How much does it cost to build a power plant? How much does the power cost? For nuclear power those answers are more complex than for any other type of power generation.
In the 1960s, nuclear power promised cheap and bountiful electricity. The initial economics appeared to support that promise-relatively inexpensive plant construction, 40-year plant life, and cheap fuel-the future looked bright.
By the late-1990s prospects for the nuclear industry, at least in the US, appeared dim. The 40-year life was coming to a close for many plants, the initial construction cost and duration estimates were way off, and several plants were sold for fire-sale prices. Then re-licensing breathed new life into the economics of existing nuclear power plants, with plant life extensions of an additional 20 years, and possibly another 20 years after that. But even re-licensing couldn't overcome the reality of competition from gas-fired power generation.
Re-licensing is but one factor that affects nuclear power economics. Other factors include plant siting and permitting, construction, operation and maintenance, water resources, uranium mining and processing, spent fuel and radioactive waste disposal, decommissioning, security, the potential for catastrophic events, and potentially carbon credits. A thorough analysis of these factors would require many thick volumes. The intent here is to present relative cost magnitudes where possible and identify investment and operational risks where cost estimation is difficult. Economics should be a significant consideration, if not the most important consideration, for choosing between alternatives of future power generation.
This paper examines metrics such as cents/kWh or $/MWh for construction-related and operations-related costs, but great care should be exercised relative to the absolute values. The claim against nuclear proponents is that they minimize these costs and risks, while the claim against nuclear opponents is that they exaggerate these costs and risks. As a result, depending on the study, the variability in the absolute costs can be large. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is considered by some a source neutral to the issue. An August 2016 EIA publication presents ranges of Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) and Levelized Avoided Cost of Electricity (LACE) for new generation sources in the years 2022 and 2040. The LCOE range for Advanced Nuclear is on the order of 1.5 times the $/MWh of combined cycle natural gas turbines. More importantly, subtracting LCOE from LACE for advanced nuclear is negative for all cases, while for combined cycle natural gas turbines it is positive for almost all cases, even for 2040. A higher avoided cost of electricity (i.e., cost to the grid from sources than otherwise displaced by the proposed plant) than levelized cost suggests questionable plant economics.
New Starts Versus Shutdowns-A Snapshot
This section provides perspective on the existing global landscape for the economics of new starts versus shutdowns. This is a holistic examination, meant to observe decisions by investors and operators, and the possible economic drivers for those decisions.
US - Notwithstanding the contribution of individual factors in the overall economic picture, the ultimate judge of nuclear power viability is whether investors have the confidence to build new plants versus the struggle of utilities to keep existing plants operating. For example, the president of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt, announced he believes natural gas power plants and renewable energy will be the best investments over the foreseeable future. This is quite a statement given GE has its own nuclear power plant division called GE Hitachi.
In the US, the high profile closures and planned closures of San Onofre, Pilgrim, Clinton, Quad Cities, Fort Calhoun, Diablo Canyon, and a dozen others at risk of early closure according to DOE, contrast starkly with the trouble of bringing new plants on line. Clinton, Quad Cities, and Fort Calhoun are notable because they had received license renewals, ostensibly allowing them to operate for many years into the future. Due to their high operational costs, many plants have had difficulty competing with natural gas power plants, while others have shut down because of repair problems during closures. The New York Public Service Commission recently approved an $8B subsidy package to save three upstate nuclear power plants that had been in danger of closure. New York lawmakers have challenged the subsidy. The Illinois legislature initially rejected a similar subsidy, which would have been the last hope for Exelon to not close the Clinton and Quad Cities power plants in 2018. Exelon may now keep the plants open with Illinois legislature December 2016 passage of the subsidy bill.
In the US, three locations plan expansions: Virgil C. Summer (#2, #3), Vogtle (#3, #4), and Watts Bar (#2). The five new units will bring more than 5GW online. In June 2016, Watts Bar #2 became the first US plant to come on line since 1996-twenty years. Originally under construction in 1973, the process halted in 1985. With construction restarted in 2007, the projected completion cost was $4.2B, but ended at $4.7B after construction delays. Another facility, TVA-owned Bellefonte (Alabama), started development in 1974 and then halted construction activities in 1988. In November 2016, TVA auctioned the assets to a developer. If the developer successfully constructs the plant, can it provide power competitively with natural gas power plants?
