2013-06-22

Like most members of the forums I read voraciously on War and Warlike Operations. Although I greatly admire the men and women and there extraordinary deeds I find that I always ask the question on what effect did they and their machines have on the Battlespace from a Operational and Strategic perspective. To me I don't judge the best on kill ratios, or speed and rate of climb etc etc but on the effect it has on the ability of the other side to wage war or project operational and strategic combat power.

So, although I am often impressed, moved and admire at the bravery, tenacity, audacity and initiative of fighting men....rarely am I effected to my core or moved to absolute astonishment on the actions of a group of courageous individuals. One that immediately comes to mind is the actions of the Australian 3rd Light Horse BDE at "The NEK", during the Gallipoli campaign. Whenever I read an account of that action I am moved to tears. As a professional soldier I can't but help wondering if I could show such mateship and love for my mate to go forth to almost certain death.

Recently I read "Whispering Death" by Mark Johnson and I was astonished of the actions of 75 SQN and their action over 44 days in the early months of 1942 at Port Moresby in what could only be described as barely tolerable conditions for men, let alone fighting men.

So, I have decided to write a brief Essay for the members of the forum. Clearly its Saturday Morning and my back still prevents me from doing some work in the garden.....where it is sorely needed.

7 Weeks.......an Eternity.

By February 1942 Australia still did not have a RAAF Fighter SQN formed and conducting Operations in Ausralia or surrounding areas. Over the preceding 3 years, Operations in Malaya, the Middle East and Britain and partly through the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS), Australian fighter pilots were siphoned off to fight beyond Australian borders. Although by early 41 1000 Australians a month were recruited to conduct training through EATS, none were allocated for RAAF fighter SQNs who would serve in the defence of Australia.

On 6 Dec 41 and subsequent Japanese Operations though Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and Dutch East Indies that all change and finally trained fighter pilots (mainly from the Desert) and new recruits were allocated to Australia's defence along with an initial delivery of 25 P40E Kittyhawks.

Three fighter SQNs were formed, with the intent to base them at Sydney, Port Moresby and Townsville. Clearly 25 P40Es was not gonna do the job. At anyrate, these 25 aircraft were allocated to 75 SQN (Port Moresby SQN) which formed in Townsville 4 Mar 42.

It was not a audacious start. During the build up ten Kittyhawks were ferried from Sydney to Townsville. They encountered awful weather prior to their arrival at Amberley near Brisbane where three aircraft crashed and two pilots were killed.

At anyrate, under command of SQN LDR John F. Jackson (a six kill ace from 3 SQN in the desert) the main body of the SQN arrived at port Moresby 17 Mar 1942. On 21 Mar the first operations were conducted and when the first flight approached Port Moresby they were subsequently shot at by AA units defending he Airfield.

There started an extraordinary tale of bravery, commitment and determination that in my view is awe inspiring, In conditions that could only be described as primitively squalid, as the fighter pilots of 75 SQN initially under command of Jackson fought alone against the Japanese Air Forces based around Rabaul. At that time Port Moresby was being utilised to base 3 RAAF SQNs of Catalina's and Hudsons, as a transit base for Allied Bombers and Patrol Aircraft as well is being the "Air Point of Entry" for logistic purposes to maintain Australian forces on the Owen Stanley Ranges (Kokoda Track).

Alone without any other Fighter Support, 75 SQN primary mission was to defend the Port Moresby Airfield and conduct offensive (strafing or escort (USN Dauntless)) operations directed at the Japanese airfields around Lae and Rabaul. It did so until 29 Apr 42 where it was relieved by two USAAF Airacobra SQNs.

The conditions were extraordinary. There was no proper accommodation, only squalid tentage that was overrun with mosquitoes and no washing facilities. Diet consisted of Baked Beans, "Bully Beef" potatoes and yams. no greens or meat. Within days the airman of the SQN were afflicted with various forms of dysentery which persisted in Epidemic proportions throughout the tour. Veterans when describing 75 SQN's actions in early 42 overriding memory in combat was Diarrhoea whilst flying and fighting. Log books were noted with "the Sh!ts" as pilots voided there bowels everytime they flew and fought. I cant imagine it.

