Upgraded F-5EM
(click to view full)
Could the words “Brazilian fighter” begin evoking images unrelated to the Gracies? Recent boosts to Brazil’s defense budget could be on its way to accomplishing that and more. The Navy and Army have already received funds to replace broken-down equipment, and new fighters will be a critical centerpiece of the Forca Aerea Brasileira’s efforts.
Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, France’s Dassault’s Rafale, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG were picked as finalists. But after repeated stalling, the question is whether Brazil will actually place an order, or fold up the competition like the ill-fated 2011 F-X process.
This free-to-view DID Spotlight article covers Brazil’s reborn F-X2 competition, adds its assessment of the competitors’ relative strengths and weaknesses, and covers ongoing events.
F-X2: FAB Foreshadowing
Brazil
(click to view full)
Brazil can depend on its sheer size, and the barrier created by its geography, to shield its population centers from many threats. The same isn’t necessarily true of its military installations or economic interests, which require either air superiority, or air denial from mobile and effective defensive missiles. Airpower’s flexibility also makes it a uniquely useful as a deterrent and response to threats and coercion, and is uniquely suited to the job of patrolling vast areas.
Much of that patrol work falls to the mid-tier of Brazil’s its air force, and its specialty fleets. Those are in good shape, which makes sense in a region where most threats are internal. Brazil’s 43 or so upgraded Brazilian-Italian AMX subsonic light attack jets, and 99 indigenous Super Tucano COIN/surveillance turboprops, are quality offerings within their respective niches. Their performance is very well suited to basic policing duties, especially when backed by a small but advanced set of airborne, ground looking and maritime R-99/ P-99 radar derivatives of Embraer’s ERJ-145 business jets. The ERJ derivatives will be augmented by 12 refurbished P-3 Orions, bought to patrol Brazil’s huge coastlines and maritime economic zone.
Unfortunately, the high end of the FAB’s fighter fleet is inferior even when judged by regional standards.
After its existing Mirage IIIs simply wore out and had to be retired at the end of 2005, FAB Command worked out a plan to find an emergency interim replacement. The final choice was 12 second-hand French Mirage 2000Cs. The airframes selected by Brazil were produced for France between 1984 -1987, and began arriving in Brazil in 2006.
A parallel F-5 upgrade program is underway to keep those 1960s-era lightweight fighters in service for another 15 years, while modernizing them to a level of effectiveness that’s slightly below the Mirages.
FAV SU-30MK2
(click to view full)
Inducting 20 year old aircraft was not a long-term solution. Especially for a country that reportedly had about 37% of its 719-plane air force grounded, due to a combination of age and the toll of Brazil’s environments. Upgrading the F-5s is useful, but can’t even be described as a short-term solution to the gap at the high end of their force. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s large military buys, and especially its FAV’s recent purchase of long-range, 4+ generation SU-30MK2 fighters, appear to have had the effect of triggering counter moves around Latin America. So, too, have Venezuela’s actions around Latin America, as the line between external and internal threats blurs. In Brazil’s case, interference within key Brazilian natural gas provider Bolivia was not seen as a friendly act.
Publicly, Brazil has been careful to stress that this is not about an arms race. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim said in a 2007 public speech that:
“Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations … one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region … (and in 2008) we’ll also be strengthening our military links… [Brazil cannot] neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50 percent… [Brazil] is elaborating a national strategy defense plan that will determine each military branch’s mission and the equipment it needs for its activities”.
The reassurances are meant to be sincere. So, too, are the plans referred to in the second half of the quote. Brazil has shaken off its sloth and taken wide-ranging steps to revive its military. Including its fighters.
In January 2008, Brazil’s President Lula authorized Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the long-delayed F-X fighter replacement program. “F-X2″ aimed to acquire 36 next generation fighters for the Brazilian Air Force. A previous 2001 F-X competition was put on hold in 2003, and then canceled in February 2004 due to budget difficulties and political issues. The initial budget for the current iteration is said to be $2.2 billion, but is likely to end up being 2x-3x that figure. The RFP leaves the door open for future buys, which could raise that total to 120 aircraft.
F-X2: The Industrial Angle
AMX light fighter
(click to view full)
President Lula da Silva’s administration had larger plans than just equipment recapitalization when it took those steps, saying that “we must overcome the lack of strategic planning and the technological dismantling of the last two decades.” The new National Defence Strategy group is designed to plan and execute the recovery of the “capability of our armed forces and the technological edge we once had in certain fields.”
Brazil maintained an impressive niche capability during the 1970s and 1980s in areas like tank and armored vehicle design, rockets, missiles, and of course aircraft. Unfortunately, in a world divided by cold war allegiances, there was often little room for a non-aligned 3rd party exporter. While some projects like the Tucano succeeded, and others like the AMX enjoyed qualified success, many promising projects saw limited exports or failed.
