Boeing Delta IV Heavy
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The EELV program was designed to reduce the cost of government space launches through greater contractor competition, and modifiable rocket families whose system requirements emphasized simplicity, commonality, standardization, new applications of existing technology, streamlined manufacturing capabilities, and more efficient launch-site processing. Result: the Delta IV (Boeing) and Atlas V (Lockheed Martin) heavy rockets.
Paradoxically, that very program may have forced the October 2006 merger of Boeing & Lockheed Martin’s rocket divisions. Crosslink Magazine’s Winter 2004 article “EELV: The Next Stage of Space Launch” offers an excellent briefing that covers EELV’s program innovations and results, while a detailed National Taxpayer’s Union letter to Congress takes a much less positive view. This DID Spotlight article looks at the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, emerging challengers like SpaceX and the new competition framework, and the US government contracts placed since the merger that formed the United Launch Alliance.
The EELV System
When comparing launch vehicles, note that Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) between 1,240 – 22,240 miles above the Earth’s surface is preferred for high-end satellites. It’s much easier to lift objects into Low Earth-orbit (LEO), up to 1,240 miles above the Earth’s surface. On the other hand, your payload’s coverage will suffer, and its lifespan might as well.
A quick primer on reading EELV configurations is in order. “AF” is the US Air Force, while “NRO” is the USA’s National Reconnaissance Office. The numbers after the rocket type represent its payload cover (fairing) diameter, and the number of boosters attached to the core rocket.
For example, in the Atlas models, 501 means a 5m diameter fairing, 0 boosters, and everything always ends with a 1. If we strapped on 4 boosters, it would become an Atlas V 541.
For Boeing’s Delta rockets, the attributes are broken out more clearly: (4,2) means a 4m diameter fairing and 2 boosters. If we switched to a 5m fairing instead, it would become a Delta IV 5,2.
Delta IV
Delta rocket family
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The Delta IV’s history dates back to the late 1950s when the US government, responding to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, contracted for development of the Delta rocket. The first successful Delta launch was NASA’s Echo 1A satellite on Aug 12/60.
Over the years the Delta family of rockets has become larger, more advanced, and capable of carrying heavier satellites into orbit. Design changes included larger first-stage tanks, addition of strap-on solid rocket boosters, increased propellant capacity, an improved main engine, adoption of advanced electronics and guidance systems, and development of upper stage and satellite payload systems.
Following a 1989 contract from the US Air Force for 20 launch vehicles, the newer, more powerful Delta II version emerged. Then, in response to market needs for a larger rocket to launch commercial satellites, Delta III began development in 1995. Its first launch occurred in 1998 and its final launch in 2000, paving the way for the Delta IV.
The Delta IV offers customization options by adding booster rockets, including a Delta IV Heavy that uses 2 additional Common Booster Cores. The Delta IV Heavy has the highest payload rating to Geostationary Transfer Orbit of any American rocket, and also beats the Ariane 5 ECA. It’s expected to stay on top even after SpaceX launches its Falcon Heavy, though the Falcon Heavy will offer greater capacity to Low Earth Orbits.
Delta IV medium-to-heavy launch vehicles became operational in 2002. The first Delta IV launch, of Eutelsat’s W5 commercial satellite, took place on Nov 20/02. The first payload delivered for the EELV program was the DSCS A3 satellite, on March 10/03.
Atlas V
Atlas family
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Developed in the late 1950s as the USA’s first operational intercontinental ballistic missile, the Atlas launch vehicle went on to become the first commercial ride to space.
The 1990s opened a new chapter in Atlas history with the first commercial satellite launch. The growing demand for satellite entertainment presented new opportunities in the launch business. The Atlas I was developed to serve these needs and to continue the evolution of the Atlas vehicle.
Launched on Dec 7/91 with a Eutelsat satellite on-board, the first Atlas II ushered in a family of Atlas vehicles that would go on to launch many commercial payloads. The Atlas II family of launch vehicles was retired in 2004.
Developed as an evolutionary bridge, the Atlas III launch vehicle, like the I and II before it, debuted by delivering a commercial payload to orbit. First launched on May 24/00, the Atlas III family was retired in 2005. There was no Atlas IV.
The Atlas V launch vehicle comes in 400 and 500 series variants, and made its debut on Aug 21/02. Like the Delta IV, each rocket can be customized by adding boosters, in order to launch heavier payloads. Atlas V can also rise to 2 Centaur second-stage engines, in the XX2 configuration.
The Atlas V has been used to launch several NASA missions, and a July 2011 agreement with NASA began the process of certifying the design for manned missions as well. ULA partnered with Blue Origin, Boeing, and Sierra Nevada Corp. for NASA’s Commercial Crew program.
Military Satellite Payloads
AEHF concept
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A rocket’s key specifications involve how much it can lift to various orbits, and the US military pushed for the EELV program in part to expand that range. There’s controversy over the military’s success in meeting other goals, but lift and range have clearly improved.
EELV rockets are currently being used to launch satellites for a number of the major military satellite programs, including:
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communication satellites that will support twice as many tactical networks, while providing 10-12 times the capacity and 6 times higher data rate transfer than that of the current Milstar II satellites.
Wideband Global SATCOM satellites that will support the USA’s warfighting bandwidth requirements, supporting tactical C4ISR, battle management, and combat support needs.