UK, Sweden, Germany, France - Europe has had a long and successful history of building and operating nuclear power plants. However, Germany and the UK have undergone major shifts away from reliance on nuclear power. France, which relies on nuclear power for 75 percent of its electricity, has signaled a long-term planned phase-out to 50 percent by 2025. Even Sweden announced it would close many of its nuclear power plants, totaling almost 9GW, but a government bailout, similar to that announced by the State of New York, may save some of those facilities for the time being.
The UK government delayed a decision to proceed with Hinckley, a plant proposed for development by Electricité de France (EDF), estimated to cost anywhere from $24B to $50B. Then, it announced it would approve the deal. French labor unions oppose the project, fearing the high cost could jeopardize EDF itself. The French government still backs it even though the French minister of energy has criticized it for the large cost, which is the most expensive plant ever proposed. The UK government was concerned the guaranteed electricity price of £92.5/MWh (~$125/MWh) offered EDF would be much higher than the projected generation cost of renewables at £50-75/MWh (~$67.50-101.5/MWh). A lot is at stake for France, which is the majority owner of EDF, the UK, for which the plant would supply approximately seven percent of its energy needs, and China, which would provide approximately one-third of the required investment, and plans to invest in another UK nuclear power plant.
Korea, China, and Japan - Over the past forty years, South Korea has had a history of building nuclear power plants on a decreasing cost per kWh basis. This is primarily because it has only one electric utility involved with design, development, and construction, and that utility initially used only one type of power plant design. China, in moving away from coal power, has embraced nuclear power and renewables, and is projected to account for half of the global growth in nuclear power by 2040. If China can follow Korea's example, it would contain construction costs and retain predictability, the loss of which was one factor in the stagnation of the US market. However, its lofty goal to bring 58GW online by 2020 is in serious jeopardy because of supply chain issues and regulator bandwidth. As with the US and Europe, operating costs and other factors (waste disposal, global investment-e.g., Hinkley) may play a large role in determining whether China decides to continue its expansion.
Japan is still recovering from the aftereffects of Fukushima. Only three of Japan's fifty-four nuclear power plants have returned to operations, with projections of twelve to twenty-five plants returning to operation by 2018. Obstacles are the lengthy review process, gaining consent from local communities, and legal proceedings.
Rest of the World - South Africa is struggling with coal power economics versus the economics of renewables. The government reportedly prefers nuclear power, while critics say nuclear is more expensive than coal. Argentina, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and many other countries are looking to nuclear power as a low-carbon, low cost energy alternative for the future. Some are optimistic, while others are cautious. Advanced reactor technologies such as molten salt, alternative fuels, and small modular reactors (SMRs) provide hope for these countries. While advanced technologies could greatly lower operating costs and risks, they remain unproven.
New Starts versus Shutdowns, a Summary - In many areas of the world, the possibility of building a nuclear power plant at a new site would seem very remote, while the probability for extensive plant closures over the next twenty years is highly likely. Will advanced reactor or fuel technologies change the fundamental economics? If they do, will they come soon enough to enable nuclear power to compete with other established low carbon alternatives?
Figures 1 and 2 show cents/kWh versus time for US Nuclear Plants. Figure 1 shows construction-related Costs, while Figure 2 shows O&M-related costs. With the advent of relicensing, it is especially instructive to appreciate the breakout between these two activities. After 30 years, the construction-related costs should essentially drop out, leaving only O&M costs to cover. For many plants, however, that's not the case.
Construction-Related Costs
Figure 1. Construction-Related Costs for US Nuclear Plants
Siting and Permitting Costs
All methods of power generation incur costs to site and permit the plant. Since the mid-twentieth century these costs have escalated dramatically. For example, siting and permitting a large ocean-based wind farm off the coast of Massachusetts is enormously expensive for both the proponents and opponents. The time delay alone creates project funding uncertainty and costs mount. As time goes on, the increasingly sophisticated arguments on both sides only increase siting costs for that and future prospective projects. If wind farm and coal power plant siting issues are complex, those of nuclear power plant siting make them pale by comparison.
