Ethiopia
2014
2015
Internet Freedom Status
Not
Not
Free
Free
Obstacles to Access (0-25)
23
23
Limits on Content (0-35)
28
28
Violations of User Rights (0-40)
29
31
TOTAL* (0-100)
80
82
* 0=most free, 100=least free
Population:
95.9 million
Internet Penetration 2014:
2.9 percent
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked:
Yes
Political/Social Content Blocked:
Yes
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested:
Yes
Press Freedom 2015 Status:
Not Free
•A significant number of service interruptions in the name of routine maintenance and system updates resulted in worsening service across the country. Internet services on 3G mobile internet networks were reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014 (see Restrictions on Connectivity).
•A growing number of critical news and opposition websites were blocked in the lead up to the May 2015 elections (see Blocking and Filtering).
•Six bloggers of the prominent Zone 9 blogging collective arrested in April 2014 were officially charged with terrorism in July 2014; two of the bloggers were unexpectedly released and acquitted in July 2015, joined by the four others in October (see
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).
•A university political science teacher known for his Facebook activism and another blogger were arrested and charged with terrorism in July 2014, among three others (see
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).
•Online journalists in the Ethiopian diaspora were attacked with Hacking Team’s sophisticated surveillance malware (see Technical Attacks).
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Introduction
Ethiopia, the second most populated country in sub-Saharan Africa, has one of the lowest rates of
internet and mobile phone connectivity in the world. Telecommunication services, in general, and
the internet, in particular, are among the most unaffordable commodities for the majority of Ethiopi-
ans, as poor telecom infrastructure, the government’s monopoly over the information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs) sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the
growth of ICTs in the country, making the cost of access prohibitively expensive.
Despite the country’s extremely poor telecommunications services and a largely disconnected pop-
ulation, Ethiopia is also known as one of the first African countries to censor the internet, beginning
in 2006 with opposition blogs.1 Since then, internet censorship has become pervasive and systematic
through the use of highly sophisticated tools that block and filter internet content and monitor user
activity. The majority of blocked websites feature critical news and opposition viewpoints run by
individuals and organizations based in the diaspora. In the lead up to the May 2015 general elec-
tions, a growing number of critical news and opposition websites were blocked, while select tools,
such as Storify and a popular URL shortening tool Bitly, remained blocked throughout the year. The
government also employs commentators and trolls to proactively manipulate the online news and
information landscape, and surveillance of mobile phone and internet networks is systematic and
widespread.
In 2014–15, the Ethiopian authorities increased their crackdown on bloggers and online journalists,
using the country’s harsh laws to prosecute individuals for their online activities and quash critical
voices. The Zone 9 bloggers arrested in April 2014 were charged with terrorism in July 2014 and sub-
sequently subjected to a series of sham trials through mid-2015. In July 2015, two of the imprisoned
Zone 9 bloggers were unexpectedly released and acquitted of all charges, which observers attribut-
ed to U.S. President Barack Obama’s official visit to the country later that month. The four remaining
Zone 9 bloggers were acquitted in October. Nevertheless, five other critical voices and bloggers who
were arrested in July 2014 and charged with terrorism remain in prison. During the numerous Zone 9
trials throughout 2014–2015, several supporters were temporarily arrested for posting updates and
pictures of their trials on social media via mobile devices.
Obstacles to Access
A significant number of service interruptions in the name of routine maintenance and system updates
resulted in worsening service across the country. Internet services on 3G mobile internet networks were
reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014.
Availability and Ease of Access
In 2015, access to ICTs in Ethiopia remained extremely limited, hampered by slow speeds and the
1 Rebecca Wanjiku, “Study: Ethiopia only sub-Saharan Africa nation to filter net,” IDG News Service, October 8, 2009,http:// bit.ly/1Lbi3s9.