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellites that will provide a key component of the USA’s future missile alert system, designed to give maximum warning and monitoring of ballistic missile launches anywhere in the world.
GPS IIF navigation satellites that are an upgrade of the original GPS, which is a worldwide timing and navigation system that utilizes a constellation of satellites positioned in orbit approximately 12,000 miles above the Earth’s surface. GPS-III will also launch using EELV rockets, instead of the Delta IIs.
EELV Budgets & Structure
Competition Again? The New “Open” Launch Framework
SpaceX Falcon
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Emerging competition from privately developed solutions like SpaceX’s Falcon-9 will give NASA and the US military additional options for all kinds of medium-heavy launch projects. EELV itself may even provide competition for NASA. The Delta IV has been considered as an alternative for a manned return to the moon, and a NASA-sponsored report concluded that using a modified Delta IV capable of human spaceflight could save billions of dollars, in place of NASA’s developmental Ares rocket. It would also provide a quickly-fielded solution to the expected gap in US space lift capabilities, now that the Space Shuttle program has ended.
As of July 2012, NASA and the Pentagon intend to pursue separate rocket buys, within a common framework. That framework is a huge departure from past practice, with big long-term implications for EELV.
In October 2011, NASA, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the US Air Force announced a game-changing development: “certification of commercial providers of launch vehicles used for national security space and civil space missions.” In English: the market for national security launches just opened up beyond EELV, which will have to compete in some segments. That simple change incorporates 4 payload types (A-D), and 3 risk categories (1-3), where 3 is lowest risk. It’s both more, and less, than it seems.
For high-value “Class A, failure is not an option” long-lived national security satellites, whose added presence has a high marginal value to the existing constellation, EELV’s “Category 3″ low-risk certified rockets will remain the only option. Barring a huge national emergency and Presidential orders, A1 or A2 combinations are impossible. At the other extreme, “Class D” payloads could fly on anything, even “Category 1″ launch vehicles classified as high risk or unproven.
Once a new entrant demonstrates a successful launch of an EELV class medium-heavy launch system, the Air Force awards integration studies, and they can begin working toward EELV certification of specified systems and configurations. If no competitor has a certification rating that matches a competed launch, ULA gets a sole-source contract as a pre-priced option.
This framework will help NASA most, but each category now has a specific number of successful launches needed for eligibility, as well as a known set of technical, safety and test data needed to verify that record. Technically, competition exists now. In reality, it will take a while.
On the other hand, the new framework’s flexibility means that every successful launch by a non-EELV platform brings it closer to a new category, which will grant access to a forecastable set of new opportunities. That makes the investment payoff clear, and should spur a long-term sea change toward a number of qualified providers for many of the US government’s launch contracts. The big and obvious potential winner here in SpaceX (vid. May 23/11), whose Falcon 9 is poised to compete in the EELV’s segments once the certification peperwork is done on its 3 qualifying launches. Orbital’s Minotaur family may also benefit at some point.
Going Forward: Block Buys in a Broader EELV Program
Delta IV, waiting
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The US military made an EELV multi-year block buy of some kind part of its procurement strategy in November 2011, as an attempt to improve a shaky industrial base and drive costs down. Boeing and Lockheed Martin saw this as their opportunity to push a multi-year deal for 40 ULA rockets and launches from FY 2013 – 2017 inclusive. That would make it much more difficult for other private firms to secure launch orders, regardless of the certification framework, while EELV annual orders nearly doubled to over $2 billion per year.
Their lobbying ended up securing a 35-core block buy from FY 2013 – 2017, but their prices kept rising, and the contract’s exact terms are murky. Note, however, that cores =/= launches. The Pentagon’s FY14 plan involved 29 total launches from FY 2013 – 2017, vs. 45 booster cores. EELV launch services are usually ordered at least 24 months before a planned mission launch, so this multi-year buy actually covers US government missions into FY 2019.
FY 2015 – 2017 was supposed to see the beginnings of competition, with 14 “cores” (about 28%) supposedly open to competition, but there are reports of restrictions in the block buy agreement that essentially remove competition before 2018. Those allegations are now the foundation of a court case involving SpaceX and the USAF.
As of March 2014, SpaceX has completed the required number of successful Falcon 9 certification missions to begin competing for some national security launches. What they don’t have yet is certification, as government employees go over every aspect of their business. The USAF is working hard on this, but SpaceX’s Silicon Valley propensity to keep innovating adds to the challenge of certifying their configurations, even as it helps improve their costs and performance. Their entire approach is a major culture clash with the standard model for space access, explaining SpaceX’s 66%+ cost advantage and better pace of innovation, as well as their solid-but-not bulletproof reliability record. The long-term bet in this race is obvious. In the short-term, it’s a tougher call.
A March 2014 GAO report explained the USAF’s options, which became even more complex after Russia invaded Crimea, and the Atlas V’s dependence on Russian RD-180 engines became a glaring problem:
Contracts & Key Events
AEHF-2 launch
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Military satellite launches will be covered in their respective satellite type’s articles. This section will generally be reserved for contracts, but significant military-related launches that are not covered elsewhere on DID may receive a pointer here. We’ll also cover EELV rocket-related issues that delay launches, but not external delays stemming from weather issues, ground equipment, etc.
