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Revision as of 06:25, 1 November 2013
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During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref>
During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref>
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Innovative Auctions has secured its fees at 1% for the first round and 4% for subsequent rounds. The first round took place in June and 6 contention sets were settled for a total of $9.01M .<ref name="applicantauction">[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th FIRST APPLICANT AUCTION SETTLED, NEXT AUCTION AUGUST 13TH]. Applicant Auction. Published 2013 June 19. Retrieved 2013 July 10.</ref> To date, the Applicant Auction has resolved contention for
14
gTLDs
for a
total sales price
of
$18.6 million.
+
Innovative Auctions has secured its fees at 1% for the first round and 4% for subsequent rounds. The first round took place in June and 6 contention sets were settled for a total of $9.01M .<ref name="applicantauction">[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th FIRST APPLICANT AUCTION SETTLED, NEXT AUCTION AUGUST 13TH]. Applicant Auction. Published 2013 June 19. Retrieved 2013 July 10.</ref> To date, the Applicant Auction has resolved contention for
18
gTLDs
. In the first two auctions (comprising 14 strings), the
total sales price
was
$18.6 million
; results from the third auction were undisclosed
.
[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>
[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>