I have had dysentery before but with the high Gs and rapid pressure changes with changes of Altitude I could not imagine what that effect that would have on gasses and fluids in the belly........My Lord imagine the pain.

The Army hospital was 25 km away, toilet facilities were "get a shovel and dig a hole". Rarely food was heated and water sterilised and there was no Mosquito precaution such as mossie nets.

They had no effective radar coverage and were completely dependent on upon observers, however the most common warning of an Air raid was when the attack was taking place by Japanese Air elements on the Port Moresby where fighters on standby would be enacted, take off, climb and most often (i.e. always) from a height disadvantage they would engage the Japanese aircraft.

Unlike European Theatres the Pacific had the extraordinary element that Allied pilots had to face when shot down was the very real and likely risk of being decapitated by Japanese Officers if captured. Escape and Evasion was not just a matter of being captured or getting back to fight but a simple reality of Survival.

A typical example Sergeant David Brown. David Brown was was shot down over Lae on the 8 Apr 42. With a pistol and knife he attempted to escape. After being spotted and trapped with machine Gun Fire, he surrended. He was searched and his picture of his fiance was taken away from him, which upset him greatly. He was beaten, tortured and moved to Rabaul, where he was executed in the usual method of the time. It was reported:

"After the execution a Japanese Officer addressed his men and spoke of the fearless manner in which all the prisoners met their deaths and said that he hoped the japanese would be prepared to die for their country as bravely as their enemy had done".

In 1950 David's father received a letter informing him that his son's remains had finally been discovered with 10 other RAAF personnel in a mass grave near Rabaul.

Although there were some reinforcements the almost daily raids on Port Moresby and other 75 SQN Operations, by the 31 Mar the SQN was whittled down to 10 serviceable aircraft. Indeed towards the end of the tour on the 29 Apr during a raid by Japanese fighters and bombers, no fighters were available to confront them. 75 SQN had literally been grounded into the dust to almost nothing.

Over this period of time not one senior RAAF Commander visited 75 SQN in Port Morsbey. Indeed those that visited (WING COMD's Gibson and Pierce) accused 75 SQN of "being Dingoes" due the method of 75 SQN pilots avoiding turning dogfights with Japanese fighters. For those who understand the strengths and weaknesses of fighter planes you would clearly understand how ludicrous this accusation was. For those who don't, quite simply if the Kittyhawks of 75 SQN engaged in turning dogfights with their Japanese counterparts......they would all likely be dead.

In 44 days 75 SQN was recorded with 18 enemy destroyed in the air, 17 on the ground with 15 losses. Of the 37 pilots that initially deployed 11 were killed in air to air combat and another killed in an accident. After 31 Mar 42 until early May when the SQN finally withdrew the SQN rarely had more that 6-8 serviceable aircraft. It has flown 638 hours with 177 hours dogfighting. When it finally withdrew 7 May 42 it had 3 operational planes and 7 unoperational.

What did 75 SQN achieve?? Ultimately in the contest of balance of forces and projection of power.....not much, it was literally the sacrifice to blunt, not stop, but blunt the Japanese spear. But what they did was dispel the fear that Japanese Air Forces were invincable. It inspired confidence to all the forces in New Guinea and presented a fighting example to all the following Allied forces in New Guinea. And finally it made Port Moresby an effective mounting base to conduct offensive operations against Japanese Forces.

I really can't think of another example of the conditions and environment that 75 SQN encountered and fought in successfully. Except one:

Guadalcanal.

The pilots who flew the Wildcats and clapped out P39s at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign fought under almost the same environmental conditions as 75 SQN. They also fought the same enemy....Japanese forces at Rabaul.

Its amazing, but Guadalcanal and Port Moresby rarely receive the comment and accolades that they deserve. Both forces were a sacrificial element who's sole purpose was not to win....but avoid further defeat. To give time to the Allies to commence, conduct and win the build up of force and technology to finally defeat Japanese Forces in the Pacific. They really did not shoot down that many Japanese planes. Aces were rare and the grim dirty gutter fight struggle that they were doomed to fight never seemed to have inspired the people back home like other battles and the men that fought them.

I think thats a disservice.

Hope you enjoyed my little effort and found it informative. :)

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