FY 2014
FY 2014 base and production contracts to ULA; GAO repport looks at USAF options; SAR report shows program costs down, but still $67.6 Bn; USAF reduces the number of competed launches; SpaceX meets cert. requirements, claims 75% savings are possible, launches lawsuit to force competition; Friction with Russia makes access to Atlas V’s RD-180 engines an issue.
Launch, Deliver… Compete?
June 3-5/14: New engine? Aviation Week quotes Gencorp President & CEO Scott Seymour, who says that their Aerojet Rocketdyne subsidiary has spent roughly $300 million working on technologies that will feed into a new AR-1 liquid oxygen/ kerosene booster engine with 500,000+ pounds of thrust, to replace Russia’s RD-180. Hoped-for costs would be about $25 million per pair. He also estimated that finishing development would take about 4 years and cost $800 million – $1 billion.
Gencorp hopes to recoup their investment by getting government funding for the remaining development work, and by fostering AR-1 use on multiple platforms. Their targets include the ULA’s Atlas V, Orbital’s Antares, “and, possibly, Space Exploration Technology’s Falcon 9 v1.1.” SpaceX uses a vertical integration philosophy, so they’d be a very tough sell. On the other hand, the Merlin engines used by SpaceX aren’t seen as an ideal solution for boosts to geosynchronous transfer orbit, and they don’t provide a high-energy upper stage. SpaceX has managed GTO launches, and they will need to prove the doubters wrong re: capacity at higher orbits with the forthcoming Falcon Heavy, which requires 27 of their Merlin 1D engines.
Meanwhile, if the government wants a new engine, why not compete the development phase? Sources: Aviation Week, “Aerojet Rocketdyne Targets $25 Million Per Pair For AR-1 Engines” | Lexington Institute, “Aerojet Rocketdyne Lays Down Challenge To Russian Rocket Engine Monopoly”.
June 2/14: ULA’s argument. The Lexington Institute, which counts Boeing and Lockheed Martin as funders, makes the case for the ULA block buy. Loren Thompson elides the issue of the latest block-buy agreement removing announced competition, which is a huge hole in his argument, but it isn’t one he can address without inside information. Beyond that, he does make some valid points:
“The Air Force says it has dedicated $60 million and 100 personnel to getting all the steps accomplished expeditiously…. [EELV hasn't] had an unsuccessful mission in 70 attempts, whereas SpaceX has seen several failures in less than a dozen launches. During the Obama Administration, the launch alliance has met its schedule objectives for when launches occur 87% of the time, while the corresponding figure for SpaceX is 29%…. the Falcon 9 rockets that SpaceX currently uses as its main launch vehicle are severely limited in terms of what kinds of payloads they can loft into which orbits….[and are] also hobbled by the lack of a high-energy upper stage…. According to [HASC Chair Mike] Rogers, various SpaceX missions have delivered a satellite into a suboptimal orbit, experienced multiple spacecraft thruster failures, or failed to successfully achieve a planned second-stage relight…. SpaceX has sought to correct all of the glitches it encountered….. [but] when a company keeps altering the configuration of its launch vehicles… it becomes unclear as to precisely what is being certified.”
Sources: Forbes Magazine, “SpaceX Versus The Air Force: The Other Side Of The Story”.
May 23/14: New engine? The Senate Armed Services Committee inserts an initial $100 million in funding into the FY 2015 defense bill, in order to begin developing an American rocket engine that can replace the oxygen-rich, staged combustion performance of the Russian RD-180. Sources: Gizmodo, “A Senate Panel Just Set Aside $100 Million To Build a Putin-Free Rocket” | Phys Org, “US Senate panel budgets $100 mn for non-Russian rocket”.
May 21/14: Mitchell Report. SpaceNews obtains a summary of the Aerospace Corp. report authored by USAF Maj. Gen. Mitch Mitchell (ret.), and describes scenarios ranging from 9 missions/ 2 years avg. delay/ $2.5 billion cost to 31 missions/ 3.5 years avg./ $5 billion:
“…a bleak outlook for the American launch landscape without the RD-180 engine…. losing the RD-180… would delay as many as 31 missions, costing the United States as much as $5 billion…. The report says 38 Atlas 5 missions are on the manifest, but United Launch Alliance and RD-Amross have only 16 RD-180 engines on hand. That number is expected to shrink to 15 on May 22 with the launch of a National Reconnaissance mission.”
Sources: Space News, “Losing Access to RD-180 Engine Would Prove Costly, Pentagon Panel Warns”.
May 13/14: Russian block? Russian Deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin unleases his Twitter diplomatic notes of Doom (SM) once more:
“Russia is ready to continue deliveries of RD-180 engines to the US only under the guarantee that they won’t be used in the interests of the Pentagon.”
That choice of words rules out fears that Russia would stop delivering US astronauts to the International Space Station, but a subsequent tweet says that will also end after the agreement expires in 2020. A release from ULA says this is all SpaceX’s fault, adding that a 2-year inventory of RD-180 engines (see also May 21/14 entry) should help cushion the blow:
“United Launch Alliance (ULA) and our NPO Energomash supplier in Russia are not aware of any restrictions…. We are hopeful that our two nations will engage in productive conversations over the coming months that will resolve the matter quickly…. [but we] have always prepared contingency plans in the event of a supply disruption…. We also maintain a two-year inventory of engines to enable a smooth transition to our other rocket, Delta, which has all U.S.-produced rocket engines.”
