As expected, the Greek parliament has approved a second set of prior measures, clearing the way for formal discussions on a third bailout program for the debt-stricken country.
As Bloomberg notes, “several lawmakers of governing Syriza party, including Parliament Speaker Zoi Konstantopoulou, former deputy Finance Minister Nadia Valavani didn’t support bill.”
As a reminder, Wednesday’s vote was largely a formality as the measures – which included EU rules on bank resolutions and civil justice reform – weren’t expected to be as contentious as those presented to lawmakers last week. Alexis Tsipras is desperately trying to regain the support of Syriza MPs who have refused to support the conditions creditors have attached to the €86 billion ESM aid package.
Although negotiations will now likely begin within the next few days, another vote (on pensions and taxes for farmers) is expected during the first week of August.
Earlier today, MNI – citing unnamed sources – reported that Tsipras will look to hold elections as soon as the third bailout is in place. Greek government officials promptly denied the report.
As a reminder, here’s what’s next for Greek politics, courtesy of Deutsche Bank.
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From Deutsche Bank
Potential political paths ahead
We see the situation as potentially leading to three different political outcomes over the next few weeks.
The first is near-term political instability that would put ESM negotiations on hold and return pressure on the Greek banking system ahead of the August 20th ECB bond redemption. This would be provoked by the PM tendering his government’s resignation either by losing additional government MPs in coming parliamentary votes or by losing support in the party’s Central Committee. Either would not necessarily cause a general election, with a government of national unity under very limited SYRIZA MP support possible until ESM talks are concluded (only 48 out of 149 MPs would be needed). Irrespectively, talks would be delayed, and the possibility of a more substantial shift in the SYRIZA position against the agreement could not be ruled out, whether before or after a new general election.
The second potential outcome is a Greek PM decision to more aggressively position himself against internal party dissent and in favour of program implementation. This would likely involve a request from dissenting MPs to resign their parliamentary seats or, in case of refusal, exclusion from the SYRIZA parliamentary group. Such a decision would aim to consolidate the PM’s influence, with the ultimate aim of moving the party towards a more moderate direction in a future general election. Current electoral law stipulates that a general election within 12 months of the last one takes place under a “list” system, providing the Greek PM with the political cover to steer SYRIZA’s candidate list towards a more moderate direction.
Still, any such decisions need to be approved by the party’s Central Committee. The latter is similarly responsible for excluding members from the party, even if the PM excludes MPs from the parliamentary group. Any such decision therefore requires the PM to take the risk of more formally splintering the party, with potential unpredictable results given his more uncertain influence over the party’s Central Committee.
The third – and what we believe the most likely outcome in coming weeks – is a continuation of the last few days’ status quo: persistent attempts by the PM to work through internal party dissent as well as the ESM negotiations, but without actively precipitating political change. In this instance the Greek PM would continue to preside over a de facto minority government, even if this is not explicitly acknowledged. A confidence vote may be called but dissenting MPs would still vote in favour and/or opposition parties would abstain. Any eventual ESM agreement would be ratified by a broad parliamentary majority, but with very strong SYRIZA dissents. Early elections could be called after. The benefit to this outcome is that near-term political uncertainty would be avoided, with dissenting and non-dissenting SYRIZA MPs as well as the opposition likely wanting to avoid near-term political instability. The cost would be that government commitment to the agreement would remain weak, maintaining the risk of a breakdown in negotiations as ESM negotiations get under way.
Whatever the outcome above, events over the next few weeks are most likely to continue to be driven by the PM’s personal decisions as well as internal developments within SYRIZA. This will in turn depend on the ongoing economic and political cost of program implementation, with large upfront fiscal tightening already being legislated but additional fiscal and structural reform commitments needed to conclude the 3rd ESM program negotiations. The PMs own approval ratings will also matter, with opinion polls released after the negotiations continuing to show higher popularity ratings than other political leaders as well as a strong SYRIZA lead over other opposition parties. It remains to be seen how long this persists given the economic costs of the agreement, but the longer support is maintained, the greater the PM’s influence over internal party politics is likely to be.
The endgame
Irrespective of the near-term outcomes above, the inherent contradiction of program implementation by a government from within which the bulk of opposition originates will have to be resolved. It is unlikely that uncertainty around the stability of the Greek economy and banking system recedes until this is the case.
Resolution could be led by Greek PM and current party president Tsipras moving SYRIZA in a more moderate direction followed by an early general election later this year after ESM negotiations have concluded. This would increase the odds of a government with greater commitment to implementation, irrespective of the electoral outcome. It would however risk a major splintering of the party or Tsipras’ own loss of authority in the process. An alternative is that the party retains its own internal contradictions, but that a government of national unity with broader-based participation is formed irrespectively. However, it remains unclear if this could materialize without an early general election, which the opposition may eventually request.
Either way, implementation risks are likely to remain strong until greater political change materializes, likely driven by the strong internal contradictions within the current ruling party, but ultimately settled by the Greek PMs own political initiatives.
Zero Hedge