The world is no longer divided into cold war camps, which may offer the Brazilian defense industry a second chance if it partners well and executes smartly. According to the main guidelines of the da Silva’s long term strategy, Brazilian defense industry should look to become a player again in the export of missiles, aircraft and other equipment. UAVs, with their long endurance surveillance capabilities and natural connection to Brazil’s aviation industry, are likely to also become a priority. The overall thrust of Brazil’s policies is certainly clear: “We must convince ourselves that we can become a world power this century,” said President Lula da Silva.
Military Review, 1999
(click to view full)
On the one hand, these statements remind one of the old joke that goes: “Brazil is the nation of the future – and always will be.”
On the other hand, anteing up with a 50% hike to the defense budget certainly displays seriousness, and Brazil has already set up a key partnership to develop the 5th generation A-Darter short range air-air missile with South Africa. A similar deal with Israel for its Derby/Alto radar guided missile is also expected at some point, and RFPs went out for a handful of medium transport helicopters (AW EH101, Russian Mi-171V, EADS EC725 – which won) and some attack helicopters (AW-TAI A129, EADS Tiger, Russian Mi-35M – which won).
The giant may be stirring again. A handful of fighters and helicopters, plus ships to patrol its coasts, won’t exactly make anyone a world power. Budgetary resources will also have to address an urgent need for transport aircraft, which is pushing resources toward Embraer’s KC-390. Still, these buys may go a long way toward ensuring the nation’s ability to patrol and enforce its long borders. The right deals may also allow Brazil to re-establish its faded indigenous defense industry on the world stage.
While the January 2011 suspension of the F-X2 competition is a setback for Brazilian industry, and for Brazil’s ability to safeguard the nation’s borders, it doesn’t stop this defense industrial drive. In the air, Embraer’s KC-390 medium transport has become a serious contender for global orders, even as the EC725 partnership with Eurocopter is giving Brazil much-improved helicopter manufacturing and servicing. The A-Darter missile program is ongoing, and on the ground, a major partnership with Iveco will produce hundreds of VBTP 6×6 wheeled armored personnel carriers. Cooperation with France will produce 5 submarines, including 1 nuclear attack sub; and a major naval tender to buy frigates, patrol vessels, and supply ships has attracted bids from Britain, Korea, France, and elsewhere. A clever buy of 3 Scarborough Class 90m patrol boats from BAE, with options to build 5 more in Brazil, has begun that process.
F-X2: The Competition
Dassault Rafale:
Takeoff at last?
(click to view full)
The 36+ aircraft under consideration for F-X2 were mostly the same set of 4+ generation fighters that were considered for the canceled F-X competition: Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, EADS’ Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Block 60, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and Sukhoi’s SU-35.
The FAB was also said to be interested in the Lockheed-Martin F-35, but the finalized nature of the Lighting’s industrial production partnership program was likely to keep the program from delivering the industrial offsets Brazil seeks. Meanwhile, a pair of competitors from earlier rounds faded out. Dassault’s Mirage 2000 production line was closing, and Brazil did not mention the F-16 as a contender – or advance Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR Block 70 offer to the finals.
Reporter Tania Monteiro of the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo writes that technology transfer will be an essential part of any deal, and quotes influential Workers’ Party Deputy (PT is Lula’s party, Deputy = MP or Congressman) Jose Genoino as saying:
“France is always the better partner. Concerning Russia, everyone knows the difficulties and we don’t know what is going to happen in ten years so that we will be able to guarantee our spare parts. The USA, traditionally, does not transfer technology… We want to seek the lowest price with the most technology transfer.”
If his assessment of Brazil’s priorities remains true, that country could represent a critical last chance for France to get some export momentum and success behind its Rafale, which has lost every competition it has entered thus far (Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, UAE, et. al.). To win, France will need to come up with a strong package. According to reports, the indications are that technology transfer will be more important than cost in terms of the final choice. Defence minister Nelson Jobim:
“Whatever the final contract it must be closely linked to national development, to help advance in the creation of a strong defense industry and therefore the technological edge we are requesting.”
Analysis: F-X2 Competitors
Some quick handicapping follows. The F-X2 finalists are Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, France’s Rafale, and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; but if the competition is re-started, new possibilities will present themselves. Beyond the air force, the Marinha do Brazil eventually intends to buy 24 fighters of its own, to operate from the carrier that replaces NAe Sao Paulo beginning in 2025. They’re watching the competition closely, and would prefer to buy the same aircraft.
Saab JAS-39 Gripen NG
Gripen: air show
(click to view full)
Pros: The JAS-39 Gripen Next Generation program offers key industrial opportunities, along with a high-performance fighter whose price and operating costs are both low. Gripen is likely to be Brazil’s cheapest option over its service life. The JAS-39BR’s avionics suite will be sourced entirely from Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary AEL, giving it commonalities with the FAB’s other fighters. JAS-39BRs would also give Brazil’s Air Force a fast integration track for the cooperative A-Darter air-air missile that Brazil is developing with JAS-39C/D customer South Africa, and deploying on its own modernized A-1M AMX fighters.
