Dassault Rafale
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Will Dassault’s fighter become a fashionably late fighter platform that builds on its parent company’s past successes – or just “the late Rafale”? It all began as a 1985 break-away from the multinational consortium that went on to create EADS’ Eurofighter. The French needed a lighter aircraft that was suitable for carrier use, and were reportedly unwilling to cede design authority over the project. As is so often true of French defense procurement policy, the choice came down to paying additional costs for full independence and exact needs, or losing key industrial capabilities by partnering or buying abroad. France has generally opted for expensive but independent defense choices, and the Rafale was no exception.
Those costs, and associated delays triggered by the end of the Cold War and reduced funding, proved to be very costly indeed. Unlike previous French fighters, which relied on exports to lower their costs and keep production lines humming, the Rafale has yet to secure a single export contract – in part because initial versions were hampered by impaired capabilities in key roles. The Rafale may, at last, be ready to be what its vendors say: a true omnirole aircraft, ready for prime time on the global export stage. The question is whether it’s too late. Rivals like EADS’ Eurofighter, Russia’s Su-27/30 family, and the American “teen series” of F-15/16/18 variants are all well established. Meanwhile, Saab’s versatile and cheaper JAS-39 Gripen remains a stubborn foe in key export competitions, and the multinational F-35 juggernaut is bearing down on it.
Dassault’s Rafale: Variants
Rafales
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The Rafale is a 9.5 – 10.5 tonne aircraft powered by 2 SNECMA M88 jet engines, each generating up to 16,500 pounds thrust with afterburner. Canards are used to improve maneuverability, especially for snap-shots in short-range dogfights, and radar shaping lowers the aircraft’s profile relative to 4th generation competitors like the Mirage 2000 or F-16. Carrier capability was a prime motivator behind France’s decision to go it alone with the Rafale program, and variants exist for both land-based and carrier use.
Despite its size, the Rafale can carry an impressive set of ordnance beyond its 30mm DEFA 791 cannon: up to 9.5 tonnes of weapons and stores on 14 pylons (1-2 on center fuselage, 2 below engine intakes, 6 underwing and 2 wingtip pylons), 5 of which are “wet” pylons that can carry heavy stores or fuel tanks. Its Thales RBE2 mechanically-scanned array or RBE2-AA AESA radar can direct MBDA’s MICA RF missiles, and future integration of the long-range Meteor is also planned. A combination of Thales/SAGEM’s OST Infrared Scan and Track optronics, and MBDA’s MICA IR medium-range missiles, allows the Rafale to supplement its radar-guided missiles with passively-targeted, no-warning attacks on enemy aircraft from beyond visual range. At present, this capability is only duplicated by Russian aircraft: Sukhoi’s SU-27/30 family, and advanced MiG-29s.
Rafale Variants: Types and Tranches
Dassault: Power of One
The Rafale comes in several broad types, and also comes in different capability tranches.
Carrier-capable Rafales are single-seat fighters, and are referred to as Rafale Ms. They will become the French Navy’s only fighters, replacing the F-8P Crusader fighter, Etendard IVP reconnaissance aircraft, and Super Etendard strike aircraft. They feature the usual set of carrier modifications, including lengthened and strengthened landing gear, strengthened airframe and arrester hook for landings, and carrier landing electronics. The front-center pylon is deleted on this version, in order to make room for that robust landing gear.
French Air Force Rafales come in 2 broad types: the preferred 2-seat Rafale B, and the single-seat Rafale C. They will eventually replace the SEPECAT Jaguar, Dassault’s Mirage F1, and most of the Mirage 2000 family in French service.
Rafale & Mirage 2000D
over Afghanistan
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Within those designations, Dassault’s Rafales also come in capability tranches that are common across all versions.
Initial Rafale F1s are limited to air superiority missions, and included only Rafale-Ms intended as urgent replacements for the French carrier force’s 1950s/60s era F-8P Crusader air superiority fighters. Rafale F1s are capable fighters, and represented a huge upgrade for the Marine Nationale. Even so, they lack the wide weapons fit of 4+ generation counterparts like the JAS-39 Gripen or modern F-15 Strike Eagles, the optimized cockpit of EADS’ Eurofighter, or the price advantages of Sukhoi’s SU-30 family. Surviving Rafale-M F1s will be upgraded to the F3 configuration.
Rafale F2. Most of the Rafales currently in service are built to the F2 standard, which adds the ability to carry and use precision ground attack weapons. This standard includes 2-seat air force Rafale-Bs, single-seat Rafale-Cs, and naval Rafale-Ms. Key additions include radar ground attack and terrain-following modes, carriage of laser-guided bombs and Storm Shadow/ Scalp cruise missiles, MICA IR missile capability using the OSF IRST sensor, a Link 16 datalink, and a buddy tanker pod for Rafale Ms. The biggest thing the F2 standard lacks is integration of independent laser targeting capability, which is why French Rafales over Afghanistan had to operate in conjunction with Super Etendard and Mirage 2000D fighters.
ASMP-A4 on Rafale
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Rafale F3. Since 2008, all Rafales have been delivered in the F3 standard. Initial changes added the ability to carry French ASMP-A air-launched nuclear missiles, allowing the Rafale to replace the Mirage 2000N in that nuclear strike role. Other modifications include full integration with the Reco NG reconnaissance pod, implementation of all currently planned modes for the RBE2 radar, antiship attack with the Exocet or follow-on ANF, and support for an improved tanker pack.
