LPD-17 cutaway
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LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy, and 11 ships of this class are eventually slated to replace up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. The difference is found in these ships’ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate the Marines’ new MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, alongside the standard well decks for hovercraft and amphibious armored personnel carriers.
While its design incorporates notable advances, the number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract was assigned appears to be part of the problem. Initial ships have been criticized, often, for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered before any of them could be sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain, due to oil leaks. It hasn’t been the only ship of its class hurt by serious mechanical issues. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts, reaching over $1.6 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPDs like the Rotterdam Class, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endurance Class LPD. This article covers the LPD-17 San Antonio Class program, including its technologies, its problems, and ongoing contracts and events.
LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Capabilities and Features
Roles and Innovations
LPD-17 Class & ATF
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The LPD-17 Class featured both an innovative development process, and 21st century features that optimize them for a number of roles. These range from an assault ship that carries and sustains Marine Expeditionary Units, to use as a US Navy command node, the ability to play the lead roles in disaster relief operations, etc.
The ships will operate as part of larger Amphibious Task Forces (ATFs) in conjunction with a full set of airpower, additional assault ships, and air and sub-surface defense vessels. They can also be parceled out as the keystones of smaller three-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs)/ Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs). At minimum, they can operate independently in low-threat scenarios during “split-ARG” operations, helping the group cover multiple areas of responsibility and respond to more than one contingency simultaneously.
A total of 11 ships of this class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships, including the USA’s older LSD-36 USS Anchorage class dock landing ships (all decommissioned as of 2004, LSD-36 and LSD-38 transferred to Taiwan) and its LPD-4 USS Austin Class ships (12 built and serving, LPD 14 Trenton now India’s INS Jalashva). The San Antonio class ships may also replace 2 classes of ships currently mothballed and held in reserve status under the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP): the LST-1179 Newport class tank landing ships, and LKA-113 Charleston class amphibious cargo ships.
MV-22 Osprey
The San Antonio Class will also serve in a number of roles beyond combat.
While LPD-17 vessels will have their own helicopter contingent for patrols and transport operations, their large deck also makes them useful inshore “lilly pads” that can quickly refuel and turn around rotary aircraft from elsewhere in order to keep them on station longer. The ships are also designed to function as casualty receiving and treatment vessels, with 24 beds and two operating rooms. With communications capabilities that surpass most US and foreign vessels,
San Antonio Class vessels are potential command ships for US and joint task forces, and should make excellent UAV hosts and/or controllers.
Their 72,000 gallon per day reverse-osmosis water production certainly improves onboard creature comforts. It also allows the ship to operate in a critical lifesaving role in the wake of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina or the 2005 Asian tsunami, when fresh water is often the most urgent and difficult requirement.
Yet the ships’ combat role remains top-of-mind, and reminders of their purpose are deeply embedded in the names – and in some cases, the very fabric – of these ships. The USS New York [LPD 21] incorporated bow steel cast from salvaged remains of the World Trade Center. Later vessels in its class include USS Arlington [LPD 24], named after the section of the Pentagon that was also hit by an airliner on September 11. USS Somerset [LPD 25] is named in memory of United Flight 93, whose passengers’ heroic struggles with al-Qaeda hijackers crashed the plane in a Somerset County, PA field instead of the intended targets of the Capitol building or White House.
Basic Specifications
Specs
More Fun Facts
The US Navy has taken a tip from the cruise ship industry, and relied on heavy automation to bring down crew size. That frees up more space for troops, but these systems’ performance and resilience have become an issue.
The ship auxiliary systems are all electric, including electric heating and water heaters, 7 big York air-conditioning units (which will be appreciated by many troops), and a 72,000 gallon per day reverse osmosis water-generating plant.
A new high-power “low-drag” propeller hub design provides improved propeller efficiency, and helps them power the ship to speeds above 20 knots.
Within the ship, passageways are 25-30% wider than previous LPDs so combat-loaded Marines can move in full gear inside the skin of the ship just as if they were topside.
Those L-shaped berthing spaces have an extra 1-2 feet of headroom, enough for sailors and Marines to sit up in their racks. Personal storage space in all the berthing areas has gone up by 40%, compared to past LPDs.
The ships are also designed from the outset to accommodate the modern reality of mixed-gender sailors and Marines.
Food service has been modeled for maximum efficiency on both ends via simulation and task/traffic flow analysis that aim to keep both chow line waits and food production humming along.
San Antonio Class ships also feature amenities such as a ship services mall to ease long deployments, a fitness center, and learning resource center/electronic classroom enabled by the ship’s improved bandwidth and computing capabilities.
Self-Defense & Survivability: Options & Issues
AN/SPS-48E on LPD 17
In order to survive both their missions and the need for upgrades during their long service lives, LPD-17 ships have incorporated significant advances in ship self-defense, survivability, and C4I systems. The question is whether they will be enough, given the ships’ size and cost.