Sources: Twitter @DRogozin, re: RD-180s and re: ISS | ULA, “ULA Statement Regarding Reports of Russian Engine Restrictions” | Washington Post, “Feud between SpaceX and ULA over space contract grows more intense”.
April 25-29/14: SpaceX sues. SpaceX files a formal legal challenge to the USAF’s long-term, sole-source, 36-core EELV contract with ULA (q.v. Dec 16/13). Their release says that EELV is 58.4% above initially estimated costs on each launch, and estimate cost savings of 75% from each SpaceX launch. More to the point, however, the allege that the block-buy deal, which has not been made public, contained clauses that negated the government’s promise of open competition before 2018:
“The contract with ULA was negotiated and executed outside of public view and has never been made public…. What SpaceX did learn, the day after the March 5th Senate hearing on EELV competition, was that the 14 missions the Air Force had said it would compete had been cut to at most 7 (and potentially a few as 1), and that this reduction was required for the Air Force to comply with previously unknown requirements contained in the block buy contract….. Clearly the block buy contract is in direct opposition with the very notion of competition. It maintains the ULA monopoly until at least 2018, perhaps well beyond. And it will needlessly cost taxpayers billions of dollars…. To be clear, SpaceX is not seeking to be awarded any launch contracts. We are simply seeking the opportunity to compete—and not just for SpaceX, but for any qualified company. If we compete and we lose, that’s ok too.”
The SpaceX releases also cite The Atlas V’s Russian RD-180 engine, produced by state-owned NPO Energomash, which is overseen by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of defense industry Dmitry Rogozin. Rogozin is best known to the world as the guy who mocks other world leaders on Twitter when they criticize his government, and he had personal sanctions placed on him by the US government in March 2014. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Announces Court Action To Open Air Force Space Launch Missions To Competition” and “EELV: The Right to Compete” | Washington Post’s The Switch, “Why Elon Musk is throwing his biggest potential customer under the bus”.
SpaceX sues for competition
April 25/14: Politics. Concurrent with the lawsuit filed by SpaceX, Sen. McCain [R-AZ] is taking actions of his own:
“The first letter is to Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James requesting additional information about her recent testimony regarding the EELV program before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 10, 2014, and conveying concern about the apparently incomplete and incorrect nature [DID: emphasis ours] of some of that testimony. The second letter is to the Department of Defense Inspector General Jon T. Rymer requesting that his office investigate recent developments regarding the EELV program.”
Sources: Sen. McCain’s office, “Senator Mccain Seeks Information On Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (Eelv) Program”.
April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. The EELV is mentioned, due to significant cost changes:
“Program costs decreased $3,062.7 million (-4.3%) from $70,685.1 million to $67,622.4 million, due primarily to savings realized in the negotiation and award of the new 2013-2017 Phase 1 contract (-$3,770.7 million), revised cost assumptions based on the negotiated contract (-$1,511.5 million), and net decreases from a change in launch vehicle configuration requirements (-$411.3 million). These decreases were partially offset by a quantity increase of 11 launch services from 151 to 162 (+$2,505.0 million).
With that said, it’s worth asking just how much can be saved by opening the process fully to competition (q.v. March 5/14). SpaceX hasn’t been formally certified yet, and it will be interesting to see what changes once that happens.
Cost Reduction
March 12/14: GAO Report. GAO releases GAO-14-382T, “Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs.” Regarding EELV:
“In December 2013, DOD signed a contract modification with ULA to purchase 35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-year period, 2013- 2017, and the associated capability to launch them. According to the Air Force, this contracting strategy saved $4.4 billion over the predicted program cost in the fiscal year 2012 budget [DID: but see March 5/14 entry].
….DOD expects to issue a draft request for proposal for the first of the competitive missions, where the method for evaluating and comparing proposals will be explained, in the spring of 2014…. The planned competition for launch services may have helped DOD negotiate the lower prices it achieved in its December 2013 contract modification, and DOD could see further savings if a robust domestic launch market materializes. DOD noted in its 2014 President’s Budget submission for EELV that after the current contract with ULA has ended, it plans to have a full and open competition for national security space launches. Cost savings on launches, as long as they do not come with a reduction in mission successes, would greatly benefit DOD, and allow the department to put funding previously needed for launches into programs in the development phases to ensure they are adequately resourced.”
March 4-11/14: FY15 Budget. The US military slowly files its budget documents, detailing planned spending from FY 2014 – 2019. In the EELV’s detailed budget briefings, which are split between ELC launch capability and ELV launch vehicles, the USAF has this to say about ongoing competition:
“The number of competitive launch opportunities from FY15-17 changed from 14 to 7 due to launch manifest changes. If competition is not viable at the time of need, missions will be awarded to the incumbent. The Air Force plans to compete all launch service procurements beginning in FY18, if there is more than one certified provider.”
