Bridge to the future?
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In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in ship killing surveillance-strike complexes, and at their need to defend large sea lanes, as key drivers shaping future navies. These premises are well accepted, but the White Paper’s conclusion was a surprise. It recommended a doubling of Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be a new successor design that would replace the RAN’s Collins Class submarines.
The surprise, and controversy, stem from Australia’s recent experiences. The Collins Class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has had a checkered career, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature and propulsion, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines. High-level attention led to a report and recommendations to improve the force, but whether they will work remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost – remain unclear, with estimated costs in the A$ 36-44 billion range. This FOCUS article covers Australia’s options, decisions, and plans, as their future submarine program slowly gets underway.
Australia’s SEA 1000 Future Submarine Program
Structure & Timeline
There is widespread skepticism that the Australian can handle this proposed project, especially after the failure of the Collins Class. Worse, a number of expert reports have pointed out that the next generation of submarines needs to be in the water before the Collins Class wears out. Many believe that the Collins’ original 2024 – 2031 range for safe and effective service is too generous (vid April 21/12 entry, below), which left very little time as of 2009.
Australia’s Labor government didn’t approach the problem with that level of urgency. The breadth and severity of problems with the Collins Class led to a number of reports covering failures in current submarine operations, and lessons learned. The good news is that this has given Australia a better foundation for its decisions, and improved the government’s understanding of its real needs and responsibilities. The bad news is that this approach delayed action on the May 2009 White Paper for almost 3 years. It’s likely to be 2017 before there’s a serious contract to build the new boats, and the schedule announced in May 2012 has already slipped slightly:
CIS re: ‘$40B mistake’
2012: The Government will make a decision on design and test facilities, including the Land Based Test Site, and will receive the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan. Actual: That skills plan wasn’t publicly unveiled until May 2013.
2013: The Government will receive the results of the design, technical, and capability studies, and will make a decision on the combat systems, torpedoes, sensors and other weapons systems. Actual: The studies were received, and the combat system was decided on in May 2013, but not the other elements.
2013/2014: First Pass approval was scheduled for late 2013/early 2014. This would presumably involve a picked design. That hasn’t happened yet, and the new Liberal Party government is rethinking the entire short list.
2017: Second Pass approval is scheduled for around 2017, with construction expected to begin afterward.
These delays and replacement realities have forced to government to state that the Collins Class can operate safely and effectively to 2031 – 2038. Whether that’s true remains to be seen.
Submarine Choices
S-80 cutaway, labeled
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Australia’s Labor government delayed making its decision, as it considered 4 broad options for the future diesel-electric fast attack submarines. By May 2013, however, it had decided to go with the riskiest 2 options for a purchase that’s supposed to be the RAN’s future centerpiece. If they get this wrong to the same degree that they botched the Collins Class, they will have crippled Australia’s future naval posture for a generation.
Off-the-Shelf. An existing design available off-the-shelf, modified only to meet Australia’s regulatory requirements. Australia looked at the AM-2000 Scorpene, U214/U216, S-80, and Soryu Class – see Appendix A for details. This option was eliminated in May 2013, but may resurface.
Picking this options would have ensured rapid delivery for the RAN’s strategic centerpiece, especially if Australia had chosen the standard approach of having 2 boats built in the foreign shipyard with Australian workers on site, and the rest built in Australia following that hands-on skills transfer period. It also would have cut the risk of technical failure by deploying proven systems, and offered greater cost certainty and savings.
The price is that the submarine chosen might not fit Australia’s exact vision. Leading to the question of how much that vision is worth, when the extra cost is judged by what else it could buy the RAN.
Modified. An existing off-the-shelf design modified to incorporate Australia’s specific requirements, including different combat systems and weapons. This option was eliminated in May 2013, but may resurface under the new Liberal government.
A design modified to Australia’s tastes in combat systems and weapons would almost certainly involve the insertion of systems and weapon capabilities that are compatible with American equipment. Otherwise, Australia would have to stock and maintain new types of torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, electronics, etc. Which could be done, but is expensive. Then again, modifying a submarine’s internal electronics is a bit more than a minor design swap-out, and carries expenses and risks of its own.
HMAS Rankin
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Evolved. An evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs, or of the current Collins Class design. Groups like ASPI suggest that Australia is moving toward an Evolved Collins Class design, but RAND’s December 2011 report (q.v. Dec 13/11 entry) suggested a potential problem:
“One problem that hindered the Collins program was the lack of the intellectual property (IP) rights to the design of the basic platform and much of the fitted equipment. Not having the rights to Collins IP on future designs may constrain the design effort for the new submarine class that will replace the Collins. Although Kockums and the DoD reached a settlement in 2004 that provided ASC and its subcontractors access to Kockums’ IP, it still protected Kockums’ proprietary information to the point that no intellectual property from the Collins can be used in a new Australian submarine design [implied: absent negotiations & licensing].”
