Today, August 1, 2016, expert Henri Locard continued his testimony in front of the Trial Chamber. He first told the court, under questioning of the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Pich Ang, about arrests and living conditions in prisons. He was then challenged by both defense teams with regards to his credibility and asked to give individual sources for several claims he had made.
Conclusion of Civil Party Lawyers’ Questions
All parties were present, with Nuon Chea following the hearing from the holding cell. The Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn then issued an oral ruling regarding the request of 29 July 2016 admission of the table of contents of Henri Locard’s PhD thesis and an article.[1] The documents were admitted and assigned E3 numbers.[2] He then handed the floor the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers.
National Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Pich Ang commenced his questioning by inquiring about the administrative system of the prisons. Mr. Locard answered that the prison system was based on the district administration. It included people’s communes. As for Tram Kok District, he said that the three people who had managed the commune level were responsible for arresting the enemies together with the local military.
He said that security matters were one of the highest priorities for the divisions. Thus, directives were given accordingly.
Mr. Ang asked whether the security centers could communicate with the higher echelon. Mr. Locard answered that “it is at the district level that the decision to execute or to free or to send to a re-education camp was made”. He said that evidence about this had been shown in court with regards to Kraing Ta Chan and Tram Kok.
Moeung Sonn recognized some of the officials from Kampong Som and former monks when he was arrested. “It was the elite from the past”. Mr. Locard explained that a communist revolution meant to arrest the old elites. When he was arrested again, all social classes were arrested. Angkar was “getting more and more suspicious” and the revolution was getting “out of hand’.
National Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer Pich Ang
As for the reasons of the arrests, he said that “individuals no longer existed in Democratic Kampuchea”. Thus, “every individual was just one small atom in a machine, and that was Angkar.” This also applied to decisions: “individual decisions were unheard of”. Thus, when someone allegedly committed an error or crime, it was unperceivable that he would have taken this decision by himself and that he must have been part of a wider plot.
The living conditions in the provincial prisons, he said, “were even worse than S-21”, since the inmates had no right to wash themselves. He said that one had to be careful about generalizing, since “it was chaos”. The food was very simple all over Cambodia: clear rice soup twice a day and a very small amount. “Usually after three or four weeks, people could not survive”. This was better at S-21, since prisoners could survive several months. “And of course there was no medical care whatsoever”. There were “nothing of the sort” of sleeping mats or mosquito nets. “They were beaten by insects, particularly as they were sweating and they were dirty”. They could not go out to relieve themselves, but had tins being passed around. “The inmates were kept much shorter than in S-21. As I wrote, I think the average was three weeks”. Hence, “lots of people died at night”.
There were three main causes of death: hunger, interrogations and executions. The number of people who were released were higher in the beginning of the regime. He said that every provincial prison released some prisoners, but estimated that this was not higher than three, four or five percent.
Credibility of the Expert Questioned by the Defense
The floor was granted to Defense Team for Nuon Chea. Victor Koppe started by revisiting his method of research. Mr. Koppe asked the expert whether he would agree that he was not an expert in psychology or psychiatry, which he did. When Mr. Koppe wanted to know that it was therefore only his personal opinion that Nuon Chea was schizophrenic, power hungry or suffered from paranoia, Mr. Locard said that he was repeating from recognized academic, and that it was therefore not his personal opinion only. There was a French psychiatrist who wrote the biography of Robespierre (Jean Artarit) who had used that term.
He agreed that he was not an expert of agriculture, “although I’ve done a lot of gardening”. However, he refuted the claim that it was merely his personal opinion that three tons of rice per hectare were unrealistic: “Every single individual who has written about Democratic Kampuchea.” Asked whether he considered himself a political scientist, he replied that he had no degree in this field, but that he had practically worked in this field: “You learn as you practice”.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he had heard of something called peer-review, which the expert confirmed. “My research was continuously reviewed”. This review was conducted by readers, journalists, and academics. He reviewed a book by François Bizot as well as Ben Kiernan’s Pol Pot – History of a Nightmare”. He also had reviewed academic papers, mainly in French. Mr. Koppe wanted to know whether there was a specific reason that he could not find some of the publications on his CV. Mr. Locard answered that you gave “the main publications” when writing their CVs. “For an average academic I have published at least an average number of publications”.
