Tejas LCA
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India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.
In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.
That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens an opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.
LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter
Tejas, side view
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Within India’s force structure, the LCA is largely expected to replace its 400 or so MiG-21 aircraft with a more versatile and capable performer. The MiGs are being retired as age claims them, and even India’s 125 or so upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ are only scheduled to remain in service until 2016. The LCA’s overall performance is expected to be somewhat similar to India’s Mirage 2000s, with lower top speed but more modern electronics.
The Tejas LCA design uses a tailless compound delta plan that is designed to be unstable, but controllable thanks to advanced flight software and quadruplex fly-by-wire technology. The aircraft is intended for a 9g / -3.5g flight range, and advanced composites, often using co-cured cobonded technology, make up more than 40% of the Tejas airframe including the wings, fin and fuselage. The radome is made of Kevlar.
Composites help to save weight, and can also lower the plane’s radar profile, depending on where they’re placed. Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters also made heavy use of composite technologies, and found some issues with delamination and cracking that required repair and changes. Static and fatigue strength studies on finite element models, and aeroservoelastic studies, have been performed on the Tejas design; nevertheless, only testing and actual service will reveal how it fares.
Preliminary statistics indicate that the Tejas will have a thrust:weight ratio of close to 1:1 in “clean” (unarmed) configuration; the initial Mark I version’s F404-IN20 power plant is rated for 18,700 lb/ 83.18 kN. Maximum speed is expected be about Mach 1.8, though Tejas will not have Mach 1+ supercruise; like most fighters, it will spend the vast majority of its flight time at subsonic speeds. 8 stations (3 on each wing, 1 beneath the port-side intake trunk for pods, 1 centerline) will allow it to carry up to 4,000 kg/ 8,800 lbs. of weapons, electronics pods, and/or external fuel, up to the maximum takeoff weight of about 12,500 kg/ 27,500 lbs. Unrefueled range is reportedly 850 km/ 460 nm, though this will vary with weapons and fuel loads. Air-air refueling capability can be used to extend that range, if necessary.
Tejas Mk.I confirmed combat accoutrements will include:
IAI’s EL/M-2032 radar, already used by India’s Jaguars and Sea Harriers.
MIL-STD-1553B databuses
Elbit DASH-III helmet-mounted display
Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer” short range air-to-air missile
RAFAEL Derby medium range air-to-air missile
RAFAEL LITENING surveillance & targeting pod
The following sub-section goes into more detail about their rationales and capabilities, and discusses other equipment.
Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control
EL/M-2032
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The plane’s avionics architecture is configured around a 3 bus, distributed MIL-STD-1553B system, using a 32-bit Mission Computer (MC) and software written in Ada. A “glass cockpit” of display screens will provide pilot information, supplemented by Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display for commonality with other IAF aircraft.
Radar Failure & Replacement
The Tejas project’s original radar, like its original engine choice, very nearly sank the project. The state-run Aeronautical Development Agency had originally intended to use Ericsson Microwave Systems’ PS-05/A radar, until they changed their mind and decided to develop their own. India’s Multi Mode Radar (MMR) program was started in June 1991, with a “Probable Date of Completion” of 6.5 years. More than 15 years later, development was still plodding away as a joint effort between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Hyderabad, India’s Electronics and Radar Development Laboratory in Bangalore, and the Centre for Airborne Studies. Even worse, test results for the radar were poor.
By August 2007, over 16 years into the project, even India’s MoD finally had to admit that the MMR faced serious problems. Radar co-development has now been initiated with Israel’s IAI Elta, with the EL/M-2032 as the radar base and interim solution. The EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar was originally developed for Israel’s Lavi fighter, and already equips India’s Sea Harrier fleet and Jaguar IM strike aircraft, and is popular around the world. M-2032s can be found on some F-16s in Israel and elsewhere, Kfir C10s flown by some Latin American customers, Chile’s upgraded F-5s, Romania’s MiG-21 Lancer upgrades, and South Korea’s FA-50 lightweight fighter. The radar features modular hardware design, with software control and flexible avionic interfaces, and a TWT coherent transmitter with a low-sidelobe planar antenna. The M-2032 functions in several air-to-air modes, as well as the air-to-ground, air-to-sea, ground-mapping in RBS, DBM, SAR with moving target tracking, and terrain avoidance modes.
Detection and classification ranges will vary depending on the aperture size. A radar adapted to fit in an F-5′s narrow nose will have lower performance than one that fits into a larger F-16. The Tejas’ dimensions suggest that performance may be near the radar’s claimed 80 nautical mile maximums for detection of fighter-sized objects.
There have been reports that the Tejas Mk.II and operational LCA Naval will fly with IAI’s EL/M-2052 AESA radar instead. That change would roughly double performance, while drastically reducing radar maintenance costs. These reports are unconfirmed, however, and other accounts cite American pressure to prevent Israeli AESA radar exports.