Saab offers strong industrial partnerships, and has a record of successful technology transfer agreements.
Grey Areas: The JAS-39 NG includes the Raven AESA radar developed with Selex Galileo, whose long history with Brazil’s FAB includes the F-5BR (Grifo-F) and AMX (Scipio) fighter programs. The Raven is an unusual combination of an AESA radar that can be mechanically pivoted, offering more points of failure but widening the radar’s scanning cone versus other competitors. That’s a strong plus, but the Raven isn’t as tested and proven as the AESA radars equipping the Super Hornet and Rafale.
Brazil combines vast over-water areas and even vaster wilderness areas to patrol, which usually translates into a focus on range and 2-engine safety. While the other 2 Brazilian finalists are both 2-engine planes, it’s worth noting that most of Brazil’s other fighters (Tucano ALX, AMX, Mirage 2000) have just one engine. The F414 engine that Gripen shares with the Super Hornet offers the advantages of certain performance and a broad long-term customer base, but it’s subject to US export approvals if that’s an issue for Brazil.
Gripen NG Demo
(click to view full)
Weaknesses: Saab’s biggest handicap is the industrial and geopolitical weight of its rivals from France & the USA.
Another handicap involves its lack of a naval variant, or even a flying prototype of same. Conversion of land-based aircraft for naval aviation is often unrealistic, but Sweden’s insistence on short take-off and landing performance from surfaces like highways gives Gripen a strong base to work from. Saab began serious work on a “Sea Gripen” in March 2011, and could offer Brazilian industry the unique opportunity to be involved in developing the modified aircraft in time for 2025. It’s still a weakness, but it’s a weakness with a hook that might prove attractive.
Offer: The JAS-39NG reportedly ranked 1st in the FAB’s technical trials, had strong support from Brazilian aerospace firms, and offered a complete package worth about $6 billion (about 10 billion Reals), of which $1.5 billion was for maintenance. Saab has even begun working with a number of Brazilian firms in advance of any contracts, discussing sub-contracting possibilities, and working to improve their industrial proficiency with key technologies like advanced composite materials.
Dassault’s Rafale F3R
FAB Rafale-B concept
(click to view full)
Pros: The Rafale has a lot of advantages in this competition. It’s a twin-engine fighter with good range and ordnance capacity, and much better aerial performance than the F/A-18 Super Hornet. It can also play the carrier-compatible card very well, since the NAe Sao Paulo was once FS Foch, and Brazil’s next carrier may well be a variant of DCNS’ PA2 design.
It also comes from a trusted supplier. Experience with the Mirage 2000 offers a common technological and training base, and France is seen as a good supplier who avoids political interference and makes good on technology transfers. Brazil is already embarked upon a broad set of major defense projects with French firms, and President Lula’s administration clearly favored the Rafale as part of that relationship.
Rafale-M
(click to view full)
Grey Areas: Thales new RBE2-AA AESA radar has been installed in French Air Force fighters, so it’s mature by the barest of margins, but it hasn’t been used in combat.
The Rafale confines Brazil to French weapons and sensors, unless Brazil spends its own money to add some locally-developed ordnance. On the other hand, Brazil has bought French Mirage aircraft a few times before, and seems unfazed by that requirement. Offers to partner in expanding the Rafale’s options might serve to hit 2 targets at once, by allaying concerns and playing the tech transfer card more strongly.
The Rafale’s January 2012 pick as India’s preferred fighter softens the type’s biggest negative, but India hasn’t signed a contract yet. The Rafale remains the only plane in this competition without an existing export customer, and it has lost a lot of international competitions.
Weaknesses: The Rafale’s biggest performance weakness is its lack of a Helmet Mounted Display, which keeps it from reaching its full potential in close-range air combat. Its biggest contest weakness is probably its price.
Offer: Subsequent events would bear out both the Rafale’s strengths, and its weaknesses. Folha de Sao Paolo reports that it was the most expensive of the 3 finalists, with a price tag of about $8.2 billion US dollars (13.3 billion Reals), plus $4 billion in maintenance contracts over the next 30 years. Dassault reportedly offered the best technology transfer package, and Defence Minister Jobim claims a subsequent $2 billion price reduction, but details remain unclear. The plane remains a strong contender, and may yet win.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
F/A-18E, Parked
(click to view full)
Pros: The Super Hornet’s biggest advantage is a huge user base, with guaranteed future funding for upgrades that Brazil won’t have to invest in to benefit from. The Block II’s combat-proven AN/APG-79 AESA radar offers Brazil an attractive technology, volume production lets Boeing start at a price comparable to the single-engine JAS-39′s, a weaker American dollar makes American exports even more affordable, and the potential to turn these planes into EA-18 electronic jamming fighters is a unique selling point for the type. The Super Hornet shares the carrier-compatible card with Dassault’s Rafale, but it offers a much wider range of ordnance to choose from.
