2016-09-21



RFS Vladivostok,
DCNS concept
(click to view full)

In August 2009, Russian media reported that their country was planning to take a radical step, and buy a French BPC-210 Mistral Class amphibious assault ship (BPC/LHD) by the end of 2009. The outlet quoted the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, who said that: “We are negotiating the purchase of one ship at present, and later planning to acquire 3-4 ships [of the same class] to be jointly built in Russia.” That plan eventually came true, with a contract for 2 ships, and a possible follow-on for 2 more.

France currently operates 3 Mistral Class LHDs, after buying a 3rd using economic stimulus funds. Unlike other LHD designs, the Mistral Class can’t operate fixed wing aircraft, and some observers in Russia and elsewhere classify at as an LHA. Regardless, it’s an important tool of power projection. Mistral Class ships can carry and deploy up to 16 helicopters, including attack helicopters like France’s Tiger or Russia’s Ka-50/52. Their main punch revolves around 4 landing barges or 2 medium hovercraft, however, which deliver armored vehicles, tanks, and soldiers to shore. Vessels of this class are equipped with a 69-bed hospital, and could be used as amphibious command ships.

Russia wants that kind of versatility – even as her neighbors fear it. After Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and the continued covert war in Eastern Ukraine, this contract became a major point of contention between Russia and NATO members.

Mistral’s Meaning: A Method to their Madness?



Mistral LHD

The Russian order represented an extension of some larger trends, but it was still a sea change on several fronts: strategic, tactical, and industrial.

Strategic: For one thing, it’s the first major arms import deal since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. That, in itself, is a huge shift. The second big change is that Russia’s current defense procurement program through 2015 didn’t even envision the construction or purchase of large combat ships.

Clearly, Russian thinking is changing. The Pacific is becoming a critical strategic theater, and Russia has placed extra strategic emphasis on its influence networks in the Eastern Mediterranean. Mistral Class LHDs, designed for both a large helicopter aviation role as well as amphibious landing and support of troops, would go a long way toward improving Russia’s capabilities in these areas.

February 2011 reports had suggested that the first 2 ships would be deployed to the Pacific Fleet near Vladivostok, but it’s certainly possible to shift the ships to other theaters given enough time, infrastructure, and planning.

By 2014, with Crimea annexed, a civil war in the Ukraine, and the Middle East facing a modern production of the 30 Years’ War, Moscow was talking about basing the ships in their namesake home ports: RFS Vladivostok on the Pacific at Uliss Bay, near Vladivostok; and RFS Sevastopol in newly-annexed Crimea’s port of Sevastopol.



Ka-29K
(click to view full)

Tactical: Control of littoral regions, which includes large stretches of Russia’s coasts, zones like the Baltic Sea and much of the Black Sea, and influence along Middle Eastern coasts, depends heavily on helicopters and UAVs. Russian naval capabilities are limited in these areas, and during the recent war with Georgia, Russia failed to control the Georgian coast.

Russia’s Mistral Class ships will carry Ka-29K utility helicopters, and navalized Ka-52K Alligator coaxial scout/attack helicopters. Other possibilities include anti-submarine helicopters, radar-carrying airborne early warning helicopters, and UAVs.

When this potent aviation punch is combined with the ships’ troop landing capabilities, the new class offers Russia a whole new dimension of offensive and influence operations.

Industrial: The other aspect of the government’s changing thinking may well be industrial. Russia’s shipbuilding industry is clearly experiencing difficulties. Major shipbuilders have defaulted on commercial contracts, and fiascos like the Admiral Gorshkov refit for India have blackened the global reputation of Russian defense products. Any Mistral Class ship built in Russia would represent a naval project whose scale Russia hadn’t seen in well over a decade – which is why initial construction will take place in France. The fact that Russia was even discussing a Mistral buy indicated a certain lack of confidence in Russian shipbuilding.

On the other hand, this Mistral order may be an opportunity for Russian shipbuilding. If construction in Russia is preceded by training in France, as the first ships are built. If engineering and project management expertise are brought back to those shipyards from France to supervise the Russian portion. If infrastructure investments are made within Russia. If all of those things are done, the Mistral order could represent a key step forward in revitalizing Russia’s naval defense sector, following its decimation in the wake of the Cold War.

France, Russia, and the “Competition”

HNLMS Rotterdam
(click to view full)

The foundations for Franco-Russian cooperation on a program of this size have been laid on several fronts over the last few years. France’s Thales already provides components for Russia’s front line military equipment, from tank gunnery sights to avionics and targeting pods for Russian-built fighters. Recent memoranda of understanding for cooperation in naval R&D (Thales) and defense R&D more generally (EADS) build on the 2006 MoU between DCN and the Russian government to develop technical, industrial and commercial co-operations between the Mistral’s builder and Russia’s naval defense industry.