Siting and permitting activity is highly location/region-specific. Attempting to site a new nuclear power plant in California, a seismic zone 4, highly populated area, would be an ambitious and unpopular activity. Siting in less populated, more geologically stable, locations, with a plentiful water supply may be less labor intensive.
Construction Costs
An interesting dichotomy exists for construction of nuclear plants between the cost history for the US and the cost history for Korea. As mentioned earlier, Korea has demonstrated a forty-year history of gradual declining construction cost per kWh, while the US has demonstrated the opposite.
In the US, much blame for the drastic cost increase is the regulatory environment, especially post Three-Mile Island, and potential third party involvement even after construction has started.
The projected cost-to-complete versus actual cost for US nuclear power plants has also been problematic for investors. The actual construction costs per GW are well documented and have increased over the years. Figure 2 (surface plot and line graph) shows costs compiled by the Energy Information Administration for 75 plants that started construction from 1966 to 1977. The projected costs have often been greatly underestimated, at every step of the process, actual construction costs-just as time-to-complete projections often greatly underestimate the actual required construction time. Extended construction schedules contribute significantly to cost overruns.
Figure 2. Estimated Construction at Percent Completion, $/kW
Technical uncertainties, politics, optimistic assumptions, and opposition all play roles in underestimating construction costs. Early twenty-first century data show this trend further degrading. In the US, the large difference between projected and actual costs has historically led to budget overruns and funding shortfalls.
Decommissioning Costs
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires sufficient funds be set aside to decommission all nuclear power plants in the United States when the plants reach the end of their useful life. This is called the Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF), funding of which is collected from ratepayers via their monthly electricity bill. Each power plant has its own trust fund.
The DTF is not the electric utilities' property and is outside their control. If a utility were to enter bankruptcy it could not use the trust fund to satisfy claims of creditors.
With the planned power plant life of thirty years, most DTFs should have sufficient funding to successfully complete decommissioning. This amount varies according to the power plant, but can run to several billion dollars. Table 1 lists power plant decommissioning estimated funding requirements.
Table 1. Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Trust Funds
What happens if a plant closes before the DTF is fully funded? Exelon's decision to close Clinton and Quad Cities is an example of this. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, Exelon could have to fund an additional $790M over the approximate $1.3B the DTFs for the plants have already accumulated. Exelon estimates the decommissioning process could require 60 years because of the large DTF shortfall. Decommissioning costs for plants which have unforeseen closures as was the case for Three-Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima rise dramatically over initial funding projections.
One of the major decommissioning issues is what to do with radioactive waste stored on-site. This issue and the economics of decommissioning funding shortfalls drives the potentially very long decommissioning project schedules.
The multi-billion dollar DTFs listed in Table 1 may seem large, but over the life of the nuclear power plant the ratepayer pays only a cent per kWh or less additional to their monthly bill to cover decommissioning.
Operation and Maintenance-Related Costs
Figure 3. O&M-Related Costs for US Nuclear Plants
Uranium Mining and Processing-Fuel Costs
Fuel accounts for 15-20% of nuclear power operating costs. Some estimates suggest a uranium supply of about one hundred years for the current global fleet. This is based on existing reactor technology. If the nuclear power global fleet experiences a major expansion, the supply would be correspondingly lower. If fuel reprocessing becomes widespread, the lifetime supply would be correspondingly higher. However, reprocessing, depending on the technology, has raised concerns over proliferation risks.
Fuel processing and enrichment facilities need to be decommissioned at termination of activity, which is also true of DOE facilities used for nuclear weapons and national defense programs. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) passed a resolution opposing a ten-year $2B tax that would be used to decommission DOE enrichment facilities in Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee.
Operation and Maintenance Costs
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) is a completely separate activity from initial plant construction activities. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has documented a long-term increase of O&M costs of 28% from 2002 to 2014 for the US fleet. The EIA documented a similar long-term from 1974 to 1993. Figure 4 shows the escalation in non-fuel O&M costs for all US nuclear power plants over 400MW in operation by the end of 1993.