Boeing’s passenger aircraft division gives them an attractive magnet for industrial offsets, and in April and June 2012, Boeing strengthened its position by signing a broad cooperation deal with Embraer. Their offering will use wide-screen displays and some other avionics from Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary AEL.
Grey Areas: The Super Hornet is an American jet, and the vast majority of its equipment and weapons are also American. The USA’s influence in Latin America can help their lobbying, but their image in Latin America can hurt them at the same time. Much will depend on what kind of relationship Brazil has with Washington around the time the decision is made, and where they want that relationship to go.
The other grey area for the Super Hornet is technology transfer and customization. Exactly how much technology Boeing and the US government are willing to transfer isn’t clear, though they promise that their offer is competitive. Source code transfer is a related point, and it affects the ease with which Brazil will be able to add its own equipment if the Super Hornet is chosen.
F/A-18E International
(click to view full)
Weaknesses: The Super Hornet offers poorer aerodynamic performance than other competitors, falling behind in areas like maneuverability, acceleration, sustained Gs, etc. Concerns about America’s propensity to use arms export bans as a political lever add a final complication to the Super Hornet’s odds, and take away some of the advantage created by its broad arsenal of American weapons and sensors.
Offer: After being the long-shot finalist for most of this competition, heavy lobbying by the US government and Boeing appears to have put the Super Hornet back in the running. Folha de Sao Paolo reports that Boeing’s package was worth $7.7 billion dollars (about 12.9 billion reals), of which $1.9 billion was for maintenance. Rousseff has reportedly pressed Boeing to improve its industrial participation offer. Sen. McCain reportedly pledged to get a Congressional commitment that the US Congress would not block the sale or transfer of technologies, but that cannot be binding, which would leave the issue of future spare parts interference etc. as an open question. There have been reports that Rousseff is interested in moving Brazil closer to the USA in the international arena. If that’s true, it could make a big difference to the Super Hornet’s chances.
Non-finalists
RAF Typhoon & ASRAAM
(click to view full)
Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/European): Technology transfer may have been an issue, but price was always the biggest stumbling block. Eurofighters consistently sell for $110-130+ million, which doesn’t square well with $2.2 billion for 36 planes. The most capable air-air choice in the group would provide unquestioned regional air superiority, but ground surveillance and strike performance is still provisional (Tranche 1 v6), or unproven (Tranche 2+). This has been fatal in competitions like Singapore’s, and may have been a handicap here.
On the plus side, EADS Airbus offered a potent option for industrial offsets, and other EADS subsidiaries had footholds of their own. Airbus Military’s A400M medium transport may create additional military interest in a long term industrial partnership, and EADS Eurocopter’s Cougar has just become the medium-lift mainstay of Brazil’s future helicopter fleet.
X-35B STOVL
(click for landing)
F-35 Lightning II/ F-16BR (Lockheed Martin) The F-35 would have offered a clear set of performance benefits over competing aircraft. No aircraft in this group could have matched the Lightning’s advanced surveillance capabilities, and surveillance is a big need in Brazil. The F-35B STOVL variant also offered Brazil the ability to operate from small, dispersed runways, and it would have been perfect for aircraft carriers like the Sao Paulo. Unfortunately, technology transfer issues weren’t the F-35′s only problem. Other barriers to an F-35 win included limited opportunities in its industrial structure, questions surrounding air-air performance, the low likelihood of deliveries before 2016 (a concern that was more than vindicated by events), a single engine design – and the potential cancellation of the F-35B variant, which would be most useful to Brazil.
Instead, Lockheed Martin offered Brazil an F-16BR. It was expected to resemble the F-16E/F “Block 70″ variant offered to India, with an AESA radar and built-in IRST/targeting sensors, an uprated engine, etc. Both India and Brazil are fond of Israeli avionics and weapons, and Lockheed Martin has a long history of including those items for Israel and for other customers.
The F-16BR offer shareed many of the Super Hornet’s perceived benefits and drawbacks: AESA radar and sensors and weaker American dollar on the plus side, poorer aerodynamic performance and distrust of America on the minus side. The F-16 cannot play the carrier-compatible card like the Super Hornet, and offers only a single-engine design. On the other hand, it did offer wide compatibility with other regional and global air forces.
SU-35
(click to view full)
SU-35 (Sukhoi/ Rosoboronexport) This was the aircraft Russia offered in the last round, and the design has matured into a production aircraft since then. Russian tech transfer is trusted. Lack of political interference is trusted absolutely. The aircraft itself would offer an option that’s better than Venezuela’s SU-30MKs, while still presenting itself to the region as an equivalency move. The price would be good, and Sukhoi had some support in the FAB.
