KC-135: Old as the hills…
(click to view full)
DID’s FOCUS articles cover major weapons acquisition programs – and no program is more important to the USAF than its aerial tanker fleet renewal. In January 2007, the big question was whether there would be a competition for the USA’s KC-X proposal, covering 175 production aircraft and 4 test platforms. The total cost is now estimated at $52 billion, but America’s aerial tanker fleet demands new planes to replace its KC-135s, whose most recent new delivery was in 1965. Otherwise, unpredictable age or fatigue issues, like the ones that grounded its F-15A-D fighters in 2008, could ground its aerial tankers – and with them, a substantial slice of the USA’s total airpower.
KC-Y and KC-Z buys are supposed to follow in subsequent decades, in order to replace 530 (195 active; ANG 251; Reserve 84) active tankers, as well as the USAF’s 59 heavy KC-10 tankers that were delivered from 1979-1987. Then again, fiscal and demographic realities may mean that the 179 plane KC-X buy is “it” for the USAF. Either way, the KC-X stakes were huge for all concerned.
In the end, it was Team Boeing’s KC-767 NexGen/ KC-46A (767 derivative) vs. EADS North America’s KC-45A (Airbus KC-30/A330-200 derivative), both within the Pentagon and in the halls of Congress. The financial and employment stakes guaranteed a huge political fight no matter which side won. After Airbus won in 2008, that fight ended up sinking and restarting the entire program. Three years later, Boeing won the recompete. Now, they have to deliver their KC-46A.
Boeing’s KC-46A, and Its Team
KC-46A concept
(click to view full)
KC-46A Pegasus production takes place in 2 phases: the 767-2C, and then the militarized KC-46A modifications.
There are still a number of things we don’t know, though more details have emerged since Boeing won the competition. The first step is to build a 767 on the commercial production line with a cargo door and freighter floor, an advanced flight deck display borrowed from its new 787, body tanks, and provisions for aerial tanker systems. Initial Boeing graphics featuring upturned winglets on the wingtips are no longer part of the design, but Pratt & Whitney’s 62,000 pound thrust PW4062s remain their engine choice. This is the 767-2C, and it receives an FAA 767 amended Type Certificate.
The 767-2C is militarized in a separate finishing center by adding aerial refueling equipment, an air refueling operator’s station that includes panoramic 3-dimensional displays, and threat detection/ countermeasures systems. The resulting KC-46A receives an FAA 767 Supplemental Type Certificate given to substantially different variants, and must also receive USAF certification that clears the way for full acceptance.
Boeing’s refueling boom is derived from the KC-10’s AARB, but adds 3-D viewing and a slightly higher fuel offload rate of 1,200 gallons/min. The centerline and wing-mounted refueling pods will now come from Cobham plc’s Sargent Fletcher, who was also partnered with Airbus for this feature. Unlike the A330 MRTT’s systems, however, the KC-46A’s wing refueling pods still need to finish testing on the 776-2C. The USAF will buy 46 wing sets for its fleet, which will allow multi-aircraft (multipoint) aerial refueling when installed.
KC-46A cargo capacity lists as 65,000 pounds, in a mix of up to 18 cargo pallets, 114 passengers, and/or 58 medical stretcher slots.
Fielding a tanker built after the 1960s allows the USAF to include a number of new systems, which would be too costly to retrofit into the existing KC-135 fleet. The net effect is to make its KC-46As front-line refuelers. The cockpit and exterior lighting are night-vision compatible for covert rendezvous. Advanced communications and secure datalinks are big steps forward for the fleet, and their classified feeds will be used by specialized ESTAR and TCS systems designed to route the tanker away from threats. NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection will allow the planes to operate in contaminated environments, while EMP hardening reduces the effects of high-frequency radiation bursts on all those new solid-state electronics. On a more prosaic level, radar warning systems, infrared defensive systems, cockpit armor, and fuel tank ballistic protection will all be welcome.
KC-46A Industrial Team
Boeing’s KC-X 1.0 Team
Boeing’s industrial team has slowly announced itself over many months since the award. American KC-46A content has been touted as high as 85%, with British firms picking up much of the balance. Boeing reportedly looked hard for supply chain savings in Round 2, though, in order to lose less money with its under-cost bidding strategy.
That KC-46A design is a big change from KC-X round 1, whose KC-767 Advanced used a 767-200ER fuselage; a 767-300F freighter wing, landing gear, cargo door and floor; and a 767-400ER’s flaps and flight deck (derived in turn from the 777). A new design fly-by-wire boom with remote viewing would expand the tanker’s effective refueling airspace, and offload more fuel. Engines would be 2 Pratt & Whitney PW4062s, with 62,000 pounds of thrust each, instead of the KC-767A/J’s 60,200 pound CF6-80C2s.
Some of the suppliers also changed, as Boeing progressed from the canceled KC-767 lease deal, to KC-X, to its final design in Round 2:
Boeing’s production line had also progressed. Near the end of the KC-X bidding, Boeing added civilian 767 orders to keep its production line going. That was enough to create a cushion if KC-X faced further challenges and issues, but the reality is that civilian 767 production looks set to end soon. The US military will soon become the 767 production line’s sole support.