Further changes were forthcoming within F3. Full integration with Thales’ Damocles surveillance and laser targeting pod was executed, and Damocles-equipped Rafales were used over Libya in 2011. The radar took a quantum leap forward as of Rafale #C137, with Thales’ RBE2-AA AESA radar replacing the mechanically-scanned RBE2 array on previous aircraft. The new radar has hundreds of active T/R modules, and involves about 400,000 lines of code all by itself. This compares to about 2 million lines of code for the entire aircraft’s avionics.
Nuclear ASMP-A capability is irrelevant to exports, but the addition of an AESA radar and full independent precision strike capability will go a long way toward making the Rafale more competitive with challengers like American F-16/15/18s, Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen, EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon, and the oncoming F-35 program.
Thales Inside
Rafale F3Rs features software enhancements to make full use of the RBE2-AA radar, Meteor long range air-to-air missile integration, SBU-64 dual mode laser/GPS AASM smart bomb integration, improvements to Thales SPECTRA self-defence system, and an Identification Friend or Foe interrogator/transponder with full Mode-5/Mode-S-compatibility. As of September 2013, the DGA started referring to these planes as the 4th tranche, and January 2014 saw full commitment to develop all of these upgrades for fielding by 2018.
Efforts to include MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-air missiles are ongoing, but it won’t be ready until 2018. That will make Rafale the last European fighter to integrate the Meteor, about 3-4 years later than the JAS-39 Gripen. It will also be the only fighter with a 1-way Meteor datalink instead of a 2-way link.
The Rafale remains behind in 2 other areas.
Its new Damocles surveillance and targeting pod’s 320 x 240 infrared array is far behind other international offerings, even with an architecture that effectively gives 640 x 480 resolution. Current performance is adequate, but this gap will continue to widen until the improved PDL-NG surveillance and targeting pod’s debut in 2018 with an effective 1280 x 1040 array. That’s about the same as some current offerings, so by 2018, the Rafale is likely to modernize from a gross competitive disadvantage in a critical technology to a less egregious competitive disadvantage.
The 2nd gap is even more consequential. While the Rafale has a wide Head Up Display, a Helmet Mounted Display that would allow the Rafale to take full advantage of its wide-borseight MICA missiles remains the type’s most important missing piece, even after F3R.
Dassault’s Rafale: Program
Le Bourget, 2005
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Current plans call for delivery of 225 Rafale B/C/M aircraft by the end of the program, which will stop sometime around 2017 without export orders. As of September 2013, 121 Rafales had been delivered: 38 Rafale-M, 39 Rafale B, and 44 Rafale C.
The French Senat tallied the Rafale program at EUR 43.56 billion over 40 years, at 2011 prices. That figure was for 286 forecast aircraft, and the EUR 152 million per-plane figure was similar to the Pentagon’s “PAUC” metric, amortizing development costs as well as flyaway purchases. Cutting production totals to 225 worsens per-plane raises the development cost average per plane, and slowed production will raise actual per-plane fixed costs.
If the Rafale is expensive, it’s also the heart of French military power. Its carrier and nuclear roles are irreplaceable, and the 2011 Libyan operation demonstrated that it has evolved to play a central role in French conventional wars. The Rafale program equally important to France’s aerospace industry, as heart of France’s advanced military aerospace research. The Rafale has been responsible for significant steps forward in French materials science, engine design, computing, sensors, etc. at Dassault, Thales, and Snecma. Not to mention over 500 sub-contractors. In total, the aircraft is said to be responsible for 7,000 direct and indirect jobs.
Rafale Program: History
Production line
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Unfortunately, 1985 proved to be a perilous start date for an expensive decade-plus weapons project. The end of the Cold War led to a severe funding crunch. Development took a long time, and fielding was delayed for many years. That delay left Rafales with great potential as a 4+ generation fighter, but limited operational capabilities that compared unfavorably with the planes it was trying to replace. That has come back to bite Dassault, and France.
The first operational Rafale-M aircraft was delivered in 2000, to the Marine Nationale, and the type entered full service in 2004, in the F1 configuration. Plans call for eventual delivery of up to 60 Rafale Ms, delivered or upgraded to at least the F3 standard.
The end of 2004 saw initial delivery of 2-seat Rafale B fighters to the French air force, and 2005 saw delivery of the 1st single-seat Rafale C. The aircraft entered service with the air force in 2006. All Rafale B/C fighters have been delivered as F2s or F3s.
By 2006, the French armed forces had ordered just 120 Rafales (82 Rafale A-C for the Armée de l’Air, 38 Rafale M for the Marine Nationale) of the planned 294. About 70 had been delivered by 2009, when a new French purchase raised the order book to 180 Rafales; but 2009 also saw production cut from 14 to 11 aircraft per year. This is seen as the minimum necessary to maintain the production line, and keeping the line at even that minimum capacity required an extra EUR 1.1 billion during 2009-2014 budget period, to bring forward 17 orders planned for later years. The challenge for the following 2015-2019 budget period was to finalize the export orders necessary to maintain production while French orders were again cut.
The Rafale Program: What’s Next?
Rafale F3
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Additional multi-year buys will be required, but absent major export orders, a combination of deteriorating global finances, future demographic crunches in Europe, and the advent of unmanned UCAV projects like the nEUROn, will all compete with additional French Rafale orders. As those orders are squeezed, Dassaut won’t be the only firm feeling the pain. The effect would be felt throughout France’s aerospace sector, as Snecma, Thales, and their subcontractors would be forced to rethink their plans – or even their existence, in the case of some lower-tier suppliers.