Persistent reports from Russia indicated that the Mistral was not the only option Russia was investigating. Reports consistently cited Spain, where Navantia makes the BPE and related Canberra Class LHDs. These ships have a “ski ramp” up front that the Mistral lacks, and have the ability to operate STOL/STOVL fighters in addition to helicopters. The other country cited was the Netherlands. Royal Schelde’s Rotterdam Class is a more conventional LPD design with good helicopter capacity, but without a flattop deck.

In the end, it appears that these reports of interest served mostly as bargaining chips, in order to get better terms from the French for the ships that Russia had always wanted.

The Vladivostok Class LHDs

Mistral Class LHD
(click to view – Francais)

Mistral Class ships are slightly smaller than contemporaries like Navantia’s BPE/ Canberra Class LHDs, or Italy’s Cavour Class aircraft carrier/LHDs, and lack the ski jump that gives their contemporaries fixed-wing aviation capability. Exercises off the American coast have demonstrated compatibility with heavy-lift helicopters in the front (#1) landing slot, however, and well deck compatibility with LCAC hovercraft as well as the conventional landing ships.

As such, the 21,300 ton Mistral Class “BPC” (Batiments de Projection et de Commandement) ships operate as helicopter carriers and amphibious assault transports, with secondary capabilities as command ships, and naval hospitals. Propulsion comes from 2 electric-powered maneuverable thruster pods, similar to those used on cruise ships, with 2 more bow thrusters for added maneuverability in tight situations. The Russian Vladivostok Class will include some unique features, but it will be strongly based on the Mistral Class.

Mistral Class vessels normally carry 450 equipped troops for up to 6 months, but can raise this figure to 700 troops or evacuees for short periods. Normal hospital capacity is 69 beds, with a fully-equipped operating room. That capacity can also be expanded in emergencies, by appropriating other ship spaces. The command post section is not expandable, but has workstations for up to 150 personnel.

Vehicle storage capacity is 2,650 square meters, accommodating an estimated 60 wheeled armored vehicles, or 46 vehicles plus 13 AMX-56 Leclerc medium tanks, or 40 tanks plus associated munitions. Russian T-90 tanks have roughly the same dimensions as a Leclerc.

To get those vehicles ashore, Mistral Class ships can carry a number of different landing vessels, including standard LCMs, American LCAC hovercraft, and France’s innovative L-CAT landing catamarans. A 2012 report suggests that Russia will become the 1st export customer for the 80t capacity L-CAT LCM, which can raise and lower its cargo floor to switch between high speed transport and on-shore unloading. Alternatives would involve the smaller Russian Project 11770 Serna LCU, or a modified Project 21280 Dyugon craft LCM with lowered masts.

Aviation Options

Ka-31 AEW
(click to view full)

Mistral Class helicopter capacity is about 1,800 square meters, accommodating up to 16 machines with size “footprints” similar to the NH90 medium helicopter or Eurocopter Tiger scout/attack helicopter. The #1 landing spot, over the bow, has been tested with American CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters. It could accommodate most Russian helicopters for “lilly pad” operations, but the huge Mi-26 might be a stretch. Testing would be required, in order to know for sure.

Under current plans, Russia’s Vladivostok Class will carry Ka-52K Alligator coaxial scout/attack helicopters. The Ka-52s will add considerable attack punch, and their short range air-to-air missiles could make them extremely unpleasant for enemy fighters to tangle with.

They’ll also carry Ka-29TB utility helicopters, a slightly enlarged variant of the Russian “Helix family” design that’s optimized for troop transport and assault roles, with the ability to carry rockets and anti-tank missiles.

The Helix family is a larger set, however, with the slightly smaller Ka-27PL Helix operating as an anti-submarine helicopter, and the modified Ka-27PS available in a search and rescue role. The SAR role is necessary for any task force, and the Ka-27PL’s ASW role would be a useful capability. If Russia decided to add the Ka-31 Airborne Early Warning derivative on board, Vladivostok Class ships would be able to serve as true centerpieces of a naval task force.

Beyond those standard options, Russia’s UAV force is too nascent to factor in at this point, and indeed most of their operational UAVs are Israeli models. It would certainly be possible to operate Searcher II UAVs from a Mistral, but they aren’t armed, and could serve only in a reconnaissance role.

The key to any of these aviation capabilities is to add the necessary training and ancillary equipment investments.

Vladivostok Class: Weapons

AK630 CIWS
(click to view full)

As noted above, the ship’s most important weapons will be its helicopters.

Beyond that, the Mistral Class is built to commercial standards, rather than naval combat standards, and currently carries very light defensive systems: 4 machine gun stations, a pair of 30mm guns, and a pair of manual Simbad twin-launchers for MBDA’s very short-range Mistral anti-aircraft missiles. Deployment in zones that feature anti-ship missiles, such as the 2006 evacuation off of Lebanon, requires protective escort ships.