Figure 4. O&M-Related Costs for US Nuclear Plants from 1974 to 1993 (1993 dollars)
Sources: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC Form 1, "Annual Report of Major Electric Utilities, Licensees and Others"; Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-412, "Annual Report of Public Electric Utilities," and predecessor survey forms; and Utility Data Institute.
The bidding process - When power plants wish to supply electricity to a market such as PJM in the US, they will bid their incremental $/MWhr cost. For wind, the cost is often negative, which is sometimes cited as a reason for the difficulty of nuclear power to compete in that particular market. However, wind and other renewables currently make up only a small portion of the market. Natural gas power plants, which currently make up a major portion of the market, a decade ago would bid over $35/MWh compared with their current bidding costs of $10/MWhr (or less). This large cost decrease is the cause of nuclear power's competitive difficulty because the nuclear power plants must bid their entire capacity. Their base load nature means that they may need to discount a portion of their bid if the electricity market demand is low. For example, Exelon's Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania failed to clear two recent PJM Interconnection capacity auctions for 2018-19 and 2019-20, which severely limits plant revenue.
Transportation Costs
Transportation of fuel and waste is a factor that is not generally considered a major economic driver. However, as with fuel reprocessing, transportation has risks relative to the potential for accidents and for increased vulnerability via theft/terrorism. Though the risk in the US may be perceived low, the risk in other parts of the world may be higher. Commercial reactor fuel is not weapons grade, meaning that further processing is required for that use, which is possible, but not easy. A more likely scenario for theft/terrorism would be to use spent fuel or waste to construct a "dirty" bomb, which could theoretically require a large-scale cleanup effort and divert use from an urban area. The economic implications of this potential risk are difficult to quantify.
Waste Disposal Costs
Disposal of nuclear waste is "vexing". It has been a politically charged issue-witness the Yucca Mountain facility challenges (approximately $20B spent to date) and the 2014 explosion at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. For example, the cleanup cost for the one drum that exploded at WIPP has been estimated at $2B. WIPP was only meant as a short-term storage location. However, even the temporary outage at WIPP required for the cleanup, points to lack of a long-term waste disposal solution, because waste destined for WIPP from weapons processing facilities and other locations had to remain on-site in "hotel" mode.
Nuclear power plants, worldwide, typically store waste in spent fuel pools or in dry storage containers.for the short-term.defined as tens to hundreds of years-much longer than originally anticipated. Ironically, relicensing, which has given nuclear power a new life in the US, also means spent fuel pools will reach their capacity over the additional twenty years.
The ideal long-term storage location for nuclear waste would be a central site, deep geologic repository, such as that once-intended for Yucca Mountain. That solution for the US, however, has no near-term time frame, which means that nuclear power plants will continue to store spent reactor fuel and other waste on-site for the foreseeable future. Other countries reprocess spent fuel and have centralized waste storage, but long-term solutions remain elusive. On-site waste storage is highly inefficient and costly compared with a central waste storage facility.
The taxpayer obligation for a long-term waste storage repository is approximately $0.001/kWh, which leads to a 2020 fund of about $20B, if the money were available and could be used to construct such a repository.
Decommissioned plants struggle with the problem of "orphaned waste". Even though the units at a location may have been decommissioned, the waste must still be stored and maintained. One estimate of orphaned waste annual cost is $8M for sites with no operating reactors.
Security Costs
Security takes the form of physical plant security and cyber security. Physical security is a part of O&M costs. Cyber security also falls under O&M costs. However, these costs and associated risks have risen dramatically recently, and will continue to rise sharply as the sophistication of cyber attacks increase.
The Potential for Failure Events-Costs
The nuclear disaster in Fukushima cast a shadow over the nuclear power industry. The Fukushima event, however, has focused a great deal of attention on siting and design. As with the aftermath of Three-Mile Island, this will translate to increased costs for new nuclear power plant construction as the number of potential sites decreases and
as the designs become ever more stringent. The direct costs of the events for WIPP, Fukushima, Chernobyl, and Three-Mile Island are: $2B, $10B, $15B, and $2B. Indirect costs are more difficult to quantify, especially for Chernobyl and Fukushima, which have impacted local economies to a great extent.