Weapons
LCA Tejas, armed
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Unsurprisingly, RAFAEL’s Derby radar-guided fire-and-forget missile will serve as the Tejas’ initial medium range air-air armament. It lacks the range and datalink of Raytheon’s AMRAAM or Russia’s R-77/AA-12, but in practice, positive identification requirements have kept most aerial fights within Derby range. Derby reportedly has good seeker cone coverage, which improves performance. It has already been integrated with the EL/M-2032 on India’s own Sea Harriers, and equips the country’s new SPYDER mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. within its range. I, anyway. If India’s own Astra MRAAM continues to progress, it might be integrated later, and supplant Derby.
For shorter-range engagements, Derby will be complemented by Russia’s infrared-guided Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer,” giving Tejas partial weapon commonality with India’s large MiG fleets. The R-73 is known for its exceptional maneuverability and “wide boresight” seeker cone, a combination that inaugurated the era of 4th generation missiles. There’s even a rear-facing version, which offers enemies a nasty surprise. Its main competitor was believed to have been RAFAEL’s Python 4/5, can face forward and still hit targets behind its fighter.
Tejas planes are expected to carry a range of ground attack weapons, from ordinary bombs and unguided Russian S-8 80mm rockets, to precision munitions. They will also be able to carry RAFAEL’s LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pod, giving them long-range looks at ground targets, independent laser designation capability, and (rumored) fleet commonality with India’s Jaguars, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000s, and SU-30MKIs.
Tests for unspecified laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs are expected, though they’re expected to be Russian KAB-1500 and RBK-500 weapons, along with Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles. Unfortunately, the MIL-STD-1553B data bus will be an obstacle to integrating GPS-guided weapons. That’s a significant and puzzling omission, given the expected future growth of GPS in weapon guidance.
Engines & Alternatives
F414-GE-400 engine
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With its radar issue solved by a foreign partnership, the fighter’s indigenous Kaveri engine (vid. Appendix B) was left as the project’s biggest unresolved issue. That was resolved with a stopgap, followed by a competition to field a working engine; even so, India’s DRDO continues to pour dollars and time into Kaveri development.
The removal of American arms trade sanctions allowed smooth incorporation of a slightly modified F404-GE-IN20 turbofan in initial Tejas Mk.I production models. The engine weighs about 1,000 kg/ 2,200 pounds, and has produced 19,000 pounds of thrust on afterburner during static tests.
Over the longer term, an international competition for the Tejas Mk.II’s engines had 2 shortlisted competitors, 1 winner in GE’s F414, 1 unofficial competitor, and a long term integration issue.
The winner: F414. GE’s F414 is that company’s more advanced alternative to the F404 family that equips the Tejas Mk.I; it currently equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. India’s F414-GE-INS6 engines will include the same single-engine FADEC modifications as the Gripen’s F414Gs, and may include some components of the F414-EPE research program for enhanced thrust. Standard F414 engines weigh about 2,300 pounds, and can reportedly produce up to 22,000 pounds of thrust on afterburners. GE has been remarkably coy about its thrust in normal operation, but the figures it supplied to India were obviously good enough to beat Eurojet’s EJ200.
Slow fade: Kaveri. If the Tejas Mk.II ends up with an alternate engine program, it will have to come from a successful Kaveri “indigenous” engine follow-on. DRDO finally admitted defeat in 2013, after around 6 years of negotiations with French engine maker Snecma ended. A global tender for assistance was proposed, and DRDO has backed away from ever re-engining the initial 40 Tejas fighters with Kaveri. For now.
The unseen issue. Unfortunately for the air force, any new engine will mean changes to a fighter’s design. Engineers must rebalance the aircraft’s weight, adjust fuel capacity for changed consumption rates, etc. One also expects that an LCA Mk.II will add newer technologies in some areas. That redesign process usually takes several years, even in a best-case scenario. Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen made a similar shift from Volvo’s F404-derived RM12 in the JAS-39 A-D models, to GE’s F414 for its new JAS-39E/F, over a few years. China’s shift to a Russian RD-33 engine for its J-10 fighter was the centerpiece of a redesign that took more than a decade.
Major delays to Tejas Mk.I production mean that it probably won’t end until 2018, and that’s the best case scenario. The delays will buy time for Mk.II testing, at the cost of IAF readiness and force strength. If the Mk.II also runs into testing problems, the LCA program will face a hard choice: produce more than 48 Tejas Mk.Is, or buy Mk.IIs before testing is done, with the accompanying risk of expensive rework and fielding delays.
In the Navy… Naval LCA
Naval LCA rollout
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Indian officials were interested in an improved engine for 2 reasons. One is simply better performance, thanks to an improved thrust:weight ratio. Another is the need for additional thrust, in order to operate the Tejas successfully as a naval aircraft.
India will induct the 40,000t INS Vikramaditya in 2013, after extensive modifications to Russia’s former Admiral Gorshkov carrier. The navy is also proceeding with construction of 2 more 35,000t “air defence ship” Vikrant Class carriers, designed in collaboration with Fincantieri and built in India. Orders have been signed for 46 Russian MiG-29Ks, but India also wants to operate navalized LCA fighters from their decks.