Mr. Koppe referred to his statement of his first trial day, in which he had said “I’m just a simple historian”.[3] He wanted to know whether he was already a historian when he came to Cambodia for the first time after the Khmer Rouge regime. Mr. Locard replied that his main area of expertise was history even when being an English teacher. He had published the autobiography by Moeung Sonn already. He had received a sabbatical year, fully paid, without any teaching obligations in Lyon. “I think I have been quite active”. His changing subjects was unusual in the French speaking world, but quite common in the English speaking world. Mr. Koppe asked whether he was not a historian in the academic sense back then. Mr. Locard said that he had not had an academic degree, but had taught “virtually nothing but British history” for several years.
Mr. Koppe asked whether the factors of that he had not taped the interviews and only spoke a little bit of Khmer had “troubled” the professors when evaluating his PhD thesis. Mr. Locard categorically denied this. This prompted Mr. Koppe to ask how they had verified the information. One of the members of the board was Khmer and there were four members on the board. “They gave me the best honors for my thesis”. Mr. Koppe pushed this topic further and wanted to know whether they had read his notes and could verify the information and interviews he indicated. “I think you make this court […] and the people who are behind me […] waste their time by asking totally useless questions. You said earlier that you have very limited time. If you have limited time, ask relevant questions”.
Trial Chamber President Nil Nonn
Mr. Koppe moved on and asked whether the panel of professors who graded his PhD thesis knew that he had at first collected the slogans in a non-academic way and “just for fun”. Mr. Locard confronted counsel: “The question is irrelevant, therefore I refuse to answer it”. The President instructed the expert to answer the question. Mr. Locard replied that if collecting the slogans were “just for fun” why it was published by Silkworm books and were still on sale in Monument books. “That is indeed a good question”, Mr. Koppe addressed the expert.
The main sources were Khmer Rouge themselves and the Khmer Rouge radio, which was “entirely written by Khmer Rouge officials”. These were his basis for his comments on the slogans. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was correct that there were no references to Revolutionary Flags, minutes of meetings, or telegrams in his book. Mr. Locard said that this was possible, since his research originated from his field work. This was because of wanted to be “the mouthpiece of the people and understand how they understood the regime, how they lived the regime”. Therefore, his sources were not the official records of the regime.
Mr. Koppe confronted the witness: “Why is it that you did not look for corroboration [in these documents] if you pretend to give a full picture of the Khmer Rouge ideology?” Mr. Locard replied that he looked for corroboration on the ground and at people’s testimonies. “And in all testimonies you find slogans, this type of slogans”.
When Mr. Koppe pressed on, Mr. Locard replied: “Let me return the question to you. You are lucky enough to defend a character who was an extremely important person during Democratic Kampuchea. […] But you advise them to stick to their right to remain silent”.
When Mr. Koppe asked whether he knew what confirmation bias meant, Mr. Locard denied this. Mr. Koppe defined it as the “tendency to interpret new information so that it becomes compatible with existing information”. He explained that he said in court on his first day that he conducted his research to “understand why there has been this catastrophic regime” and asked whether he had this bias before he started his research. Mr. Locard snapped back: “I don’t know about Holland, where you come from, but I can tell you that in France, we are taught from early childhood to exercise critical thinking”. He insisted: “We never stop criticizing, and criticizing, and criticizing” and gave an example of the popular belief that the Khmer Rouge “destroyed everything”, which he did not agree upon. “I think the Khmer Rouge have committed enough crimes”, which is why he became angry when someone accused Khmer Rouge with crimes that they did not commit.
Asked about his concrete method to counter confirmation basis, Mr. Locard gave the example of rape: He had thought that rape would have been rare, since Rule 6 said to respect women. However, when looking back at his notes, he realized that this was committed “systematically” before women were executed. Thus, he had a bias beforehand that rape had been rare, but changed his mind when he reviewed his notes. “I hope I don’t have too many pre-conceived ideas”.