The Vladivostok Class be be similarly armed. With respect to the transfer of French military technology, and especially questions raised about the SENIT-9 combat system and SIC-21 fleet command system, DCNS had this to say:

“A Russian combat management system will be installed on board in France. The communication system will integrate Russian communication equipment with French equipment. Some of these equipment will be installed and integrated with the French equipment, some Russian equipment will be installed in Russia. The radar is French. ESM(Electronic Support Measures, detects & pinpoints incoming radar emissions) is not planned on board. Only the pre-installation of the self-defence (A360, Gibkha) will be done in France. The installation will be done in Russia, after the delivery of the ship.”

AK-630 systems are Russian 30mm radar-aimed gatling guns used for close-in defense. Drawings from DCNS suggest that the Vladivostoks will carry 2 of these, along with 2 SA-N-10/ Gibkha 3M-47 quad-launchers fitted with 4 very short range SA-24 Grinch/ 9K338 Igla-S missiles. Four DP-65 anti-saboteur grenade launchers will also be scattered around the ship.

Other Russian Modifications

Vladivostok launch

The Russian ships may include a number of changes, to the point of making them a variant class.

The biggest change appears to be an air wing of 30 helicopters, instead of 16, but that could be a mirage. Russian Ka-27/29/31 naval helicopters have smaller footprints than the Mistral’s base NH90, owing to their design, while the Ka-52 attack helicopter is comparable. Some natural increase to about 18 on board is possible, therefore, but the Russian official who gave that figure spoke of combined ship and land-based elements, in order to ensure fast rotation of the helicopters for repairs, or replace combat losses. Russian equipment doesn’t have an outstanding reliability record, and training will require set-asides, so a wing of 30 to deploy 16-18 helicopters is plausible.

Other helicopter-related changes include raised hangars to accommodate taller Russian coaxial designs. Changing overall ship height would change the ship’s balance, but squeezing other decks would change capacity for other key items. It will be interesting to see how the Russian design decides to cope.

Structurally, weather is the first priority. Operations within Russia’s Pacific and Northern fleets will require some hull strengthening to guard against ice damage, which may squeeze internal space a bit more, and parts of the flight deck will need more power for de-icing. The well deck door will reportedly close completely, eliminating the Mistrals’ top opening. Finally, drawings show a modified bridge structure with less protected forward visibility, and more and larger radomes around the ship to accommodate Russian equipment.

For Russian sailors, however, some of the Vladivostok Class’ most important features may be more basic: hot water to shower in, comfortable bunking quarters, etc. Given the state, age, and design philosophy of most current Russian navy vessels, we wouldn’t be surprised if the Russian Vladivostoks soon earn an unofficial sailor’s nickname with the word “Dacha” in it.

Contracts and Key Events

2014-2016

September 21/16: France has delivered its second Mistral class helicopter carrier to Egypt. The Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessel was handed over during a change of flag ceremony attended by the chiefs of staff of the Egyptian and French Navies on Friday in France. Dubbed the Anwar El Sadat, the ship, with its Egyptian crew, will now take part in an exercise with the French Navy before sailing to its homeport of Alexandria.

June 3/16: Egypt has taken over the first of its new Mistral-class helicopter carriers in a ceremony in the French city of Toulouse. The country’s Defense Minister Sedki Sobhi was in attendance with his French counterpart with the vessel to be named after Egypt’s famous strong-man President Gamal Abdel-Nasser.

March 18/16: Negotiations between Russia and Egypt over communications equipment for the Egyptian Navy’s two new Mistral-class helicopter carriers is progressing well. The French made vessels initially intended for Russia had several armament, command-and-control, navigation systems, as well as radio and electronic equipment taken out in accordance with the terms of the cancellation of the sale. The Egyptians now seem to be turning to Russia to help provide these systems, after purchasing navalized Ka-52 helicopters from Moscow. It’s believed that Cairo is seeking radio and electronic equipment worth at least $1 billion USD to equip and operationalize the carriers, amounting to a nice chunk of money for Russia.

February 26/16: Delivery of Mistral warships to Egypt is expected for September this year as 180 Egyptian naval officers prepare to go to France at the end of March for training. It’s believed that tactical training is being provided by specialists from manufacturer DCNS, shipbuilders STX France, and DCI Navfco, as well as training and support consultants to an advance group already there. Each vessel can carry 16 helicopters, four amphibious landing craft, 70 armored vehicles, and 450 soldiers; with the helicopters on board to be navalized Ka-52K attack helicopters from Russia. The sale sees Egypt’s arms sales from France increasingly grow, with negotiations ongoing between them and DCNS for four Gowind corvettes.

February 8/16: Egyptian Navy crews have arrived in France to prepare for the delivery of two Mistral helicopter carriers due in June and September. Training will continue until the end of March. The French built vessels, which had been originally destined for Russia, have subsequently had their communications equipment replaced with Egyptian systems. In a separate deal, Egypt will purchase navalized versions of the Ka-52K attack helicopter designed for the Russian purchase. With the initial sale to Moscow billed at around $1.3 billion, Egypt has enjoyed a slight reduction, purchasing the vessels for $1 billion.