That leaves 2 options for the platform.
As the British have demonstrated, one way to improve a jet’s affordability is to improve maintenance contracts. In 2008, the French defense ministry’s SIMMAD signed a 10-year “Rafale Care” contract with Dassault that paid for availability and flight-hours, rather than spares and man-hours. The British approach has been to build toward a contract that makes 1 firm responsible for all sub-contractors as well, but in 2012, a decade-long contract between SIMMAD and Thales made it clear that France prefers a set of modular performance-based contracts instead.
Once the French approach has several years of data behind it, that kind of future cost certainty could be helpful on the export front.
That would be timely, because after over a decade of failure, exports may offer the program a 2nd ray of hope. Rafale versions were picked as the preferred choice in India’s MMRCA competition, and have several potential export contenders in the wings. They need to close a few of these deals – but that hasn’t been easy.
Rafale’s Export Issues
French Mirage 2000C
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For previous French fighters, domestic production has been supplemented, and subsidized, by strong export sales. The Mirage III was exported to around 20 countries, and was so successful that its export profits could have financed almost 25% of France’s oil imports! The Mirage F1 was exported to only 10 countries. The Mirage 2000 has 8 customers. Rafale? None.
To date, the Rafale has lost export opportunities in Algeria (SU-30MKA – Rafale a long shot), Brazil (Gripen NG – Rafale the favorite), Greece (Eurofighter, then F-16), Morocco (F-16C/D – Rafale the favorite), The Netherlands (F-35A), Norway (F-35A), Oman (Eurofighter – Rafale a long shot), Saudi Arabia (Eurofighter), Singapore (F-15SG), South Korea (F-15K, Rafale won but politics reversed the pick), Switzerland (JAS-39E Gripen NG), and the UAE (F-16E/F, but could win next competition). Other losses have been rumored over the years.
Europe’s 4G+ trio
In a March 2012 statement, Dassault CEO Charles Edelstenne threw its export issues into sharp relief. Translated:
“When one is in a country like India which is an open country and in which Americans do not have the same weight as countries that are their private hunting preserve, we have a chance. And this chance, we got it… The market for the Rafale, it is countries that do not want or can not buy or American countries who want to have a second source while buying American. Now all countries, except two, where we lost, were countries that did not fit this definition.”
There is some truth to this statement, but it also elides many of the Rafale’s genuine problems. Questionable precision ground attack capabilities for Rafale F1-F2s, coupled with limited integration beyond French weapons, hurt the aircraft badly on the export market until almost 2010. Ground attack capabilities have been fixed, but the Rafale’s EUR 100+ million price tag leaves it occupying a high-end market segment that has historically been responsible for just 25% of fighter export sales. That price gap beyond competitors like Saab’s Gripen, Lockheed Martin’s F-16, and Sukhoi’s SU-30 has also cost Dassault sales, most recently in Brazil and Switzerland.
Despite Dassault’s rosy projections for the global fighter market as a whole, therefore, their lack of foreign orders has choked expected investments, and started to feed back into platform modernization issues.
It’s also affecting the rest of the French air force. Lack of exports is forcing extra French funding, in order to keep the Rafale production line at its minimum sustaining rate. That extra spending is delaying the much-needed modernization of France’s Mirage 2000 fleet, and is beginning to pose an operational risk for France.
Current export opportunities for Dassault include:
India (~126). Preferred choice, but no contract yet.
Qatar (36). Could rise to 72 over time. The QEAF is looking to replace their 12 Mirage 2000D fighters and 6 combat capable Alpha Jet light aircraft, but the growing power vacuum is pushing them toward a larger buy. Competition: Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet, F-15 Strike Eagle, F-35A?
The UAE (60). Mirage 2000 customer. Negotiations have dragged for a long time.
Secondary opportunities include:
Bahrain (12-18). Considered a low odds bid. Competition: Eurofighter, likely F-16V and F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet.
Canada (~65). F-35 partner. Very unlikely there there will even be a real competition.
Kuwait (18-24). Considered a low odds bid. Competition: Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet.
Malaysia (18). MiG-29N replacement on hold. Competition: JAS-39E Gripen NG, Eurofighter, F/A-18 Advanced Super Hornet, Sukhoi SU-30MKM.
Contracts and Key Events
2014
Rafale F3R upgrades ordered; 1st export contract to Qatar?; Indian workshare agreement negotiated.
2013 French Air Force
June 19/14: Qatar. Reports continue to predict that Sheikh Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani’s visit to Paris on June 23/14 will herald a contract for 36 Rafales, with an option for 36 more. The move would represent the Rafale’s 1st export contract, and a dramatic expansion of Qatar’s fighter force from the current fleet of 12 Mirage 2000s.
With that said, the best source is France’s La Tribune. They cite government sources who are pleased with the progress of negotiations, while cautioning readers about the deal’s complexity, and doubting that the Rafale deal will be signed in Paris.
Qatar is a significant customer for French defense equipment, and their support of the Muslim Brotherhood has given then an anomalous position within the Gulf Arab states. France recently sold them A330 aerial tankers and NH90 helicopters as part of a $23 billion global splurge, and are reportedly negotiating to sell the Emirate VBCI wheeled APCs and FREMM FREDA air defense frigates on top of the Rafales. Sources: La Tribune, “Le Qatar veut le Rafale de Dassault Aviation” | Bloomberg, “Dassault Said to Close in on Rafale Contract to Lift Exports”.