A May 2013 agreement with Sweden’s FMV procurement agency has settled that issue, but an Evolved Design option remains inherently risky, precisely because it’s so easy to pretend that the structural and electronic modifications to an existing class won’t really create much risk. Experiences in a range of Australian and Canadian programs show that this simply isn’t true. Both technical and cost risks can become serious problems, as demonstrated by the fact that the Collins Class was itself begun under those same auspices. An evolved option can become less risky if the original manufacturer has already made independent progress on some sort of upgraded version, for its own reasons. The U216 might be considered an evolved U214 design, for instance, but it was eliminated in May 2013.
New. An entirely new developmental submarine, designed in Australia.
The “New Developmental Submarine” option is, of course, the riskiest option of all. It’s also by far the most expensive, as a large amount of R&D must be financed. Since export sales from Australia are deeply unlikely, any R&D expenses are simply money down the drain.
With that said, the Swedish government may have a very interesting offer to make. They have broken off talks with Germany’s TKMS following accusations of bad faith in TKMS’ management of Kockums, which designed the Collins Class. In response, they’re working to revive a Swedish submarine industry at Saab. One possible solution is to continue taking those steps toward a Swedish submarine industry, but buy Australia’s ASC as well, and design their planned A26 successor submarine as a co-development project with Australia.
Contracts and Key Events
2014
New center-right gov’t and its supporters rethinking the program; Interest in Japan’s Soryu Class continues; Swedish sub turmoil could be Australia’s big opportunity.
A26 concept
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May 28/14: Japan. Reuters reports that Japan is warming to the idea of selling submarines to Australia, but what they want in return is something Australia will need to think about:
“Japan is considering selling submarine technology to Australia – perhaps even a fleet of fully engineered, stealthy vessels, according to Japanese officials. Sources on both sides say the discussions so far have encouraged a willingness to speed up talks…. Japanese military officials and lawmakers with an interest in defense policy have signaled a willingness to consider supplying a full version of the highly regarded Soryu to Australia if certain conditions can be met. These would include concluding a framework agreement on security policy with Canberra that would lock future Australian governments into an alliance with Japan, the [Australian] officials said.”
China’s likely reaction would create diplomatic complications, and limit Australia’s future political options. On the other hand, the Japanese have the one proven design that meets Australia’s needs. Just don’t expect rapid decisions. That isn’t the way things are done there. Sources: Reuters, “Japan & Australia consider submarine deal that could rattle China”.
April 14/14: Saab to buy Kockums. Saab AB and ThyssenKrupp Industrial Solutions AG sign a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding concerning the sale of the Swedish shipyard ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AB (formerly named Kockums), including its Malmo, Karlskrona, and Musko operations, to Saab AB.
“Both parties agree that during the negotiations phase, the integrity and the operating ability of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AB must be safeguarded. The transaction will be subject to regulatory approval. The negotiations between Saab AB and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AB are at an early stage and more information will follow.”
There’s a major backstory here. Sweden’s FMV effectively raided TKMS’ offices in Malmo “to take sensitive technological equipment,” but FMV says that since “…it was a transfer of defence material, belonging to FMV, all information regarding the transfer is classified as secret”. It’s generally believed that they came and took the A26 submarine’s plans, as well as a complete Stirling Air-Independent Propulsion system, which are technically owned by the Swedish state. A country that believes time is of the essence, and doesn’t want what it perceives as a hostile corporation to have leverage from holding state materials, might be inclined to move swiftly. The very fact that this happened speaks to how badly relations between Sweden and TKMS have deteriorated. Sources: Saab, “Saab and ThyssenKrupp have signed a MoU on an acquisition of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems” | Radio Sweden, “Defence authority leaves empty-handed after Kockums raid” | The Local – Sweden, “‘Baffling’ Swedish raid on German sub makers” | The Local, “Swedes ‘took engine’ in German sub site raid”.
Saab buys Kockums
April 12/14: Swedish option? The Collins Class was built around a Swedish design, News Corp Australia says that Saab and the Swedish Government have been engaged in secret talks around a joint submarine effort. That proposed approach may have the potential to cut through many of the dilemmas faced by Australia’s government, and Sweden’s as well. Here’s Australia’s problem, as explained in the SMH:
“This week the Australian Strategic Policy Institute hosted a conference billed as the “Submarine Choice” – but the arguments simply shot past each other. Nothing connected. The Navy stressed its strategic need for submarines without reference to the budget; industry obsessed about the business case without worrying about how such massive expenditure would severely unbalance the forces; while politicians agonised over the need to save jobs and save money, despite the fact these objectives stand in direct contradiction to one another. In the meantime, the bandwagon rolls remorselessly onwards.”