These fighters are expected to receive a different designation than “Tejas.” Key changes to the Naval LCA include:
Dropped nose, for better visibility in high angle-of-attack (nose pointed up) landings
Leading edge vortex controls that can extend from the edges of the main wing. They help the aircraft sink faster while remaining safe, in order to land in smaller spaces, and can also improve takeoff response.
Arrester hook to catch landing wires
Strengthened spine and related systems, to absorb the high impact of carrier landings
Longer, strengthened undercarriage
Powered nose wheel steering for better maneuverability on deck
Fuel dump system that can shed 1,000 kg of fuel from the fighter’s wing tanks, in case of an emergency just after take-off. Fuel weighs a lot, and that added weight can imperil attempted emergency landings.
The other change will be the engine. India’s military and designers believe that the naval Mk.I derivative, powered by the same F404-GE-IN20 engine in the IAF variant, can be used for training and testing. At the same time, they believe that only the a Tejas Mk.II derivative with its more powerful F414-GE-INS6 engine will be capable of loaded carrier operations from the Vikrant Class’ “ski jump” ramp, in just 200m of takeoff space.
The naval Tejas program began in 2003. Variant paper designs have been produced, and an initial order placed in 2009 began turning those designs into prototypes. April 2012 saw the 1st flight of NP-1, and a 2012 decision gave the go-ahead for initial production of 8 planes, but that isn’t expected to become a contract before 2013.
LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future
the Program
India’s LCA Programs
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The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program began in 1983, and is currently in Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II, under which India’s DRDO was trying to deliver production fighters to the IAF by December 2010. Initial Operational Clearance wasn’t granted until January 2011, and then only with significant waivers. Limited Series Production aircraft in final configuration have arrived, but IOC issues aren’t expected to resolve until mid-2013, and most weapons haven’t been tested yet. Final Operational Clearance as a day/night, all-weather platform, and the official induction of a Tejas squadron at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu, isn’t expected until 2014-2015.
The first test-flight of the improved and re-engined Tejas Mark-II is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016.
When it was originally approved in 1983, the Tejas program’s cost was set at Rs 560 crore (5.6 billion rupees). The cost had risen to over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise since. The Times of India places the 2011 program total at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants, and a subsequent. So far, 40 Tejas Mk.I fighters have been ordered. Current plans call for another 100 aircraft (mostly Mk.II) for the air force, and up to 60 naval variants for the Navy.
Industrial Team
The Tejas industrial team is weighted toward government participation, which is one of the reasons for its long development cycle. Instead of buying finished and tested equipment from abroad, new designs had to be invented by government research agencies, then tested by themselves until they were ready, followed by integration testing with other elements. These choices were driven by India’s desire for long-term self-sufficiency in many aircraft sub-systems, in order to reduce their dependence of foreign suppliers.
There have also been a wide variety of sub-contracts to Indian firms for Tier 3 or Tier 4 participation to supply tooling, testing equipment, software development, or sub-assemblies. They are not covered in our list above.
Tejas: Future Prospects
Tejas: 2 views
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Exports are important to fighter programs. The added buys keep production lines open at no cost to the home country, and drop prices per plane. A combination of profits and paid-for modifications help keep the design current, allowing the plane to add new technology and remain relevant.
The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft’s exact per-plane flyaway price point isn’t known yet, but the goal is an inexpensive fighter in the $20-25 million range, with performance that compares well to early model F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Historically, the low end of the market is where the largest volume of global fighter buys have taken place. ‘In recent years, however, pressure from home-country buyers has pushed the West into a niche of high-end platforms like the F-15, F-35, Europfighter, and Rafale. Some mid-tier options exist, like new F-16s, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and JAS-39 Gripens, but even those are fairly pricey for emerging economies. As regional tensions rise, it remains to be seen whether the last decade has seen a permanent shift toward mid-level and high-end platforms, or whether traditional patterns will reassert themselves via buys from emerging economies.
Likely Tejas competitors include the market for second-hand F-16s, the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family of supersonic trainers and light fighters. The Russian MiG-35 multi-role fighter may also become a competitor, depending on Russia’s chosen pricing approach.
Even with this competition, India’s growing geopolitical influence offers the Tejas good prospects. HAL’s problem is that the Tejas must first achieve success in India.
Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Agency (MoD ADA) R K Ramanathan promised a 2010 in-service date, while touting a reduction from over 30,000 components to around 7,000. That would still have been 27 years after the program began, and it didn’t come close to happening. Plans to field 40-48 aircraft into the first 2 air force squadrons won’t even begin to field operational squadrons until 2014 or 2015, and the final “Tejas Mk.2″ will be hard-pressed to be operational before 2020.
Official plans still call for 100+ fighters, but the IAF are taking something of a “wait and see” approach to a longer term commitment, until the final aircraft is delivered with working systems and the “Tejas Mark II” design has shown what it can do.