May 28/14: Qatar. La Tribune says that France’s Rafale has emerged as Qatar’s 1st choice for its new fighter fleet, against competition from the Eurofighter Typhoon and an American offer that was not the F-35 (i.e. F-15 Strike Eagle or F/A-18 Super Hornet – q.v. Nov 26/13). Talks reportedly resumed in March 2014, with Qatar inquiring about a range of options from 12-72 aircraft. The pick is expected to be announced by Sheikh Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani on June 23/14, when he visits Paris.
The stakes are high for France, whose recent multi-year budget would buy only 26 Rafales from 2014 – 2019, despite a minimum required production rate of 11 jets per year. The French order would only last until the spring of 2016. Given the contract penalties involved in falling below minimum production, France would be forced to move its own orders forward, unless significant export orders arrive to rescue the production line. Sources: La Tribune, “Le Rafale de Dassault sur la piste d’envol au Qatar?” | AFP, “Qatar nears exclusive talks on buying Rafale fighter: Report” | Gulf News, “Qatar nears talks to buy ‘unpopular’ Rafale fighter jets”.
March 2/14: India. Dassault and HAL have reportedly established an initial workshare agreement for Indian Rafales, after long and difficult negotiations. Dassault will provide the first 18 planes from its own factories in fly-away condition. After that, HAL will be responsible for directing 70% of the work in India, while Dassault remains responsible for 30%.
Negotiations have included industrial coordination, as well as straight workshare. For instance, RBE2-AA AESA radar production will be outsourced to state-owned Bharat-Electronics Ltd (BEL) in Bangalore, while the corresponding radome will be manufactured by HAL. One step toward the agreement involved HAL setting up a new facility close to the one that BEL has in Bangalore, so that issues with radome or radar production won’t create compatibility problems that leave India’s Rafales unable to meet acceptance tests.
The MoD has already spent this term’s capital budget, so the deal will have to be finalized by whichever government wins India’s May election. Which turns out to be a landslide for the BJP opposition. Sources: Indian Express, “India seals Rafale jet deal with French firm” | NDTV, “A big step in India’s Rafale jet deal with France”.
India: workshare deal
Jan 22/14: Canada. Dassault SVP of NATO affairs Yves Robins is quoted as saying that they’re offering Canada unrestricted transfers of technology if it picks the Rafale, including software source codes for servicing the planes. That’s something Canada won’t get with the F-35, and it’s being touted as a long-term cost savings that will let Canadian firms do more of the required maintenance. They’re also pushing the government to declare a competition.
The CBC report goes on to show that the broadcaster doesn’t really grasp the issues, asking about the Rafale’s ability to operate alongside the USAF. France replies that this worked over Libya, but that isn’t the real question. The question is whether Canada could use its American weapons with the Rafale, without having to conduct expensive integration and testing programs. In most cases, the answer is no. Which is why Rafale is a long shot, in the unlikely event that Canada even declares a competition. Sources: CBC News, “Dassault Aviation ramps up CF-18 replacement pitch”.
Jan 10/13: F3R. French defense minister Jean-Yves le Drian hands Dassault Chairman and CEO Eric Trappier the Rafale F3R development contract, during a visit to Dassault Aviation’s Merignac plant. The contract, which is reported to be worth about EUR 1 billion ($1.32 billion), had actually been ratified by the DGA on Dec 30/13.
Key additions to the Rafale F3R include full integration with the SBU-64 laser/GPS AASM smart bomb and the Meteor long-range air-to-air missile, improvements to Thales SPECTRA self-defence system, an Identification Friend or Foe interrogator/transponder with full Mode-5/Mode-S-compatibility, and assorted incremental improvements to the plane’s navigation systems, data links, and radar.
At the same time, the DGA announces the expected EUR 119 million development deal with Thales Optronics for the F3R’s new PDL-NG surveillance and targeting pod, under the 2014-2019 budget. That’s on top of the initial EUR 55 million risk-reduction phase that confirmed the system’s architecture, integration, and development schedule (q.v. Jan 28/13). The French military expects to order 20 pods during a subsequent initial production phase, with 16 delivered between 2018 – 2019. The full program is expected to order 45.
French Rafale orders currently stand at 180 production aircraft, with 126 delivered: 39 Rafale-M naval single-seaters, 42 Rafale-B twin-seaters for the air force, and 45 Rafale-C single-seaters for the air force. Sources: French DGA, “Lancement du nouveau standard du programme Rafale” | French DGA, “La DGA lance le developpement du PDL-NG” | Dassault Aviation, “RAFALE “F3 R” standard launched” | Usine Nouvelle, “L’Etat debloque un milliard d’euros pour rendre le Rafale exportable” | Thales Group, “Thales begins development of New Generation Laser Designation Pod”.
Rafale F3R & PDL-NG pod development contracts
2013
Rafale program to end early in France, putting the pressure on exports; Loss in Brazil doesn’t help; Qatar competition delayed into 2014; PDL NG targeting pod development; Rafale F3R.