March 5/14: Politics. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk gives testimony to the Senate Committee on Appropriations’ Defense Subcommittee. His basic message is that once competition is possible, every launch should be competed on a firm fixed-price basis, and ULA’s $1 billion per year subsidy should be removed. His firm isn’t certified for national security launches yet, but he hopes that a very involved and intrusive process involving over 300 government officials will be done by year-end. Key excerpts:
“I commend the United Launch Alliance (ULA) on its launch successes to date. However, year after year, ULA has increased its prices…. In FY13 the Air Force paid on average in excess of $380 million for each national security launch, while subsidizing ULA’s fixed costs to the tune of more than $1 billion per year…. By contrast, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 price for an EELV mission is well under $100M… and SpaceX seeks no subsidies…. had SpaceX been awarded the missions ULA received under its recent non-competed 36 core block buy, we would have saved the taxpayer $11.6 billion…. now we have serious concerns that it may not be the case that 5 missions [planned outside the block buy] will be openly competed [in FY15]…. To be clear, every mission capable of being launched by qualified new entrants should be competed this year and every year moving forward…. Consistent with federal procurement regulations and DOD acquisition directives, when a competitive environment exists, the Government should utilize firm, fixed-price, FAR Part 12 contracts that properly incent contractors to deliver on-time and on-budget. That also means eliminating $1 billion subsidies to the incumbent, as those subsidies create an extremely unequal playing field.”
Air Force data that wasn’t public until the GAO’s report yesterday (q.v. March 4/14) show $2.247 billion in FY13 funding for 11 launches from all EELV customers, which works out to $204 million per launch. The comparison may not be exact – either way, ULA’s problem is that they’re unlikely to be able to compete with SpaceX on a level playing field, now that SpaceX has refined rockets whose significantly lower costs are a product of hardware research & design. The GAO has explained (q.v. March 4/14) why pure fixed-price competition is best for SpaceX, but the implications go farther. ULA’s problem isn’t just competitive, it’s existential. Firm-fixed price competition for every launch, under a structure that eliminated byzantine cost-reporting systems, could turn ULA into a sharply-downsized bit player very quickly.
To survive, ULA has 3 options: (1) Hope that lobbying funds can deliver them contracts by skewing competitive structures, and limiting competition, regardless of costs to the government, even as military budgets shrink; (2) Deliver new designs with different cost points, soon, thanks to major, fast-moving and wide-ranging internal design efforts that are already underway; (3) Hope that future accidents force SpaceX into a lesser launch status, and force Falcon redesigns with higher costs. Just to make things really interesting, and highlight the need for #2, Musk’s testimony makes a pointed reference to the Atlas V’s Russian engine:
“Our Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launch vehicles are truly made in America…. the United Launch Alliance’s most frequently flown vehicle, the Atlas V, which uses a Russian main engine and where approximately half the airframe is manufactured overseas. In light of Russia’s de facto annexation of the Ukraine’s Crimea region and the formal severing of military ties, the Atlas V cannot possibly be described as providing “assured access to space” for our nation when supply of the main engine depends on President Putin’s permission. Given this development, it would seem prudent to reconsider whether the 36 core uncompeted, sole source award to ULA is truly in the best interests of the people of the United States.”
Competition options
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March 4/14: GAO Report. The GAO releases GAO-14-377R, “The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement”. The period from 2002 – 2013 has seen a total of $18.974 billion spent on 55 military and government launches, and the GAO places the total for EELV-type space launches to 2030 at an astonishing $70 billion. They also look at potential competition structures, which is a critical question. There are outside indications that the federal government could save up to half of its costs, as well as risks that the wrong acquisition policy could entrench existing or new monopolies. What’s the right thing to do? The GAO’s competition structure chart is reproduced here.
The GAO also covers significant changes in the EELV contract structure. Projected escalations in EELV costs were so high that they forced a new acquisition strategy in 2011, and the Pentagon & NRO’s homework included both intrusive and detailed pricing data for ULA rocket components, and scrutiny of the government’s own launch processes. A June 2013 contract for 35 cores was finalized in December 2013, leveraging insights gained to improve government bargaining, combining the 2 previous launch & infrastructure contracts into 1 framework (but 2 budget lines), and creating a touted $4.4 billion in relative savings, according to the USAF. Even so, nailing down exact costs per launch remains tricky, because about 75% of cost-reimbursement items still aren’t broken out per launch. Other key excerpts:
“…DOD officials say the administrative burden of renegotiating every year will be substantially lessened due to the new contract’s simplified structure…. ULA periodically sells launch services to customers outside of the EELV program, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and to commercial customers. Because DOD pays for ULA’s fixed costs, DOD receives compensation… on a per-launch basis for launches ULA sells to non-DOD customers. Prior to the December 2013 contract modification, compensation amounts were loosely based on an average of 30 days of launch pad use… DOD was reimbursed through price reductions on ULA invoices submitted to DOD at the end of the fiscal year. Under the new contract, compensation is based on some actual costs, including factory support and direct labor hours, and is approximately three times the dollar amount per-launch of reimbursements under previous contracts.”
As for the new competition regime, which is expected to start in FY15, it’s worth noting that some of the questions involve the byzantine reporting systems demanded by cost-reimbursement approaches. ULA had to install them, raising their costs and lowering corporate flexibility. SpaceX hasn’t, and a firm-fixed price per launch cost wouldn’t force them to. The US government may move to systems that would force such systems on SpaceX, despite firm-fixed costs half as much as ULA’s. Cost alone won’t be the decider, either:
“DOD officials told us they intend to use a best value approach in evaluating proposals from all competitors… may also consider mission risk, taking past performance into account, and satellite vehicle integration risks…. DOD is currently developing its methodology for comparing launch proposals, including establishing how proposals are to be structured, and what the specific evaluation criteria will be…. “
Jan 6/14: SpaceX. SpaceX launches the THAICOM 6 satellite from Cape Canaveral’s Space Launch Complex 40. It’s a successful launch that reaches a targeted 295 x 90,000 km geosynchronous transfer orbit at 22.5 degrees inclination.