One the one hand, the project’s long development period, and DRDO’s past performance on defense projects, tend to justify that wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, the project can easily run into danger without adequate military and political backing. On Feb 6/06, The Telegraph in Calcutta reported that:
“Though air headquarters has not said so in public, it is weighing whether it should commit funds because it is anticipating a resource crunch for the big ticket purchases of multi-role combat aircraft – that could cost the exchequer more than $5 billion over 10 years – and other equipment that it has projected as an immediate need.”
The rumored growth of the MRCA foreign fighter program to 170-200 aircraft, naval plans for 32 more ships in the next 10-15 years, submarine construction, and other planned capital purchases do indeed have the potential to squeeze the Tejas. The reality of limited funds and budget cuts began to hit home in 2013, and another global economic slowdown will press India into harder choices still. Confidence in the Tejas, or the lack of it, will influence India’s choices in the MMRCA buy of 120-200 foreign fighters. That influence that will be reciprocal. Fewer MMRCA aircraft at a flyaway price tag of $100+ million makes $25-35 million Tejas LCA fighters look more attractive, in order to plus up numbers. Just as long as the LCA can in fact be produced to that cost level, be delivered on time, and perform at an adequate level.
Every one of those variables is currently in play.
At present, the worst-case scenario for the Tejas program is truncated production at about 48 aircraft. The generally accepted goal is 7 squadrons, or about 168 planes. The best-case scenario would involve full production for the IAF, a serving STOBAR (Short Take Off via ramps, But Assisted Recovery via arrester gear and wires) naval variant in service by 2020, and export successes that drive up production and help finance future updates.
Contracts and Key Events
2013
GE F414 engine contract; No Kaveris for Tejas fleet; AESA radar?
LCA Naval
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Aug 7/13: Costs. A Parliamentary reply to Shri S. Thangavelu in Rajya Sabha sets out the costs for each phase of the Tejas program in slightly more detail. Our chart above has been amended to reflect the current figures.
India is still in Full Scale Engineering Development Phase II, which aims to build 3 prototypes and 8 Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft, and establish infrastructure for producing 8 aircraft per year. LSP-8 made its maiden flight on March 31/13, but reports to date suggest that meeting the infrastructure goal will require a significant increase in development costs (q.v. Dec 9/12). India MoD.
June 1/13: Excuses. DRDO chief V K Saraswat tries to deflect criticism of Tejas’ continuing delays, by citing the effects of sanctions that ended 13 years ago. Lack of cooperation and foreign help might explain why Tejas was slow to develop from the early 1980s to 2000. It doesn’t explain why DRDO didn’t follow professional practice by working with experienced pilots and the IAF, which created a multitude of poor design decisions that created years of delays to produce only partial fixes. Or the reason DRDO has wasted so much time with engine and radar choices that were obviously inadequate, all well after sanctions had ended. Or why, 13 years after sanctions had ended, Tejas isn’t ready for service yet, while Pakistan’s JF-17 equips 3 squadrons.
Weak excuses do not inspire future confidence. Brahmand Defence & Aerospace.
April 21/13: Tejas a lemon? The Sunday Standard reports that the Tejas is much farther away from viability than anyone is admitting, and says that DRDO’s notional stealth AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been put on hold until the LCA project can be made to work. A stealth FGFA/SU-50 is already in co-development with Russia, so AMCA’s value is unclear anyway. With respect to the Tejas LCA, the Sunday Standard’s unnamed sources say:
“The plane cannot fly on its own. It needs a lifeline in the form of support and monitoring of its systems from the ground by technicians…. The common man thinks the plane is doing fine, its engine sounds great and the manoeuvres are perfect. But those flying and weapons firing displays are done with ground monitoring and support. The plane is still not ready to flying on its own”…. the sources noted that LCA was grounded for three months between September and December 2012 following problems with its landing gear. “Normally, a combat plane is ready for its next sortie following a 30-minute [servicing]. In the case of LCA, after a single sortie of about an hour or so, it needs three days of servicing before it can go for its next sortie,” they said.”
These revelations come against a backdrop of pressure from India’s defense minister Antony and India’s government to buy designed-in-India items unless there’s no other choice. He’s selling changes to India’s Defence Procurement Policy as an anti-corruption effort – but what do you call spending billions of dollars on politically-allied state organizations, who don’t deliver on the critical defense projects assigned to them, and never pay any serious penalties for it? Their competitors in China and Pakistan are consistently faster and often better – while doing a better job developing their industries. See also India PIB.
March 20/13: More delays. A Parliamentary reply confirms the obvious, formally extending the scheduled end of the LCA’s Phase 2 Full Scale Engineering Development from December 2012 to March 2015.
The IAF has ordered 20 fighters in “Initial Operational Clearance” (January 2011) status, and another 20 in “Full Operational Clearance” (i.e. combat-ready) configuration. Full Operational Clearance is now expected in December 2014. PTI, via Zee News | India MoD.