Mr. Koppe referred to his book, in which he had talked about a person who had told him about rape.[4] In this instance, Mr. Locard had said that this person had wanted to “impress a naïve researcher” and did not believe his account. Mr. Koppe asked what made him say this. Mr. Locard recounted that some people were manipulated by the PRK regime. Gradually, he became more independent and did not depend on local authorities and could therefore interview people more freely.
Interviews
After the break, Mr. Locard inquired whether he was in a position to say how many people were victims and how many people were CPK cadres of the people he interviewed. “As I was researching the darker side of Democratic Kampuchea, that is the prison system, I was really addressing myself to the victims”. However, he found a few Khmer Rouge cadres. Moreover, Khmer Rouge cadres were also victims themselves often, or at least close relatives of them. Mr. Koppe asked how he had ensured to have collected a representative sample during his research. He answered that they were not representative in general, but applicable to the prisons. First, there were victims who had been imprisoned. Second, there were people who lived around there. Third, there were the Khmer Rouge cadres themselves.
He disagreed with the methods of DC-Cam: “They had tended to inflate the numbers of the victims […] by one third”.
First, the duration of the prison was indicative of how many people had been there. Second, he would know from people surrounding the area how many people were brought in and out. Third, as for the number of people who were killed, he estimated this on the basis of people who were freed.
Mr. Koppe said that there were no archives for other prisons than Kraing Ta Chan and S-21. “How are you even in a position to make such a statement?” He said that Mr. Koppe just said that he visited a quarter of the prisons, and that this already covered a significant number of the prisons. He said that there were no numbers on people who died of starvation, illnesses, executions, or mass executions.
Mr. Koppe gave the reference for his statement that Mr. Locard had visited less than one quarter of the prisons.[5]
As for the collection of the slogans, the expert explained that he wanted to collect them “as they were uttered at the grassroot in the peoples’ communes” and not as they were distributed on the radio. He did not include the ones that were written on the walls in S-21. “They did not seem genuine to me”.
Mr. Koppe asked him to elaborate on his statement that DC-Cam rejected his offer to work with the “because I was a Frenchman” and that it did not seem “open to the public”. He said that “I think that in DC-Cam there is not much interest in the French language” There were, to his knowledge, no French documents in the institution and that “the head does not speak or read French”.
As for Philip Short, Mr. Locard said that he had “great admiration” for him. When Philip Short came to Cambodia, this county “puzzled” him. He said that Mr. Short was “much more competent, much more active than me”. Thus, “he was a great leap forward”. In contrast to David Chandler, Mr. Locard said that Philip Short did directly speak for the people. He said that “Philip Short interviewed far more Khmer Rouge officials than others”. He had a different approach to doing research than David Chandler. He named a few people that Ben Kiernan had interviewed, such as included Phy Phuon, Suong Sikhoeun and Khieu Samphan, and said that he also interviewed a number of people who were involved directly or indirectly in the Khmer Rouge regime.
As for his interview with Ieng Sary, he confirmed that he had notes about this. He pointed out that it was a short interview.
Mr. Koppe wanted to know what Phy Phuon told him that had not already been said in the courtroom, since he had said that he was a “useful source”. Mr. Locard explained that he had repeated what he had already said in court. He had explained to him what they meant with the Long March, gave him details about the civil war, the seizure of Phnom Penh. As for what information exactly he had given to him that he had not told the court yet, Mr. Locard said that he had worked with him for 18 months, while the court only questioned him for three or four days.
Further research
Mr. Koppe inquired whether Mr. Locard agreed with Philip Short and S-21 should be compared to the French security centers in Algeria in the 1950s. Mr. Locard replied that he “did not know a lot”, because he was “quite young” during the time in Algeria and was not a specialist of the Algerian period. “I’m not absolutely convinced that the comparison is relevant”. Mr. Koppe asked whether he conducted research on how many prisons existed before 1975. Mr. Locard said that this was the subject of the research of Luc Binesh, who he had worked with. The idea of wooden shackles and chains existed already during the colonial period, but that they would be chained only at night time. Later, they learned how to interrogate people. When Mr. Koppe insisted on the question, he said that it was “a pity” that the tribunal did not question Duch about the period precedent to 1975 sufficiently. He did not compare the prisons under the Democratic Kampuchea to the prisons from pre-1975. Instead, he compared them to the prisons under the Soviet Union. He had not conducted research with regards to prisons post-1979.