The reported Swedish solution would buy ASC, and embark on a fully cooperative joint design for Sweden and Australia’s next submarines. Australia would receive a design that’s explicitly built for Australia’s needs – a necessary compromise for Sweden, whose needs are different. It’s also worth noting that the Japanese Soryu Class propulsion system that has attracted so much interest from Australia’s Navy is part Swedish. From industry’s point of view, making ASC part of Saab removes any conflict of interests with a foreign firm that acts as the project lead, and creates both development jobs/skills and production work. From the politicians’ point of view, a program that includes Sweden and Australia offers the added security of shared risk, and shared acquisitions.
Sweden is looking to re-establish an independent submarine industry (q.v. March 26/14), and their challenge will be buying enough talent, building an equivalent production workforce, and designing the new sub within Sweden’s budgets. Australia offers Sweden a development partner, and a workforce with good experience. Poland has also been mentioned by some sources as a possible team member. Sources: News Corp., “Swedish firm Saab bids to design new Royal Australian Navy submarines” | Sydney Morning Herald, “Swedish-Australian submarines could fit defence needs”.
April 8/14: Minister for Defence Sen. David Johnson gives the speech, but says that the government is still evaluating options and has made no decisions. Since his party had campaigned on building 12 submarines in Australia, he also needs to qualify his way out by invoking his statement that “…if anything the Minister has said is based on fantasy, we’ll tell you and we’ll revisit this.” He does put industry on notice that the priority is performance rather than jobs, and adds that the priority isn’t X number of submarines, but a stable submarine capability that matches what Australia can afford and operate.
Taken as simple logical propositions, both points are extremely sensible. The government can expect to face strong lobbying from the shipyard and its associated unions, and that’s already starting, but the sheer size of the price tag involved means that the unions’ traditional allies on the left aren’t going to fight very hard alongside them. Observers are speculating that that the minister’s framework means 6-9 submarines, but no-one knows at this point. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – Speech – Address for the ASPI conference” | Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – [Q&A] Transcript – ASPI Conference” | ASPI, “The Submarine Choice: ASPI’s International Conference, Canberra” | State-owned ABC, “Submarines off-the-shelf would breach promises to South Australia, says Penny Wong” | The Age, “Why do we need more submarines?” | The Australian, “Cheaper submarines ‘risk the lives of sailors’”.
April 7/14: Rethink? Looks like the stirrings of discontent earlier this year (q.v. Jan 29/14, Dec 17/13) are about to become more real. Minister for Defence Sen. David Johnson is scheduled to make a speech at ASPI on April 9/14, and there’s considerable speculation that he will change the submarine program in 3 important ways. One, he may choose to cut the program from 12 boats to 9, on both cost and operational capacity grounds. Two, he will force ASC to make a case to win the work, saying that the Navy’s strategic centerpiece “is not a job-creation program”. Third, there’s the clear implication that if the ASC case isn’t good enough, some or all of the submarines may be built abroad. As a final wrinkle, talks continue with Japan regarding their large Soryu Class boats, shortly after Japan relaxes their restrictions on exporting weapon technologies:
“When asked yesterday what aspects of the Japanese boats might be included in an Australian design, a senior government source replied: “Everything.”…pressed on whether that included buying the boats off-the-shelf from the Japanese the answer was an emphatic “yes”.”
The usual approach is to build the first few boats aboard, with some local workers sent to participate, and then begin production locally. That would create an industrial timing problem for ASC, but if the government replaces 3 submarines with a 4th Hobart Class air defense destroyer, it could enhance Australia’s naval and missile defense options while covering the industrial gap. Sources: News Australia, “Australia in talks to buy Japanese submarines to upgrade fleet” | Sydney Morning Herald, “Coalition casts doubt on plan to replace Collins Class submarines”.
April 6/14: Japan. Jane’s reports that Australia and Japan have agreed to start talks on creating a framework for defense technology co-operation, with an initial project involving joint research into marine hydrodynamics.
“An official at the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) told IHS Jane’s said this would include the analysis of propulsion and water resistance around submarine hulls.”
The message to Jane’s also suggested that the propulsion technology that so interests in Australians was deemed too sensitive. Instead, Japan’s Technical Research and Development Institute and Australia’s DSTO would begin collaboration here. Japanese decision making processes are slow, especially in an area so likely to create tensions with China. Will they be too slow for the decisions Australia needs to begin making? Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Japan, Australia agree to joint research on submarines, hydrodynamics”.
March 26/14: Sweden. Sweden is looking at ways to restore its indigenous submarine-building capability, and Saab is involved:
“Defence and security company Saab is currently working on the order from the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) regarding a study on a consolidated underwater strategy. Commenting the article by Karin Enström, Swedish Minister for Defence, in the Swedish business daily Dagens Industri, Saab would like to clarify that no further order has been placed.
As previously announced, defence and security company Saab, received a contract from FMV at the end of February 2014. The order was to conduct a study on a consolidated underwater strategy. This study is now being carried out within the business area Security and Defence Solutions.”