November 11/15: Egyptian plans to acquire Ka-52K naval attack helicopters – reported in October – will not go ahead until the Russians have finished dismantling the sensitive equipment on board the Mistral LHDs they will equip. Russian specialists began removing sensitive communications systems, combat information systems and other equipment in September [Russian], after the Egyptians announced the acquisition of the two Mistrals, signing a contract in October. Completion of the removals is expected in November, with Egypt yet to submit a formal request for the helicopters.

October 22/15: Jane’s is reporting that Egypt is planning to order Kamov Ka-52K Katran helicopters to equip it’s newly-acquired Mistral LHDs, in addition to the 50 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters it signed for in September. The navalized Ka-52K was supposed to equip the Mistrals had they been delivered to Russia, with Moscow reportedly planning to acquire 16 Ka-52K helicopters per vessel.

October 2/15: The Mistral LHD resale to Egypt has cost the French taxpayer between EUR200 and EUR250 million, according to a report [French] delivered by the country’s Senate. Industry has also seen a loss of approximately EUR90 to EUR146 million, including profit loss and uninsured expenses such as maintenance. The two Mistrals previously destined for Russia are expected to be delivered to Egypt next year, following a deal announced earlier this month.

September 24/15: Egyptian and French leaders have negotiated a deal for the two Mistral LHDs owned by the French state following a deal with Moscow in August. The Egyptians are also reported to be in talks over acquiring two more Gowind corvettes, to supplement the four ordered in 2014. However, reports [French] indicated that there was a brief sticking point over the price of the two Mistrals. Reports from August indicated that Saudi Arabia [French] may be financing the Egyptians, with Malaysia also previously indicating interest in the Mistrals.

As France celebrates offloading the two vessels, French personnel began on Wednesday to remove sensitive Russian equipment [Russian] installed on the LHDs, joined by Russian experts to assist in the removal/prevent any unwanted prying into the systems. The systems are thought to collectively value around EUR50 million and include combat information systems, missile fire controls, helicopter landing modules and artillery systems.

September 15/15: With Egypt appearing to lead the pack of prospective buyers for the two French state-owned Mistral LHDs, the Russian government has reportedly indicated that if the North African state were to acquire the two ships then the sensitive Russian equipment installed on them could remain in place, after stating earlier this month that this equipment would be removed. The same reportedly goes for India, with both countries established markets for Russian military hardware. With reports indicating that Saudi Arabia may finance the acquisition of the vessels for Egypt, in order to leverage the country’s navy as a regional proxy, the Egyptians have recently purchased a number of French naval vessels, including a FREMM frigate and Gowind corvettes.

September 09/15: The sensitive work of removing Russian equipment from the Mistrals that France is refusing to deliver will take place in a few weeks. Among the sensitive systems are combat information control systems, missile fire control, and the helicopter landing control module.

August 28/15: France has reportedly returned Russia’s $900 million for failing to deliver the two Mistral class helicopter carriers it had manufactured. Interestingly, the Sputnik News report indicates that Russia feels it has a right to grant or withhold permission to France to resell the craft to a third nation. This could conceivably be the case were Russia contributing significant design work or classified specifications.

August 26/15: France is reportedly in talks with Malaysia to take on the two helicopter carriers initially purchased by Russia. France found it impolitic to sell to the Russians after various instances of Russian ill behavior. Malaysia joins a lengthening list of countries reportedly interested in the craft, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

August 10/15: Saudi Arabia is reportedly [French] looking to purchase France’s pair of Mistral LHDs for Egypt, following an agreement between Russia and France last week which opened up the possibility of a foreign buyer for the two ships. China expressed interest in the two ships when negotiations between Paris and Moscow began in May. Egypt has been a major customer for French shipyard DCNS in recent years, including a FREMM frigate and Gowind corvettes.

August 7/15: Moscow and Paris have reached an agreement over the Mistral LHDs currently sitting idle in St. Nazaire, with France cancelling the two contracts and returning Russia its sunk investment. The two ships are now property of the French state, which suspended their delivery in November last year in response to Russia’s support for separatists in Ukraine. Negotiations began in May, with the total amount to be paid by France reported to be less than the €1.2 billion value of the original June 2011 contract. The French government is now looking for possible buyers for the two ships, with several potential customers reportedly interested.

May 21/15: One of the Mistral LHDs originally destined for Russia departed St. Nazaire on Wednesday for a third set of sea trials. The Sébastopol is one of two Mistrals at the heart of a diplomatic spat between Paris and Moscow, with negotiations having begun earlier this week.

May 8/15: French newspaper Le Figaro has reported [French] that the French government may opt to scuttle the two Mistral-class LHDs originally built for Russia, with the French Navy having little desire [French] to integrate the ships into their own fleet. The French have held off delivering the two vessels, originally ordered in 2011, owing to Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. Discussions between Russia’s Putin and France’s Hollande last month must have amounted to little, with the Russians previously pressing the French to make a decision on delivery by June.