Step 1 involves making detection and lock-on harder. The San Antonio Class was intended to have a significantly reduced radar cross section signature (1/100th of the LSD-41 Class). Indeed, the San Antonio Class works to minimize its signature across a number of spectra. It optimizes radar cross-section by streamlining topside layout, and incorporating reduced radar signature technologies and design. Relevant design features include a boat valley instead of a boat deck, removable coverings over the rescue boat and fueling at sea stations, and accommodation ladders that fold into the ship’s hull. Meanwhile, the advanced composite-enclosed mast/sensors, which cover the ship’s SPS-48E and SPQ-9B radars and its communications antennas, give the ship its distinctive profile. In the end LPD-17 designs do have a smaller signature than the ship classes that preceded them, but a July 2007 article in the San Antonio Express-News points out that the ship’s radar signature won’t be reduced as much as planned, compromising its survivability in near-shore regions.
A minor consolation of the class’ stealth design is that there are fewer edges and seams to collect rust, and corrosion-resistant paint and composite building materials were expected to reduce future maintenance and painting costs. Unfortunately, serious construction flaws in several ships of class are quickly piling up maintenance costs in other, unexpected areas.
RIM-116 RAM Launch
Step 2 is active defense. The class will use Raytheon’s SSDS combat system, which will control and partially automate a set of air, surface, and navigation radars, as well as electronic countermeasures systems, towed torpedo decoys, missile decoy systems, and air defense that will include the short-range RAM missile system. That single layer of active protection has been highlighted as a weakness in Pentagon reports, which state that the ship’s radar and defensive systems can’t defend the ship reliably against the most advanced anti-ship missile threats. That may prompt the Navy to add bolt-on launchers for the medium-range RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles that equip many advanced NATO warships. For close-in defense, the LPD-17 class will use the MK46 stabilized 30mm autocannon with advanced sensors, as well as traditional .50 caliber machine guns mounted about the ship.
Step 3 involves the ability take a punch and keep fighting. The ship’s design worked to optimize the separation of redundant vital systems, and possesses a diverse suite of fire-fighting options. Fiber-optic wiring throughout the ship is designed for high-bandwidth SWAN (Shipboard Wide Area Network) applications, and features long-term upgradeability, redundancy, and durability. It will also help the automated ship control systems manage ship systems, and quickly make changes in the event of damage. It is also used as part of an advanced lighting system that improves visual stealth, lowers power requirements, and makes it easy to switch the entire ship to specified lighting modes.
Unfortunately, these features have not lived up to their promise. Pentagon reports cite reliability and effectiveness issues with the Engineering Control System (ECS), the electrical distribution system, and the SWAN, saying that they may magnify the effects of a crisis, instead of helping the crew save the ship.
Other shipboard vulnerability upgrades include improved fragmentation and nuclear blast protection, and a shock-hardened structure with upgraded whipping resistance and structural connections.
Overall, Pentagon reports rate the class as more survivable than previous LPDs, but question whether they are survivable enough for the modern environment. This reflects the horns of their basic design dilemma. If a ship is made very large, it offers peacetime efficiencies and better capability per ton, but its cost will rise to a level that pushes it toward the addition of advanced radars, defensive systems, etc. These additions improve the odds that one’s ship won’t be lost and destroy the entire naval mission, but they also drive each ship’s price even higher.
The other classic approach to this problem is to build more but smaller ships, which tends to add costs by using more raw materials and building more hulls. On the other hand, cost per ship drops sharply – foreign LPDs tend to be somewhere between 1/3 to 1/10 the price of an LPD-17. With more hulls in the water, the loss of one ship is less likely to destroy an entire mission, and less expensive defensive systems can be used.
LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Program, Budgets & Timelines
Full flight deck view
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The original December 1996 US Navy contract was awarded to an industrial alliance led by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (formerly Litton Avondale, now Huntington Ingalls Industries), with General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Raytheon Electronic Systems and Intergraph Corporation, to design and construct the first of an anticipated 12 ships under the Navy’s LPD-17 program.
Avondale was supposed to build 8 of these ships, while Bath Iron Works would build 4 ships. In June 2002, however, a revised Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Northrop Grumman and Bath Iron Works. Northrop Grumman would be responsible for the construction of all LPD-17 San Antonio Class vessels, but they would trade construction of 4 of the USA $1.5 billion DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers to Bath Iron Works.
LPD-17 production, originally authorized for 11 or 12 vessels as functional replacements for 41 1960s-era ships, dropped to just 9 as cost spirals took their toll, and was eventually forced back up to 11 with extra spending. 2013 Navy budget documents show an average cost per ship of over $1.6 billion through all vessels, which offers the unusual phenomenon of no reduction in cost vs. the first ship of class.
According to official Pentagon budget documents, recent funding for the LPD-17 class has included:
San Antonio Class budgets, 2002-2012
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Even by 2002, Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) was mostly complete for this class, and the vast majority of funds spent under the program have been focused on building ships. Note that requests for a given year generally include both funds to finish building a ship, and funds for long lead-time items like engines, “government-furnished equipment” that isn’t bought by the shipbuilder, and other items that must be ordered early so construction of the next ship can start on time.
FY 2010 funding would technically buy 0 ships; it finishes LPD 26, and buys long lead time items for LPD 27. FY 2011 funding was the bare minimum, and the LPD 27 order hung on passing a FY 2012 budget. The final shipbuilding contract was placed in July 2012.
Timelines
Current and planned ships in this class, and key milestones include:
San Antonio Class LPDs – Timelines
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For some ships still in progress, we’ve noted discrepancies between announced or estimated dates earlier in a contract, and completion dates for key milestones. For ships that are already in service, noticing the time lapses between key stages for an individual ship, and in the progression of ships through a given stage, provides its own indication of problems that have arisen. The effect of August 2005’s Class 5 Hurricane Katrina can certainly be seen in several of the ship timelines above. So, too, can the effect of manufacturing quality problems.