More to the point, it’s the 3rd of 3 required certification flights for EELV qualification. Looks like there’s going to be a new competitor in town. Until then, the company says that “SpaceX has nearly 50 launches on manifest, of which over 60% are for commercial customers.” In case anyone was still wondering, ULA and Airbus Defence & Space have a serious competitor on their hands. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Successfully Launches Thaicom 6 Satellite To Geostationary Transfer Orbit”.
Dec 16/13: FY14 Production. United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $530.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, which finalizes the multi-year FY 2014 – 2017 contract, and sets the FY14 buy (q.v. June 16/13, Oct 18/13). Which may explain why $679 million in FY14 funds is committed immediately. Recall that the FY 2014 budget (q.v. April 10/13) begins a split between EELV Launch Capability (ELC) and Launch Services (ELS). This is the ELC award. Orders for FY 2015-2019 will have to be exercised separately.
ULA will produce the following configurations: Air Force Atlas V 501, Air Force Atlas V 511, Air Force Delta IV 4,2, Air Force Delta IV 5,4, and a National Reconnaissance Organization Delta IV Heavy.
Work will be performed at Centennial, CO; Vandenberg AFB, CA; and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL, and is expected to be complete by Q2 2018. The USAF’s Launch Systems Directorate at the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PZ0001).
ULA Rockets bought
Dec 3/13: SpaceX. SpaceX successfully launches a civil SES satellite into geostationary transfer orbit. SES-8 is the Falcon 9′s 1st GTO launch, the 1st commercial flight from Cape Canaveral in over 4 years… and the 2nd of 3 certification flights needed to certify the Falcon 9 to fly EELV national security missions. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Successfully Completes First Mission to Geostationary Transfer Orbit”.
SpaceX SES-8 to GTO
Oct 18/13: FY 2014 ELC. United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $939.1 million sole-source contract modification covering FY 2014 support work, including integration of the space vehicle with the launch vehicle mission assurance, program management, systems engineering, launch site and range operations, and maintaining the launch infrastructure. The contract’s structure is cost-plus-incentive-fee, with cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract line items.
$294.3 million is committed immediately. Recall that the FY 2014 budget (q.v. April 10/13) begins a split between EELV Launch Capability (ELC) and Launch Services (ELS).
Work will be performed at Littleton, CO, Vandenberg AFB, CA, and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL and will run until fiscal year end on Sept 30/14. The USAF Launch Systems Directorate at the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003, PO 0002).
FY 2014 ULA base (ELC) award
FY 2013
Major program changes: Multi-year block buy is a huge windfall to ULA, but opens 28% of EELV to competitors; SpaceX begins Falcon 9 certification process.
Falcon Heavy
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June 26/13: United Launch Services LLC in Littleton, CO receives a maximum $1.088 billion sole-source letter contract for “production services in support of” 7 launch rockets: AF Atlas V 401; AF Atlas V 501; AF Delta IV 4,2; AF Delta IV 5,4; NRO Atlas 401; NRO Atlas 541; and a NRO Delta IV 5,2. $525 million in FY13 funds is committed immediately.
A quick primer on reading these configurations is in order. “AF” is the US Air Force, while “NRO” is the USA’s National Reconnaissance Office. The numbers after the rocket type represent its payload cover (fairing) diameter, and the number of boosters attached to the core rocket. In the Atlas models, 501 means a 5m fairing, 0 boosters, and everything ends with a 1. If we strapped on 4 boosters, it would become an Atlas V 541. For Boeing’s Delta rockets, the attributes are broken out more clearly: (4,2) means a 4m fairing and 2 boosters. When we use a 5m fairing instead, it becomes a Delta IV 5,2.
Work will be performed at Centennial, CO, and is expected to be complete by 2015. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center’s Launch Systems Directorate at Los Angeles AFB, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0003).
ULA Rockets bought
June 11/13: SpaceX. The USAF’s Space and Missile Systems Center signs a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with SpaceX, to begin certifying Falcon 9 v1.1 for National Security Space (NSS) missions according to the New Entrant Certification Guide (NECG).
The NECG process will monitor at least 3 certification flights, after looking at the Falcon 9 v1.1′s flight history, vehicle design, reliability, process maturity, safety systems, manufacturing and operations, systems engineering, risk management and launch facilities. The CRADA will be in effect until all certification activities are complete, and the USAF has made a decision. USAF SMC.
May 24/13: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/12 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF] describes and costs out the major shifts underway (vid. April 10/13):
“Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) – Program costs increased $35,717.0 million (+102.1%) from $34,968.1 million to $70,685.1 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 60 launch services from 91 to 151 launch services (+$16,040.5 million) resulting from an extension of the launch manifest from FY 2018 to FY 2028 and the program life extension from FY 2020 to FY 2030 that was directed in Space Command’s Strategic Master Plan (+$20,987.5 million). These increases incorporate cost saving methodologies implemented in the revised contracting strategy, to include incentivizing the contractor, enabling the government to implement cost cutting initiatives during technical evaluations and contract negotiations, improving insight into the contractors’ costs, and enforcing better cost management. These increases were partially offset by cost savings realized in the FY 2014 President’s Budget Future Years Defense Program due to a revised acquisition strategy and other initiatives (-$1,671.6 million).”