Mr. Koppe referred to his interview with a chief of a small village nearby Kraing Ta Chan.[6] He confirmed that he had talked to this person. He also confirmed that most of the people he had interviewed talked about other security centers that were not in the scope of the trial. Mr. Koppe asked whether it was correct that the interview with Hu Khel was the only addition to the tribunal and that all other documents were already in possession of the tribunal. Mr. Locard confirmed this and said that his research now related to the archives of Kraing Ta Chan.
Mr. Koppe said that he also mentioned a person called Pen Sovan.[7] Mr. Locard said that he had interviewed this person in Takeo City and that he had notes of this interview. He said that he had summarized the most important points in his paper about Kraing Ta Chan, but could look into his notes to verify whether he had left out any important points.
At this point, the President adjourned the hearing for a break.
Cold War and Comparisons to Other Countries
After the break, Mr. Koppe turned to the comparison between the Khmer Rouge and the Cold War that Mr. Locard had made and asked about atrocities committed by Western states from 1975 until 1979. Mr. Locard answered briefly: “On that subject I know nothing”.
Mr. Koppe asked whether he knew anything about the mass atrocities committed in 1965 in Indonesia. Mr. Locard said that he knew from secondary sources that the Khmer Rouge were “very much aware” of the atrocities committed in Indonesia with hundreds of thousands of victims mainly in the Chinese community. He said that Nuon Chea was aware of this and was therefore very focused on protecting the leadership. He had not studied in detail what happened in Indonesia in 1965.
Back to the Slogans
Moving to his next topic, Mr. Koppe quoted Mr. Locard, who had said that the slogans “strikingly expressed DK policy”.[8] Mr. Locard replied that they presented “a summary of what were the main policies of Democratic Kampuchea”.
Moreover, he had collected all slogans around how “clever Angkar was”, as well as how enemies were identified and their fate. When asked why he had not used Revolutionary Flag, for example, he questioned why these should be the only sources and why one should not rely on secondary sources.
As for the slogan that 17 April People were parasites, Mr. Locard recounted that he heard the saying throughout the country.[9] Mr. Koppe asked whether it did not “concern him” that the term 17 April People could not be found in any official sources. “I couldn’t care less”, he said, since his sources were “the brains of people”.
In Democratic Kampuchea policies, “most of their policies they borrowed from the radical Chinese communists”. They abolished classes, “but they created casts”, the difference being between the two that there was no social mobility in the latter. The old people were also called the 18th of March People, making reference to people who joined the revolution on 18 March 1970.
Mr. Koppe inquired about the meaning of “Angkar is God”.[10] Mr. Locard told the court that instead of praying to make the rain come, Nuon Chea said that people should use their hard labor on the irrigation systems. Mr. Koppe referred to his testimony, in which he had said that monks were worms and asked what he meant with “microbes speech”[11] He said that he had taken this term from Steven Heder. Before eliminating people, “they had to be excluded from mankind”. Mr. Koppe inquired whether he knew who said the following quote: “We will continue to cleanse the virus from all state institutions, because this virus has spread. Unfortunately like cancer, this virus has enveloped the state”, which the witness could not recollect. The expert said that it was not a slogan but more seemed to originate from a speech from a person in power. Mr. Koppe affirmed this and said that it originated from a speech given by Erdogan in Turkey.
Questions by the Khieu Samphan Defense Team
The floor was granted to Khieu Samphan Defense Counsel Anta Guissé, who pointed to “The Black Book – Actions of Aggressions of Vietnam”.[12] Mr. Locard confirmed that he drew information from his book and said that Pol Pot was the author.
He also confirmed that the radio broadcasts were pure propaganda aimed at people oversea and Khmer Rouge cadres.