Feb 6/13: AESA Radar? At Aero India 2013, Defense Update files a report that adds the short-range Python 5 air-to-air missile to the Tejas’ list of integrated weapons, alongside the Russian R-73/AA-11. It adds:
“The LCA will also carry the EL/M-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by IAI Elta. Originally, the EL/M-2032 was selected but the new 2052 now available with a more compact antenna is best designed to fit the nose cones of LCA and Jaguar, offering enhanced capabilities for both fighters.”
If the Defense Update report is true, it would roughly double the Mk.II fighter’s radar performance, and sharply lower its maintenance costs. DID has been unable to confirm this report, and there have been previous reports (q.v. Jan 14/11 entry) that said M-2052 sales for the Tejas Mk.II had been barred by American pressure. Indeed, the Americans managed to pressure the Israelis not to install the M-2052 in their own F-16i fighters.
Feb 5/13: On the eve of Aero India 2013, Indian defense minister AK Antony tells DRDO that:
“I am happy for your achievements of DRDO but not fully happy. Delay in delivery is a real problem… Try to speed up your process and reduce time for research, development and production. [DRDO is getting ready for a 2nd initial clearance for Tejas, but] I am impatient for the Final Operational Clearance (FOC)….. Antony also expressed his disappointment over reported lack of cohesion between the aircraft development agencies under DRDO and aircraft maker HAL.”
In India, FOC means “ready for combat operations”, which is closer to the US military’s idea of “Initial Operational Capability.” The Pioneer.
Jan 20/13: F414 deal. India Strategic quotes DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat, who says that India’s government has finalized the terms of GE’s F414 contract, including the difficult issues surrounding Indian production. That process took over 2 years, as the engine was picked in September 2010.
The deal is reportedly a Rs 3,000 crore (about $560 million) contract for 99 of the Tejas Mk.II’s F414-GE-INS6 engines, with an option to buy another 100 at fixed terms. IANS via Silicon India | Times of India.
F414 engine deal finalized
Jan 4/13: Kaveri. India’s Business Standard reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has failed in its 6 years of sole-source negotiations with Snecma, and will try a global tender to secure cooperation in developing the Kaveri engine. The engine’s development has hit a technical dead-end, and cannot incorporate key alloys, single-crystal blades, and other manufacturing and design technologies without foreign help. The DRDO’s GTRE department has also conceded defeat with respect to the LCA, according to its chief Dr. C.P. Ramnarayanan:
“We were planning to re-engine first 40 Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the F-404 engine.”
DRDO swill use Kaveri for its UCAV, and still holds out hope that a redesigned Kaveri can power a locally designed AMCA twin-engined medium fighter. To power AMCA, the engine would need to improve afterburner performance of about 15,825 pounds thrust. That means foreign help, but DRDO has made global solicitations before, and had no takers beyond Snecma.
2012
Cert & program delays; Naval prototype flies; Kaveri for UCAV; Shaping up HAL – which clearly needs it.
A critical view –
from Pakistan
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Dec 26/12: Kaveri. India wants to develop a long-range, jet-powered armed drone, powered by a modified Kaveri engine (vid. March 21/12 entry). These are commonly called UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), but India refers to their project as USAV (Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle).
Now DRDO’s GTRE has asked the Ministry for another Rs 595 crore (about $93 million), covering a 48-month program to develop 2 prototypes of a modified Kaveri engine with no afterburner. This includes removing the base design flaws detecting during 2010-11 testing in Russia, ground testing in Bangalore, and confirmatory tests in Russia at the Gromov Flight Research Institute. The program would be capped by flight testing of the 2 no-afterburner prototypes in LCA prototype PV-1.
This idea actually makes sense. The Missile Technology Control Regime makes it problematic for countries to sell India a USAV jet engine, since a cruise missile is also an armed unmanned aircraft. On the Indian side, the Kaveri engine has the most problems adding enough thrust in afterburner, but “dry” statistics of 11,060 pounds thrust are close to the project’s goal of 11,500. Dropping the afterburner sheds engine weight, which has been an issue for Kaveri, and UCAV engines to date don’t have afterburners anyway. Other countries’ UCAV designs have all been sub-sonic drones that rely on stealth or low-threat environments to survive. Business Standard.
UCAV: a good use for Kaveri
Dec 12/12: Naval LCA. India’s Navy is upset by the fact that only 1 naval LCA has been built, and need aircraft to train with. Media reports say they’re about to issue a an Rs 1,000 crore (about $185 million) RFP to produce the first 8 Limited Series Production Tejas naval fighters, which would include both single-seat test aircraft and 2-seat trainers. This would turn the Feb 27/12 approval into a contract after negotiations with HAL, and work is expected to begin in 2013. Whether HAL’s production capacity can handle it (vid. Dec 9/12) is another question.