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state’s tight grip on the telecom sector.2 According to the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), internet penetration stood at a mere 3 percent in 2014, up from just 2 percent in 2013.3 Only
0.5 percent of the population had access to fixed-broadband connections, increasing from 0.25
percent in 2013.4 Ethiopians had more access to mobile phone services, with mobile phone penetra-
tion rates increasing from 27 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2014,5 though such access rates still
lag behind an estimated regional average of 74 percent,6 and cell phone ownership is much more
common in urban areas than rural areas. Meanwhile, less than 5 percent of the population has a
mobile-broadband subscription as of the latest available data from 2013.7 In March 2015, Ethiopia’s
single telecoms provider, the state-owned EthioTelecom, announced it had launched 4GLTE mo-
bile technology in the capital Addis Ababa,8 but the service is reportedly only available to a mere
400,000 subscribers.9 Radio remains the principal mass medium through which most Ethiopians stay
informed.
While access to the internet via mobile phones increased slightly in the past year, prohibitively
expensive mobile data packages still posed a significant financial obstacle for the majority of the
population in Ethiopia, where per capita income stood at US$470 as of the latest available data from
2013.10 Ethiopia’s telecom market is highly undeveloped due to monopolistic control, providing cus-
tomers with few options at arbitrary prices, which are set by the state-controlled EthioTelecom and
kept artificially high.11 As of mid-2015, monthly packages cost between ETB 200 and 3,000 (US$10 to
$150) for 1 to 30 GB of 3G mobile services.
The combined cost of purchasing a computer, setting up an internet connection, and paying usage
charges makes internet access beyond the reach of most Ethiopians. Consequently, only 2 percent of
Ethiopian households have fixed-line internet access in their homes.12 While access via mobile inter-
net is increasing, the majority of internet users still rely on cybercafes to log online. A typical internet
user in Addis Ababa pays between ETB 5 and 7 (US$0.25 to $0.35) for an hour of access. Because
of the scarcity of internet cafes outside urban areas, however, rates in rural cybercafes are more
expensive.
For the few Ethiopians who can access the internet, connection speeds are known to be painstak-
ingly slow and have not improved in years, despite rapid improvements everywhere else around
the world. Logging into an email account and opening a single message can still take as long as six
minutes at a standard cybercafe with broadband in the capital city—the same rate reported over the
past few years—while attaching documents or images to an email can take as long as eight minutes
2 Tom Jackson, “Telecoms slow down development of Ethiopian tech scene – iceaddis,” humanipo republished on
Ethioconstruction, October 22, 2013, http://bit.ly/1ZlzWhw.
3 International Telecommunication Union, “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.
4 International Telecommunication Union, “Fixed (Wired)-Broadband Subscriptions, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.
5 International Telecommunication Union, “Mobile-Cellular Telephone Subscriptions, 2000-2014,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.
6 International Telecommunication Union, “Key ICT data, 2000-2015,” http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.
7 International Telecommunication Union, “Ethiopia Profile (Latest data available: 2013),” ICT-Eye, accessed August 1, 2014,
http://bit.ly/1NEnLHk.
8 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia launches 4G mobile service in the capital,” ed. Mark Potter, Reuters, March 21, 2015, http://reut.
rs/1FP0Pky.
9 “A short report about Ethio-Telecom recent launch of 4G network in Addis Ababa,” EthioTube video, 8:44, April 3, 2015,
http://bit.ly/1Ryeb90.
10 World Bank, “Ethiopia Overview,” last updated April 05, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.
11 Ethiopia – Telecoms, Mobile, Broadband and Forecasts, Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd.: June 2014, http://bit.ly/1ji15Rn.
12 International Telecommunication Union, “Ethiopia Profile (Latest data available: 2013).”
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or more.13 According to May 2015 data from Akamai’s “State of the Internet” report, Ethiopia has an
average connection speed of 1.8 Mbps (compared to a global average of 3.9 Mbps).14
Despite reports of massive investments from Chinese telecom companies in recent years,15 Ethiopia’s
telecommunications infrastructure is among the least developed in Africa and is almost entirely ab-
sent from rural areas, where about 85 percent of the population resides. There are only a few signal
stations across the country, resulting in frequent network congestions and disconnections, even on
state controlled media.16 Consequently, many people often use their cell phones as music players or
cameras. In a typical small town of Ethiopia, individuals often hike to the top of their nearest hills to
access a signal for a mobile phone call. Frequent electricity outages also contribute to poor telecom
services.