Rafale w. Damocles
Dec 18/13: Brazil. Earlier press reports that the competition was stalled for another 2 years are proven wrong by a somewhat unexpected announcement from the Ministerio da Defesa. Brazil has picked Saab’s Gripen-NG as their preferred bidder, and expects to buy 36 planes for $4.5 billion. That’s currently just an estimate, as negotiations need to sort themselves out. A final contract and financing arrangements are expected in December 2014, and deliveries are expected to begin 4 years later. Dassault shares fall by about 2% on the news, despite statements by French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Driana that this was a:
“…disappointment on a target that wasn’t a priority…. Brazil was not the priority target for the Rafale. We have more important targets in India and the Gulf (Arab states)…. We have good reason to think that in India and the Gulf (Arab states) there will be results.”
The Gripen NG contract figure tracks exactly with previous reports by Folha de Sao Paolo, which means an additional $1.5 billion contract can be expected for long-term maintenance and support. Saab was the cheapest of the reported offers, beating Boeing ($5.8 billion) and Dassault ($8.2 billion, reportedly reduced) by significant margins. Once Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA spying on Brazil’s government killed Boeing’s chances, there was no middle ground. The Rafale’s reported $10.2 billion purchase + maintenance total made it 70% more expensive than Saab’s Gripen. Brazil’s economic slowdown, and the Rousseff government’s focus on entitlement spending, made that cost chasm a big factor. Dassault issued a terse statement pointing out the presence of US parts on Gripens, and positioning the Rafale in a different league. Which may or may not be true, but it’s indisputably true that global fighter buys have historically been heavily weighted toward a less-expensive league. Gripen is within that low to mid price range, and Rafale isn’t. Sources: DID full report, “F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet” || See also: Dassault, “FX2 contest – 2013/12/18″ | Le Monde, “A qui la France peut-elle encore vendre le Rafale?” | Reuters, “France soothes nerves over Dassault jets after Brazil setback”.
Loss in Brazil
Dec 10/13: Sub-contractors. PTI reports that Dassault Aviation and India’s NYSE-listed Reliance Industries are planning to set up a Bangalore facility to produce Rafale wings for India’s future order, and reportedly have the approvals they need to do so. The facility would reportedly cost about INR 10 billion ($248 million) to build, but the ultra-modern facility would leave Reliance in a strong position to leverage additional civil and defense-related aerospace work. That would be a new sector for Reliance, but Dassault is impressed with them, and reportedly wanted to use Reliance as the Rafale’s main Indian manufacturing contractor.
India’s government insisted on the state-owned HAL instead, but Dassault may still see a larger opportunity. If Reliance can produce quality assemblies at a cost savings, outsourcing some production for future orders could help Dassault lower their cost per jet, while meeting India’s targets for industrial offsets. Sources: FirstPost.Business, “Reliance, Dassault may join hands to make wings for Rafale fighter jets”.
Nov 26/13: Qatar. La Tribune cites a number of French export opportunities in Qatar, including 22 NH90 transport/naval helicopters (bought), up to 480 VBCI wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, Gowind ASW corvettes, FREMM air defense frigates, and SAMP/T Mamba air and missile defense systems.
The Rafale has been helped by the USA’s failure to respond to the fighter RFP (q.v. Nov 10/13), and their Swedish Gripen competitor wasn’t even invited to bid. Qatar already uses French weapons on their Mirage 2000s, and their defense purchases are far more straightforward than India’s, leading to optimism that the Rafale’s 1st export sale could take place in the Middle East. If Qatar really does want a mixed fleet, the Rafale’s competition narrows to only the Eurofighter. Sources: La Tribune, “La France au Moyen-Orient (3/5) : le Qatar premier client du Rafale?”.
Nov 10/13: Qatar. Qatar’s competition will be delayed because the US Dept. of State couldn’t get their act together in time to issue all of the necessary export approvals. The QEAF is looking to replace their 12 Mirage 2000D fighters and 6 combat capable Alpha Jet light aircraft, but the neighborhood’s growing dangers are pushing them toward a larger buy. A split buy within their maximum total of 72 is seen as a real possibility, and some observers even see a potential split buy among the initial planned set of 36 planes. The initial decision was supposed to come down by the end of 2013, but will now take place in mid-2014.
Dassault already has a foothold here, and the Qataris are exactly the kind of customer they need to win. Eurofighter buys in Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened the door in the Gulf, and a UAE turn toward the platform could cement it as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s future standard. On the flip side, Rafale wins in the UAE and Qatar could open doors to tougher GCC customers like Bahrain and Kuwait.
The US State Department was reportedly wrestling with a pair of Boeing platforms as alternatives: the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and the F-15 Strike Eagle family. The later group includes the stealth-enhanced F-15SE, as well as the Saudis’ new F-15SA standard. Despite ongoing rumors regarding interest in the F-35 stealth fighter, Defense News reports that it isn’t a factor yet. Sources: Defense News, “US Bid Delays Qatar Jet Competition”.
October 2013: Need for Exports. As France is working on its 2014-19 defense budget law, the need to finalize an export order becomes ever more acute. To meet the French government’s baseline financial scenario, 7 out of 11 planes delivered in 2016 would already have to go abroad, which means a firm order has to be locked in by mid-2014 as jets for foreign customers would have their own configuration. France’s DGA procurement agency pays for Rafales in 3 installments. If exports don’t pan out in time, they may have to face difficult cash management trade-offs. Source : Les Echos, Rafale : le plan B de Dassault et de la DGA [in French] | LPM 2014-19: MINDEF, Legifrance [both in French].