SAR – big program changes
April 10/13: FY14 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.
This budget describes major changes in the EELV program, whose components have been moving into place for a couple of years now. These changes include the use of the Open Launch Framework to compete almost 30% of planned launched through FY 2017, as described above. In addition, beginning with the FY 2015 budget submission, EELV Launch Services (ELS) and EELV Launch Capability (ELC) support will become separate budget lines.
Major shifts for EELV
Dec 5/12: SpaceX. SpaceX announces that USAF Space and Missile Systems Center has awarded them 2 “EELV-class” missions. DSCOVR (Deep Space Climate Observatory) is slated for launch by a Falcon 9 in late 2014, while STP-2 (Space Test Program 2) would be launched aboard a Falcon Heavy in mid-2015. The Falcon Heavy launch is significant, as the rocket hasn’t flown yet, but SpaceX also says that “the awards mark the first EELV-class missions awarded to the company to date.”
Both missions fall under Orbital/Suborbital Program-3 (OSP-3), and aren’t directly part of EELV. OSP-3 is its own contract for small and medium-class military payloads. Orbital Science’s Minotaur rockets had been the staples for those missions, but they’re going to have more competition now. OSP-3 is also partly designed to provide new entrants an opportunity to demonstrate their vehicle capabilities, as part of the path to EELV certification. These 2 SpaceX missions are expected to launch from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL. Sources: SpaceX, “SpaceX Awarded Two EELV-Class Missions From The United States Air Force” | Aerospace Blog, “SpaceX Bests Orbital Sciences In First OSP-3 Duels”.
FY 2012
Certification framework opens EELV to competition; Launch contracts; Boeing sues for pre-ULA costs; NASA’s CCiCap a boost to ULA and competitors.
Dream Chaser & Atlas V
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Sept 28/12: FY 2013. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $1.168 billion cost plus incentive fee and cost plus fixed fee contract for 4 Delta IV and Atlas V launches.
Work will be performed in Littleton, CO, and the contract will run through FY 2013 to Sept 30/13. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-13-C-0001).
Aug 3/12: NASA CCiCap. NASA issues about $1 billion in contracts under its Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) program. These “space taxis” will rely on heavy-lift rockets to make it into space, and 2 of the 3 winning entries have picked Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V, which was the subject of a ULA-NASA agreement in July 2011. That’s good news for the Atlas industrial base, and for the Pentagon. Seven firms entered, and the 3 winners are:
Boeing in Houston, TX – $460 million for their CST-1000 capsule, which will launch using Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V.
Sierra Nevada Corporation in Louisville, CO – $212.5 million for their Dream Chaser space plane, an evolution of a NASA’s former HL-20 test vehicle that’s boosted into orbit on an Atlas V.
SpaceX in Hawthorne, CA – $440 million for a manned version of the Dragon capsule that recently docked at the International Space Station. They will continue to use their own Falcon 9 booster. Read “NASA’s CCiCap: Can Space Taxis Help the Pentagon?” for full coverage.
NASA CCiCap
July 26/12: GAO report & EELV plans. The US GAO releases “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy.” The Pentagon plans to spend about $19 billion on launch services from FY 2013-2017, and $35 billion through 2030.
The question is how that will be divided up, and the Pentagon hasn’t made a decision about the length or amount of any block buy. They’re trying to get a very clear picture of EELV costs, down to the sub-component level, and won’t decide until they have that. Meanwhile, they plan a FY 2013 EELV bridge buy. The ULA will present its certified block buy pricing proposal later this summer, with price proposals for its Atlas V and Delta IV booster cores to cover different launch quantities across several contract lengths. The Defense Contract Audit Agency will be involved in reviewing contractor and subcontractor proposals and cost or pricing data.
The idea of joint NASA/Pentagon EELV buys is out the window, as DOD and NASA plan to continue to acquire launch vehicles on separate contracts. The GAO thinks the US government isn’t getting as much benefit or leverage as it could, and launch technology R&D is also a concern. Existing R&D programs are receiving minimal funding. Less than $8 million of the roughly $1.7 billion in the FY 2013 EELV budget is R&D, for instance, with no R&D funding budgeted after 2014. This naturally leads to the question of other launch providers, who are working with NASA already and developing new technologies. This excerpt makes it seem like an afterthought, rather than an avidly pursued solution, but time will tell:
“Another assessment that will take place prior to EELV contract award is an evaluation of the potential production capability and technology development status of a new launch provider, and potential competitor of ULA. DOD has authorized an assessment of a launch vehicle provider who may in the future be certified by the Air Force to compete with ULA for EELV-class missions. The assessment is being conducted by retired Air Force personnel with launch expertise. The results of this assessment are expected to be finalized by the end of the fiscal year.”
July 20/12: Atlas V & NASA. The United Launch Alliance has completed a review of its Atlas V rocket to assess its suitability for NASA human spaceflight, under the Commercial Crew Development Round 2 (CCDev2) agreement with NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP). NASA provided technical consultation during the ULA’s System Requirements/Design (SRR/ SDR) reviews. This is a follow-on to the July 2011 co-operation agreement between ULA and NASA.