Business Standard reports the Indian military’s current belief that the navalized Tejas Mk.I can be used for training, and the state-owned ADA is touting a 1st representative takeoff by mid-2013 and a 1st representative landing by the end of 2013. At the same time, they believe that only the Tejas Mk.II will be capable of loaded carrier operations, using just 200m of space and a “ski-jump” ramp. The design has also turned out to be harder than expected. Commodore CD Balaji, who directs the Naval LCA project at ADA told India’s Business Standard that:
“In the paper design it looked feasible [to convert the IAF's Tejas], similar to what Eurofighter proposed for a navalised Typhoon; or what Gripen proposed for the Sea Gripen [DID: both of which are higher end designs, with better base performance]. But when we started the detailed design and the actual build… we realised the benefits of what Dassault had done with the Rafale. They designed and built the naval variant first, the Rafale Marine. The air force Rafale is just a subset of Rafale Marine. That is the easiest path.”
Dec 9/12: Industrial fail, more $. India’s Business Standard offers a scathing portrait of incompetence at HAL, which has been unable to set up and operate a production line for the LCA, even though many of its projects involve assembling foreign designs on production lines in India. On the other hand, see the March 24/11 entry, where HAL executives point out that it doesn’t make much sense to establish a full modern production line for a program that has only featured limited production orders and an uncertain future.
As a result, Tejas fighters built to date have been custom-built limited-production and prototype aircraft. The immediate consequence is that the Ministry of Defence has to budget another Rs 1,500 crore (about $277 million) to try and set up a modern production line. Air Marshal (ret.) Pranab K Barbora:
“HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”
The paper points out that HAL’s new CEO RK Tyagi has “no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture,” and openly doubts the government ADA’s program manager, P. Subramanyam. He promises that HAL will build 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters in 2.5 – 3 years, with production of the next 20 in just over 2 more years, by 2018. That might be possible if an experienced foreign manufacturer is contracted quickly to help set up production, and the MoD is reportedly studying that idea. By itself, however, HAL hasn’t been able to build even 2 Tejas fighters per year over a prolonged reference period, and India has no operational squadrons. Meanwhile, Pakistan has already fielded almost 3 squadrons of their JF-17 Thunder fighter, which began its design cycle after Tejas.
Note that the Business Standard’s figure of INR 155.470 billion (Rs 14,047 + 1,500 crore) for the entire LCA Tejas program is almost exactly double the Indian government’s official March 2012 figures. The math indicates that they’re probably including the Kaveri engine. DID considers the 2 programs to be separate, and pegs unofficial total Tejas development costs at INR 131.015 billion (Rs 13,101.5 crore, currently about $2.15 billion), including current and forecast costs for the naval variant, and the expected Rs 1500 crore for production line help. With Kaveri included, our figures rise to INR 144.405 billion, and are probably slightly behind actual Kaveri spending. Business Standard.
HAL: Industrial fail
Dec 3/12: Kaveri. India’s state-owned Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) aims to integrate the Kaveri powerplant with a Tejas fighter operated by India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), with the aim of flying it by the end of 2013. Whether it can perform to standard won’t change DRDO’s advocacy, but it may matter to the IAF. As of May 14/12 (q.v.), India’s Minister of Defence said that it couldn’t meet India’s 90kN/ 20,200 pound thrust requirement.
A March 21/12 answer to Parliament (q.v.) pegged the Kaveri’s development cost at INR 28.39 billion ($520 million), nearly 10 times greater than the original INR 3.83 billion. Flight International.
Aug. – Nov. 2012: Testing halted. The Tejas encounters a DASH of trouble, as India discovers that the top of the pilot’s DASH-III integrated helmet display can end up above the top of the Martin-Baker ejection seat. That’s a serious problem, because it means the helmet could hit the canopy as the seat rockets out of the cockpit, killing the ejecting pilot. India had to halt testing for 3 1/2 months before the problem was fixed. Their response was to modify the seat, and to provide a backup mechanism that they calculate will blow the canopy off before the pilot’s head can hit it. They had better be right.
DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat has confirmed to India’s Business Standard that the fixes are done, adding that ADA used the down time to make other modifications as a result of flight test feedback. Even so, a string of setbacks has shifted Tejas’ Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) from a re-baselined end-2010 to mid-2013 – if nothing else goes seriously wrong. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) for combat operations was scheduled for end-2012, and now looks unlikely until 2014-2015.
To the west, Pakistan has already inducted 3 squadrons of its comparable JF-17 fighters, whose joint development with China began 16 years after Tejas. India’s Business Standard.
A DASH of trouble
Oct 18/12: Lessons Learned. Air Commodore Muthanna’s “Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA” [PDF] has some interesting bits in it. The Commodore believes that the fighter deserves to enter service. Unfortunately, Indian officials and firms didn’t involve aviators in the initial design process, either by teaming with the IAF or by the widespread practice of embedding aviators in the design teams. The IAF had to get involved after the 2006 contract, and a lot of the time and cost slippage from then until now has involved RFAs aimed at fixing deficiencies that should have been addressed in design. Beyond that, he cites serious issues in management, manufacturing, and training:
“A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program…. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge….
….[Transitioning from design to manufacture,] the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings…. [is] an elaborate process…. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to mee t DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower.
….With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken…. there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.”