Flight II: What’s Next
LPD Flight II changes
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The LPD-17s aren’t quite done production yet, but unless the shipyard receives new orders, that time is coming soon. HII’s response has been to look ahead, and look beyond amphibious ships.
An LX(R) competition looks to replace existing LSD-41/49 amphibious ships with up to 10 new amphibious support vessels, in the unlikely event that programs like the F-35 and SSBN(X) don’t gut US Navy procurement. The stated goal is 10 ships, with the 1st ship delivered between 2018 – 2022. HII’s response is the LPD Flight II, which keeps the same basic hull, but carries fewer Marines, holds less cargo, and removes a number of elements that add costs. Their stated target is a 30% cost reduction; unfortunately, that still makes their 23,000t design about twice as expensive as a foreign 17,000t LPD like the Dutch Johann De Witt. The benefits of using a mature production line and many common elements are real, but a $1.1 billion price tag per ship simply may not be affordable amidst hugely expensive programs and fiscal crises.
Fortunately for Huntington Ingalls, they didn’t stop there. Once they had stripped the LPD-17 design down and removed the hangar and some superstructure, they realized that they had a platform for other roles as well.
Joint Command and Control. The US Navy currently operates 4 dedicated command ships, all of which are over 30 years old. At some point soon, the Navy must either replace them of forego them. The LPD Flight IIs begin with advanced communication suites, and contain all the space one might require to house and run a full theater command. HII would have some decisions to make about organic on-board helicopter capability, but otherwise, most of the modifications would involve internal layouts and wiring. The big question remains the same: could this be done more cheaply by using another platform?
Hospital Ship. The USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy are converted oil supertankers, originally launched in 1975 and 1976. The San Antonio Class has an internal hospital with 24 beds; in contrast, the USA’s hospital ships can hold and care for up to 1,000 patients, complete with a full pharmacy, advanced tools like radiology, optometry, testing lab, etc. The LPD Flight II is far smaller than these 65,000t+ behemoths, but it does have a good deal of internal space that could be put to good use, and that capacity may be more than adequate for most deployments. Innovative approaches could even modify the Flight II’s enhanced deck space to stack containerized TransHospital systems, for medical satellite deployments ashore.
USNS Mercy actually sat pierside from 1991 – 2004, whereas a platform that could operate at lower cost would be easier and more tempting to deploy. If the Navy can get beyond its steeper acquisition cost.
LPD Flight II for BMD?
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Ballistic Missile Defense. This seems like the most radical change, but it isn’t if you think of the ship as specialized for this air and space defense role. A Flight II BMD ship would remove the well deck, in favor of a deck elevator that leads down to a helicopter hangar. It would also add a superstructure with the 21′ AMDR-S radar that the Navy considers ideal for ballistic missile defense, but which current destroyers cannot carry. The AEGIS BMD combat system would be installed, and the space cleared by the removal of most LPD-17 Class superstructure would be used to mount vertical launch cells around the edges. Notional designs show a nearly-ridiculous 288 Mk.41 VLS cells, or they could cut the number of cells and improve survivability by switching to the same Mk.57 PVLS on board the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class battlecruisers.
Effectively, a FLT II BMD aerospace warfare cruiser would create a more potent air and missile defense platform than current American destroyers, at a similar cost, in exchange for less versatility. US Navy 2009 estimates pegged a similar arsenal ship concept at around $2.55 billion, which still seems about right as a starting point. The Flight II BMD design would be more costly than existing LPD-17s, or existing DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD destroyers (around $1.8 – 2 billion). It might be cheaper than the $2.5 – 3 billion estimates rumored for DDG-51 Flight III destroyers, but it would have limited versatility. It has enough VLS cells to act as an air defense ship, but it would lack the speed required to perform the “plane guard” role for carriers on calm days. It’s possible to load some cells with VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles, and deploy an MH-60R helicopter from the under-deck hangar, but the ship itself wouldn’t have the systems needed to detect and track submarines. It would be a very effective arsenal ship for land attack with cruise missiles, but other ships and submarines can do the same thing, without putting such high-end BMD capability at risk.
That might be an acceptable trade, depending on the Navy’s commitment to leadership of American missile defense efforts. With discussions regarding DDG 51 Flight IV focusing on power-hungry rail guns and lasers, the Flight II’s power generation capabilities could give them a unique defensive niche. On the other hand, Flight II BMD ships would probably have to be paid for by sacrificing DDG-51 destroyers. The class’ lead shipyard Bath Iron Works needs those destroyers to remain a major shipbuilding concern, which means HII would be cannibalizing its own DDG-51 production.
LPD-17 Program: Performance Problems
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The LPD-17 program has done some things well. Reduced operational costs and an improved capability to incorporate technological advances over its 40-year service life were essential design objectives for LPD 17. In working to accomplish these objectives, the design team incorporated hundreds of suggestions and recommendations from more than 1,000 sailors and Marines in the “Design for Ownership” process. Simulation and modeling were used heavily, and virtual crews drawn from other areas of the US Navy took “virtual tours” of the design zones of the ship via a 3D model at initial reviews, at 50% design reviews, and at 90% design reviews. Cargo functions received particular attention.