October 17/13: India. Deputy chief of air staff Air Marshal S. Sukumar said during a conference that the contract with Dassault will be finalized before the end of the government’s current fiscal year, which ends on March 31st, 2014. Sukumar is a former flying instructor with 4,000+ flight hours who took his current job in December last year. Dassault was really hoping to get this done in 2013, but the sudden death of chief negotiator Arun Kumar Bal on October 2 must not have helped an already slow process. Source: Reuters, India to finalize Rafale deal this fiscal year.
October 2013: Canada. Yves Robins, a senior vice-president for corporate communications at Dassault Aviation, pitched Diane Finley, Canada’s Minister of Public Works and Government Services, during an Aerospace Summit luncheon. Robins urged Canada to run a full competition to replace its CF-18s and played the industrial cooperation card by reminding the minister that Dassault buys engines from Pratt & Whitney Canada for its Falcon business jets, and promising full technology and intellectual property transfer.
Mr. Robins is familiar with the fact Canada so far selected the JSF without a competition, as this came up when he met with the National Defence Committee in Parliament 3 years ago. At the time Robins insisted on the Rafale’s open design which would let it host Canada’s US-made weapons, though he refrained to say how much that would add to the price tag. Montreal Gazette: Aviation execs seek wide open competition for Canada’s fighter jet contract | National Defence Committee on Nov. 4th, 2010.
Sept 19/13: 4th tranche. The French DGA confirms that they’ve received the 1st “4e tranche” Rafale, a twin-sea Rafale-B for the air force. It includes the new RBE2-AA AESA radar, an improved electronic warfare system, and upgraded IFF. All are part of the “Rafale F3R,” but Meteor missile integration won’t happen until 2018.
The DGA also offers a snapshot of deliveries to date: 121 aircraft, including 38 Rafale-Ms, plus 44 Rafale-C and 39 twin-seat Rafale-B fighters for the air force. Source: French DGA.
Sept 13/13: Weapons. Russia’s Tactical Missile Corporation (TRV) told journalists at MAKS 2013 that they’re negotiating with Dassault Aviation for the possible use of their missiles on India’s Rafales. India bought MBDA’s MICA air-to-air missiles for its Mirage 2000s, and Paveway-II guided bombs are already in use by the IAF, but Rafale-compatible weapons don’t otherwise feature prominently in India’s existing stocks.
The ability to use Russian weapons would help the Rafale in some export competitions, but it doesn’t come for free. Unless the TRV/Dassault partnership develops a Universal Weapon Interface for TRV’s products, and probably modifies a number of the missiles themselves, that kind of integration and testing is time-consuming and expensive. How much less expensive than buying new weapons? And what’s the capability/ reliability payoff if India buys French products instead? That’s what negotiations, and Indian business analysts, need to determine. Sources: TRV Products page, via WayBack 2013 | AIN, “Russian Missiles for India’s Rafales?”
June 20/13: India. IANS reports that India’s Minister of State for Defence Jitendra Singh told an audience at the 50th Paris Air Show that the Rafale deal:
“…is not stuck anywhere. It is the biggest deal of its kind in the world and, of course, a very complex one too. They are talking to HAL and the private sector companies in India as well; so it is progressing…”
In his first Le Bourget press conference as Dassault CEO, Eric Trappier had made a similar-sounding statement a week earlier.
June 20/13: Qatar. AFP says that the Middle Eastern Emirate intends to launch its RFP for 24-36 fighters “soon.” They own a fleet of Mirage 2000-5s, which recently flew to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.
French President Hollande will visit Doha for high-level economic talks on June 22, and France has close ties with the Emirate, but the Qataris aren’t waiting around. They reportedly spent time in May 2013 evaluating the Eurofighter Tornado with the RAF, and will soon host a Eurofighter team in-country for flight trials. Boeing also remains in the mix. Agence France Presse.
June 12/13: French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian reminds Dassault that they will need to rely on exports after French orders are done. They can’t be all that surprised, given a minimum delivery of 11 planes per year, and the April 29/13 White Paper’s reduction of the French fleet to 225 planes.
With 180 already ordered and 120 received, orders will stop sometime between 2016-2019, probably in 2017. The problem with these kinds of public reminders is that they make negotiations more difficult for Dassault, and may end up reducing export sales instead of spurring them. On the other hand, there have been reports of frustration in Paris over Dassault’s pricing and flexibility; if true, this kind of public reminder is one way to send a message. L’Usine Nouvelle [in French].
May 16/13: Meteor. The Rafale team continues to work on integrating MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile in time for 2018, which will make the Rafale the last core platform to become operational. It will also be the only platform with a 1-way datalink, as Rafale uses the same transmit-only system for MICA and Meteor.
Saab’s JAS-39 Gripens will be operational by 2014, and Eurofighter GmbH eventually signed a June 2013 contract with a 2017 in-service date. Both fighters will have 2-way datalinks.
Late May will see over-water release trials begin at the Cazaux flight test centre, with 2 tests (high-g, and high angle of attack) scheduled before the end of 2013. The 1st controlled and boosted launch is slated for 2015. France placed an initial order for 200 Meteors in January 2011, and missile production began in June 2012. Flight Global.
April 28/13: Coming cuts. France releases their defense white paper (Livre Blanc) for 2013, which aims to set their force structure to 2025. With respect to the air assets, by 2025 they’re planning for:
“…les forces aériennes comprendront notamment 225 avions de combat (air et marine), ainsi qu’une cinquantaine d’avions de transport tactique, 7 avions de détection et de surveillance aérienne, 12 avions ravitailleurs multirôles, 12 drones de surveillance de théâtre, des avions légers de surveillance et de reconnaissance et 8 systèmes sol-air de moyenne portée.”