Sweden’s problem is that they allowed ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to buy Kockums, Sweden’s submarine builder and the Collins Class’ designer. TKMS promised to keep Kockums as an independent firm, but the reality is that they’ve blocked Kockums’ efforts to export their submarines to existing customer like Singapore, in favor of a new German U216 design. This suggests that the acquisition may have had more to do with removing a competitor, but Sweden is a neutral country that is disinclined to depend on others. Sweden’s government has pulled out of talks with TKMS concerning their next-generatin A26 submarine, and is turning to Saab, who is hiring Kockums engineers and trying to become a sub-builder. Sources: Saab, “Comment on statement regarding the Swedish stand on the underwater domain from the the Minister for Defence”.
March 6/14: Evolved Collins. It isn’t new to say that Australian politicians seem to be leaning toward an evolved Collins Class submarine, given the riskiness of designing a new boat. The political dynamics at work are more interesting:
“An evolved Collins-class has emerged as the favoured option for Australia’s next generation of submarines amid signs the much maligned existing boats will remain in service beyond 2030…. Few sources close to defence believe it will opt for a new design given the risk of having an orphan boat class. Treasurer Joe Hockey is said to be uneasy with the mooted pricetag of $36 billion. Defence Minister David Johnston has also cast doubt on whether Australia will double its fleet to 12, saying the number first mooted in the former prime minister’s 2009 white paper has never been justified.”
The report also says that decision makers are more comfortable leaving the Collins Class in service until 2030 – ironically, because they’ve been defective so often and spent so much time out of water. Sources: Australian Financial Review, “Evolved Collins favourite but timing unclear”.
Jan 20/14: Political pushback. The A$ 30-40 billion size of the future submarine project guarantees political scrutiny, but that won’t really begin until it’s a near-term project rather than just funded studies. The Sydney Morning Herald decides to start as the new center-right Liberal Party government prepares its 1st budget, and it’s coming from a right-wing source:
“Whatever one may think of [new Board member] Mirabella [q.v. Dec 17/13], she is an economic dry and does not shirk the dirty work of confronting spendthrift bureaucrats, military brass and trade unions, all of whom have treated the Australian Submarine Corporation and the Defence Materiel Organisation as a giant honey pot.
Both organisations are impervious to competence…. The idea that Australia should produce a dozen submarines in South Australia, at a projected cost of about $3 billion a vessel, is madness…. The new submarines will have a unit cost that dwarfs the Collins-class subs if built here, or roughly three times the cost of acquiring the submarines from foreign shipyards. The navy disputes this disparity but history does not.”
As many observers have noted before: please tell us how you really feel, Paul Sheehan. More seriously, this is an early sign that Abbott’s traditional allies may not be solidly behind the program as currently conceived. Meanwhile, the Labor Party is no longer in power, and hence no longer really bound to defend a program that will demand many more dollars for national defense. Sources: Sydney Morning Herald, “Future Submarine project a farce that has missed a mention”.
2013
Combat system picked. Potential work with Japan?
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Dec 17/13: ASC Board. Former Liberal Party MP Sophie Mirabella, a 12-year incumbent who was the only party incumbent to lose her seat in the recent election, is appointed to ASC’s Board of Directors by Prime Minister Tony Abbott, alongside new members Peter Iancov and Paul Rizzo.
Ms. Mirabella does have qualifications as the Coalition’s Shadow Minister for Innovation, Industry and Science while they were in opposition, and is known as a strong opponent of public sector waste. It’s arguable that ASC could use both, given the scale and importance of the projects they’re handling, and will soon begin to execute. Prime Minister Abbott could certainly use a critically-minded loyalist on the inside, to avert problems or at least give him advance warning of any nasty surprises. Now he has one. Sources: Minister for Finance, “Appointment of Three New Board Members to ASC Pty Ltd” | Sydney Morning Herald, “Coalition appoints Sophie Mirabella to board of government-owned shipbuilding firm”.
May 16/13: IP deal. Australia’s government signs a deal with Sweden’s FMV procurement agency, Intellectual Property rights for submarine design and technology. As RAND’s 2011 report had noted (q.v. Dec 13/11), this was a major stumbling block for any sort of Evolved Collins design.
The agreement covers use of Collins Class submarine technology for the Future Submarine Program. It also creates a framework and principles for the negotiation of Intellectual Property rights, if Australia wants to be able to use and disclose other Swedish submarine technology for an Evolved Collins solution. Disclosure is included because there are sub-contractors et. al. who require some level of disclosure in order to work on the project. Defense Ministers Joint Communique | Australia DoD.
Swedish Intellectual Property Agreement
May 2/13: White Paper. The Labor government’s 2013 defense white paper rejects the safer and quicker options of buying or modifying an existing class from abroad. Instead, they’ll focus on options #3 & 4: an evolved design of the Collins Class, or a completely new Australian design. As part of that decision, they’re going to continue with the American AN/BYG-1 combat system as their standard. It equips every class of American nuclear submarines thanks to a combination of initial installs and systems modernizations, and a BYG-1(V)8 variant was inserted into the current Collins Class as Project SEA 1439 Phase 4A.