April 14/15: Russian state defense export agency Rosoboronexport has stated that the French and Russian governments have two more contractually-stipulated months in the $1.5 billion Mistral contract to work out an agreement before Russia makes a decision based on the “terms and conditions set forth in the contract.”

March 4/15: 2nd ship to trials. France will soon have a second built-for-Russia Mistral class helicopter carrier on its hands. The first, the Vladivostok, is biding its time while France waits for a period during which Russia does not appear to be acting war-like against European allies. The second, the Sevastopol, should
start sea trials later this month.

Dec 11/14: negotiating tactics. Russia’s official TASS news agency relays a statement from “a high-rank source in the Russian defense sector” bearing the studied vagueness that is a trademark of Russian communications:

“The Navy has put construction of Russia’s own amphibious assault ships on a long-term program of shipbuilding for up to 2050 and these plans have been endorsed by the Defense Ministry. The document envisions (the emergence of) these ships, many such ships actually.”

Of course if Russia does want to do it alone they’re more than a decade away from having working ships, and if the Kremlin was confident in their own shipbuilding capabilities, they would not have gone to France in the first place. Russia obviously can’t come with an overnight homegrown substitute, but this is consistent with the overall messaging from Russia that they care, but not that much, and that they can operate with eyes set on a long term horizon. It sounds like the Russian are hedging to save face in case France does cancel the Mistral contract.

Sebastopol under construction

Dec 5-8/14: Politics. Jean-Yves Le Drian, in an interview discussing the French government’s ambiguous position, first repeated that ceasefire conditions needed to be fulfilled in Ukraine for the BPC delivery to proceed. Pressed by journalist Jean-Jacques Bourdin the defense minister finally said that the Russians had to realize that “one may never deliver [the ships].” A new ceasefire is supposed to start on December 9.

In past months French officials had stuck to postponing then at most freezing delivery until genuinely peaceful conditions could be observed in Ukraine. Given that fighting redoubled since the September ceasefire, France has little choice but to start making firmer declarations. Some, but not all, politicians from the UMP and FN right-wing parties have have criticized the (left-wing) government for its contractual wobbling.

All along, Russia’s official response had been to downplay any delivery delay as long as France would eventually fulfill its contractual obligations. But Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also used starker language in a press conference held on December 5:

“We have already had enough of this issue, it’s not our problem, it’s the problem of France’s reputation. And next, the contract must be strictly fulfilled.”

On December 6 President Hollande met with his Russian counterpart. Putin said that Mistrals had not even been discussed, an assertion that strains credulity. By Monday Presidential aid Yuri Ushakov said that it would suit Russia if France returned their money.

Sources: BFM TV [Le Drian, video in French] | Elysee statement, Sept. 23/14 [in French] | ITAR-Tass [Lavrov] | BBC [ceasefire] | Slate.fr [French internal politics] | ITAR [accepting a refund].

Nov. 28/14: Theft aboard Mistral #2. The public prosecutor in Saint Nazaire, the French port where the Sevastopol is under construction, told French media that computing hardware and communications software from Thales had been stolen aboard the ship. There was no confidential information on the equipment. The theft happened between November 18 and 25 and is under investigation. Source: Ouest France [in French].

Nov. 21/14: Sevastopol launch and DCNS liability. The 2nd Mistral ship was launched from its dry dock in Saint Nazaire, one month later than expected. Though Coface, France’s export insurance agency, is covering the contract, DCNS is reportedly exposed to a gap of about €200 million that the company is trying to get the government to pay if they end up blocking the sale. That’s about a whole year worth of profit for the state-owned shipbuilder. Source: L’Opinion [in French].

Nov. 14/14: Vladivostok MMSI. Activist website “No Mistral for Putin” – yes, there is a website for that – is outraged that the Maritime Mobile Service Identity showed the ship under Russian flag for about a day. DID was not witness to this and can’t corroborate.

Uliss Bay, 1908

Sept 3/14: Politics. French President Francois Hollande issued a statement that RIA Novosti quoted as follows:

“The [French] security council has studied the situation in Ukraine. It is difficult. Russia’s recent actions in eastern Ukraine violate the principles of European security. The president of the republic stated that despite prospects for ceasefire, which is yet to be achieved and put into practice, present circumstances do not allow the delivery of the first helicopter carrier by France.”

The Russian military actually started training on the ship in June 2014, but the statement leaves lots of room to deliver the warship on Nov 1/14, or slightly later. With that said, other reports cite unnamed sources who say that the French are trying to figure out how to avoid added contract cancellation penalties, on top of the state-insured cost of refunding the 2-ship contract if it’s terminated. Pressure has been building on France, and the potential loss of equal or greater missile defense and attack helicopter competitions in Poland may be introducing new complications. Sources: Bloomberg, “France Said to Weigh Cost of Ditching Russia Mistral Deal” | Deutsche Welle, “France changes tack on Mistral warship delivery to Russia” | RIA Novosti, “France Puts Off Delivery of First Mistral-Class Helicopter Carrier to Russia” | Russia Today, “France says it cannot deliver Mistral warship to Russia over Ukraine” | Washington Post, “France backs off sending Mistral warship to Russia in $1.7 billion deal”.