Translation: 225 fighters (all Rafale, cut from 234), about 50 tactical transport aircraft (A400Ms and CN-235s), 7 E-3F AWACS planes, 12 A330 MRTT aerial tankers and transports, 12 MALE drones and an unspecified number of light surveillance planes, and 8 SAMP/T long-range air and missile defense batteries. Note that original plans for the Rafale had involved 294 planes. Livre Blanc 2013 [PDF, in French].
March 8/13: Brazil. Brazil has asked the 3 F-X2 finalists to extend their bids for another 6 months from the March 30/13 deadline, as the Brazilian commodity economy remains mired in a 2-year slump. The competitors had hoped for a decision by the time Brazil’s LAAD 2013 expo opened in April.
The length of the cumulative delays could create changes for the bids, and it effectively squashes any faint hopes that the new jets would be able to fly in time for the 2014 World Cup. Reuters.
Feb 25/13: With Rafales flying combat missions again, in Mali, Jane’s reports that France will designate a new round of improved Rafales as “F3R”. They’ll include a major software upgrade that allows the aircraft to take fuller advantage of the new Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, improves their Thales SPECTRA self-defence systems, adds Mode-5/Mode-S capable Identification Friend or Foe, and allows the Rafale to deploy MBDA’s Meteor long range air-to-air missile. IHS Jane’s.
Feb 7/13: India. While a French Rafale-B performs at Aero India 2013, negotiations grind on. India’s defence minister, A K Antony, describes negotiations as a 6-7 layer process, which then has to be sent to the Ministry of Finance. There will be no deal during Aero India, as the contract simply isn’t ready. Antony adds that coming defense budget cuts won’t delay the Rafale deal, but an election looms in 2014.
India’s Financial Express cites anonymous “highly placed sources” who say that remaining friction involves industrial issues. The Dassault team that visited the HAL facility in Nashik were said to have been disappointed by the infrastructure in place, and concerned that HAL will have trouble absorbing the required technology. They’re also reportedly wrestling with India’s insistence on giving HAL ‘lead integrator’ responsibility for decisions about workshare with other companies, while sticking Dassault with overall responsibility for the project. The French are trying to use the RFP as a starting point for discussions, while India insists that the RFP’s terms are the final word. Economic Times | Financial Express.
Jan 28/13: PDL NG The DGA commits a EUR 55 million risk reduction contract for Thales to develop the next-generation PDL NG surveillance and targeting pod, as the successor to the Damocles pod. Another EUR 115 million tranche is expected by year end, and deliveries are expected to take place beginning in about 5 years, from 2018-2022.
The DGA touts this as a boost to the export attractiveness of French fighter jets, which is true. Targeting pods have become such an important ancillary that the Rafale can’t really remain competitive without one that meets modern high-end standards. It’s essentially part of the Fighter’s life-cycle modernization plan. Damocles’ 320 x 240 IR resolution is far behind the 1280 x 1024 arrays in current Sniper SE or LITENING SE pods, and needs improvement. Unlike its European competitors, which use LITENING-III pods from Israel, France is keeping full control over the technology and exportability by designing its own.
The bad news is twofold. One is that the Rafale will receive a pod in 2018 whose doubled-scan 640 x 520 array (effectively 1280 x 1040) is roughly equal to Sniper-SE and LITENING-SE pods being delivered in 2013. High design modularity ensures that both of its competitors will continue to evolve, swapping in better sensors and new technologies by the time PDL-NG appears.
The 2nd bit of bad news is that France’s need to do this themselves results in a final expected cost per targeting pod of EUR 10 million, in order to equip the French Rafale fleet with 45. Exports could help boost PDL-NG production, but first the Rafale must win some foreign orders. India, whose Mirage 2000s are getting life extensions, is an important target for both the Rafale and PDL-NG – and a committed customer for RAFAEL’s LITENING pod across several of their fighter fleets. French DGA | Les Echos | Usine Nouvelle.
PDL-NG pod development
2012
Thales MAESTRO maintenance contract; Preferred in India; Not taking “no” for an answer in Switzerland; Rafale with AESA radar delivered.
Rafale-M
(click to view full)
Oct 30/12: From Damocles to PDL NG. The unofficial site Rafale News quotes the latest issue of Air & Cosmos (N°2305), who says that the Rafale’s future surveillance and targeting pod won’t be an upgraded Damocles pod, whose 320×240 infrared sensor is very small compared to competitors.
Instead, France is reportedly planning to invest EUR 450 million to develop and produce 45 PDL NGs (Pod de Designation Laser Nouvelle Generation), to equip both Rafales and Mirage 200Ds. The new pods will reportedly have a 1280×1024 equivalent IR resolution, by using a 640×560 array plus a micro-scanning technique. Better GPS/INS geolocation will have accuracy that matches the new AASM smart bombs. In terms of its shape and design, PDL NG is expected to offer carrier landing compatibility, and provide a lower radar cross-section.
Oct 4-10/12: Meteor. Rafale B301, operating from Cazaux DGA Flight Test Center in southwestern France, successfully completes 2 successful tests of the Meteor long-range air-to-air missile.