This is a decision that exacerbates both the performance risks so amply illustrated by the Collins Class to date, and the risks of delayed in-service date for new boats. Which is why it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the government has extended their estimates of how long the Collins Class can serve. Unless they want a gap where Australia loses its submarines entirely, or operates with a much-reduced force, delays and decisions to date mean that the government can’t say anything else. Whether their study’s carefully-couched conclusion is true in an operational sense is a different question.
On the topic of performance risks, even with the new Submarine Propulsion Energy Support and Integration Facility, the submarine skills plan, and government plans to improve productivity in Australian shipbuilding, the new submarine decision expands almost every possible risk facing the Australian Navy’s future strategic centerpiece. It may be that a new propulsion system can fix some of the Collins Class’ problems, but the boats’ problems over the years have stemmed from a wide variety of defects and failures, across multiple systems. There are conflicting reports regarding the extent and success of the fixes tried to date, and one can be forgiven some skepticism that the same organizations responsible for the present situation can create or insert new designs that solve all of their previous mistakes. Since the systems will be new, or at the very least not proven in operations with the boat they’re inserted into, it’s also more than possible that “unforeseen” delays will make it hard to get new boats into service before the existing fleet becomes unfit for purpose.
In exchange, of course, the government gets to promise more spending with a state-owned firm (ASC) and its sub-contractors, on behalf of a Labor Party whose political standing is shaky, a few months before an election. Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan | Australia DoD release | ASC | ASPI | ASPI Shipbuilding timeline.
2013 White Paper, Combat System picked
Feb 13/13: Japan. The New Pacific Institute reports that Japanese media are now openly discussing a Soryu Class deal with Australia, and chronicles the process so far. Bottom line: If a deal is consummated, it’s going to be a delicate process of mutual trade-offs, not a straightforward transaction:
“The article did not offer much additional detail about how the process from here is likely to unfold, although it did frame the technology transfer as part of a supposedly mutual desire to balance against Chinese naval activities. It nevertheless suggests that defense officials are still considering the plan and that the chances are good that something will come out of the process notwithstanding any domestic or international backlash. The main issue for the Japanese side likely revolves what level of information and access to provide to the Royal Australian Navy.”
The relaxation of Japan’s export laws was meant to support joint development projects like the SM-3 Block IIA, rather than a 1-way transfer of technology to a foreign shipbuilder. Japan sees submarines as a strategic technology for its own preservation, and must weigh the risk of dissemination against the potential benefits. NPI doesn’t believe that complicating China’s life is enough of an inducement all by itself. Meanwhile, Australia knows that it wants a large diesel-electric sub, and believes that Japan has a reliable propulsion system design. Cooperation that stops short of full-scale licensed submarine construction might be an option for both parties.
2012
Initial studies budget; Is the project about pork-barrel politics, at the expense of defending Australia? Japan’s Soryu Class enters the mix; Kokoda’s shoddy study.
JS Soryu
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Nov 15/12: Requirements. David Feeney, Parliamentary Secretary of Defence, speaks to the Submarine Institute of Australia Biennial Conference. He describes regional trends that could see A$ 44 billion spent by 2021 and up to 150 diesel-electric submarines operational, offers a naval “sea control” doctrine formulation straight from Sir Julian Corbett, and adds more clarity to his government’s expectations for the future submarine:
“Denial retains a place, but sea control operations ensure that Australian response options are not constrained and our freedom of action is not threatened. It is inconceivable that Australia can achieve sea control – a requirement for successful maritime power projection – without submarines.
Government is resolved that the Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities (i.e. communications) as compared to the current Collins Class submarine. The Future Submarine must be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUVs)… conduct strike operations against military targets, including an adversary’s operating bases, staging areas and critical military infrastructure.
Relative to other nations that operate diesel-electric submarines, the Future Submarine must operate across exceptionally vast distances… Asia-Pacific possesses numerous critical maritime nodes – notably the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait- all of which are critical to the global economy. These nodes are 2,000 or even 3,000 nm from [naval base] HMAS Stirling.”
The problem is that those requirements amount to a unique requirements set that will add massive costs to the project, along with risk that the next batch will fail like the Collins Class. Industry infrastructure is acknowledged to be shaky. Could the same money be used to buy an existing design, along with the sub tenders needed to give it all of that range and more? Or a set of submarines plus other critical sea control forces (like maritime aircraft)? Very likely. But the “made in Australia” rhetoric is all about jobs and perceived government largesse first, and defense second. Australia DoD Transcript.
Nov 14/12: Jobs justification. Jason Claire, Minister for Defence Materiel, speaks to the Submarine Institute of Australia’s 6th Biennial Conference. He begins by justifying the need for large submarines, on the grounds that they need to operate at long ranges. There are other approaches which could address this issue, but it makes for a useful uniqueness justification when he gets to the speech’s point – justifying his decision to build all of the submarines in Australia.