Meanwhile, the entire project alliance worked together at the same location along with the project sponsor, in order to maximize communication. Those efforts show through in many aspects of the ships’ design.
Unfortunately, the LPD-17 Class has experienced a number of long-running problems, particularly those ships built at the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans.
Financial. Overall, the class’ financial and budgetary performance has been a long-running failure. The LPD 17 San Antonio was initially budgeted at $954 million, but ended with a final price tag of about $1.76 billion. The LPD 18 New Orleans was budgeted at $762 million, but finished at a similar cost to LPD 17.
Northrop Grumman isn’t solely to blame for these overruns. The need to tear down and rebuild completed sections of the LPD 17 San Antonio was a major cause of its cost increases, while workforce attrition rates as high as 35% annually led to its construction delays. According to San Antonio Express-News, a less obvious but equally consequential source of trouble was a computer design program dubbed 3D CAD, which was touted for its ability to give 3-dimensional views, but was not up to the task of designing an entire ship.
What’s far more disturbing is the fact that these massive cost increases over the original $800 million projections have continued throughout the class’ lifetime. Indeed, they showed no improvement at all. That’s never supposed to happen, but FY 2013 budget documents show an average $1.6 billion cost over the full 11 ships.
Workmanship. The 2nd performance failure has involved ship quality. Northrop Grumman delivered the 1st ship, USS San Antonio [LPD 17], in the summer of 2005, but difficulties with her INSURV inspections and acceptance sea trials forced a delay of almost 3 years before her 1st mission, which featured a major mechanical breakdown. A similar fate befell the USS New Orleans [LPD 18], and those delays are clearly visible in the timelines, above.
In contrast, USS Mesa Verde [LPD 19], which was built at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls yard in Mississippi instead of its Avondale yard near New Orleans, performed well in sea trials, and has been reliable in service.
Unfortunately, that wasn’t the end of the class’ problems. In 2010 a number of ships of class, especially the Avondale-built ships, discovered very serious problems that took them out of service for difficult repairs. They included USS San Antonio [LPD 17], USS New Orleans [LPD 18], USS Green Bay [LPD 20], and USS New York [LPD 21].
Once again, the bright spot was USS Mesa Verde, built at the Ingalls yard in Pascagoula, MS, which moved to substitute for USS San Antonio on a recent deployment.
Governments have generally ignored this shipyard quality problem. A $50 million grant from the state of Louisiana did help Northrop Grumman modernize production at Avondale, and another $98.6 million in federal funding has also filtered down to local NGSS shipyards in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Nevertheless, scathing Navy inspector general reviews that detailed shoddy construction and basic workmanship problems at Avondale are cause for legitimate concern in areas that will not be fixed by modernization alone.
Eventually, Northrop Grumman spun off its shipbuilding units as Huntington Ingalls Industries, and moved to close the Avondale, LA shipyard. That may finally resolve the issue – after more than $15 billion had been spent on a supposed cornerstone of the future amphibious fleet.
DID will continue to spotlight this issue, in “LPD-17 Reliability Issues Surface Again.”
The Vicious Cycle
The San Antonio class’ problems fit into a larger set of trends. The Navy and Congress make life very difficult for American military shipbuilders, who also operate in ways that come back to bite them. Key challenges include yo-yoing political budget projections and military requirements. That problem leads to “binge and purge” hiring cycles, impairs shipyard effectiveness, and ultimately raises costs, while lowering quality. The growing costs of US Navy ships then feed back into this phenomenon, as budgets and projections break, and require drastic changes to fix.
On the contractor side, lowball initial prices, followed by cost increases once projects begin, leads to inevitable build reductions part-way through. Which means fewer ships per dollar, as R&D dollars are amortized over fewer ships. The Pentagon is often a collaborator in these games, assuring lawmakers of the initial contract’s reasonableness long after outside reports question their realism. Such approaches may ensure shipyard work in the near term, but they also feed into yo-yoing federal budgets, as cost growth makes it impossible for the Pentagon to fund all of the programs it has started.
Poor accountability and oversight can compound these issues, and has, but good oversight alone won’t remove them.
Ultimately, the US Navy loses the most. These escalating requirements and costs mean fewer ships overall. While the resulting fleet may be more capable, the number of contingencies it can cover, and the setbacks that it can safely absorb, drop. Even as the entire process shrinks a US industrial base that no longer builds many civilian vessels, and so has little resiliency.
It’s a vicious cycle – one that is damaging American global power.
LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Contracts & Key Events (1996-Present)
Unless otherwise noted, all contracts were issued by the US Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, DC.
FY 2015 – 2016
LPD Flight II
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December 8/15: The US Navy has awarded Huntington Ingalls $200 million to build the next amphibious transport dock (LPD) warship. The advanced procurement contract will fund the final of twelve of the San Antonio class ships to be commissioned by the Navy. The vessels are to be used by both the Navy and Marine Corps and are to be utilized for the embarking and landing of Marines and their supplies as well as supporting them across a variety of operational tasks. The John P. Murtha San Antonio class LPD was launched in March and was the programs most cost effective and advanced to date.
Oct 20/14: LX-R. It hasn’t exactly been a secret that the US Navy has wanted LPD-17 Flight II as its replacement for existing LSD-41/49 ships (q.v. July 25-28/14, Dec 6/13, April 9/13). Now Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has signed an internal memo recommending the use of LPD-17 Flight II ships to replace existing LSD-41/49 ships, rather than rebuilding existing LSDs with changes or opening competition to other designs. The cost?