Oct 2/12: Thales and Dassault deliver the 1st production Rafale equipped with the RBE2-AA AESA radar, an air force Rafale C. Aircraft C137′s delivery makes the Rafale the 1st European fighter in service with an AESA radar, though older American designs (F-15 retrofits, F-16 E/F, F/A-18E/F Block II) have had this equipment for several years now. French DGA [in French] | Thales Group | Usine Nouvelle [in French].
1st Rafale with AESA
Sept 27/12: Media are forecasting a signed M-MRCA fighter deal with India before the end of their fiscal year, in April 2013. That’s certainly possible, but India’s history suggests that any such expectation is a very risky bet. Usine Nouvelle [in French].
Sept 20/12: Exocet qualified. The French Navy qualifies the air-launched AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile on its Rafale fighters, using Rafale-M number 27 launched from FS Charles de Gaulle [R 91]. The firing conditions were deemed to be fully representative of an operational mission. MBDA.
AM39 Exocet
Aug 23/12: India. L’Usine Nouvelle say that any India deal will be done as a series of agreements to produce specific items, with the scope growing over time. They also say that over 50% of initial production will remain in France, even after the initial 18 fighters are delivered, until Indian production expands. Beyond the engines, which are very likely to remain in France, the article cites complex electronics, and especially Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, as being difficult to transfer. India’s failure with its Tejas fighter’s multi-mode radar, which was a generation behind AESA, does lend credence to that view.
Meanwhile, highly placed Russian and German sources say that India and Russia are having trouble coming to agreement on technology transfer and price, and say that the M-MRCA competition isn’t closed yet. The Hindu | IBN Live | Times of India | L’Usine Nouvelle [in French].
July 11/12: India. Indian defense minister Antony effectively ends contention over the Rafale’s selection as L1, the lowest evaluated bid. Replying to the Feb 27/12 letter from Rajya Sabha member MV Mysura Reddy:
“The issues raised by you were examined by independent monitors who have concluded that the approach and methodology adopted by the Contract Negotiations Committee (CNC) in the evaluation of the commercial proposals thus far, have been reasonable and appropriate and within the terms of the Request for Proposals (RFR) and Defence Procurement Procedure, 2006.”
India’s history shows that this is a big moment for the M-MRCA program, preventing its derailment and allowing negotiations toward a contract to continue. Hindustan Times.
July 9/12: Sim upgrade. Thales announces that France’s DGA procurement agency has accepted the 1st F3.2 simulator upgrade, to the first 2 cabins at the simulation centre in Saint-Dizier. The Rafale Transformation Squadron in Saint-Dizier has a total of 4 cabins, and the 2 upgraded simulators will faithfully replicate the F3 Rafale’s ability to use AM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, ASMP/A nuclear missiles, the advanced Reco-NG surveillance pod, and the Damocles targeting pod.
The 2 cabins at the Rafale simulation center in Landivisiau will be upgraded to the F3.2 standard in the summer of 2013.
July 7/12: Brazil. The FAB has asked the 3 bidders (Boeing, Dassault & Saab) to renew their F-X2 fighter offers. It’s the 4th consecutive 6-month extension, while Brazil dithers over its choice and the timing of the buy. France24.
July 7/12: Wi-Fi of Doom. Raytheon announces that it has integrated its dual-mode GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II laser/GPS guided smart bombs onto France’s Rafale-M fighters, after successful tests at Bisacrosse. The Marine Nationale had been using the 250 kg weapons for 6 years on their trans-sonic Super Etendard Modernisee naval fighters, and they wanted their supersonic naval Rafales to have the same capability. The challenge was how to do that without spending all the time and money that full weapon integration usually requires.
Enter Raytheon’s WiPAK. The WiPAK kit consists of a small wireless transmitter in the cockpit, a pilot interface, and a small receiver affixed to the Paveway weapon. Raytheon VP Harry Schulte explains that “WiPAK uses wireless connectivity technology similar to what is being used in laptop and tablet computers.” Hopefully, it’s more resistant to jamming. Raytheon describes WiPAK as “a combat proven system, used operationally on counterinsurgency aircraft.”
The tests open the door to competition against Safran’s emerging dual-mode SBU-64 AASM Hammer smart bombs. France’s air force already uses GBU-49s from their Mirage 2000D fighters, so a similar conversion for AdlA Rafale-B/Cs is an obvious opportunity.
July 2/12: Crash. A Rafale-M aboard FS Charles de Gaulle crashes during exercises with the USS Eisenhower’s F/A-18s. The pilot ejected, and American helicopters picked him up and transfer him to the de Gaulle. The cause of the crash is under investigation. US Navy | French MdlD [in French] | Navy Recognition | Usine Nouvelle [in French].
Crash
April 20/12: Refit. The DGA’s Christophe Carpentier discusses some of the complexities involved in the 10-plane Rafale-M refit, which is upgrading these F1 aircraft to an F3 standard that will add precision ground attack, reconnaissance, and even nuclear warhead delivery to their capabilities. The biggest challenge is that the upgrades take place on the Rafale production line, so careful scheduling is essential to avoid disrupting new-plane production. French MdlD [in French]. See also Nov 30/09 entry.
March 30/12: 1st RBE2-AA. Thales announces that they have delivered the 1st RBE2-AA AESA radar to the Dassault Aviation production line in Merignac, France. The radar will now be installed on Rafale C137, which is scheduled for delivery to the French defence procurement agency (DGA) in summer 2012.
A comprehensive 3-month flight test program conducted at the Istres air base has already been held to demo