Lessons learned report
May 14/12: Kaveri. Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony replies to Shri Bal Kumar Patel in Lok Sabha. No, DRDO still has no time frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. Antony reiterates that the engine does not meet requirements for the Tejas, but will be used in UAVs and marine applications. A technology demonstrator may fly in a Tejas Mk.I fighter around 2015. The operative word here is “may”.
April 27/12: Naval LCA. NP-1, the 1st Tejas naval prototype, has its maiden flight. The plane is piloted by chief test pilot of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) national flight test centre (NFTC) Commodore TA Maolankar and co-piloted by the centre’s flight test engineer, Wing Commander Maltesh Prabhu. NP-2 will be the single-seat naval variant. Zee News.
Naval variant flies
March 21/12: Costs. Defence minister Antony answers a Parliamentary question, and provides cost and schedule slips for the LCA Tejas, LCA Naval, and Kaveri engine. Those are reproduced above along with other information. Antony also discusses what’s being done about these slips, which amounts to more oversight and monitoring. That won’t cure a system whose main problem is a lack of accountability or consequences for the state-run development agencies, and whose secondary problem is the system’s own red tape. On the other hand, the answer makes it sound like the government is doing something. Antony adds that:
“Tacit knowledge acquired by the DRDO scientists during this project will also be applied for further aerospace technology. Kaveri spin-off engine can be used as propulsion system for Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV).”
Readers may note that he is not referring to the LCA Tejas program as a destination for Kaveri, despite DRDO’s wishes in the matter. See also Indian government PIB | Flight International.
March 14/12: Goal – 6 squadrons. Indian minister of state for defence M M Pallam Raju tels the Rajya Sabha upper chamber that the IAF plans to induct 6 LCA squadrons over the next decade or so, including 4 squadrons of Tejas Mk.II fighters. Given current schedules, past performance, and the extent of the redesign and testing involved, India may be lucky to induct any Mk.II fighters by 2022. Deccan Herald.
March 11/12: Naval LCA. India’s Sunday Guardian reports that India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) has refused flight certification for the Naval LCA, until the new landing gear’s weight is reduced, and its wing leading-edge vortex controls are redesigned. The US Navy and EADS are reportedly being consulted to help fix the problems.
CEMILAC’s decision will add further delays to a program that is already late, and effectively ends hopes for a March 2012 flight. The naval variant’s initial flight was initially slated to happen by the end of 2010, following a July 2010 roll-out. As of Sept 26/11, it had managed only an Engine Ground Run.
March 10/12: Testing. While Tejas continues to make test flights, and has been granted initial certification, final certification and full production continues to face delays, and will not come until late 2013 or even 2014 now.
New test aircraft LSP-7 had a maiden flight, without a chase plane, “to test many indigenously-developed instruments,” as well as the M-2032 radar and DASH helmet. It’s close enough to the final standard that it will be one of the planes offered for IAF user-evaluation trials, but the final-configuration LSP-8 won’t be ready until later in 2012. LSP-8 will be the version presented to CEMILAC for full certification and flight clearance, a necessary step before full production can begin for the two 20-plane orders. The Hindu.
Feb 29/12: HAL, shape up. India’s MoD explains that changes are coming to HAL, and cites the Tejas program as one reason behind the push:
“The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to realign its business processes for strategic alliances and joint ventures, as also, to step up R&D efforts to remain globally competitive… Keeping in mind the mammoth role that the HAL would assume in the coming years in the aerospace industry and the challenges that it would face, the government has set up an expert group under the chairmanship of Shri BK Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission to suggest measures to strengthen and restructure HAL… the Group will suggest how best the spin offs from HAL order book can be earnest to ensure better involvement of the private industry in the defence sector. It will also suggest measures to enhance the synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and the civilian industry.
“Taking part in the discussion the Members of Parliament appreciated the role played by HAL in the defence arena of the country over the years. They, however, pointed out certain shortcomings such as the delay in the induction of the Light Combat Aircraft in the Indian Air Force, delay in the development of Kaveri Engine, delay in phasing out of Mig-21 aircraft and lack of an aggressive strategy to export HAL products.”
See also March 24/11 entry, The Pioneer | Flight International | IN FOCUS: India advances air force modernisation.
Feb 27/12: Naval LCA. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned the building of 8 Naval LCA aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and reportedly allocated the necessary funds for a contract. That does not mean a contract has been signed yet.
The 8 planes will be built as a mix of single-seat test fighters and twin-seat trainers, and would begin to add production fighters on top of the ordered fleet of 6 test aircraft. The first flight is announced for sometime in March, though talks last year of a maiden flight in July did not pan out. Business Standard.
2011
Tejas initial clearance; RAFAEL Derby picked as MRAAM; Kaveri engine still alive but in limbo; HAL pushed to outsource.
