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Revision as of 00:44, 4 April 2013
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** Ackoff (2006) ''A little book of f-laws: 13 common sins of management''. p.12
** Ackoff (2006) ''A little book of f-laws: 13 common sins of management''. p.12
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* The only problems that have simple solutions are simple problems. '''The only managers that have simple problems have simple minds.''' Problems that arise in organisations are almost always the product of interactions of parts, never the action of a single part. Complex problems do not have simple solutions.
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* The only problems that have simple solutions are simple problems. '''The only [[manager]]s that have simple problems have simple minds.''' Problems that arise in organisations are almost always the product of interactions of parts, never the action of a single part. Complex problems do not have simple solutions.
** Ackoff (2007) as cited in: Stefan Stern (2009) "Fond farewell to a brilliant thinker". in: ''Financial Times'', November 9, 2009.
** Ackoff (2007) as cited in: Stefan Stern (2009) "Fond farewell to a brilliant thinker". in: ''Financial Times'', November 9, 2009.
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=== ''Management misinformation systems'', 1967 ===
=== ''Management misinformation systems'', 1967 ===
Ackoff, Russell L. (1967) "Management Misinformation Systems," in: ''Management Sciences'' Vol. 14, No. 4, December 1967.
Ackoff, Russell L. (1967) "Management Misinformation Systems," in: ''Management Sciences'' Vol. 14, No. 4, December 1967.
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* I do not deny that most managers lack a good deal of information that they should have, but I do deny that this is the most important informational deficiency from which they suffer. It seems to me that they suffer more from an overabundance of irrelevant information.
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* I do not deny that most [[manager]]s lack a good deal of information that they should have, but I do deny that this is the most important informational deficiency from which they suffer. It seems to me that they suffer more from an overabundance of irrelevant information.
** p.147
** p.147
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* My experience indicates that most managers receive much more data (if not information) than they can possibly absorb even if they spend all of their time trying to do so. Hence they already suffer from an information overload. They must spend a great deal of time separating the relevant documents. For example, I have found that I receive an average of 43 hours of unsolicited reading material each week. The solicited material is usually half again this amount.
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* My experience indicates that most [[manager]]s receive much more data (if not information) than they can possibly absorb even if they spend all of their time trying to do so. Hence they already suffer from an information overload. They must spend a great deal of time separating the relevant documents. For example, I have found that I receive an average of 43 hours of unsolicited reading material each week. The solicited material is usually half again this amount.
** p.148
** p.148
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* Unless the information overload to which managers are subjected is reduced, any additional information made available by an MIS cannot be expected to be used effectively.
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* Unless the information overload to which [[manager]]s are subjected is reduced, any additional information made available by an MIS cannot be expected to be used effectively.
** p.148
** p.148
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* Most managers have some conception of at least some of the types of decisions they must make. Their conceptions, however, are likely to be deficient in a very critical way, a way that follows from an important principle of scientific economy: The less we understand a phenomenon, the more variables we require to explain it.
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* Most [[manager]]s have some conception of at least some of the types of decisions they must make. Their conceptions, however, are likely to be deficient in a very critical way, a way that follows from an important principle of scientific economy: The less we understand a phenomenon, the more variables we require to explain it.
** p.149
** p.149
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=== ''The future of operational research is past'', 1979 ===
=== ''The future of operational research is past'', 1979 ===
Ackoff, Russell L. (1979) "The future of operational research is past". In: ''The Journal of the Operational Research Society'', Vol 30, pp.93-104.
Ackoff, Russell L. (1979) "The future of operational research is past". In: ''The Journal of the Operational Research Society'', Vol 30, pp.93-104.
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* Managers are not confronted with problems that are independent of each other, but with dynamic situations that consist of complex systems of changing problems that interact with each other. I call such situations messes. Problems are extracted from messes by analysis. Managers do not solve problems, they manage messes.
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* [[Manager]]s are not confronted with problems that are independent of each other, but with dynamic situations that consist of complex systems of changing problems that interact with each other. I call such situations messes. Problems are extracted from messes by analysis. Managers do not solve problems, they manage messes.
** Cited in [[Donella Meadows]] (2008) ''Thinking in Systems: a Primer''. p.1
** Cited in [[Donella Meadows]] (2008) ''Thinking in Systems: a Primer''. p.1
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=== ''A little book of f-laws: 13 common sins of management'', 2006 ===
=== ''A little book of f-laws: 13 common sins of management'', 2006 ===
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* The lower the rank of managers, the more they know about fewer things. The higher the rank of managers, the less they know about many things.
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* The lower the rank of [[manager]]s, the more they know about fewer things. The higher the rank of managers, the less they know about many things.
** p.2 cited in: Gregory H. Watson (2010) "By rejecting the status quo, Russ Ackoff took systems thinking to greater heights" in: ''QP''. vol 27, March 2010, p.30
** p.2 cited in: Gregory H. Watson (2010) "By rejecting the status quo, Russ Ackoff took systems thinking to greater heights" in: ''QP''. vol 27, March 2010, p.30
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* '''Managers who don't know how to measure what they want settle for wanting what they can measure'''. For example, those who want a high quality of work life but don't know how to measure it, often settle for wanting a high standard of living because they ''can'' measure it.
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* '''[[Manager]]s who don't know how to measure what they want settle for wanting what they can measure'''. For example, those who want a high quality of work life but don't know how to measure it, often settle for wanting a high standard of living because they ''can'' measure it.
** p.4, bold text cited in: Colin J. Neill, Phillip A. Laplante, Joanna F. DeFranco (2011) ''Antipatterns: Managing Software Organizations and People''
** p.4, bold text cited in: Colin J. Neill, Phillip A. Laplante, Joanna F. DeFranco (2011) ''Antipatterns: Managing Software Organizations and People''
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* '''The less sure managers are of their opinions, the more vigorously they defend them.''' Managers do not waste their time defending beliefs they hold strongly – they just assert them. Nor do they bother to refute what they strongly believe is false.
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* '''The less sure [[manager]]s are of their opinions, the more vigorously they defend them.''' Managers do not waste their time defending beliefs they hold strongly – they just assert them. Nor do they bother to refute what they strongly believe is false.
** p.8, bold text cited in: Gregory H. Watson (2010)
** p.8, bold text cited in: Gregory H. Watson (2010)
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* '''The less important an issue is, the more time managers spend discussing it.''' More time is spent on small talk than is spent on large talk. Most talk is about what matters least. What matters least is what most of us know most about.
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* '''The less important an issue is, the more time [[manager]]s spend discussing it.''' More time is spent on small talk than is spent on large talk. Most talk is about what matters least. What matters least is what most of us know most about.
** p.16, bold text cited in: Gerald Haigh (2008) ''Inspirational, and Cautionary Tales for Would-be School Leaders''. p.142
** p.16, bold text cited in: Gerald Haigh (2008) ''Inspirational, and Cautionary Tales for Would-be School Leaders''. p.142
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* Managers cannot learn from doing things right, only from doing them wrong
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* [[Manager]]s cannot learn from doing things right, only from doing them wrong
** p.37 cited in: Andrew Carey (2008) ''Inside Project Red Stripe: Incubating Innovation and Teamwork at the Economist''. p.49
** p.37 cited in: Andrew Carey (2008) ''Inside Project Red Stripe: Incubating Innovation and Teamwork at the Economist''. p.49