Start with an estimate of $2.02 billion for LPD 28, which is higher than the original LPD-17’s final figure, in order to keep the production line going until LX(R). The Navy believes themselves to be about $1 billion short in terms of securing that funding. Regardless of what happens with LPD 28, the estimate is $1.64 billion in construction costs for the lead LX(R) Flight II ship, and $1.4 million for the next 10 planned hulls. Plus any funds required to do further design work that fixes existing LPD-17 issues.
Even assuming a multiyear procurement block buy that cuts costs over 10%, it’s hard to see that as affordable, especially in light of the USA’s expected fiscal situation and the demands of other programs. The next major step for the program is the Q2 FY2015 Milestone A review to settle the final outline, then a JROC review in Q1 2016. Purchases would begin in FY 2020, with delivery of the 1st ship expected in FY 2025. Sources: Inside Defense, “Senior Navy Officials Tell Mabus LPD-17 Variant Is Best Option For LX(R)” and “Mabus Signs Decision Memo: LPD-17 Variant Preferred Platform For LX(R)” | USNI, “Memo: Hull Based on San Antonio Design is Navy’s Preferred Option for Next Generation Amphib”.
FY 2014
LPD 24 & 25 commissioned; Testing reports still negative; Lots of pressure to use Flight II for LX(R) – but can the Navy afford it?
LPD 25 trials
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July 25-28/14: LX-R. The Navy and Marines have finished the LX(R) program’s in-depth Analysis Of Alternatives (AOA) v2.0. Rebuilding a modernized or enlarged version of the current LSD-49 Whidbey Island Class isn’t on the table for some reason. Instead, they’re focused on either a budget-killing LPD-17 Flight II (q.v. Dec 6/13), a license-built foreign design that may have trouble with higher USN survivability requirements, a clean sheet design that would be risky and potentially expensive, or some combination of JHSVs, MLP ships, and others that wouldn’t really duplicate what the LSDs do.
The Us Navy is reportedly aiming for about 11-ship class that will average about $1.43 billion per hull once they’re in production, or almost $16 billion in production costs alone. First, this figure is also substantially more than many other countries have paid for comparable ships. In many cases, it’s twice as much. One wonders where the Navy expects to find this money, given other major programs like aircraft carriers, submarines, the F-35B/C, growing healthcare costs, etc.. All at the same time as demographics start really stressing social programs, and a shaky fiscal posture for the USA as a whole.
Unsurprisingly, some high-level officials think the AoA could wind up having a v4.0 before all is said and done. Or maybe it’s time for a major break with NAVSEA tradition: a serious examination of each requirement’s defensibility, in light of the AoA. There are some signs that the Navy is asking more questions than usual this time. Sources: Breaking Defense, “‘$1 Billion-Plus Short’: Amphib Add Isn’t Enough, So Navy Wants To Repurpose It” | USNI, “Cost Continues To Drive Quest For Next Amphib”.
July 17-25/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. It includes $800 million to begin funding what would become LPD 28, to fulfill section 123 of S. 2410. Even with $243 million added from FY 2013, the Navy would only have a bit more than half of the monies required, and the SAC is also mindful of the industrial agreement with Northrop Grumman (now HII) and GD Bath Iron Works (q.v. June 8/14):
“While Congress is not a party to this agreement, the Committee directs the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees no later than March 1, 2015, on the Navy’s options and potential courses of action to fulfill the requirements of the SWAP 1 agreement preceding or concurrent with when LPD 28 is placed under contract.”
The House hasn’t voted any money, and the Navy is less enthused. For starters, Sean Stackley makes it clear that they won’t issue an LPD 28 contract until all of the required funds have been appropriated. He adds that the Navy is more interested in funding the RCOH refueling of CVN 73 USS George Washington, and in other amphibious ship programs. Sources: US Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Committee Approves FY 2015 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill – Report: Department of Defense” | Breaking Defense, “‘$1 Billion-Plus Short’: Amphib Add Isn’t Enough, So Navy Wants To Repurpose It”.
June 8/14: Industrial. The Navy, HII, GD-BIW and Congress are all entangled in a ship allocation controversy, as a result of a 2002 MoU that shifted work on 3 LPD-17 ships to Northrop Grumman (now HII), in return for corresponding destroyer awards to GD Bath Iron Works.
Everything was fine until Congress began placing funding in the proposed FY 2015 budget budget for a 12th LPD 28 ship (q.v. May 23/14). If that goes ahead, does HII have to take away one of its destroyers under the current multi-year contract, and give it to GD-BIW? Bath Iron Works says absolutely, yes, and we consider that legally binding. HII says that GD-BIW winning construction of DDG 116 as an extra ship, via competitive bid, satisfies the terms as their 4th extra destroyer. The Navy says “we didn’t want LPD 28, leave us alone.” The lawyers say “job security!” Sources: Defense News, “Fallout From 12th LPD: Fine Print in Old Deal Could Cost Yard a Destroyer”.