IOC flight
(click to view video)
Dec 21/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony explains the Kaveri engine’s current development status:
“So far 9 prototypes of Kaveri engines and 4 prototypes of Kabini (Core) engines have been developed. Total 2050 hours of testing have been conducted on various Kaveri and Kabini engines at ground and altitude conditions for various requirements including performance, operability, endurance, environmental, etc. Two major milestones viz. successful completion of Official Altitude Testing (OAT) and completion of first block of flights of Kaveri engine in Flying Test Bed (FTB) has demonstrated the technological capability and maturity of this indigenous effort. Kaveri engine prototype (K9) was integrated with IL-76 aircraft at Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI), Russia and flight tests have been successfully carried out up to 12 km maximum forward altitude and a maximum forward speed of 0.7 Mach No. Twenty seven flights for 55 hours duration have been completed on IL-76. Critical subsystems and its associated knowledge know-how and know-why has been acquired in association with Indian public & private sector industries, including certification methodologies.”
Nov 23/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony says that nothing has changed with respect to the Kaveri engine’s successor. He doesn’t put it like that, but that’s the reality. India MoD.
Aug 8/11: Kaveri. In response to questions, the Indian MoD clarifies the status of the Kaveri engine project. There is no signed co-operation agreement with SNECMA, but the Air Force has reviewed the draft technical specification and approved it.
“The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has made no agreement with a French firm to develop the Kaveria aero engine to be used for the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. However, DRDO is negotiating with M/s Snecma, France for co-development and co-production of Kaveri aero engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas MK-II. The project proposal will be put up for Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval after the completion of price negotiation… IAF has further suggested that the engine design should have minimal impact on the LCA Tejas airframe for future retrofitment.”
If it succeeds, India’s Tejas fleet would have an alternative engine option, much like the popular F-16. Several countries fly F-16s, and even F-15s, with 2 different types of engine (PW F100 or GE F101) in their fleet, as insurance that keeps their air force flying even if an engine type develops problems. First, however, an agreement must be signed. Then, the development project must succeed at a reasonable cost.
July 20/11: Naval LCA. The naval Tejas will probably get a different name. Meanwhile, an F404-IN20-powered naval variant is undergoing ground integration tests at HAL’s Bangalore facility, followed by engine runs and ground runs in the coming weeks. A 1st flight within 3 months is considered optimistic.
Meanwhile, India’s ADA has asked the US Navy to help it define carrier suitability plans, and the US Navy is assisting. Flight International.
May 23/11: Testing & Weapons. Aviation Week reports that the Tejas Mk.I is due to undergo a 2nd phase of night trials. Aircraft LSP-5 reportedly made 6 night flights in April 2011, which tested avionics, the instrument landing system, and integration involving the IAI ELTA multimode radar, Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display, and RAFAEL’s LITENING pod. The push to finish night operations clearance will also include items waived for the IAF’s initial clearance (vid. Jan 10/11 entry) – waivers that the service does not intend to grant again.
The next 16 months will see assessments of Tejas’ angle of attack, g-forces and sustained turn rate, with limited series production aircraft #6 arriving to help speed things along. It will also see a greater focus on weapons integratiopn tests – so far, only R-73/AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missiles and standard bombs have been tested. Still to go: Laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and Russian 80mm S-8 rocket pods. RAFAEL’s Derby medium-range air-to-air missile isn’t set to test until mid-2012, and the IAF also expects Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles as part of the Tejas Mk.I’s intended configuration.
March 24/11: Industrial. India’s Business Standard reports that the Indian DRDO is pushing HAL to outsource some Tejas production or set up joint ventures, in order to meet required delivery schedules and keep the IAF’s fighter fleet at acceptable numbers. The current line can reportedly produce just 8 planes per year, and a high-level HAL team has reportedly toured Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Eurofighter GmbH facilities.
A request of this nature from the DRDO is nothing short of revolutionary. HAL has 2 serious problems, however, which make such a different approach thinkable for India’s bureaucrats. One is low real orders for Tejas. As one HAL executive put it: “…how much money could we have realistically invested in a production line?… So far, future Tejas orders of 100-120 more fighters are only plans.” The other problem is the load level on the state-owned firm’s Aircraft R&D Centre, which is is simultaneously trying to develop the Tejas Mark II; the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT); the Sukhoi-HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); and the Irkut-HAL Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The firm is also developing Dhruv helicopter variants, including a light attack helicopter. That’s a tremendous amount of competition for attention and resources, and HAL will face more strains if/when each project becomes a production demand.
Other likely candidates for partnerships wold have to include France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s Saab, and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as BAE and Northrop Grumman. The latter 3 firms have considerable experience as fighter program sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman is looking to sell its E-2D AWACS and Global Hawk UAVs to India; while IAI supplies a range of equipment to India already, and has industrial partnerships in place. So, too, does BAE, who is already working with HAL to produce its Hawk advanced trainer jets in India.
Feb 14/11: Tejas runs the Derby. Indian Aeronautical Development Agency director P.S. Subramanya says they have picked RAFAEL’s Derby as the Tejas’ initial beyond visual range air combat missile. He expects a contract by March 2011, with delivery expected in the second half of 2012,