On the other hand, service and parts delivery were almost guaranteed to be bad. That gave the FAB real pause. One way around that might be to offer licensed local production. In order to solve the Russian service problem[1], it would also have to extend to the aircraft’s NPO Saturn engines and fitted avionics. In the end, it didn’t matter. The SU-35S was not a finalist, but Sukhoi has reportedly made an unsolicited offer anyway.
Contracts and Key Events
2013
Gripen would use AEL avionics suite; Sukhoi’s unsolicited offer; Boeing deepens Embraer ties.
Sea Gripen Concept
(click to view full)
Aug 5/13: Tchau, Mirage. Brazil will retire the FAB’s 12-plane Mirage 2000B/C fleet in December, without a replacement. The people in Brazilia’s glass Supreme Court building will be relieved.
There are conflicting reports as to why they’re being retired. Some cite the Dassault support agreement, which was extended for another 2 years from 2011 – 2013, but ran up against manufacturer recommended service life limits. The cost of the in-depth overhauls would far exceed the $80 million Brazil paid for the used jets, and if Brazil wanted to add modern weapons to keep the planes competitive, the radar and electronics would also need replacement. Finally, in a tight budget environment, it’s worth noting that other customers have complained about high maintenance costs for this type. Taiwan is planning to retire more advanced Mirage 2000-5s, for instance, even though they really need front-line fighters.
Brazil’s 2005 purchase of the used French fighters didn’t include resale rights, so the fighters will return to France. Due to their age, however, they won’t be resold again. Brazilian reports cite a likely “replacement” of 6-12 F-5Ms at the Anapolis AB near Brazilia, but those are refurbished fighters that were already in FAB stocks. Only F-X2 fighters will act as replacements, if indeed the FAB buys any. Estado de S. Paulo [in Portuguese] | Defense Update.
July 6/13: Delays. Brazil won’t be making their F-X2 decision until the end of the year. They have, of course, asked the contenders to extend their bids yet again. Brazil Defence [unofficial].
June 18/13: Boeing & Embraer. Embraer and Boeing sign an agreement to market Embraer’s KC-390 medium airlifter in limited international venues, building on the June 26/12 MoU. Boeing will be the lead for KC-390 sales, sustainment and training opportunities in the USA, UK and “select Middle East markets.”
Outside the Middle East, that doesn’t actually encompass a lot of meaningful opportunities, but it’s one more factor bolstering Boeing’s F-X-2 bid. Boeing | Embraer.
May 20/13: SU-35, unsolicited. RIA Novosti quotes Rosoboronexport’s SITDEF exhibition lead Sergey Ladigin, who says they’ve offered to deliver Su-35 fighters and Pantsir S1 air defense systems to Brazil outside the framework of a tender, and says the offer is being considered.
Brazil wants the Pantsir short-range air defense gun/missile systems, but the SU-35 failed to make the shortlist in 2009. On the other hand, if you don’t ask, you’ll never get. So Russia’s is throwing in the Su-35 offer, and Ladigin said in Lima that they were “ready to transfer 100% of manufacturing technologies,” as well as some technologies from their T50 (future SU-50?) stealth fighter. Russian Aviation.
May 15/13: Sea Gripen. Saab remains serious about its “Sea Gripen NG,” and has been working on the idea since their May 2011 announcement. Brazil’s Navy is expected to buy its own fighters to equip a new aircraft carrier, which is expected to replace NAe Sao Paulo around 2025. They expect their 24 new fighters to be the same type as the FAB’s F-X-2 winner, which leaves Saab competing against 2 proven naval fighters: Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornets and Dassault’s Rafale-M.
To help build their case, former Brazilian naval aviator Comte. Romulo “Leftover” Sobral is invited to flight test a JAS-39D, in order to verify the design’s basic suitability for naval conversion. Sobral liked the aircraft’s intuitive flight controls, ground handling, stability at low airspeeds, acceleration response, handling at the high angles of attack used in carrier landings, and good visibility. He even liked the flight suit. The plane landed in 800m, and Comte Sobral believes that the plane does have the basic requirements to become an effective naval fighter. The Sea Gripen’s lack of proven status, and absence of even a flying prototype, will still hurt the JAs-39. On the other hand, the time lag from F-X2 to a naval buy gives Brazilian industry a unique opportunity to participate in designing the Sea Gripen. Saab Gripen Blog | Full article at Defesa Aerea & Naval [in Portuguese].
April 15/13: Rafale. Defense World reports from LAAD 2013 that Dassault’s F-X2 offer will be the Rafale F3R, which includes a major software upgrade that allows the aircraft to take fuller advantage of the new Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, improves their Thales SPECTRA self-defence systems, adds Mode-5/Mode-S capable Identification Friend or Foe, and allows the Rafale to deploy MBDA’s Meteor long range air-to-air missile.