David Chandler and Steven Heder had used sources that were secret material under the Khmer Rouge as primary sources, and Mr. Locard had relied on them in turn. Ms. Guissé asked whether the Kraing Ta Chan archives were the only sources that he relied on. The expert confirmed this and said that it would have been useless to reproduce work that had already been conducted by David Chandler, for example. The expert confirmed this as well and had only recently looked at Chhao Seng’s confessions, but was disappointed by it. He never found any other archives.
Nuon Chea Defense Counsel Victor Koppe
Ms. Guissé asked about the difficulty of obtaining archives, because a number of them had been destroyed by the power that took control after Democratic Kampuchea. She wanted to know how he reached his conclusions when he made generalizations, such as the number of people being involved in interrogations. He answered that the written archives did not give much information on this matter. Thus, he received this information from victims and interrogators. Moeung Sonn and his wife were the one that gave him “the key which opened up this mysterious world to me”. She inquired about his statement that the security centers were primarily administered by district and asked whether he knew names and authority structures in the districts. Mr. Locard replied that he had many names, and sometimes numbers, in his notebooks. Since he was not a court researcher, he did not research who these people were. Sometimes he found people who still held political positions today. The repression was “first and foremost” carried out by the Khmer Rouge, but it was difficult to find the prison and district leaders now who are still alive.
In 1977 or 1978, when the purges started with Koy Thuon and spread to the Northwest, West, East and Northeast, people were told that they were purged because they killed too many people. However, he did not believe that. There were only one, two or three criminals in the prisons.
He had made a distinction between notes that were written at the detention center Kraing Ta Chan itself and those who had been written before. She wanted to know how he could make the distinction. Mr. Locard replied that the people who arrived at a prison “had a file with them”. It was “absolutely certain that the people arrived with a file”. First, they were almost all of the New People and all of them asked to write their own biography. They were asked to add more information at the prison. He said that prisoners had told him that they were interrogated and someone took notes. For Moeung Sonn, for example, there were already files about him when he arrived at the prison. As for the archives, he said that there were a bit under 500 files of people, which could not represent the entirety of the prisoners at Kraing Ta Chan.
Ms. Guissé gave a document to the expert and asked whether he remembered having access to this document.[13] He answered that he did not remember the document.
Ms. Guissé referred to a document written by Mr. Locard.[14] He said that at “the entire population” of the East were indeed sometimes regarded as New Population. He said that they had “a lot of indicia” to estimate how many people were executed, such as the number of prisoners, looking at the houses, et cetera.
Research methods
After the last break of the day, Ms. Guissé referred to the numbers indicated by DC-Cam in relation to Wat O Trakuon, when he had said that the numbers “could never have been that precise”. He had called them as “young, inexperienced researchers”.[15] He elaborated on it and said that “there were the bad Khmer Rouge and there were good Khmer Rouge” as described as the “abominable Pol Pot” and “abominable Nuon Chea”, for example and that it was not in the interest of the new regime to say that S-21 was the only prison.
Ms. Guissé quoted statements by people of DC-Cam or other people who worked on reports related to execution sites.[16] She wanted to know who is was accompanied by when going to the sites in the beginning. Mr. Locard answered that during the UNTAC period, he went to the Cultural Office. He said it depended on the places he went to.
Khieu Samphan
As for research relating to pre-1975, he said that there were several chapters on the history of democracy in Cambodia.[17] He had relied on secondary sources here. He answered that he had written a summary of this in Why the Khmer Rouge.
Ms. Guissé asked about his Pol Pot’s Little Red Book, in which he had said that the tasks of the Khmer Rouge were to find all oppositions and kill them, which was subject to discussion at the highest level of leadership.[18] He insisted that Khieu Samphan’s department was the only department that was effective under the Khmer Rouge, but that he had not the specific leadership of repression. “Nothing worked under Democratic Kampuchea, nothing”.