KC-X: The Program
A March 2012 GAO report summed up the risk driving the KC-46A program, and the current state of the USAF’s tanker fleets:
“According to the Air Force, the national security strategy cannot be executed without aerial refueling… the KC-135 Stratotanker, is over 50 years old on average and costing increasingly more to maintain and support. With… more than 16,000 flight hours on each aircraft, the KC-135s will approach over 80 years of age when the fleet is retired as projected in the 2040 time frame. In 1981, the Air Force began supplementing its fleet of KC-135s with [59] KC-10s… that transport air cargo and provide refueling. Much larger than the KC-135, the KC-10 provides both boom and hose and drogue refueling capabilities[Footnote 4] on the same flight and can conduct transoceanic missions. The KC-10s now average about 27 years of age with more than 26,000 flight hours on each, and their service life is expected to end around 2045.”
The $7.2 billion October 2012 development cost estimate includes $4.9 billion for the aircraft development contract and 4 test aircraft, $0.3 billion for the aircrew and maintenance training systems, and $2 billion for other government costs and some risk funds. The total procurement cost estimate of $40.46 billion in base-year dollars buys 175 production aircraft, initial spares, and other support items as priced in contract options.
Cost estimates as of April 2014 are stable, with an estimated $1.6 billion to cover other government costs like program office support, test and evaluation support, contract performance risk, and other development risks. That includes the cost of test flights, which will sometimes feature operational military aircraft of various kinds to act as receivers.
An accompanying military construction estimate of $4.2 billion includes the projected costs to build aircraft hangars, maintenance and supply shops, and other facilities to house and support the full 175-plane KC-46 fleet at up to 10 main operating bases (McConnell AFB, KS is MOB1), 1 training base at Altus AFB, OK; and the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex depot.
The KC-46A Development Phase: Budgets, Splits, & Dates
KC-46 development
The Pentagon’s latest Selected Acquisition Report estimates a total KC-46A development cost of $5.615 billion, which would actually be $1.221 billion over the KC-X EMD phase’s original Target Cost of $4.394 billion. Fortunately for the USAF, they structured the contract so they can’t pay more than $4.7 billion, and the overall bid cost to the US government for development plus production remains below Airbus’ bid.
Here’s how it works:
Up to the $4.898 billion ceiling, the contract split for amounts over the $4.394 billion base price is 60/40. The difference is $504 million, so the government would pay $302.4 million ($4.696 billion total), and Boeing would pay about $201.6 million.
Costs above the $4.898 billion ceiling are all Boeing’s responsibility.
Current estimates show that there’s almost no chance of coming in under the ceiling. Boeing’s current cost estimate is $5.164 billion, which would raise its private liability for the cost increases to $467.5 million (201.6 + all 265.9 over the ceiling). If the government program manager is right, Boeing’s liability rises to $918.6 million (201.6 + all 717.0 over). The difference matters to Boeing, but the Pentagon doesn’t have to care which EMD Phase figure is correct, or how much higher EMD costs go. Their costs are set, at $4.7 billion, though actual dollars will be a bit higher due to inflation etc.
That’s if, and only if, the USAF doesn’t start asking for design changes. If they do, that would trigger a cycle of charges over and above the agreed contract.
As of December 2012, schedule planning looked like this:
Concurrence concerns
The USAF has maintained its Q4 FY 2015 (summer 2015) goal for a successful Operational Assessment and Milestone C decision, and this remains the official target. Success which would clear the way for 2 firm-fixed-price Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots to deliver the initial 19 aircraft. Full-Rate Production options would follow beginning in FY 2017 as a firm-fixed-price contract with some adjustments for outside circumstances, and a not-to-exceed cap. The USAF will be assessing the possibility of breaking out the engines as a separate government procurement in FRP, instead of having Boeing provide them.
As Airbus predicted when the contract was awarded, however, Boeing has admitted to trouble meeting these development milestones. The schedule will need to be changed, but there’s no official replacement schedule yet.
The schedule may need to incorporate other changes as well. The Pentagon’s own DOT&E testers have doubted proclaimed Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) dates (Q3 FY 2016 – Q1 2017) for some time. Beyond technical issues that have slowed the new design, testing must avoid revealing significant problems.
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was pegged for August 2017, with Full Operational Capability (FOC) expected by August 2019, but USAF Air Mobility Command is no longer giving official target dates.
The program as a whole is expected to end by 2028.
The KC-46A Production Phase: Risks & Numbers
KC-10 & F/A-18C
The current program calls for Boeing to begin delivering KC-46As to the USAF by 2015. Unfortunately, the KC-46A is too different from previous KC-767A models sold to Japan and Italy, so it will need its own development, testing, and certification time. That’s why Airbus and program skeptics have always doubted that Boeing could deliver 18 certified, fully developed and tested planes by 2017. Boeing disputes this, but the Pentagon’s own DOT&E office added weight to those concerns in its 2011 reports, which declared the KC-46A’s test program “not executable.” That continues to be a concern.
Beyond basic integration and certification considerations, a March 2012 GAO report cites 6 key technical risks to the program:
1. Weight limits. The KC-46A is close to its limit, and any more growth will start to take away fuel capacity, while increasing fuel burn rate. As of December 2013, Boeing remains confident that they will remain under the maximum take-off weight of 204,000 pounds.
2. New wing refueling pods. The KC-46’s pods will be redesigned to reduce buffeting of the aircraft’s wing, and change the way the refueling hose exits the pod. Still a technical risk as of December 2013.