Given Brazil’s insistence on an AESA radar, Dassault could hardly avoid offering the F3R.
April 10/13: Gripen. Saab executive Eddy de la Motta is quoted as saying that Brazilian JAS-39 Gripen NGs would use AEL’s avionics, creating a forked version under the wider development effort. This will help Saab meet industrial offset obligations, and also create commonality for Brazil’s fighter fleet, but integrating all of those components with the plane’s mission computers, OFP core software, weapons, etc. is not a trivial task. Elbit subsidiary AEL’s avionics are used in many Brazilian aircraft, with the exception of the Mirage 2000s that will retire as F-X2 fighters enter the FAB.
A less comprehensive suite of AEL avionics will also be used in Boeing’s F/A-18 International, which offers AEL’s wide-screen display and some other components to all potential customers. Defense News.
April 3/13: Embraer. Embraer’s CEO Luiz Carlos Aguiar talks to Defense News about F-X2 and other subjects. Regarding the fighters:
“I think [the decision is] going to be in the next months, this year, I would say. Our role in that depends… on who is going to win. We have a memorandum of understanding with all three of the contenders. Each of them offers an offset program, but we prefer not declaring publicly our preference…. Whatever they choose, we’re going to be in the process. They need to make this decision because Brazil needs that…. With the F-X, we can even go further in terms of technology, and even some new products could come up with one of these three contenders. That’s what I can tell you, I can’t go further than that.”
Given Embraer’s dominant position in the Brazilian aerospace industry, it would be shocking if any of the contenders had chosen not to sign industrial partnership MoUs with Embraer. In light of the April and August 2012 agreements, the “new products” comment suggests that Boeing may have replaced Saab (q.v. Sept 28-29/09 entries) as Embraer’s preferred choice. That isn’t at all certain, however – as Aguliar surely intended. Defense News.
March 8/13: More delays. Brazil has asked the 3 F-X2 finalists to extend their bids for another 6 months from the March 30/13 deadline, as the Brazilian commodity economy remains mired in a 2-year slump. Boeing, Dassault, and Saab has hoped for a decision in time for Brazil’s April 2013 LAAD defense expo.
The length of the cumulative delays could create changes for the bids, and it effectively squashes any faint hopes that the new jets would be able to fly in time for the 2014 World Cup. Given required production and training times, those hopes started to become awfully faint by around mid-2012. Reuters.
2012
Rafale wins in India; Boeing trying hard.
Rafale
(click to view full)
Dec 11/12: Still no deadline. In a joint press conference with French President Hollande, Brazil’s President Rousseff remains very non-committal regarding F-X2. On the one hand, the timing will depend on Brazil’s economy, which is commodity based and so subject to the effects of global slowdowns. On the other hand, she says that the government expects enough growth in the coming months to resume the selection process. French President [in French] | YouTube press conference video | Les Echos [in French].
Dec 7/12: Super Hornet. The Brazilian news weekly Istoe publishes an article claiming that the FAB’s formal analysis had preferred Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. The report was shelved by the government, which favored France’s Rafale. The air force’s preference is reportedly due in part to the fact that the Super Hornet has the widest variety of integrated weapons and equipment, and partly because it’s available immediately and could be delivered very quickly. The FAB is reported to be concerned about both the age of its fleet, and its regional competitiveness.
The Super Hornet’s cost was in the middle, at $5.4 billion rather than the Gripen’s $4.3 billion, or Rafale’s $8.2 billion. So, too, were estimated operating costs, at about $10,000 per flight hour vs. $7,000 for Gripen, or $20,000 for the Rafale.
The government’s thinking is still opaque, though Boeing’s technical cooperation agreements with Embraer (vid. April 3-9/12 and June 26/12 entries) add a bit more weight to the industrial side of the equation. Istoe [in Portuguese, and note that their picture is an F-15] | Defense World.
Aug 9/12: Delayed, again. Brazil may need a 5th consecutive extension. Defence Minister Celso Amorim tells Dow Jones that:
“The project is not being abandoned. There will be a decision in the right time. But, today, I would prefer not to give a date… The economic situation has taken a less favorable turn than expected and it naturally requires caution.”
With China’s economy appearing to slow, and the EU debt crisis as an ongoing drag on their economy, a commodity-based economy like Brazil could find itself in tight straits for a while unless something changes. Fox News.
July 7/12: Extension. The FAB has asked the 3 bidders to renew their fighter offers. It’s the 4th consecutive 6-month extension, while Brazil dithers over its choice and the timing of the buy. France24.
June 26/12: Boeing & Embraer. Boeing and Embraer announce an agreement to share some specific technical knowledge regarding the KC-390, and to evaluate markets where they may join their sales efforts for medium-lift military transports. It’s part of a broader agreement signed in April 2012 (vid.), and its immediate significance is limited.