Restrictions on Connectivity
The Ethiopian government’s complete control over the country’s telecommunications infrastructure via EthioTelecom enables it to restrict access to the internet and mobile phone services. Ethiopia is connected to the international internet via satellite, a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to its international gateway, and the SEACOM cable that connects through Djibouti to an international undersea cable. All connections to the international internet are completely central- ized via EthioTelecom, enabling the government to cut off the internet at will. As a result, the inter- net research company Renesys classified Ethiopia “as being at severe risk of Internet disconnection,” alongside Syria, Uzbekistan, and Yemen in a February 2014 assessment.17
There were a significant number of service interruptions throughout the year in the name of routine maintenance of network infrastructure and system updates across the country, resulting in worsen- ing service. Numerous users reported extremely slow internet and text messaging speeds during the coverage period, and internet services on EVDO and CDMA networks were reportedly unavailable for more than a month in July and August 2014.18
In a sample test conducted in March 2015 to measure the frequency and pervasiveness of mobile network interruptions, 40 to 60 percent of phone calls dropped in the middle of conversation.19 Nearly 70 percent of the time, testers needed to make prolonged and repeated attempts for their calls to go through. Text messaging services were also found to be extremely poor and slow. The same sample test found that it took an average of six minutes to send a text message to ten individ- uals, while replies varied from one to six minutes. Approximately 30 percent of text messages were not delivered to the intended recipient at all. The test further found that 60 percent of mobile phone users frequently ran out of their prepaid mobile data allowances prematurely.
13 According to tests by Freedom House consultant in 2015.
14 Akamai, “Average Connection Speed: Ethiopia,” map visualization, The State of the Internet, Q4 (2014),http://akamai. me/1OqvpoS.
15 Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia signs $700 mln mobile network deal with China’s Huawei,” Reuters, July 25, 2013,http://reut. rs/1OpDgVj.
16 Endalk Chala, “When blogging is held hostage of Ethiopia’s telecom policy,” in “GV Advocacy Awards Essays on Internet Censorship from Iran, Venezuela, Ethiopia,” Global Voices, February 3, 2015, http://bit.ly/1OpDvzz.
17 Jim Cowie, “Syria, Venezuela, Ukraine: Internet Under Fire,” Renesys (blog), February 26, 2014,http://bit.ly/1R2z0IT. 18 Freedom House interviews.
19 Conducted by Freedom House consultant, March 2015.
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ICT Market
The space for independent initiatives in the ICT sector, entrepreneurial or otherwise, is extremely
limited,20 with state-owned EthioTelecom holding a firm monopoly over internet and mobile phone
services as the country’s sole telecommunications service provider. Despite repeated international
pressure to liberalize telecommunications in Ethiopia, the government refuses to ease its grip on the
sector.21
China is a key investor in Ethiopia’s telecommunications industry,22 with Zhongxing Telecommunica-
tion Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei currently serving as contractors to upgrade broadband networks
to 4G in Addis Ababa and to expand 3G across the country.23 The partnership has enabled Ethiopia’s
authoritarian leaders to maintain their hold over the telecom sector,24 though the networks built
by the Chinese firms have been criticized for their high cost and poor service.25 Furthermore, the
contracts have led to increasing fears that the Chinese may also be assisting the authorities in de-
veloping more robust ICT censorship and surveillance capacities.26 In December 2014, the Swedish
telecom group Ericsson emerged as the latest partner to improve and repair the quality of Ethiopia’s
mobile network infrastructure,27 though China’s ZTE still maintains the lion’s share of the telecom in-
frastructure investment sector.
Meanwhile, onerous government regulations stymie other aspects of the Ethiopian ICT market. For
one, imported ICT items are tariffed at the same heavy rate as luxury items, unlike other imported
goods such as construction materials and heavy duty machinery, which are given duty-free import
privileges to encourage investments in infrastructure.28 Ethiopians are required register their laptops
and tablets at the airport with the Ethiopian customs authority before they travel out of the country,
ostensibly to prevent individuals from illegally importing electronic devices, though observers be-
lieve the requirement is an effort to keep tabs on the ICT activities of Ethiopian citizens.29
Local software companies in the country have also suffered from heavy-handed government regu-
lations, which do not have fair, open, or transparent ways of evaluating and awarding bids for new
software projects.30 Government companies are given priority for every kind of project, while smaller
entrepreneurial software companies are completely overlooked, leaving few opportunities for local
technology companies to thrive.