3. 3-D display for the boom operator.
4. Threat Correlation Software. Used to help plot safe routes, along with the…
5. ESTAR software.
6. ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver integration. Issues like figuring out precise placement, and antenna design, make fitting a large aircraft more challenging than many people expect.
Problems with these or other systems could delay the program further, and some of these issues could also make certification harder or longer. Even so, the actual risk that set the development program back wasn’t any of these. It was the need to redesign certain wiring sections for military-grade shielding requirements and mandatory separation distances.
Meanwhile, the USAF plans to respond to continued budget cuts by removing their existing KC-10 heavy refuelers entirely, adding tremendous risk by removing their inherent boom/hose versatility, and leaving no tanker alternative if the KC-135s develop a serious problem.
Fleet Risks
Over the longer term, plotting even a 3-year production delay against planned deliveries and KC-135 retirements never drops the medium tanker fleet much below present levels. The initial drop is slight, and the same final figure is reached in 2030 instead of 2027. On the other hand, RAND’s 2006 Analysis of Alternatives for KC-X highlighted a very different risk, which needs to be understood:
“The current (December 2005) assessment of the flight-hour life of the KC-135 fleet and the expected future flying-hour programs together imply that these aircraft can operate into the 2040s. It cannot be said with high confidence that this is not the case, although there are risks associated with a fleet whose age is in the 80- to 90-year range. It can also not be said with high confidence that the current fleet can indeed operate into the 2040s without major cost increases or operational shortfalls, up to and including grounding of large parts of the fleet for substantial lengths of time, due to currently unknown technical problems that may arise. The nation does not currently have sufficient knowledge about the state of the KC-135 fleet to project its technical condition over the next several decades with high confidence.”
In English, nobody knows if an airplane fleet that’s already 50 years old will remain safe, or avoid unforeseen mechanical or structural problems, because there’s no previous example of what they’re trying to do. Those kinds of sudden “age-out” problems recently grounded the USAF’s F-15A-D fleet for several months, and led to the unexpected retirement of almost 1/4 of the fleet. If anything similar happens to the KC-135, the USAF’s planned number of aerial tankers may not resemble its actual future fleet.
This risk, and the potential absence of the KC-10, is exactly why the KC-X program has been the USAF’s #1 priority. On the other hand, it’s an equally good reason not to trust the USAF’s own rosy projections for its future fleet size. The graph below shows how this kind of scenario could play out. In DID’s hypothetical example, we used actual data to the present day, plus all planned reductions in the USAF’s 2011 plan. Fleet problems lead to the forced retirement of 1/3 of the remaining fleet in 2021 over safety and cost-to-fix issues, followed by a second mechanical issue or budget crisis that grounds another 55 planes in 2029. The KC-10 fleet is not part of this calculus at all.
The USA’s looming fiscal entitlements crisis will begin to bite in earnest post-2020, and the pattern of cuts in the USA and in other countries shows a marked tendency to simply retire platforms with significant maintenance costs. KC-135 per-hour flight costs are already increasing, and a fleet that also needed expensive refits or fixes would be a prime target for future cuts. Here’s what this scenario looks like:
Finally, DID believes that there will be no KC-Y or KC-Z, so the timing of KC-135 problems and retirements isn’t critical. Any serious problems in the KC-135 fleet could create a similar end-point, even if the drops happened after 2030.
KC-46A Export Prospects
IAI’s KC-767 MMTT
Once the KC-46As do enter service, they will join Italy’s KC-767A (4) and Japan’s KC-767J (4) small KC-767 fleets. Both customers have experienced long delivery delays while Boeing has worked to iron out technical problems, and their KC-767s will have a number of key differences from the KC-46A. Japan’s boom-equipped KC-767s were delivered form 2008-2010, but Italy’s aircraft with hose-and-drogue systems were only accepted in February 2011.
That’s one option, if Boeing will produce the planes.
The KC-46A’s schedule and dwindling civil 767 production are problematic for export orders, because the USAF will be Boeing’s sole focus until the EMD Phase is done in 2017 – or later. Countries that need aerial tankers before 2019-2020 will need to look elsewhere. Boeing declined to bid on India’s aerial tanker RFP, for instance. There’s also a customer commitment issue. Should customers accept the KC-767A, which is certified and in service, or wait for the KC-46A, and hope it’s on time?
Airbus sees this lock-up as an opportunity to add to its A330 MRTT customer list, of course, signing customers like India, Qatar, and Singapore. Ironically, the other big beneficiary may by Israel’s IAI Bedek, whose inexpensive KC-767 MMTT conversion of used Boeing freighters already has customers in Colombia and Brazil.
As of June 2013, Boeing was reportedly pursuing prospects for up to 20 aerial tanker exports. If so, they have been quiet pursuits. The next big opportunity will be in South Korea.
KC-X: Contracts & Key Developments
FY 2015
Boom assembly
September 17/15: The first KC-46A tanker is expected to fly on 25 September, following a year-long delay. The trouble-hit tanker has become a headache for Boeing, which has been absorbing increasing development costs through a firm-fixed contract signed in February 2011 which capped Air Force costs at $4.9 billion. The most recent setback resulted from an accident involving the insertion of chemicals into the aircraft’s refuelling system in early August, pushing the tanker’s schedule back by a month.