Nuclear power plants are required to be covered by insurance for failure events. Many conventions worldwide back the insurance requirements. For example, the US and twenty other countries have signed the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which entered into force as of 15 April 2015. Japan and India were recent additions to the CSC. France and many other countries fall under the Paris Convention (PC) and the Brussels Supplemental Convention (BSC) and amending protocols. Others, such as Russia, Mexico and Brazil fall under the Vienna Convention. Yet others, such as China, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and South Africa don't follow any of the conventions. China nuclear power plants are covered by many insurance companies, with Ping'an Insurance Company providing the largest share.
Typically, nuclear third party liability follows the principles below:
Strict liability of the nuclear operator
Exclusive liability of the operator of a nuclear installation
Compensation without discrimination based on nationality, domicile or residence
Mandatory financial coverage of the operator's liability
Exclusive jurisdiction (only courts of the State in which the nuclear accident occurs have jurisdiction)
Limitation of liability in amount and in time
The limitation on liability has caused concern from many quarters relative to failure events. Some insurers have proposed a catastrophic accident insurance pool on the order of $10B that could be covered by an additional ratepayer cost of 0.1 to 0.2 cents/kWh.
Carbon Credits
The threat of global warming, a well-documented trend over the last century, has brought nations together for accords such as Kyoto and more recently, the Paris Climate Agreement, to which the world's two largest economies, the US and China, have committed. To mitigate the problem, groups, nations, and states have created numerous carbon credit programs. Nuclear power is considered a zero CO2 generation source and can benefit economically by generating carbon credits. To date, this advantage has been slow in being realized. The New York Zero Emission Credit subsidy of $8B over a period of twelve years, approved by the Public Service Commission August 2016, that provides funding for three New York nuclear power plants, would be an exception. It is currently under legal challenge. Illinois passage of December 2016 energy subsidy is also an exception.
Water Resources
Nuclear power plants rely extensively on cooling water, which means water use is an important issue. China, in particular, with its rapid expansion of power plants, takes water resources for cooling as a critical siting factor. Water has become an endangered resource. Water use costs vary tremendously depending on the available local supply. Siting for nuclear and thermal plants often favor locations with proximity to seawater cooling. In the case of Fukushima, siting and design were problematic in this respect.
Who Pays?
Generally, the ratepayer picks up the tab for construction-related and O&M-related costs. Generally, taxpayers bear the cost of insurance subsidies (Price-Anderson Act) and tax credits (e.g., the Nuclear Power Plant Tax Credit, enacted 2005).
The utility pays for shortfalls in DTF funding as well as the difference between public utility commission-approved rates and market bid prices, which is why many utilities have found competition from natural gas power plants to be doubly painful. A premature closure caused by non-competitive operations can create the DTF shortfall.
Global states (governments) pay the difference between the limitation of liability covered by insurance and overage of that limitation for a catastrophic event.
Conclusions
Nuclear power accounts for approximately 10% of global electricity production. The nuclear power renaissance currently happening in China shines a bright picture for the future of nuclear power in some areas of the world. The future of nuclear power in Europe and the US appears less bright. In the US, the reasons that caused the dearth of new starts over the last 20 years have only increased in strength. The competition from natural gas has painted a very dim picture. Will nuclear power account for more than 10% of global electricity production in the next 50 years? Even China's growth from nuclear power currently accounting for 3% to 10% by 2040, makes that appear unlikely. In California, for example, the world's sixth largest economy (recently surpassing France), nuclear power, depending on the season, now supplies only three to five percent of the state's electricity generation (after the closure of San Onofre). With the planned closure of Diablo Canyon in favor of renewable generation, the nuclear percentage will decrease further. EIA projects nuclear power in the US to account for less than 15% by 2040, down from its current 20%.