20 Al Shiferaw, “Connecting Telecentres: An Ethiopian Perspective,” Telecentre Magazine, September 2008, http://bit.ly/1ji348h.
21 “Ethio Telecom to remain monopoly for now,” TeleGeography, June 28, 2013, http://bit.ly/1huyjf7.
22 Paul Chapman, “New report explores the Ethiopian – telecoms, mobile and broadband – market insights, statistics and
forecasts,” WhatTech, May 1, 2015, http://bit.ly/1L46Awu.
23 “Out of reach,” The Economist, August 24, 2013, http://econ.st/1l1UvJO.
24 “Out of reach,” The Economist.
25 Matthew Dalton, “Telecom Deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism,” The Wall Street Journal, January 6,
2014, http://on.wsj.com/1LtSCkD.
26 Based on allegations that the Chinese authorities have provided the Ethiopian government with technology that can be
used for political repression—such as surveillance cameras and satellite jamming equipment—in the past. See: Addis Neger,
“Ethiopia: China Involved in ESAT Jamming,” ECADAF Ethiopian news & Opinion, June 23, 2010, http://bit.ly/1LtSYI9; Gary Sands,
“Ethiopia’s Broadband Network – A Chinese Trojan Horse?” Foreign Policy Blogs, Foreign Policy Association, September 6, 2013,
http://bit.ly/1FWG8X1.
27 ENA, “Ericsson to take part in telecom expansion in Ethiopia,” Dire Tube, December 18, 2014, http://bit.ly/1PkZfvA.
28 The Embassy of the United Stated, “Doing Business in Ethiopia,” http://1.usa.gov/1LtTExh.
29 World Intellectual Property Organization, “Ethiopia Custom Regulation: No 622/2009,” http://bit.ly/1NveoeB.
30 Mignote Kassa, “Why Ethiopia’s Software Industry Falters,” Addis Fortune 14, no. 700 (September 29, 2013), http://bit.
ly/1VJiIWC.
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Meanwhile, cybercafes are subject to onerous operating requirements under the 2002 Telecommu-
nications (Amendment) Proclamation,31 which requires cybercafe owners to obtain an operating
license with EthioTelecom via a murky process that can take months. In the past few years, EthioTele-
com began enforcing its licensing requirements more strictly in response to the increasing spread
of cybercafes, reportedly penalizing Muslim cafe owners more harshly. Violations of the stringent
requirements, such as a prohibition on providing Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services, entail criminal liability,
though there have been no reported violations to date.32
Regulatory Bodies
Since the emergence of the internet in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA) has been the primary regulatory body overseeing the telecommunications sector. In practice, executives in the government have complete control over ICT policy and sector regulation.33 The Information Network Security Agency (INSA), a government agency established in 2011 and controlled by indi- viduals with strong ties to the ruling regime,34 also has significant power in regulating the internet under the mandate of protecting the country’s communications infrastructure and preventing cyber- crimes in the country.
Limits on Content
Dozens of critical news and opposition websites and blogs were blocked as the country prepared for the general elections in May 2015. Over 100 websites remained blocked overall. The activities of pro- government commentators noticeably increased during the coverage period.
Blocking and Filtering
The Ethiopian government imposes nationwide, politically motivated internet blocking and filter- ing that tends to tighten ahead of sensitive political events. The majority of blocked websites are those that feature opposition or critical content run by individuals or organizations based in the country or the diaspora. The government’s approach to internet filtering generally entails hindering access to a list of specific internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the Ethio- Telecom-controlled international gateway. Deep-packet inspection (DPI) is also employed, which blocks websites based on a keyword in the content of a website or piece of communication (such as email).35
During the coverage period, over one hundred websites remained inaccessible in Ethiopia.36 Blocked
31 “Proclamation No. 281/2002, Telecommunications (Amendment Proclamation,” Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 28, July 2, 2002, http://bit.ly/1snLgsc.