May 23/14: Politics. The Senate Armed Services Committee has completed the mark-up of the annual defense bill, which passed by a 25-1 vote. The section relevant to the LPD-17s is explained this way:
“Provides authority for the Secretary of the Navy to use unobligated funds from underperforming programs to transfer up to $650 million for the acquisition of a 12th ship of the USS San Antonio – class of amphibious ships. Acquisition of this ship would enable the Marine Corps to better support the Asia – Pacific defense strategy. Provides permissive authority to incrementally fund LPD-28.”
Sources: US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Senate Committee on Armed Services Completes Markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015”.
April 4/14: LPD 24. USS Arlington is commissioned by the US Navy in Philadelphia, PA. During the ceremony and follow-on tours, the ship’s 684-foot flight deck boasted a Marine MV-22 Osprey, UH-1 Huey, AH-1 Cobra and CH-53 Sea Stallion.
The name honors the first responders and the 184 victims who died when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon on Sept 11/01. The ship’s sponsor is Joyce Rumsfeld, the wife of then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was in the building when the plane hit. Donald Rumsfeld initially went to the crash scene and offered some assistance, before heading back into the building by 10:00 am. Sources: Wikipedia, “United Airlines Flight 93” | US Navy, “In Emotional Ceremony, USS Arlington Joins the Fleet”.
USS Arlington
March 1/14: LPD 25. USS Somerset is commissioned by the US Navy in Philadelphia, PA.
The name honors United Flight 93, whose passengers won the battle for control of their 757 jetliner on Sept 11/01, albeit at the cost of all of their lives. It crashed in Somerset County, PA. It was reportedly headed for Congress or the White House. Sources: US Navy’s Navy Live Blog, “USS Somerset Commissioning Ceremony” | South Jersey Times, “USS Somerset sets sail down Delaware River after Philadelphia commissioning”.
USS Somerset
Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The short version re: the LPD-17s:
“The Navy is working to correct deficiencies identified during IOT&E that led DOT&E to assess the ship not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not survivable in a hostile environment. However, correction of a number of these deficiencies has not yet been verified by follow-on operational testing and some deficiencies have not been corrected [including issues from Shock Trial Reports].”
DOT&E says that some critical systems have been improved, but “the Navy has not yet demonstrated the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence capabilities needed to support LPD-17 when performing amphibious assault operations,” and the Shipboard Wide Area Network continues to attract scrutiny. they also maintain an interest in “reliability problems with amphibious support equipment and propulsion equipment,” “integration problems with self-defense in multiple warfare areas,” and want demonstrations of improvements re: performance issues created by the AN/APS-48Es radar mast shroud.
Reliability is also an ongoing issue, and DOT&E wants measurements for the ships as a whole, while flagging the gun systems, Magnetic Signature Control System, and SSDS Mk 2-based combat system.
Dec 6/13: LX-R. The US Navy and Marine Corps are working with HII and GD’s NASSCO to understand what’s driving costs for the proposed LX(R) follow-on amphibious ships, after the March 12/13 approval of LX(R) as a pre-major defense acquisition program. The first ship wouldn’t be ordered until FY 2019, and wouldn’t arrive until FY 2025.
CBO and Navy reports of $1.4 – 1.6 billion per ship have to be alarming. First, that’s almost as much as the 27,000 ton LPD-17s, which are already far over budget, to produce a 16,000 ton ship. Second, other countries are building similar 16,000 ton LSD/LPD ships for a bit more than a quarter of that amount. It’s well and good to jaw about a $15.4 billion, 11-ship program for medium size amphibious ships, but its future looks bleak if you project demographic effects, and overlay the other shipbuilding programs that will be underway and competing for limited funds.
The LX(R) alternatives being explored reportedly include resuming production of the LSD-41/49 ships, a modified San Antonio-class LPD-17 ship per HII’s “Flight II” pitch, a wholly new ship design, and an assessment of foreign-designed dock landing ships. Using cheaper commercial components, including propulsion systems, is also a possibility. Sources: Inside Defence, “Eying New Amphibious Ship, Navy Conducts LX(R) Affordability ‘Deep Dive'” | DoD Buzz, “Navy Considers Commercial Technology for New Amphib”.
Dec 6/13: LPD 21 moves. It’s December – time for New Yorkers to head to Florida! USS New York [LPD 21] continues this tradition, as she changes her home port from NNS Norfolk, VA to NNS Mayport, FL.
The entire 3-ship Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) will eventually be based there, as a replacement for the decomMSioned FFG-7 Class frigates USS Underwood and USS Klakring. USS Iwo Jima [LHD-7] and USS Fort McHenry [LSD-45] are slated to join USS New York in 2014. Sources: USN, “USS New York Changes Homeport to Naval Station Mayport”.
Dec 6/13: Huntington Ingalls Industries in Pascagoula, MS receives a $39.1 million modification for LPD-17 life cycle engineering and support services: planning, repairs, spares, upgrade work, etc.
Work will be performed in Pascagoula, MS, and is expected to be complete by December 2014 (N00024-10-C-2203).
Nov 27/13: Support. Raytheon IDS in San Diego, CA receives a $32.4 million contract modification to deliver ongoing engineering and support services for LPD 17 class integrated shipboard electronic systems. the Pentagon’s descriptive hairball includes:
“…lifecycle engineering and support services, including post-delivery planning, logistics and engineering, homeport technical support, integrated product data environment, data maintenance, equipment management, systems integration and design engineering, software support, research engineering, obsolescence management (both technical and logistics), material readiness support, emergent repair planning, training and logistics support; Planning Yard support of integrated electronic systems, including fleet modernization planning, ship alteration development and installation, material management, configuration data management, research engineering, logistics documentation, and other logistics and executing activity coordination, and management; performance-based logistics support, including providing sustaining engineering and obsolescence management support for unique LPD 17 class integrated shipboard electronic systems.”