August 19/15: The mistake earlier this month involving the accidental insertion of chemicals into the fuel system of the KC-46A tanker has officially delayed the aircraft’s first flight by a month. The tanker will now see its first flight in late-September or early October, with the program’s original timetable calling for this flight to have taken place last year, with this pushed back to April and then again to late August, before this latest setback.
July 1/15: South Korea has selected Airbus’ bid to supply the country’s Air Force with four refueling tankers, beating competitors Israel Aerospace Industries and Boeing for the $1.07 billion program. The winning bid – the A330 MRTT – dashed Boeing’s hopes of securing its first export order for the KC-46A, which saw a strong dollar raise its bid price compared with a weakened euro for the European bid. The four tankers are scheduled for delivery in 2019.
June 10/15: NAVAIR has been slamming missiles into the side of its KC-46 tankers as part of Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division survivability testing at the Weapons Survivability Laboratory. The tests used – among other sensors – ten high-speed cameras to capture the impact of the test missiles, themselves specifically designed to inflict maximum possible damage to the aircraft. The Air Force intends to buy 179 of the tankers to replace approximately a third of the current tanker fleet, which consists principally of KC-135 Stratotankers.
April 24/15: Tinker Air Force Base (Oklahoma) has been named as one of four potential locations to base the Air Force’s fleet of new KC-46A refueling tankers, alongside Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base (North Carolina), Westover Air Reserve Base (Massachusetts) and Grissom Air Reserve Base (Indiana).
Jan 26/15: Flight test. Boeing conducted a flight test from Payne Field in Everett, Washington. The four-hour flight was uneventful, but well-documented.
Dec 10/14: spares. Boeing is awarded a not to exceed $84.5M undefinitized contract action modification (P00054) to previously awarded contract FA8625-11-C-6600 for 4,880 production support equipment items and 6 production spare parts. Work will be performed at Seattle, WA, and is expected to be completed by June 30, 2016. $9.5M in FY14 aircraft procurement funds and $32.2M in FY15 aircraft procurement funds are being obligated at the time of award.
Dec 03/14: wiring. Boeing Dennis Muilenburg told investors during a conference organized by Credit Suisse that wiring problems that had led to delays and charges (q.v. Sept 17/14) were now “resolved and closed out.”
Dec 01/14: Training. The USAF intends to finalize its Maintenance Training System (MTS) RFP in January 2015. The draft, released back in September, is found under solicitation IDN-KC-46-MTS.
Nov 24/14: Personnel. The Air Force Personnel center announces that the aircrew of 41 officers and enlisted members from the active force, Reserve and National Guard have been selected to staff initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E).
Nov 19/14: Schedule. The USAF publicly admits what KC-46A program watchers already know: Boeing is essentially out of schedule margin to deliver the 767-based KC-46As on time by 2017. The USAF is still describing the contract as “achievable,” but so many things have to go right that this isn’t a smart bet for outside observers. The USAF won’t really say anything else until disaster is certain, though, because the admission will make the service look bad (q.v. March 4/11). Sources: Reuters, “US Air Force sees challenges on Boeing KC-46 tanker program”.
Oct 16/14: Delays. Boeing finally admits that the KC-46A’s program schedule will have to be changed. They don’t know how many milestones will need adjustment, but they’re still holding to the idea that they’ll have 18 KC-46As delivered by August 2017.
Can they avoid proving Airbus’ March 4/11 prediction that Boeing would deliver late? It’s hard to see how Boeing’s on-time promise adds up now, given significant GAO and DOT&E concerns that the testing program as proposed is too compressed and can’t be executed (q.v. April 11/14, Sept 17/13). Boeing gets to try convincing Pentagon acquisition officials with an official submission early in 2015, and the USAF will then conduct its own “schedule risk assessment” to examine Boeing’s assumptions.
Most ways of speeding up programs involve spending more money, though that tends to have diminishing returns past a certain point. The program’s official cash reserve is expected to run dry in March 2015, but the USAF’s costs are capped, so it’s likely that Boeing will wind up spending more private funds on KC-46A development. Sources: Bloomberg, “Boeing Seeks Revised Schedule for U.S. Aerial Tanker”.
FY 2014
Competition in South Korea? Initial basing decisions; Boeing takes extra costs charge, announces delays.
Workers saluted
Sept 17/14: Flight delay. First flight for the KC-46A is in question due to the same wiring bundle technical issues that forced Boeing to take an additional $272 million Q2/14 charge on the program (q.v. July 23/14). USAF spokesman Ed Gulick:
“We are disappointed with Boeing’s current KC-46 production challenges and their inability to meet internal production milestones, but we do not see anything of great concern and are confident they will overcome the issues,” said Gulick in a statement to Puget Sound Business Journal. “The KC-46 program’s technical and cost performance are on-track; Boeing has met every contractual requirement to date.”
The baseline 767 has about 70 miles of wiring in the design, and the need for redundancy in certain systems pushes the 767-2C to 120 miles, including shielding requirements and mandatory separation distances for safety reasons. The redesign will address these issues, but it sideswipes plans for concurrent installation in the 4 test aircraft currently under construction. Given the program’s known issue with compressed test schedules (q.v. April 11/14), they had better be ready by April 2015. Sources: Aviation Week, “First Flight for KC-46 Tanker Platform Slips Further” | Puget Sound Business Journal, “Air Force ‘disappointed’ in Boeing tanker delays; issues cost Boeing millions”.