That approach significantly raises the risks of program failure, and of failure to replace existing boats in time. If the submarines really were a strategic priority, an approach that had the first 2-3 subs built abroad with Australian engineers on site, and the rest built locally as expertise grows, would be the obvious plan. Note, too, Claire’s use of the word “design,” indicating that despite government assurances, use of an existing submarine design isn’t getting serious consideration from this government:
“…will create thousands of jobs and work for hundreds of Australian companies. More than this it will create a new Australian industry… It will take decades to build 12 submarines, and by the time the last is built the first will need to be replaced. It’s not a short project. It will go on and on. It will create an industry that could last for a century or more. That industry should be here. That industry also has flow on benefits. It will build skills useful for other industries and technology… also build the capabilities and skills of our universities and our technical colleges… it is important we have an indigenous capability that can design, develop, build and maintain submarines.
That is not something we can or should do on our own… But we also can’t, and shouldn’t, outsource the whole task… Acquiring nuclear powered submarines… [means] outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines… built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas. That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.
We have got a valley of death between the last AWD and the start of construction of the first future submarine. It’s a valley where jobs are lost and the skills we need will disappear… We need to fix this. This is the job of the Future Submarines Industry Skills Plan that I will receive next month.”
Sept 6/12: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces that the Future Submarine Systems Centre will be based in Adelaide, South Australia. There had been some concern that the work might migrate elsewhere, but this is where Australia’s naval shipbuilding infrastructure is located.
The Systems Centre is set to formally open in 2013 as the home of the Future Submarine program, much as the AWD Centre in Adelaide has been the home of the A$ 8 billion Air Warfare Destroyer program. There are already staff working on the project, but they are based at state-owned shipbuilder ASC. Once they move, the center will be used to conduct evaluation of options, design work, program management, engineering, logistics and production planning. Over the next few years, it will grow to include hundreds of Defence personnel from Navy, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), and defense contractors.
There has also been a steady drumbeat of criticism over Australia’s slow decision-making, and the government’s readiness to choose an industrial structure that will roughly double the program’s cost to A$ 36 billion or more, and introduce significant risk. Even as the RAN has extreme difficulties sustaining and manning its existing fleet of 6 Collins Class subs. The government is sticking to the 2009 plan of 12 new submarines to be assembled in South Australia, with the same 4 options under study, etc. The minister adds that this commitment will be reinforced as part of the 2013 Defence White Paper.
Aug 28/12: Where’s Coles Review 2? Liberal Party opposition defense critic Sen. Johnston releases a statement:
“Part 2 of the Coles Review of the Sustainment of Australia’s Collins Class Submarines was expected to be handed to the Minister in April, but in spite of the Minister declaring Collins Class sustainment was at the top of the Government’s Project of Concern List, it is still nowhere to be seen… I can see why the Defence Minister isn’t exactly pushing down Mr Coles’ door as Part 1 of his report was a damning indictment… Senator Johnston said this year alone taxpayers will spend close to $1 billion on maintenance and sustainment of the Collins Class with only one, sometimes two out of six submarines operationally ready at any one time.”
The review doesn’t arrive until mid-December 2012.
July 25 – Aug 3/12: Breakdowns & delays. After reporting a successful torpedo firing and sinking exercise during RIMPAC 2012, Australia’s DoD reveals that a leak is forcing HMAS Farncomb to return to port immediately. The Liberal Party’s shadow defence minister, David Johnston, reminds Sydney Morning Herald readers that these kinds of breakdowns are all too common, while highlighting the timing problem that could leave Australia without a viable fleet. The time for a decision, he says, is now:
“The ASPI report described the gap between when all the Collins Class have been retired and the time it would take to build a replacement as “nothing short of catastrophic”… three years “of no submarines at all”… After some prodding the Minister also declared [in May 2012, 3 years after the White Paper] a final decision on the replacement would not be made until late 2013 or 2014 – in other words, not until after the next election… all against the backdrop of our submarines being so operationally fragile that competing in exercises with allies becomes a case of going in with fingers crossed… We also have our submariners reluctantly leaving the Navy because they simply don’t get time at sea doing what they signed up to do.”
July 9/12: Japan’s Soryu? RAN Future Submarine Program head Rear-Admiral Rowan Moffitt, and DMO Chief Defence Scientist Dr. Alexander Zelinsky are traveling to Japan to look at the country’s new 4,200t Soryu (“Blue Dragon”) Class/ 16SS submarines.
Japan relaxed its ban on weapon exports somewhat in December 2011, which opens up the possibility of an Australian-built submarine derivative. On the flip side, the previous ban means that Japanese firms lack the same kind of technology transfer and off-site quality control experience that has been earned over the years by Germany’s HDW (Greece, India, South Korea, Turkey), and France’s DCNS (Brazil, India).