Aug 5/14: Ka-52Ks ordered. IHS Jane’s reports that Russia has ordered its 32 Ka-52K helicopters for use with its Vladivostok Class LHDs. The order isn’t a surprise, it was just a question of when the contract would be placed. See “Russia’s Ka-52 Alligator Scout-Attack Helicopters” for full coverage.

32 Ka-52K helicopters

July 30/14: First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitiry Rogozin tells ITAR-TASS that if the 2nd Mistral ship is held up, Russia will pursue full contract penalties, then build an aircraft carrier on its own. Not only did they delivery INS Vikramaditya to India, but “…now we have shipyards with dry docks in Crimea and they presuppose ability to build ships of this class.”

That may be true, but standing up a new project of this scale in a new shipyard isn’t trivial, and creates both extra costs and cost ovverruns. India ended up paying $2.9 billion for Vikramaditya, which was modified from the pre-existing Admiral Gorshkov. If one somehow assumed that Russia could build a new one for just $2 billion, which strikes us as unlikely, it would still be more than double the cost of a Vladivostok Class ship. ITAR-TASS, “Russia to build own aircraft carrier if France annuls Mistral supplies — deputy PM”.

July 27/14: Basing. Russia seems to be changing its mind, and now plans to deploy a Mistral ship with the 5th Squadron in the Black Sea, where its focus would project into the Eastern Mediterranean:

“The Russian navy said during Sunday’s Navy Day celebrations that a French-made Mistral-class carrier will become the flagship of its budding Mediterranean Fleet, while Western leaders continue to pressure Paris into withholding the delivery of the warships…. A navy spokesman told Interfax on Sunday that the second ship has “every opportunity” to become the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet by 2016…. The Black Sea Fleet’s admiral, Alexander Vitko, said Sunday that …. “We have begun the construction of new naval stations and airfields”… adding that new aircraft for the fleet have already been flown in…. Looking further ahead, the Black Sea Fleet will receive 20 new vessels by 2020, Vitko said…”

RFS Sevastopol’s delivery is expected in 2015, so the article’s assertion that meeting this basing schedule would force RFS Vladivostok to be deployed in Crimea is wrong. Sources: Moscow Times, “Second Mistral Warship to Head Russia’s Mediterranean Fleet”.

July 22/14: France will still deliver RFS Vladivostok on schedule, despite criticism from the USA, UK, and other NATO countries. Indeed, President Hollande hits back at Britain for allowing so many Russian oligarchs and their finances in London, while continuing to export military equipment themselves. With respect to the sale, Hollande says:

“For the time being, a level of sanctions [“level 3″] has not been decided on that would prevent this delivery…. Does that mean that the rest of the contract – the second Mistral – can be carried through? That depends on Russia’s attitude”

Since level 3 sanctions against the entire Russian economy are extremely unlikely no matter what, Hollande is essentially saying that the sale will go through. Sources: Bloomberg, “Hollande Threat to Cancel Russia Mistral Warship May Be Empty” | EurActiv, “Hollande: Delivery of second Mistral warship depends on Russia’s ‘attitude'” | Moscow Times, “Under Fire, France Stands by Mistral Warship Sale to Russia” | RIA Novosti, “France Must Adhere to Mistral Contract Instead of Blackmailing Moscow – Russian Lawmaker” | RIA Novosti, “UK Continues Exporting Arms to Russia Despite Call for New Sanctions” | Voice of America, “France Criticized for Warships Contract with Moscow” || UK Parliament, “MPs call for tightening over arms exports for external repression” | Moscow times, “Cameron: Selling Mistral to Russia Is Now Unthinkable; Hollande Disagrees” | The Telegraph, “French lash out at British ‘hypocrisy’ over Russian oligarchs” .

July 17/14: MH17. Russian-backed separatists, who fight alongside Russian special forces units in Ukraine’s civil war, use an SA-11 missile to destroy a Malaysian Airlines 777 flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. The plane it hit while flying at 33,000 feet, and all 298 people on board are killed.

MH17 shot down

June 5/14: Politics. Germany steps in and defends France’s willingness to honor their contract with Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel:

“The question of exports to Russia falls under [EU sanctions] stage three. About when to trigger stage three, if there is more destabilisation we have agreed, also myself bilaterally with the US President, that if [Ukrainian] elections take place we won’t trigger stage three. We see elections have taken place successfully….”