32 Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency, “License Directive for Resale and Telecenter in Telecommunication Services No. 1/2002,” November 8, 2002, accessed October 20, 2014, http://bit.ly/1pUtpWh.
33 Dr. Lishan Adam, “Understanding what is happening in ICT in Ethiopia,” (policy paper, Research ICT Africa, 2012)http://bit. ly/1LDPyJ5.
34 Halefom Abraha, “THE STATE OF CYBERCRIME GOVERNANCE IN ETHIOPIA,” (paper) http://bit.ly/1huzP0S.
35 Daniel Berhane, “Ethiopia’s web filtering: advanced technology, hypocritical criticisms, bleeding constitution,” Horns Affairs, January 16, 2011, http://bit.ly/1jTyrH1 .
36 Test conducted by an anonymous researcher contracted by Freedom House, March 2015. During the test, some websites opened at the first attempt but were inaccessible when refreshed.
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sites included Ethiopian news websites, political party websites, blogs, television and online radio
websites, and the websites of international digital rights organizations, such as the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation and Tactical Technology Collective. Select tools such as text messaging apps and ser-
vices on Google’s Android operating system on smartphones were inaccessible at irregular intervals
but for unclear reasons.
Online censorship intensified as the country prepared for the May 2015 general elections, with new
blocks on dozens of social media pages, blogs, and diaspora-based opposition websites that were
created to report on the general election.37 A diaspora-operated website called AddisVoice, which
published a series of critical articles about the educational qualifications of government officials, was
a top target for blocking in 2014-2015.38 International news outlets were also targeted. In June 2014,
the Ethiopian authorities were accused of jamming the satellite operations of the BBC, Deutsche
Welle, France 24, and the Voice of America, blocking a few of the stations’ websites as well.39 Al Ara-
biya, a Saudi Arabia-based media outlet, and Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English websites were intermit-
tently blocked throughout the coverage period.40
Blogs are also a prime target for blocking. In 2007, the government instituted a blanket block on the
domain names of two popular blog-hosting websites, Blogspot and Nazret, though the authorities
have since become more sophisticated in their censorship techniques, now blocking select pages
such as the Zone9 independent blog hosted on Blogspot,41 as opposed to the entire blogging plat-
form. Nazret, however, remained completely blocked as of June 2015.
Facebook and Twitter platforms were otherwise generally accessible, although some individual Face-
book groups belonging to opposition individuals remained blocked altogether when accessed via
the unencrypted (HTTP) URL pathway. However, the social media curation tool Storify—first blocked
in July 201242—remained blocked during the coverage period,43 in addition to the URL shortening
tool Bit.ly.44 Circumvention tools are also blocked, including Tor—an online tool that enables users
to browse anonymously—which has been blocked since May 2012.45 According to an independent
source, key terms such as “proxy” yield no search results on unencrypted search engines,46 reflecting
the government’s efforts to limit users’ access to circumvention tools and strategies.
Some restrictions are also placed on mobile phones, such as the requirement for a text message
37
Interview with the producer of a website called Mircha.org, http://mircha.org/category/english/ .
38
Abebe Gelaw, “Exposed: Prof. Constantinos Berhe has two fake degrees,” Addis Voice, January 18, 2015, http://bit.
ly/1zrOETe.
39
“BBC condemns Ethiopian broadcast jamming,” BBC, May 30, 2014, http://bbc.in/1oCH8VO.
40 “Ethiopia ‘blocks’ Al Jazeera aebsites,” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2013, http://aje.me/1144wNh.
41 Zone9, blog post, October 8, 2015, http://zone9ethio.blogspot.com/.
42 Mohammed Ademo, Twitter post, July 25, 2012, 1:08 p.m., https://twitter.com/OPride/status/228159700489879552.
43 Mohammed Ademo, “Media Restrictions Tighten in Ethiopia,” Columbia Journalism Review, August 13, 2012,http://bit. ly/1Lm2npk.
44 Ory Okolloh Mwangi, Twitter post, November 6, 2013, 9:20 a.m.,https://twitter.com/kenyanpundit/ status/398077421926514688.