The Soryus have a Stirling Air Independent Propulsion system, and began service just 3 years ago. They’re also much larger than competitors like France’s 2,060t MESMA AIP equipped AM-2000 Scorpene. That makes the Soryus attractive to Australia, and some think they might have the range and capacity Australia needs. It’s worth noting that smaller submarines like Germany’s 1,830t U212As have traveled thousands of miles while submerged, and technically have a longer range than the Soryus. Still, bigger is better to some. The Japanese subs do offer a lot more space for weapons, and a similar submarine design might offer interesting opportunities for Australian-Japanese operational cooperation. Adelaide Now | Sydney Morning Herald.
May 3/12: Initial budget & plans. Australia’s Labor Party government announces a budget of another A$ 214 million for the next stage of the Future Submarine Project, and appoints Mr. David Gould as the DoD’s General Manager of Submarines, working within the DMO and reporting directly to its CEO. The initial budget will pay for detailed studies and analysis to inform the design choice, the cost/ capability tradeoffs, and the workforce skills requirements to build them in Australia. Those funds are on top of the government’s December 2011 RFI, and the contract with Babcock for a land-based propulsion testing site.
Overall, the Government announces that they’re considering 4 broad options for diesel-electric fast attack submarines, as outlined above. with respect to the studies and work conducted:
Scientific and technological studies will be conducted primarily by the Australian DoD’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).
The off-the-shelf studies will be undertaken with same trio of firms who were sent the December 2011 RFI: DCNS (Scorpene), TKMS HDW (U212A/214), and Navantia (S-80). TKMS Kockums will perform the evolved design studies for the Collins Class, as they were its original designers.
An interesting 2nd look will happen within the AUSMIN framework agreed in November 2010. US technical cooperation will involve capability modeling for both off-the-shelf and evolved Collins options. Systems Performance and Analysis, and GD Electric Boat, will do that work under a US Foreign Military Sales case.
The workforce skills plan will be developed by a team be led by the DoD’s Defence Materiel Organisation CEO, Mr. Warren King, and supported by an Expert Industry Panel headed by Mr. David Mortimer, AO. The Expert Industry Panel will include representatives of the Navy; DMO; the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education; Skills Australia; unions; the CEOs of ASC, Austal, BAE Systems and Forgacs Engineering; and the Australian CEOs for local subsidiaries of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Thales, Saab Systems and BAE Systems. Australia DoD.
Budget & Studies
April 23/12: An interview with Minister for Defence Stephen Smith touches on the Collins Class’ ongoing problems, and the decisions to be taken regarding Australia’s future submarines. An excerpt:
“So there are capability issues [with the operating ranges required for Australian submarines] but no decisions have been made other than the Government ruling out a nuclear [propulsion] option… Australia does not have a nuclear industry, and if we acquired nuclear submarines that would effectively see the outsourcing to another country of our maintenance and sustainment… We remain committed to 12 submarines assembled in Australia.
“…Whether there is a gap in capability will in the end depend upon the decision that we make about the new submarine, firstly; secondly, the length of life or the life of type of the Collins Class Submarine. That is currently not known… one of the studies we have currently under way is a study trying to better define the life of type of the Collins Class Submarine… it would have been in my view wrong – indeed, irresponsible – to have leapt into a Future Submarine Project without trying to address the long-standing endemic, systemic difficulties that we’ve had with the Collins Class Submarine.”
April 21/12: Captain’s Critique. Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, resigns from the RAN after commanding both HMAS Waller and HMAS Collins. While the boats and their crews had “serviced the navy well and achieved much,” the media obtain a copy of his overall assessment. It is stark and scathing: scrap the class.
“I don’t believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad… Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse… Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores… Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome.”
The submarines’ diesel engines come in for special criticism, but they are far from his only target. His final conclusion has special relevance to Australia’s next-generation program: “I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.” The Australian.
Jan 19/12: Kokoda criticized. The Kokoda Foundation releases its study “Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine,” written by former ASC employee Brice Pacey. It concludes that no off-the-shelf conventional submarine can meet Australia’s requirements, and that a nuclear submarine program is unaffordable and unmanageable. Instead, it recommends “an evolution of the Collins design,” and claim that “the cost of building the submarine will be markedly less than some published estimates… there is no cost penalty for an Australian build.” These statements are from the foundation’s release; the full document itself is a for-fee publication.
While there is widespread agreement that nuclear-powered SSN fast attack boats are not a realistic option for Australia, the foundation’s other 3 conclusions draw fire. First, submarine-builder ASC’s sponsorship of the paper has led several observers to question the study’s seriousness and objectivity. The critics add that requirements themselves are arbitrary, unless the gaps involving current state-of-the-art submarines create serious mission problems, and the cost to field a 100% solution is acceptable. Given the demonstrated capabilities of submarines like the U214, they see the capability gap as too small, and the price gap as too large.