$6.2 million is committed immediately, and the award uses a hodgepodge of Navy budget lines: FY 2005, 2012, and 2014 shipbuilding and conversion; and FY 2014 operations and maintenance. $1.8 million will expire on Sept 30/14 (N00024-10-C-2205).
Nov 20/13: LPD 25. General Dynamics NASSCO in San Diego, CA receives a $12.1 million contract modification, exercising the option for Somerset’s [LPD 25] fitting-out availability. The ship hasn’t been commissioned yet.
$730,431 is committed immediately, and $215,383 will expire on Sept 30/14. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by December 2014. This contract was competitively procured, with 4 proposals received (N00024-12-C-2400).
Nov 15/13: LPD 17. General Dynamics NASSCO-Earl Industries, Portsmouth, VA receives an $11.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for the USS San Antonio [LPD 17] phased maintenance availability. They’ll conduct miscellaneous structural and mechanical repairs. All funds are committed immediately, and will expire on Sept 30/14.
Work will be performed in Norfolk, VA, and is expected to be complete by May 2014. This contract was competitively procured via Navy Electronic Commerce Online, with 3 offers received by the Norfolk Ship Support Activity in Norfolk, VA (N50054-14-C-1401).
Oct 18/13: LPD 25 delivered. Somerset is formally handed over to the US Navy at the Avondale shipyard. Sources: HII, Oct 18/13 release.
FY 2013
LDP 24. Weapons.
LPD 23 & LPD 24
(click to view full)
Sept 20/13: LPD 25. Somerset returns from successful US Navy acceptance sea trials. Sources: HII, Oct 10/13 release.
Aug 19/13: LPD 25. Somerset returns from 3 days of builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. Sources: HII release, Aug 19/13.
May 4/13: LPD 23 commissioned. The US Navy commissions LPD 23 as USS Anchorage, in her namesake city of Anchorage, AK. Her home port will be San Diego, CA. US Navy.
USS Anchorage
April 12/13: Naming. The last San Antonio Class ship is among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.
LPD 27 will become USS Portland, becoming the 3rd ship in the fleet’s history to beat that name. CA-33 was a World War II heavy cruiser, named after Portland, ME. LSD-37 was also an amphibious assault ship, which was decommissioned shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom began. It was named for Portland, ME and Portland, OR. LPD-27 is named after Portland, OR. Pentagon | Oregon Live.
April 9/13: LX(R)? USMC Commandant Gen. James Amos publicly recommends that the Navy replace its 16,360 ton LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class ships with a San Antonio Class derivative, provided it can be made affordable. The question is whether HII’s stripped-down LPD Flight II proposal drives enough costs out of the base platform to make sense. $1.5 billion per ship won’t cut it for LSD replacement, and even HII’s touted 30% savings of $1 billion for a 23,165t ship would be about double the cost of capable foreign LSDs like the 17,000t Rotterdam/JDW Class.
The Navy is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives for its notional 10-ship LS(X), which aims to deliver its first ships to the Navy between 2018 – 2022. It’s called LX(R) because they may want configurability for a wider range of missions than the existing LSDs. The AoA is due in September 2013. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Amos: Replace LSD amphib fleet with LPDs” | Defense News, “Different Missions Might Await New USN Amphib” | USNI News, “Second Act for San Antonio?”.
April 9/13: UAV test. Insitu Inc. announces a successful 1st maritime flight for the RQ-21A UAV from LPD 19, the USS Mesa Verde. The RQ-21A is based on Insitu’s Integrator platform, and was picked as the USMC’s small UAV back in July 2010.
The flight comes after 3 months of land-based development testing and operational assessment, and the RQ-21A’s outstanding endurance for its size will make it an important part of the San Antonio Class’ onboard equipment.
April 6/13: LPD 24 commissioned. USS Arlington is commissioned at Naval Station Norfolk, VA. US Navy Live blog.
Dec 14/12: Weapons. Raytheon in Tucson, AZ receives a $12.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 4 refurbished and upgraded Rolling Airframe Missile MK 49 Mod 3 guided-missile launch systems and associated hardware. these 21-missile launch packs will equip LPD 27 John P. Murtha (2 systems), and the Freedom Class ships LCS 9 and LCS 11 (1 each). All funds are committed on award, and there are options for 4 additional launch systems.
At the time of award, a $5.5 million option is also exercised for 2 remanufactured MK 49 launch packs, with Mod 3 updates and associated hardware. They’ll equip the Freedom Class ships LCS 13 and LCS 15.
Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by December 2015. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304c1 (N00024-11-C-5448).
Dec 7/12: Support. Huntington Ingalls Industries in Pascagoula, MS receives a $54.5 million contract modification, to exercising the 3rd of 4 options associated with the Feb 16/10 award. HII will perform Life Cycle Engineering and support services on San Antonio Class ships, with $12.9 million obligated at contract award. The total value of this contract is now $157.9 million.
Work will be performed in Pascagoula, MS, and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-10-C-2203). See also HII.