Poland has added their voice to public opposition, which may well cost France a major air and missile defense contract there. Regardless, French President Hollande is holding to the same position Germany is articulating, promising that the Vladivostok would be delivered in October 2014. Meanwhile, the article quote an anonymous EU diplomat asking why France should pay a price, when UK oil firm BP has just signed a major deal with Rosneft. All very predictable. Sources: EU Observer, “Germany backs France on Russia warship contract” | Le Monde, “La Pologne opposée a la vente de Mistral a Moscou” | Vice Magazine, “Why Is France Building Warships For Russia?”.

May 29/14: Politics. Eliot Engel [D-NY], Ranking Member of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, writes to NATO’s Secretary General, urging the alliance to buy France’s 2 Vladivostok (Mistral) Class LHD ships as a pooled asset, instead of selling them to Russia. He’s joined by Rep. Michael Turner [R-OH, Chair of the US delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly], and Rep. William Keating [D-MA, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging threats].

The idea makes sense on paper, because it fills a critical military gap. But the lawmakers’ obliviousness to France’s position, and to the reality of European defense budgets, is stereotypically American – in a bad way. It doesn’t help that the USA is reportedly about to try fining France’s Bank Paribas $10 billion for violating sanctions against Sudan and Iran. They’re guilty, but rightly or wrongly, France is less likely to listen to American offers under these circumstances. More to the point, any offer of this nature needs to be serious, and come with serious financial backing. Hope is not a plan. Sources: House Committee on Foreign Affairs Democrats, “Engel: Stop Sale Of French Warships To Russia” | The Economist, “The fine on BNP Paribas: How much is too much?” | Les Echoes, “Quand l’Amérique perd la raison”.

Feb 26 – March 18/14: Crimea annexed. Massive street protests force Ukrainian President Yanukovych to flee, shortly after he signs treaties that abandon relationships with the EU and tie Ukraine to Russia. Yanukovych signed with a metaphorical economic gun to his head, but the guns quickly become real as Russian troops without identifying markings begin capturing Crimea’s Parliament building, key airports, etc. On March 18/14, Russian President Vladimir Putin formally annexes Crimea into Russia, including the key naval base of Sevastopol, after a hurried referendum takes place in that region.

Very limited American sanctions draw open and public disdain from Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, and Europe’s response is equally weak despite its bluster. France provides Exhibit B in this farce, and validates Russia’s confidence that European governments can be had.

In the interview with France’s TF1 channel, French foreign minister Laurent Fabius warns Russia against further “escalations” in Ukraine, which at this point would involve invasion and annexation of eastern Ukraine. “If Putin carries on like this, we could consider canceling the sales [of the Mistral ships],” he says. By the next day, he’s backtracking, saying that “What is being envisaged is the suspension of these contracts [not cancellation – suspension until when?] but … that would only be in the event of us moving to a third level of sanctions and we are not there yet…” Getting to that level would, of course, involve a consensus within the EU that won’t happen, along with financial sanctions against Russian oligarch assets imposed by a British government that’s showing no inclination to do so. Putin’s speech proclaiming Crimean independence says that Russia has no further intentions in Ukraine, which seems to rule out escalation anyway. Meanwhile, Rogozin decides that it’s France’s turn as the target of his Twitter account:

“France is starting to undermine confidence it is a reliable provider in the very sensitive sector of military and technical cooperation…. All those political waves around the referendum in Crimea will soon subside, but our countries will have to continue working together…”

One presumes that traditional diplomatic cables and notes are reserved for countries one actually respects. Sources: Russia’s state-run RIA Novosti, “France May Scrap Russian Warship Deal Over Ukraine Crisis” | Canada’s CBC, “Vladimir Putin defends Crimea vote in Moscow speech” | CNN, “Ukraine cries ‘robbery’ as Russia annexes Crimea” | Der Spiegel, “Ticking Timebomb: Moscow Moves to Destabilize Eastern Ukraine”.

Crimea annexed by Russia

Feb 11/14: Infrasructure. Russia has begun expanding the naval facilities at Uliss Bay, near Vladivostok, to house their new ship. Things look a lot better than they did in 1908, but it’s still going to be a lot of work. A 1.6 km berth will be created by extending the naval base’s quay to 2,700 meters, access roads and railways will be upgraded, they’ll “drastically” modernize the ammunition loading site, and existing water, electricity and communications systems will all get replaced.

Pacific Fleet commander Rear Admiral Sergei Avakyants said that basic infrastructure will be finished by October 2015, while the base will be ready to host the ships by the beginning of 2018. If they’re lucky, the construction standard will be better than the Olympic facilities in Sochi. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russia Begins Construction of Mistral Ship Base”.

2013

Construction. Schedule.

STX St. Nazaire
(click to view full)

Oct 4/13: A “high-ranking defense industry official” adds some precision to Vladivostok’s final delivery date, telling RIA Novosti that it’s Nov 1/14. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russia to Receive First Mistral Warship in November 2014”.