On which topic, reports indicate Kokoda estimates of just A$ 18 billion for the 12 boats, which is, indeed, significantly less than other published estimates. The history of the Collins Class, with respect to both build costs and performance, is not overly encouraging, and the credibility of this estimate has been deeply doubted. ASPI analyst Andrew Davies summed up this view with a Carl Sagan quote: “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” Kokoda Foundation release [PDF] | Canberra Times | Lowy Institute for International Policy.
2011
German “Type 216″?; Learning from other submarine programs – including Australia’s.
U214 cutaway
(click to view full)
Dec 28/11: Type 216? HDW has released details of a 4,000t “Type 216″ concept design, which appears to be targeted at Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine program.
Australian sources have expressed concerns that the U214, and other boats investigated in the RFI, may not have the size and range to meet Australia’s specification. This may or may not be accurate, but a larger design could conceivably appeal to customers like Australia, India, and possibly Canada one day.
With doubts growing that an Australian-designed successor to the Collins class boat cannot be ready by the 2025 deadline, HDW might find some traction with a large submarine that offered 10,400 nm/ 19.240 km notional range, Air-Independent Propulsion for long underwater patrols; and the ability to launch cruise missiles, a special forces swimmer delivery vehicle, or UUVs. The flip side is that first-of-class boats can be problematic, even if the class is designed by a very experienced and skilled firm. The Greek experience with the 1st of class Papanikolis (U214) is instructive here. Canberra Times | Navy Recognition (incl. drawings).
click to read
Dec 13/11: Studies & Contenders. The Phase 1 Coles Review into the Collins Class’ difficulties is released, and goes as far as calling Australia’s approach to managing submarines “unfit for purpose.” The same day, Australia’s DoD releases RAND’s requested report of lessons learned from US, UK, and Australian submarine programs, and discusses the class options they’re investigating:
“Options for the Future Submarine range from a proven fully Military off the Shelf design through to a completely new submarine. All options are being considered, other than nuclear propulsion which the Government has ruled out… The Government has approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers… [to] provide a better understanding of the capabilities of off-the-shelf options.”
The list deals a blow to recent reports, as it’s made up of France’s DCNS (Scorpene), Germany’s TKMS HDW (Type 214), and Australia’s biggest shipbuilding partner, Spain’s Navantia (S-80). TKMS’ Swedish Kockums subsidiary, who worked with Australia to design the Collins Class, didn’t see its developmental A26 Class make the list.
The government isn’t stopping there. Australia’s DoD has signed a contract with Babcock Australia to study a land-based propulsion systems test facility, and the Defence Materiel Organisation has been ordered to develop a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, in consultation with Australia’s defense industry. Meanwhile, the Government refers to the discussions and agreement with the USA at AUSMIN 2010, regarding Australian-United States cooperation on submarine systems, which “will extend into future submarine acquisition program.” That could add one more advantage to Navantia, whose S-80 uses a number of American technologies. Australia DoD | RAND Report | Coles Review, Phase 1 [PDF].
Coles Review & RAND Report
Oct 15/11: The Labor Party government’s leader in the Senate, Chris Evans, indicates that components and possibly modules of Australia’s future submarines are expected to be built beyond South Australia, and even overseas. This is not a surprising plan, given the history of the Collins Class, but it creates political sparks. ASC, of course, is lobbying to keep everything it can in-house. The Australian | Adelaide Now.
Oct 15/11: Australian media report on the Collins Class’ annual costs, and future sub competition:
“Figures obtained by the Herald Sun, show the six Collins subs cost about $630 million a year – or $105 million each – to maintain, making them the most expensive submarines ever to put to sea… A US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine – more than three times the size of a Collins boat – costs about $50 million a year to operate.
The cost figures are revealed as Defence officials say at least two possible contenders for the navy’s new submarine fleet – the Spanish S-80 and French-Spanish Scorpene class boat – have been ruled out of the future submarine project.”
If true, one wonders what’s left. Sweden is just beginning to design a new A26 Class, and Germany’s HDW has its U214. Russian designs aren’t a realistic option. The other possibility is that Australia might seek, once again, to design its own submarine. Herald Sun | Courier Mail, incl. infographic | Australia’s Daily Telegraph.
July 25/11: The Australian reports that Australia’s DoD:
“…will seek US help with Australia’s plan to build 12 big conventional submarines to replace the navy’s six troubled Collins-class boats… After initial problems with the Collins fleet a decade ago, the US provided a state-of-the-art combat system and the latest technology to improve the subs’ propulsion systems and make them less noisy.”
July 19/11: Coles Review begins. Labor Party Defence Minister Stephen Smith admits that there are “long-term difficulties” with the Collins Class submarine fleet, and announces a full independent review led by British private sector expert John Coles. The Minister cites too many stretches where only 1-2 submarines have been available, and there are reportedly doubts that the subs’ diesel engines are robust enough to last until 2025 as planned:
“These problems are significant and highly technically complex. At times we have seen as few as one Collins Class sub