Dec 7/12: LPD 24 delivered. Huntington Ingalls Industries delivers LPD 24 Arlington to the U.S. Navy. HII.
Dec 3/12: LPD 24. BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair in Norfolk, VA receives an $11.1 million contract, exercising options for the USS Arlington’s fitting-out and post shakedown work.
Work will be performed in Norfolk, VA (90.53%), and Chesapeake, VA (9.47%), and is expected to be complete by May 2013. Contract funds in the amount of $2.8 million will be obligated at time of award. This contract was competitively procured via FedBizOpps, with 4 proposals received (N00024-10-C-2204).
Nov 27/12: Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in San Diego, CA receives a $41.9 million modification, exercising Option Year 4 for LPD-17 class Integrated Shipboard Electronic Systems life cycle engineering and support services. Last year, it was $40 million.
Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (98%) and Norfolk, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013. $7.3 million is committed on the contract’s award, and $703,893 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-10-C-2205).
Nov 5/12: LPD 24 trials. LPD 24 Arlington successfully completes US Navy INSURV acceptance trials. She is now set to be commissioned in Spring 2013. HII.
FY 2012
LPD 21 to 23.
Osprey onto LPD 21
(click to view full)
Sept 17/12: LPD 23 delivered. HII delivers the amphibious transport dock ship Anchorage [LPD 23] to the US Navy. HII.
Aug 24/12: LPD 24. LPD 24 Arlington returns from successful builder’s sea trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The real key is US Navy sea trials, which are next. HII.
Aug 1/12: Bolted. A new issue involving improperly installed bolts has emerged in the latest ships built by the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans. The Navy’s acceptance of LPD 23 Anchorage is now delayed, and LPD 25 Somerset is also affected.
An Ingalls inspector discovered the issue, which could lead engine mountings to shear under sudden shock, or loosen enough over time to set up damaging vibrations in the ship’s propulsion systems. Fitted bolts that don’t meet the ultra-tight tolerances for engine mountings are being replaced, and the Navy is also checking the 520 applicable bolts on every other Avondale-built ship. The problem is apparently confined to the Avondale shipyard, which has been the source of so many previous problems with the class. Ingalls-built ships from the Mississippi shipyard are unaffected. Gannett’s Navy Times.
More workmanship problems
July 28/12: LPD 25 christened. Nearly 1,800 guests attend the christening of LPD 25 Somerset, at HII’s company’s Avondale shipyard near New Orleans. LPD 25 is named to honor the courage of the passengers and crew members of United Airlines Flight 93, who fought the hijackers and brought their plane down near Shanksville in Somerset County, PA. US Navy | HII.
July 27/12: LPD 27 ordered. Huntington Ingalls Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives the main order contract for LPD 27: a sole-source $1.514 billion fixed-price-incentive contract modification. When added to previous long-lead item orders, the shipbuilding cost is $1.8 billion, with key “government furnished equipment” like weapons on top of that.
Work will be performed in Pascagoula, MS (82%), Crozet, VA (4%), Beloit, WI (2%), and New Orleans, LA (1%), with other efforts performed at various sites throughout the United States (11%). Work is expected to be complete by June 2017 (N00024-06-C-2222). See also HII release.
LPD 27 main order
June 25/12: LPD 23 completes INSURV. HII announces that LPD 23 Anchorage has returned to her Avondale, LA shipyard, after successfully passing 3 days of Navy trials in the Gulf of Mexico. Delivery to the US Navy is set for Q3 (summer) FY 2012.
May 21/12: LPD 23 trials. LPD 23 Anchorage returns to Avondale, LA from successful builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The ship will now prepare for acceptance sea trials by the U.S. Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), in preparation for delivery later in 2012. HII.
May 19/12: USS San Diego. The US Navy commissions LPD 22 into the 3rd Fleet as USS San Diego, based in San Diego. US Navy.
USS San Diego
May 15/12: LPD 27 lead-in. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. in Pascagoula, MS receives a maximum $133.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for advance buys of LPD 27 long-lead-time materials and pre-construction activities. HII confirms that this is their 5th long-lead materials contract for LPD 27. This brings total long-lead contracts for this ship, from all contractors, to $419.6 million.
Work will be performed in Pascagoula, MS, and is expected to complete by June 2017 (N00024-06-C-2222).
April 13/12: LPD 19. Small business qualifier MarineTec, a joint venture between Marine Hydraulics International, Inc., and Tecnico Corp. in Norfolk, VA, wins a $10 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for USS Mesa Verde’s [LPD 19] phased maintenance availability (PMA). They’ll perform miscellaneous structural, mechanical, and electrical repairs, and the contract runs until September 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11.
This contract was competitively procured via the Norfolk Ship Support Activity’s solicitation website, with 4 proposals solicited and 3 offers received (N50054-12-C-1203).
March 27/12: LPD 21 deploys. The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (IWO ARG) and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU) depart for deployment from Norfolk and Camp Lejeune, NC, headed to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf/ Indian Ocean areas.
The IWO JIMA ARG/24 MEU includes the amphibious assault ships USS Iwo Jima [LHD 7], USS New York [LPD 21], and USS Gunston Hall [LSD 44]; and is manned by Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (BLT 1/2); Aviation Combat Element, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (Reinforced); and Combat Logistics Battalion 24.