In Korea, construction costs have experienced a long-term downward trend and appear to be following the same path in China. In much of the rest of the world, this is not the case. The upfront financial risk is very large compared with alternatives in power generation and typically requires major government subsidies for insurance and investment (e.g., Hinkley). Given the history gas price volatility, gas prices could rise to previous levels. However, with the reported 400 Tcf in natural gas proven reserves in the US alone, the gas problem does not appear to be a short-term issue. For an investor, this type of competitive problem provides pause.
Risks associated with spent fuel/waste disposal, security, water resources, and failure events are difficult to monetize, which also leads to uncertainty for investors.
According to nuclear proponents, carbon credits, in one form or another (e.g., the New York and Illinois legislation), should provide a major economic advantage over coal and natural gas power plants. Reportedly, the new US administration is not strictly an adherent of anthropogenic climate change, which could limit the economic potential of carbon credits. However, even an optimistic carbon credit scenario may not overcome the competitive problem of natural gas economics, let alone overcome the risk uncertainties of waste disposal, security, and failure events.
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Relicensing
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New Starts/Shutdowns
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Siting
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Transportation
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Security
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Failure Events
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60. Lundin, B., Worst plant owner? Entergy blamed for majority of nuclear near misses, SmartGridNews, March 2016.
61. Alvarez, L., Nuclear Plant Leak Threatens Drinking Water Wells in Florida, March 2016.
62. Vartabedian, R., Nuclear Accident in New Mexico ranks among the costliest in U.S. History, Los Angeles Times, August 2016.
63. World Nuclear Organization, Liability for Nuclear Damage, www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/liability-for-nuclear-damage.aspx, April 2016.
Carbon Credits
64. Goggin, M., Fact Check: Wind power and nuclear can successfully coexist, June 2016, AWEA Blog -- http://www.aweablog.org/fact-check-wind-power-and-nuclear-can-successfully-coexist/
65. Bade, G., Atoms for green energy: What role should nuclear power play in decarbonization?, Utility Dive, July 2016.
66. Irfan, U., To cut carbon emissions, some argue for the nuclear option, www.eenews.net/stories/1060038231/, June 2016.
Water Resources
67. World Nuclear Association, Is the Cooling of Power Plants a Constraint on the Future of Nuclear Power?, Position Paper, January 2016.
68. Valentine, H., Future Power Generation in a Water Constrained Environment, http://www.energycentral.com/community/energybiz/future-power-generation-water-constrained-environment, January 2016.
69. Overton, T., The Water-Energy Nexus Takes Center Stage, Power, July 2014.
SMR Sidebar
70. Lydersen, K., Nuclear advocates eye former coal plant sites for small reactors, July 2016.
71. NuclearEnergy Insider, US Committee prioritizes advanced reactors; Southern, X-energy win DoE funds, January 2016.
72. NuclearEnergy Insider, US utilities join forces with SMR vendors to speed development, February 2016.
73. Maize, K., Small Modular Reactors Speaking in Foreign Tongues, Power, January 2015.
74. Larson, A., Is There a Market for Small Modular Reactors?, Power, June 2016.
75. Overton, T., What Went Wrong with SMRs?, Power, September 2014.
76. NuclearEnergy Insider, NuScale targets SMR cost below $90/MWh on wider deployment, http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/small-modular-reactors/nuscale-targets-smr-cost-below-90mwh-wider-deployment, November 2015.
Fusion Sidebar
77. Boyle, A., Renegade Fusion, Science News. P.18, February 2016.
78. Hirsch, R., Fusion Power Illusions, Delusions, and Hope, Power, February 2016.
79. Beck, M., Finding the funding for fusion energy, www.EENews.net/stories/1060034711, Energy & Environmental Publishing, March 2016.
Charles Botsford is a professional chemical engineer in the State of California with 30 years experience in engineering process design, distributed generation, and environmental management. He has a wide range of experience relative to oil refining, power electronics, renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, and air quality issues. Mr. Botsford is a Qualified Environmental Professional (QEP) Emeritus. He holds a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from the University of New Mexico, and a master’s degree in chemical engineering from the University of Arizona.
December 7, 2016
Nuclear Power
Power Generation
Nuclear Generation