Sept 15/14: Training. The USAF issues a Draft Request for Proposal (DRFP) for the KC-46 Maintenance Training System (MTS) Program. It consists of various specific component trainers, e-learning materials, and Training System Support Center build-outs. Sources: FBO.gov, “KC-46 Maintenance Training System, Solicitation Number: IDN-KC-46-MTS”.
Aug 5/14: Basing. The USAF announces that the KC-46A’s MOB2 Air National Guard base will be Pease ANGB, NH, which beat Forbes AGS, KS; Joint-Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; Pittsburgh International Airport AGS, PA; and Rickenbacker AGS, OH.
Pease has apparently been the preferred alternative since May 2013, owing to its location in a region of high air refueling receiver demand and successful ANG-USAF partnership. This announcement follows the required environmental reviews. Sources: Pentagon NR-409-14, “Pease Air National Guard Base selected to receive KC-46A Pegasus aircraft”.
Basing: MOB2 ANG picked
July 23/14: Cost. During a Q2 analyst conference call, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney says that they’re absorbing a $272 million unexpected charge related to problems with KC-767 wiring harnesses:
“We bid the EMD (engineering manufacturing and development) contract for the tanker aggressively, with zero margin, with planned profitability in the production phase. Despite our disappointment in encountering these challenges, the issues are well understood, and no new technology is needed to solve them…. We have a wet fuel lab, a lighting lab, those have all been put in place to de-risk the program. We have a wet lab where we are running fuel through pumps and valves to validate that on the ground.”
Sources: Boeing, “Boeing Reports Second-Quarter Results and Raises 2014 EPS Guidance” | Puget Sound Business Journal, “Boeing: We can fix Air Force tanker problems without new technology”.
July 14/14: Cost. The KC-46A development phase could end up costing Boeing more than expected. That may concern Boeing executives, but the USAF won’t pay any more and doesn’t care:
“Defense Undersecretary Frank Kendall told reporters late on Sunday that Boeing was performing “satisfactorily” on the KC-46 tanker program, but several events – including water damage caused by a sprinkler malfunction at the company’s Everett, Washington plant – meant costs were higher than expected.”
Boeing says that they’ll be able to cut costs with their testing approach. We’ll see. Sources: Reuters, “AIRSHOW-Boeing may face higher than expected costs on KC-46 tanker”.
June 30/14: South Korea. Boeing confirms that they’ve formally offered South Korea the KC-46A tanker being developed for the USAF, rather than the KC-767 model that’s already in service with Japan and Italy. They tout the KC-46A’s quick-conversion main deck cargo floor, but in the face of North Korea’s WMD arsenal, and ability to target ROKAF bases with missiles, they make a point of mentioning that:
“Unique among tankers, the KC-46 can operate in chemical, biological and nuclear conditions, features cockpit armor for protection from small arms fire, and can also operate from a large variety of smaller airfields and forward-deployed austere bases.”
Sources: Boeing, “Boeing Offers Next-Generation KC-46 Tanker in Republic of Korea Competition”.
June 4/14: Infrastructure. The Ross Group Construction Corp. in Tulsa, OK wins a $17.5 million firm-fixed-price contract with options, to built the KC-46A Fuselage Trainer Flight Training Center and the Fuselage Trainer at Altus AF, OK. Option 4 for sidewalks and landscaping, and Option 5 for additional concrete parking stalls, are exercised at time of contract award. Altus AFB was recently chosen as the KC-46A’s main training base (q.v. April 23/14), and already operates in that capacity for the KC-135 fleet.
The estimated completion date is Oct 5/15. Bids were solicited via the Internet, with 7 received by the US Army Corps of Engineers in Tulsa, OK (W912BV-14-C-0015).
May 29/14: Infrastructure. MEB General Contractors in Chesapeake, VA wins an $8.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for construction services to alter the KC-46A apron fuels distribution system and supporting facilities at McConnell AFB, KC, and to relocate fuel vents/valves at the 3-bay hangar and 2-bay hangars.
All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 military construction budgets. Work will take place at McConnell AFB (KC-46A MOB1), with an estimated completion date of Dec 3/15. Bids were solicited via the Internet, with 2 received. The US Army Corps of Engineers in Kansas City, MO manages the contract (W912DQ-14-C-4010).
Flight Simulator
April 23/14: Basing. The Pentagon announces that McConnell AFB, KS will be is the KC-46A’s active duty-led MOB1 Pegasus main operating base. McConnell won because swapping in 36 KC-46As for 44 KC-135s involved the lowest military construction costs, and the base is located in a high-demand area. McConnell was also seen as “an ideal central location for the new KC-46A Regional Maintenance Training Center.” It beat Fairchild AFB, WA (2 KC-135 Sqns), Grand Forks AFB, ND (1 KC-135 Sqn), and Altus AFB, OK, all of whom will continue to operate KC-135s.
By default, Altus AFB, OK will continue in its FTU tanker training role, which it already performs for the KC-135. Advantages to keeping it in a training role include co-location with both tanker and heavy receiver aircraft for training purposes, and “considerably fewer” new construction requirements vs. McConnell. Altus will begin receiving KC-46A planes in 2016.