On the other hand, it has the potential to turn Boeing into a medium transport rival to C-130 maker Lockheed Martin, while extending Embraer’s marketing reach to match Lockheed Martin and Airbus. That’s the sort of thing that could change the KC-390′s global prospects, but it’s still too early to tell. Boeing | Embraer.
June 14/12: Boeing & AEL. Boeing picks Elbit Systems and its AEL Sistemas subsidiary to provide a low-profile head-up display (LPHUD), as part of the Advanced Cockpit System for Boeing fighter jets. This follows the March 5/12 pick to supply the ACS’ Large Area Display (LAD) offered as an option for new F/A-18 Super Hornets and F-15s, including the F-15SE Silent Eagle. Boeing.
May 19/12: 2012 decision? Mercopress reports that Rousseff’s government intends to make its F-X2 decision by the end of 2012. That’s a good way to reduce those tiring lobbying meetings.
April 3-9/12: Boeing & Embraer. Boeing announces its new Sao Paulo facility, Boeing Research & Technology-Brazil. It is the firm’s 6th global advanced research center, after Europe, Australia, India, China and Russia. Areas of research focus for the new center will include sustainable aviation biofuels (Brazil is a leading biofuel producer), advanced air traffic management, advanced metals and bio-materials, and support and services technologies.
That announcement is followed by a broad business agreement with Embraer to cooperate in these areas, as well as in commercial aircraft. The broader announcement by Embraer and Boeing was made on the same day as the signing by the Brazilian and United States Governments of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Aviation Partnership, to expand and deepen cooperation between the 2 countries on civil aviation. Boeing re: facility | Boeing re: cooperation.
March 5/12: Boeing & AEL. Boeing Company and Elbit Systems announce a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate in Brazil. As part of the MoU, Elbit has committed to investing in its AEL Sistemas S.A. subsidiary. Elbit’s 11″ x 19″ Large Area Display has already been picked for next-generation F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15 Eagle variants & upgrades, and the implication is that AEL would help develop and integrate this capability in any Brazilian F/A-18 Super Hornets.
Per Elbit’s investments, AEL will participate in LAD software & hardware development, and establish an Advanced Cockpit Technology Center of Excellence in Brazil. They’re already the Brazilian military’s top avionics supplier, and the firm hopes to expand its cockpit avionics market reach to other fixed-wing and helicopter platforms. Boeing.
Feb 10/12: Reuters reports that Boeing has frozen its 2009 bid price, as the same price for any new tender. In effect, it’s a price reduction of the cost of inflation over that time; the Reuters article offers estimates of a 12% real discount.
Jan 31/12: Rafale in India. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as India’s preferred plane for its 126+ plane M-MRCA fighter contract. A subsequent article in India’s newspaper The Hindu, by Brazilian Prof. Oliver Stuenkel, notes that Brazilian defense minister Amorim’s recent trip to India, immediately after the Rafale had been picked, included an agreement “to share with Brazil some of its experiences of carrying out the open tender evaluation to select the best aircraft… The big question now is how the decision to have Brazil study documents about India’s selection process will affect the tender process in Brazil.”
2012
F-X2 put in limbo, but maneuvering continues; Minister Jobim resigns; Sea Gripen started.
Training for what?
(click to view full)
Dec 21/11: Boeing announces Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with MSM Powertrain Ltda. (logistics services, ground support equipment, engineering support) and Pan Metal Industria Metalurgica Ltda. (assembly, subsystem installation, machined parts, processing, heat treatment) to explore work opportunities with Boeing and its industry partners if Boeing wins F-X2. MSM and Pan Metal join more than 25 other companies throughout Brazil that Boeing and its industry partners have already identified.
Sept 30/11: Brazil’s new Defense Minister Celso Amorim says that:
“By the end of 2013, none of the 12 Mirage (aircraft) at the Anapolis air base will be in full flying condition. This [fighter buy] is something that is really urgent, very important… The need to defend the Amazon, the borders – We need to have adequate combat aircraft…”
He reiterated Brazil’s position that the “transfer of technology” is the key sticking point, but earlier comments from Brazil’s government indicate that a larger sticking point may involve the parlous and unstable state of the global economy. If the EU’s inability to enforce its membership terms triggers a global economic crisis, Brazil may find it difficult to field the fighters it needs. AFP | TheLocal.se (note that Saab the carmaker is not Saab aerospace).
Sept 22/11: MercoPress reports that Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota has given French President Sarkozy a possible 2012 date to resume F-X2 – but that comes with a large caveat:
“Depending on the evolution of the global economic situation, if the crisis turns out to be less severe than some imagine, then those plans can resume next year.”