June 26/13: Sub-contractors. RIA Novosti reports that Baltiisky shipyard has floated out the Valdivostok’s stern, for towing to France on July 8/13 and an expected arrival at the main shipyard in on July 25/13. Vladivostok is scheduled for structural completion and float-out at Saint-Nazaire, France on Oct 15/13.

June 18/13: More for France. Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Yury Borisov tells reporters that stern construction for the first-of-class Vladivostok was being moved from the Severnaya Verf shipyard in St. Petersburg to the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire, France for completion. It became clear to the Russians that their own shipyard wasn’t going to meet the deadline, and “we won’t take risks so as not to delay the contract”.

The Russians are hoping to move the completed ship to Russia as early as October 2013, in order to install Russian weapons, combat system, communication equipment, etc., and prepare the ship for delivery in 2014. The 2nd ship, Sevastopol, is scheduled for 2015 delivery, so Severnaya Verf will need to get it together fast. RIA Novosti.

June 17/13: Keel laying. The keel is officially laid for the future RFS Vladivostok. Source.

May 5/13: Industrial. South Korea’s STX group reportedly plans to sell its 66% stake in the St. Nazaire shipyard. The French state holds the other 34%. The South Koreans appear to have decided that the Vladivostok contract, and a December 2012 contract to build a large cruise ship for Royal Caribbean, aren’t enough for long-term success.

In order to sell, of course, they need a buyer. State nationalization is one option, but what does that really do for French politicians? Sources: Liberation, “Les chantiers de Saint-Nazaire entre deux eaux”.

March 17/13: Naval Recognition offers additional background concerning the new Vladivostok Class weapons and modifications from the initial Mistral design.

Jan 24-26/13: Taking fire. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin criticizes the Mistral Class while addressing a meeting of the Academy of Military Science:

“It’s very odd that ships for offloading a landing force, floating in our latitudes won’t work in temperatures below 7 degrees (Celsius)….”

That would be very odd if it were true, given that France often experiences temperatures below 7C. Rogozin didn’t explain the source of his remark, but the fact that he made it is instructive. It came hard on the heels of industrial criticisms from Military-Industrial Commission Deputy Head Ivan Kharchenko, who told a meeting of defense companies that:

“We have been discussing the absurdity of this earlier decision. It was the initiative of Serdyukov and it’s not the only damage he has inflicted to the government and the industry…”

Russia’s alternative domestic options for fielding a naval amphibious force aren’t exactly clear to outside observers, and Kharchenko did hedge by saying that it’s impossible to backtrack on the 2-ship Mistral deal now. Cancellation costs would be lethal, but ships #3 & 4 aren’t protected by a full contract, and a hostile trend appears to be gaining strength. Vladimir Putin campaigned hard in military-industrial cities during the last election, and these criticisms of the Vladivostok Class come on the heels of a turn away from an Iveco joint venture to produce wheeled armored vehicles in Russia. RIA Novosti | Rossiyskaya Gazeta’s RBH | UPI.

2012

Preliminary design review passes; 1st keel laid; Ka-52K helicopter modifications; Russia ordering L-CATs?; Project cut from 4 to 2?

CNIM’s L-CAT

Dec 21/12: Just 2? Russia’s Vedemosti newspaper reports that Russia may cancel the 2nd pair of Mistral ships, quoting an unnamed “government source” and citing cost as an issue. It’s just an unconfirmed report at this point, but if it is true, cost is likely to be a secondary consideration. Much depends on the outcome of all the political reshufflings, now that defense minister Serdyukov has been fired and replaced by former emergencies minister Sergei Shoigu.

OSK United Shipbuilding Corp. says that they have not received any instructions from Russia’s defense ministry concerning the cancellation of ships #3 & 4. Both reports could be true, of course. The initial report said “may” cancel, and there’s no finalized contract in place to demand immediate notification. Lenta.RU via RusNavy | RIA Novosti.

Nov 23/12: L-CATs? Russia’s Ambassador to France, Alexandre Orlov, seems to announce that Russia will become the 1st export customer for France’s innovative landing catamarans:

“We signed a contract on the purchase of two Mistral Class ships. The first is already under construction in Saint-Nazaire, the second will follow. We also discussed the construction of two Mistral LHDs in Saint-Petersburg, Russia. Everything is on schedule. There are also additional contracts. We will buy small french boats that will be aboard the Mistral LHDs, they are landing catamarans…”

The only landing catamarans qualified for this class are France’s new EDA-R (L-CAT) vessels. They can carry up to 80t at up to 18 knots, if the central cargo platform is raised. Once the vessel reaches shore, that platform is lowered, and its cargo can walk or drive off. This performance approaches the capabilities of American options like LCAC/SSC hovercraft, at significantly lower cost. Navy Recognition.

Oct 23/12: STX France tells the Vzglyad newspaper that they’ll launch the Vladivostok’s hull in September 2013, before moving the ship to Toulon for outfitting. Commissioning dates are currently planned for 2014 and 2015, which could be a bit optimistic is there are delays integrating the ships’ Russian electronics and weapons,

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