The Air National Guard MOB2 base (q.v. Jan 9/13) remains undecided, and will be picked in summer 2014. It will be 1 of Forbes Air Guard Station, KS (whose chances have probably dropped); Joint-Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; Pease Air Guard Station, NH; Pittsburgh International Airport Air Guard Station, PA; and Rickenbacker Air Guard Station, OH. The winner will begin receiving planes in 2018. Sources: Pentagon, “Air Force Announces Bases to House New Tanker Refueling Aircraft”.
Basing: MOB1 & FTU picked
April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. The KC-46A has seen the Pentagon’s program costs go down:
“Program costs decreased $2,181.5 million (-4.2%) from $51,642.1 million to $49,460.6 million, due primarily to lower construction estimates based on site surveys of initial bases (-$715.4 million), funding reductions in FY 2015-2018 given stable program execution and no engineering change proposals to date (-$655.6 million), and the removal of construction planning and design funding from FY 2014-2024 budgeted elsewhere (-$268.8 million). Additional program cost decreases included the application of revised escalation indices (-$222.7 million), accelerating the procurement buy profile (-$157.7 million), and sequestration reductions (-$142.9 million).”
Cost decrease
April 11/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables “KC-46 Tanker Aircraft: Program Generally on Track, but Upcoming Schedule Remains Challenging“. Flight testing is scheduled to begin in June 2014 for the 767-2C, and in January 2015 for the KC-46, but it will be a bit of a squeeze making that:
“The KC-46 program has made good progress to date—acquisition costs have remained relatively stable, high-level schedule and performance goals have been met, the critical design review was successfully completed, and the contractor is building development aircraft. The next 12 months will be challenging as the program must accomplish a significant amount of work and the margin for error is small. For example, the program is scheduled to complete software integration and the first test flights of the 767-2C and KC-46. The remaining software development and integration work is mostly focused on military software and systems and is expected to be more difficult relative to the prior work completed [which is generally on schedule]. The program’s test activities continue to be a concern due to its aggressive test schedule. Detailed test plans must be completed and the program must maintain an unusually high test pace to meet this schedule. Perhaps more importantly, agencies will have to coordinate to concurrently complete multiple air worthiness certifications. While efficient, this approach presents significant risk to the program. The program office must also finalize agreements now in progress to ensure that receiver aircraft are available when and where they are needed to support flight tests.”
The GAO and the Pentagon’s DOT&E group continue to believe that Initial Operation Test & Evaluation should be pushed back 6-12 months, in order to train aircrew and maintenance personnel and verify maintenance procedures. The USAF isn’t convinced yet, and knows that this move would delay the entire project for a similar period. Furthermore, the testing schedule itself is so concurrent that any problems found during test are almost certain to create delays to the program as a whole. One technical area that could still bite them involves “lingering instability in…. the centerline drogue system and wing aerial refueling pod,” but Boeing hopes to fix that before flight testing begins.
Finally, as of December 2013, the original $354 million program reserve budget has just $75 million (21.1%) left, leaving the program at risk of running out before testing begins. As long as the USAF doesn’t change the design, however, that’s Boeing’s problem.
March 31/14: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2013, plus time to compile and publish.
The KC-46 Tanker program comes in for praise in a couple of areas. One has to do with the “should-cost” method for the final product, which will reportedly save $6.8 billion over the total program, with $6.4 billion listed as already realized. The other area that drew praise was the program’s use of all 4 best practices for development programs: (1) identifying key product characteristics; (2) identifying critical manufacturing processes; (3) conducting producibility assessments to identify manufacturing risks; and (4) completing failure modes and effects analysis to identify potential failures and early design fixes. Boeing should be motivated to do all that, because their contract makes them fully responsible for any fixes required in early production aircraft.
Costs remain almost identical to initial estimates, so far. The bad news is that test boom production has been delayed by almost a year due to design changes and late parts, but Boeing hopes to have it ready in time for initial KC-46A flight testing in January 2015.
March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. The KC-46A program’s revised totals are reflected in the article’s charts, and the USAF has worked hard to protect the program. What’s interesting is the program’s schedule. It hasn’t been changed officially, but Air Mobility Command isn’t giving an official Initial Operational Capability date.
Previous years had listed budgets for spares, but those have effectively been revised. A contractor service agreement for the initial planes will see also spares bought as part of the procurement budgets, until the USAF takes over all maintenance itself.
Feb 20/14: KC-46 Pegasus. USAF Gen. Mark Welsh announces that the KC-46A will be the “Pegasus”. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James had approved the recommendation from Air Mobility Command boss Gen. Paul Selva earlier in the week. Sources: AFA Air Force Mag, “Introducing the KC-46A Pegasus” | Everett Herald, “Air Force dubs KC-46A tanker ‘Pegasus'”.
KC-46 Pegasus
Jan 16/14: Industrial. Boeing has begun assembling the 4th and final KC-46A test aircraft, and says that the program remains on track to deliver the initial 18 tankers to the Air Force by 2017. According to the current schedule, the 1st flight of a KC-46 test aircraft will take place at mid-2014 without its aerial refueling systems, followed by the first flight of a full KC-46A tanker in early 2015.
The first delivery of a production aircraft to the Air Force is planned for early 2016, but of course that depends on things going well during testing. Official reports to date have been skeptical, so no matter how things turn out, someone is about to be proved wrong. Sources: Boeing, “Boeing Starts Assembly of Final KC-46A Test Aircraft”.