Aug 5/11: Personnel is policy. Brazilian defense minister Nelson Jobim is forced to resign, after public reports of critical comments concerning fellow ministers. He’s the 3rd minister to resign since President Rousseff took office in January 2011, which is creating strains in her governing coalition.
Mr. Jobim will be replaced by the former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim. Amorim is a high profile figure. Some have called him anti-American, but Wikileaks cables suggest that this may have been a reaction to the activities of other figures in his department. It remains to be seen if, and how, his selection may affect the fighter competition. Mercopress | BBC | Amorim July 2011 interview, incl. video.
July 20/11: Boeing holds an industry forum in Brazil to outline opportunities available as part of the company’s F/A-18 Super Hornet offering.
May 24/11: Sea Gripen starts development. A Saab Group release states that Saab AB will open new UK headquarters and a new Saab Design Centre in London. The engineering center:
“…will capitalise on the UK’s maritime jet engineering expertise and is scheduled to open in the late Summer. Initially staffed by approximately 10 British employees, its first project will be to design the carrier-based version of the Gripen new generation multi-role fighter aircraft based on studies completed by Saab in Sweden.”
Sea Gripen was initially pushed for India (q.v. Dec 28/09 entry), but with Gripen out of M-MRCA unless something changes, the likely target would appear to be Brazil’s suspended F-X2 program.
May 18/11: Saab. Official opening of the Swedish – Brazilian centre of research and innovation (Centro de Inovacao e Pesquisa Sueco-Brasileiro, CISB) in Sao Bernardo de Campo, Brazil, which grew out of the Saab CEO’s September 2010 visit to Brazil. So far, the centre has attracted over 40 partners from academia and industry, who will be active partners in the specific projects. Areas of focus will be in Transport and Logistics, Defence and Security, and Urban development with a focus on energy and the environment.
Saab President & CEO Hakan Buskhe cites a coastal surveillance radar project with Atmos and a datalink development project with ION as examples, and the firm sees many opportunities in Brazil beyond the Gripen project. Civil security will get special attention, as Brazil is hosting both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games within the next few years. Saab Group.
Feb 22/11: U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere affairs, Frank Mora, stands by the technology transfer offer made to Brazil in the event of an F/A-18 Super Hornet buy, calling it “a significant technology transfer” that “would put Brazil at par with our close partners.” The question is whether the Brazilians will consider that enough, if an when they make a decision. UPI.
Feb 20/11: Agence France Presse:
“Major daily O Estado de Sao Paulo cited four unnamed government ministers as saying new President Dilma Rousseff saw no “climate” for the acquisition in 2011, and that such a move in the midst of a $30-billion slash in the year’s budget would be an “inconsistency.”
Jan 17/11: President Rousseff leaves the F-X2 competition in limbo, in light of concerns about the financing of the purchase, how much to borrow for the initial fighter purchase, and inter-agency disagreements. The exact commitment is a decision later in 2011, but no contract until 2012. In practice, however, there is no firm timeline or deadline for a decision, and domestic spending priorities loom large in Rousseff’s agenda. Which makes this a de facto suspension.
If it is a suspension, it leaves the situation of every contender in play. Rousseff has said she wishes to re-open the arguments between the air force (Gripen preferred) and the ministry (Rafale preferred), via an inter-ministerial group, and also wishes to open a dialogue with industry. Both of those moves would have the effect of adding weight to Saab’s bid. She has also reportedly pressed Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] to secure a clear written commitment that the U.S. Congress would not veto the transfer of technology and fighter components, and has reportedly pressed Boeing to improve its industrial participation offer. There have been reports that Rousseff is interested in moving Brazil closer to the USA in the international arena. If they are true, that could make a big difference to the Super Hornet’s chances. Folha de Sao Paolo [in Portuguese] | Defense News | Defense Update | Flight International || Americas Society (AS-COA) | Bloomberg | BusinessWeek re: Rafale program overall | Le Figaro [in French] | Reuters | UPI.
2010
FAB’s (revised?) evaluation in; Controversy in Brazil; Lula won’t sign a contract before he leaves office.
Rafale: Takeoff?
(click to view full)
Dec 6/10: End of F-X2? Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva confirms that he won’t sign a fighter deal before he leaves office. An excerpt published by state news agency Agencia Brasil said:
“It’s a very big debt, it’s a long-term debt for Brazil. I could sign off on it and do a deal with France, but I’m not going to do that…”
A number of analysts expect his successor, former Marxist guerilla Dilma Rousseff, to cancel the program altogether. With inflation beginning to rear its head in Brazil, Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega is promising a program of government spending cuts, in order to help deal with it. Unfortunately, the used Mirage 2000s that Brazil bought are unlikely to last much beyond 2014, and French officials remain confident – in public, at least. Agence France Presse | Bloomberg | <a href="http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?id=5309&h=%20Does%20Brazil%20fav