Surmieda MR, et al. Surveillance in evacuation camps after the eruption of
Mt. Pinatubo
,
Philippines
. MMWR. CDC Surveill Summ. 1992;41:963.). Literature has recorded a four fold increase in TB during the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1991 and during the civil war and famine in
Somalia
in 1991-92, the incidence of TB increased four-fold. In Somali refugees of 1985, 26% of deaths were attributable to TB.
Malnutrition, over crowding, poor monitoring and access to health care some of the factors for transmission, morbidity, and mortality of TB in displaced peoples. Currently, TB and particularly MDR TB poses huge health threat in
India
. The Directorate of Health should pro-actively consider diagnoses, management and control of TB among the flood affected community. Ensuring continuity of care of previously known cases should be a top priority. The second most important priority should be detection and management of new cases. (Epidemics After Natural Disasters, David M. Lemonick, MD, FAAEP, FACEP
Based on a presentation at the 2011 AAPS Annual Scientific Meeting,
Tysons Corner
,
VA
, June 21-22)
Meningitis: It is well recognised that meningococcal meningitides is transmitted from person to person, particularly in situations of crowding. WHO (2005 & 2006) has reported cases and deaths from meningitis among those displaced in Aceh and
Pakistan
. Large outbreaks have not been recently reported in disaster-affected populations but are well-documented in populations displaced by conflict.
Prompt response with antimicrobial prophylaxis, as occurred in Aceh and
Pakistan
, can interrupt transmission. Large outbreaks have not been recently reported in disaster-affected populations but are well-documented in populations displaced by conflict. Haj immunisation programme