Nov 5/13: Infrastructure. URS Group Inc. in Mobile, AL receives a $13 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery contract for architect-engineering services to support USAF KC-46 beddown in the continental United States. The 767 is closer in size to the KC-135, which means that it needs fewer infrastructure changes than the A330/ KC-45.
There will still be facilities and features to build (q.v. FBO.gov, Oct 2/13). Estimated completion date is Nov 14/18, with work location and funding determined with each order. Bids were solicited via the internet, with 57 received by the Army Corps of Engineers in Mobile, AL (W91278-14-D-003).
Oct 22/13: Industrial. Boeing announces that assembly of the 3rd aircraft and 2nd boom are underway. They sound confident that manufacturing of the initial batch of 4 aircraft remains on track to be completed by Q3 2014.
This would be good news for their USAF client, and would also help the company make its case in South Korea (q.v. Aug 7/13), where parliament is about to review whether to proceed with a competition for 4 tankers to be delivered in 2017-19. Sources: Boeing, Oct 22/13 release.
Oct 2013: Basing. Public hearings scheduled at the end of the month in Kansas and Oklahoma are postponed on October 11 because of furloughs at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the government shutdown. As of Oct 23, a new date for the hearings had not yet been released. Meanwhile the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) and the US Army Corps of Engineers are preparing infrastructure work: AFCEC | Industry Day | Sources Sought.
FY 2013
Design finalized after CDR; State of the program reports; Sequester threat; Basing competition; Training aids picked.
KC-46A and B-2
(click to view full)
Sept 17/13: Testing. KC-46A program executive Gen. John Thompson offers a bit of clarity regarding testing plans. The first 4 planes will be split between the commercial 767-2C baseline, which is set to fly in January 2014, and 2 fully converted KC-46A tankers, which won’t fly until June 2015. Civil certification is an important precursor to the military supplemental certification (q.v. May 31/13), and the 767-2Cs will eventually become KC-46As to support initial operational test and evaluation.
Thompson sounds very confident about the intensive testing schedule, but then, he needs to. Past GAO and DOT&E reports have flagged it as a program risk (q.v. Jan 17/13, Feb 27/13), and have even called the test plan “not executable” (Jan 17/12). Sources: NDIA Magazine, “Newly Designed KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker to Undergo Strenuous Testing”.
Sept 4/13: Boeing announces that the USAF has validated the final design elements of the KC-46A, concluded that it meets requirements, and frozen the plane’s configuration. That clears the way for production and testing.
Design is set.
Aug 7/13: South Korea. Yonhap reports that South Korea may acquire 4 aerial refueling tankers by 2019. It seems to be at the discussion level rather than a firm decision. If it proceeds, Boeing’s KC-46A and Airbus Military’s A330 MRTT are seen as the logical contenders, and the 2019 date makes the KC-767 a viable possibility.
The A330’s challenge is that, unlike Australia, South Korea’s zone of action doesn’t really need the A330’s range and size. That will make the extra expense problematic. It’s also worth noting that South Korea already has significant defense relationships with Israel’s IAI. That could create an opening for IAI’s much cheaper K-767 MMTT option, which is also on offer to Singapore. Sources: Yonhap News, “Air Force to acquire 4 aerial refueling tankers by 2019”.
July 10/13: CDR. KC-46A Weapon System Critical Design Review takes place, and is successful. Source: Boeing, Sept 4/13 release.
CDR
July 3/13: Sub-contractors. Fleet Canada Inc. in Fort Erie, ON receives its 1st order from Boeing, for sub-assemblies of the KC-46A Camera and Boom Fairings. The contract is issued as part of Boeing’s industrial offset requirements for various Canadian defense buys, including the C-17A airlifter and CH-47F Chinook helicopter. Fleet Canada.
June 26/13: production. Boeing announces that production of the first aircraft has begun. The USAF’s Critical Design Review (CDR) will start in July 2013, as announced last year. Beyond that, the company is forecasting the following milestones:
First aircraft assembly: Nov. 2013-January 2014
First flight: 2015
First delivery: 2016
Delivery of the first 18 aircraft by August 2017
June 16/13: Exports. Boeing told reporters that Boeing is engaged in talks with several export prospects in Asia and the Middle East, for a total of 20 potential units. The company’s defense and civilian arms are working together to be able to make the aircraft available for sales abroad by 2017. Bloomberg | DoD Buzz.
May 31/13: Certification process. Boeing will seek FAA certification in 2 phases: first there is one for the commercial 767-2C aircraft, then a supplemental one for the military modifications to the commercial aircraft.
In March 2012, the GAOlisted the fact that Boeing planned to pursue some parts of these 2 certifications in parallel as a risk factor. John Howitt, the program deputy manager, told AIN that this is addressed with joint technical planning and work, even though the 2 certifications are separate from an administrative perspective. Sources: AIN.
May 1/13: Training. Berkshire Hathaway company FlightSafety Services Corp. in Centennial, CO wins a $78.4 million fixed-price-incentive-firm and firm-fixed-price contract to design, develop, and build the KC-46 aircrew training system, including delivery of courseware and simulator-based training systems. FlightSafety will design and manufacture the KC-46, Boom Operator, and Part Task Trainers at its 375,000 square foot simulation facility in Oklahoma; the first device is scheduled for delivery in February 2016.