Atlas V was picked because it had already launched numerous satellites and robotic missions into space for NASA, including the Mars Science Laboratory Curiosity rover and the Juno probe to Jupiter. That gives it a strong baseline that it doesn’t need to test, but human spaceflight is a step beyond that. ULA has partnered to launch Boeing’s CST-100 capsule, Sierra Nevada’s Dream Chaser spaceplane, and Blue Origin’s Space Vehicle on missions to low Earth orbit and the International Space Station. NASA | ULA.
July 20/12: We Sue. Boeing is suing the USAF for $385 million, to recover “legitimate, allowable costs of the Delta IV program that Boeing incurred prior to the creation of ULA in 2006.” Boeing and the ULA filed the joint complaint on June 14/12 “to preserve their rights to recover these costs,” since ULA is the legal “successor-in-interest” to the relevant contracts and agreements.
This isn’t a surprise to the USAF. Boeing reportedly made the recovery of those costs a condition of accepting the EELV restructuring and joining ULA, back in 2006. Reuters.
May 14/12: United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $398 million firm-fixed-price contract for an Atlas V EELV launch carrying the narrowband MUOS-4 communications satellite, and a Delta IV EELV launch carrying a GPS satellite.
Work will be performed in Decatur, AL, and the contract runs until Nov 30/14. The USAF’s SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0001 PO 0018).
March 26/12: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics redesignates the EELV Program as an Acquisition Category ID (ACAT ID) Major Defense Acquisition Program, and removes it from the “sustainment phase” designation. Source: USN budget documents.
Program shift
Jan 10/12: Launches. United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $1.516 billion firm-fixed-price contract for Atlas V EELV launch services in support of Defense Meteorological Satellites Program satellite DMSP-19, the narrowband UHF Mobile User Objective System satellite MUOS-3, and 3 National Reconnaissance Office missions. It also buys Delta IV EELV launch services in support of Air Force Space Command-4, 2 GPS satellites, and the DMSP-20 weather satellite.
Work will be performed in Decatur, AL, and the contract runs until June 30/14. The USAF’s SMC/LRK in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-001 PO 0012).
December 2011: Industrial. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L), Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy office, completes a study of the liquid rocket engine industrial base. It’s part of their efforts to estimate independent cost estimates for 2 EELV engines.
The bad news is that the Space Shuttle had been stabilizing this industrial base, and now it’s gone. Unless military missions get an alternative launch vehicle, these engines are necessary for national security – but all of the liquid rocket engines currently supporting these requirements are associated with EELV. The report provides evidence of instability in the supplier base, and adds that the current lack of design opportunities make it difficult for industry to sustain a skilled workforce for future liquid rocket engine development programs.
The study is used to highlight the need for an EELV block buy, in order to provide certainty for these companies. It could also highlight the need for private alternatives, in order to remove dependence. US GAO.
Nov 28/11: Launch. United Launch Services, LLC in Littleton, CO receives a $150 million unfinalized firm-fixed-price contract, for launch services in support of Wideband Global Satcom satellite F5. The USAF Space and Missile Systems Center in El Segundo, CA manages the contract (FA8811-11-C-0001).
Oct 14/11: Competition – and Politics. NASA, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the US Air Force announce an agreement this week to establish clear criteria for “certification of commercial providers of launch vehicles used for national security space and civil space missions.” In English: the market for national security launches just opened up beyond EELV, which will have to compete in some segments.
For high-value “Class A, failure is not an option” long-lived national security satellites, whose addition has a high marginal value to the existing constellation, EELV’s “Category 3″ low risk certified rockets will remain the only option. There are no A1 or A2 launches, barring a huge national emergency and Presidential orders. At the other extreme, “Class D” payloads could fly on anything, even “Category 1″ launch vehicles classified as high risk or unproven (to keep symmetry, shouldn’t that have been the Cat 3?). This will help NASA most, but each category now has a specific number of successful launches needed for eligibility, as well as a known set of technical, safety and test data needed to verify that record.
The new framework’s flexibility means that every successful launch by non-EELV platforms brings it closer to a new category, which will grant access to a forecastable set of new opportunities. The big and obvious potential winner here in SpaceX (vid. May 23/11), whose Falcon 9 is poised to compete in the EELV’s segments. Orbital’s Minotaur family may also benefit.
In response, Boeing and Lockheed Martin are seeking to close the opened door by pushing a multi-year deal to buy 40 ULA rockets and launches from FY 2013 – 2017 inclusive. This would make it much more difficult for other private firms to secure orders, regardless of the certification framework. The stakes are high. Some estimates see the deal as being worth more than $12 billion, and the ULA’s 2016 budget could grow to around $2.0-2.2 billion, from its current 2011 figure of $1.2 billion. ULA claims that their deal would still leave 20% of the US government launch market up for grabs. SpaceX doubts those projections, and says that it could deliver saving far above the ULA’s advertised 15% – possibly up to $1 billion per year. In response, Congress has asked the GAO to report on this issue. NASA | USAF | Aviation Week | TMC’s Satellite Spotlight | Space News | The Space Review | Washington Post.
Competition?
FY 2011
Launch contracts; Atlas V for manned spaceflight?; EELV R&D plan to improve engine and replace obsolete parts; Contract type shifting; Hearings showcase SpaceX’s cost advantage over NASA.
Lynx XR-5K18 nozzle test
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July 28/11: ULA R&D. United Launch Services in Littleton, CO receives a $34.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to complete the development of the RL10C-1 engine. The <a href="http://www.pw.utc.com/