45 “Ethiopia Introduces Deep Packet Inspection,” Tor (blog), May 31, 2012, http://bit.ly/1A0YRdc; Warwick Ashford, “Ethiopian government blocks Tor network online anonymity,” Computer Weekly, June 28, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LDQ5L2.
46 A 2014 report from Human Rights Watch also noted that the term “aljazeera” was unsearchable on Google while the news site was blocked from August 2012 to mid-March 2013. According to HRW research, the keywords “OLF” and “ONLF” (acronyms of Ethiopian opposition groups) are not searchable on the unencrypted version of Google (http://) and other popular search engines. Human Rights Watch, “They Know Everything We Do,” March 25, 2014, 56, 58, http://bit.ly/1Nviu6r.
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to obtain prior approval from EthioTelecom if it is to be sent to more than ten recipients.47 A bulk
text message sent without prior approval is automatically blocked, irrespective of the content of the
message.
There are no procedures for determining which websites are blocked or why, precluding any avenues
for appeal. There are no published lists of blocked websites or publicly available criteria for how such
decisions are made, and users are met with an error message when trying to access blocked con-
tent. This lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s continued denial of its censorship
efforts. Meanwhile, the decision-making process does not appear to be controlled by a single entity,
as various government bodies—including the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), Ethio-
Telecom, and the ICT ministry—seem to be implementing their own lists, contributing to a phenom-
enon of inconsistent blocking. Government officials flatly deny the blocking of websites or jamming
of international satellite operations while also stating that the government has a legal and a moral
responsibility to protect the Ethiopian public from extremist content.
Content Removal
In addition to increasing blocks of online content, politically objectionable content is often targeted for removal, often by way of threats from security officials who personally seek out users and blog- gers to instruct them to take down certain content, particularly critical content on Facebook. The growing practice suggests that at least some voices within Ethiopia’s small online community are being closely monitored. For instance, during the various legal proceedings of the Zone 9 bloggers throughout 2014-2015 (see “Prosecutions”), friends and reporters who posted pictures and stories of the trials on social media were briefly detained and asked to remove them.48
Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation
Lack of adequate funding is a significant challenge for independent online media in Ethiopia, as fear of government pressure dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites. A 2012 Advertising Proclamation also prohibits advertisements from firms “whose capital is shared by foreign nationals.”49 Launching a website on the local .et domain is expensive and onerous,50 re- quiring a business license from the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a permit from an authorized body.51 While the domestic Ethiopian blogosphere has been expanding, most blogs are hosted on international platforms by diaspora community members.
Despite extremely low levels of internet access, the authorities employ progovernment commen- tators and trolls to manipulate the online news and information landscape. There was a noticeable increase in the number of progovernment commentators in the last few years, as confirmed in a
47 Interview with individuals working in the telecom sector, as well as a test conducted by a Freedom House consultant who found it was not possible for an ordinary user to send out a bulk text message.
48 Reporters prevented from reporting on the trial of Zone9 Bloggers: Trial Tracker Blog, http://trialtrackerblog.org/home/ .
49 Exemptions are made for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin. See, Abrham Yohannes, “Advertisement Proclamation No. 759/2012,” Ethiopian Legal Brief (blog), September 27, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LDQf5c.
50 “Proclamation No. 686/2010 Commercial Registration and Business Licensing,” Federal Negarit Gazeta, July 24, 2010,http://bit.ly/1P3PoLy; World Bank Group, Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency, Economy Profile 2015, Ethiopia, 2014,http://bit.ly/1L49tO6.
51 Chala, “When blogging is held hostage of Ethiopia’s telecom policy.”
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June 2014 report by the Ethiopian Satellite Television Service (ESAT) that detailed the government’s
efforts to recruit and train progovernment citizens to attack politically objectionable content online.
According to the ESAT report, hundreds of bloggers reporting directly to government officials had
been trained on how to post progovernment comments and criticize antigovernment articles on so-
cial media platforms.52
Meanwhile, increasing repression against journalists and bloggers has had a major chilling effect
on expression online, particularly following the arrest of the Zone 9 bloggers in April 2014 and their
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