FlightSafety is no newcomer to this role, with operations at 15 U.S. Military bases that include Flight School XXI; Training systems for the KC-10 Extender, C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster, AFSOC’s HC-130P Combat King, and the V-22 Osprey tiltrotors; and Contractor Logistics Support for the T-6 JPATS and T- 37/38 trainers. The KC-46A contract pays $1 million initially, with the rest to be paid over time, including additional production and operations options that could raise its value beyond $78.4 million. Warren Buffett will be glad to hear that.
Work will be performed at Broken Arrow, OK and St. Louis, MO and is expected to be complete by 2026 if all options are exercised. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition, with 5 offers received by USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WNSK’s Simulators Division (FA8621-13-C-6247). See also USAF | FlightSafety International.
April 17/13: Sub-contractors. ITT Exelis announces a contract from Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) to supply its anti-jam N79 CRPA (Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna) GPS antennas, for use with Raytheon Navshield and Advanced Digital Antenna Production equipment on the KC-46A. Work will be performed in Bohemia, NY.
April 13/13: Restructure at peril. USAF AMC commander Gen. Paul J. Selva reiterates the KC-46A’s #1 priority status for the Air Force, and warns about the effects of restructuring this contract:
“…because we have a firm fixed-price contract for the development of that airplane, if we allow ourselves to get into the position where we don’t have the funds to pay for the initial development of the airplane, that contract gets reopened…. We’ll pay more…”
Probably. Boeing bid hundreds of millions of dollars below development cost to win KC-X, but 2 years into the contract, the US military’s ability to switch to Airbus is more limited. They’d have to delay their #1 priority program, while creating a lot of opposition in Congress. There are creative ways to charge more in total, and Boeing would be well placed to negotiate a few in any restructuring.
April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage. For KC-X, it’s pretty much steady as she goes, hewing more or less to previous plans.
Total reductions from FY 2014-2017 are around $182 million compared to FY 2013 plans, but a fixed-price contract is going to have to reach the agreed total regardless. Current budgets show just $3.173 billion allocated for RDT&E from FY 2011 – 2018, but the USAF is near-certain to owe $4.7 billion for the EMD phase.
April 7-10/13: Basing. As the USAF prepares to make decisions about where to base its KC-46s, communities are competing. The catch is that there are really 2 initial competitions, and they’re mutually exclusive (q.v. Jan 9/13 entry). Grand Forks Herald | Lawton Constitution | Wichita Eagle.
Feb 27/13: GAO Report. The GAO’s annual in-depth look at the KC-46 program is out. The good news is that after 28% ($1.4 billion) in development work, the program costs and schedule haven’t changed much. The CDR is still scheduled for July 2013, albeit with some risks. The USAF and Boeing are evaluated as managing the project well, and have added the ability to track progress toward key aircraft performance goals.
Concerns fall into 3 areas: financial reserves, weight, and software. The GAO is one of several agencies that think flight testing and certification will need to take about 6 months longer, and the boom refueling system is changing a bit, but those are secondary risks right now.
The development contract set aside about 7% ($354 million) in reserves, and 2 years into a 7-year development program, 79.6% of those reserves have been spent, leaving less than $72 million to cover an expected $3.5 billion in work. Some of the issues driving this spending aren’t resolved yet. As we explained above, the government’s costs won’t change if this problem isn’t solved, but GAO is worried about technical problems growing and creating schedule issues.
Projected weight is now expected to exceed the KC-46’s target weight, and each pound above target reduces fuel payload by 1 pound. Extra weight could also affect operating requirements for takeoff, mission radius, and landing. The program has a mitigation strategy in place, and further weight reduction initiatives can create tradeoffs in areas like durability and cost.
Software is a good news/bad news story. They’ve cut total software development by 40%, but code reuse will be less than planned (52% vs. 76%), which means new and modified software has doubled to 48% from 24%. That means more work overall and more testing, though program officials are claiming that schedules won’t be affected.
Feb 22/13: KC-135Rs retiring. After more than 50 years of service and 22,500 flying hours, the 1st operational re-engined KC-135R Stratotanker retires from service, and heads to AMARG’s “boneyard” at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ. KC-135R #61-0312 first flew as a KC-135A on Aug 14/62, and was re-engined into a KC-135R on June 27/85.
This plane’s retirement is budget-driven, as 1 of the 16 scheduled KC-135 retirements in FY 2013. On the other hand, the KC-135 Program Office at Tinker AFB, OK used the Fleet Health Analysis Tool to pick the aircraft. Joey Dauzat, 97th Maintenance Directorate KC-135R sortie generation flight chief, discussed KC-135 usage patterns, which will become much more relevant if something happens to the KC-X program:
“[KC-135Rs] assigned to Altus Air Force Base fly approximately 1,820 sorties per fiscal year, which averages out to 91 sorties per aircraft…. Flight hours are approximately 7,030 hours per fiscal year, which averages out to 351 flight hours per aircraft. All sorties are required to have [refueling booms] on them, so every sortie flown is a boomer training sortie.”
Feb 2/13: A USAF presentation to Congress says that if sequestration takes effect, the KC-46A program may need to be restructured, along with the F-35 fighter and MQ-9 Reaper Block 5. Flight International.
Feb 2/13: Hi