Ms. Guissé said referred to Mr. Locard’s statement that Khieu Samphan was obsessed with cleansing pre-1975, which could be seen as “paranoia”.[19] Mr. Locard answered that Khieu Samphan “was known as Mr. Clean”. He had refused to engage in corruption, for example. He confirmed that he used the term “obsession” following these terms. Ms. Guissé said that in the first edition of his book (the 2013 edition), he had said about Khieu Samphan that he “often was very aggressive” toward European students and that the society needed to be cleansed.[20] Ms. Guissé wanted to know how he drew this generalizing conclusion. He replied that he had already replied to this question. He did not attend the class, since he was at the Lycée Déscartes at the time.
Ms. Guissé inquired wanted to know what led him to belief that Khieu Samphan had been threatened by the Sihanouk Regime and that he had ties with the secret regime. Mr. Locard answered that he had found two mentions: his source in this case was Saloth Ban. This was the nephew of Salot Sor. It was been 1959 and 1963. He had notes of the interview with Saloth Ban.
Ms. Guissé said that three figures could be seen as the clandestine party. She wanted to know what his sources were if he had indication who these figures were. Mr. Locard said that there was no coup d’état against Sihanouk (since he was overthrown in an “overwhelming majority” in the Parliament). He then recounted that there was a trio who led this clandestine movement, who were taught in France. Pol Pot was well-known in the Revolutionary Movement, he said. Ms. Guissé asked whether he had come across information of the French secret service.[21] Before the fall of Phnom Penh, the “American services were of course aware of the situation”. She asked whether he particularly studied the transcripts and judgment of Case 001, which he confirmed. He had followed Steve Heder’s testimony. He answered that “the people in their entirety were certainly not informed, neither were most of the journalists”.
International Defense Counsel Anta Guissé
Ms. Guissé read an excerpt of the first edition of his book. He had said that Khieu Samphan was put to the fore, who was not one of the people in the shadow.[22] His second edition was revised, in which he had said that Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Pol Pot and Son Sen were in the shadow.[23] She asked to explain this difference. The expert said that he had interviewed Phy Phuon and Saloth Ban between the two editions, and explained that Phy Phuon had told him more about the civil war. He recounted that at the time of the capture of Phnom Penh, Khieu Samphan was already in charge of Economic Affairs and in charge of distribution of ammunition.
Ms. Guissé then asked what it meant what he meant when saying that he was in charge of distributing. He answered that he had relied on Phy Phuon for this and that the latter had a very good memory “and remembered everything”. As for Saloth Ban, “he was someone who had just traditional education.” He estimated that he only said half of what he had
There were photographs of Khieu Samphan in Phnom Penh. “Pol Pot was the leader of the army, somewhat like Hitler”. He was the one issuing of orders. Ms. Guissé said that he stated about Khieu Samphan that he was the “very heart of power” as the secretary of the Standing Committee of the Party.[24] He said that “you can’t prove anything”, for example about the level of hierarchy and the like. Ms. Guissé asked whether he agreed with her that his conclusions were based on elements that he did “not necessarily see or study with attention”. He replied that he did not have access to the documents she mentioned. “I relied on the work of others”, especially when he referred to Khieu Samphan as the secretary of the politbureau.
As regards the second edition, he had included Khieu Samphan in the hydra of power.[25] Ms. Guissé asked him to explain this. Mr. Locard said that he did not believe that he talked of a three-headed hydra. He pointed to Phy Phuon’s testimony as reported by Philip Short, it appeared that the key-note speaker of the main education sessions was Khieu Samphan. “He could crack joke and make people at ease”. In contrast, Nuon Chea would speak “he looked very austere and stern.”
She referred to witness Ang Thuon’s statement, who had talked about a meeting, which did not confirm the expert’s statement that Khieu Samphan was a great speaker.[26] Mr. Locard replied that Steve Heder gave him the notes of Ang Thuon and that he knew the latter very well. He said that Ang Thuon had attended a study session with Khieu Samphan. The returnees had to “give up their material belongings”. In Philip Short’s book, it was said that you had to “give up your personality” and hand it to Angkar. This was the message conveyed by Khieu Samphan, Mr. Locard said. It was not Ieng Sary who was the head of state in August 1976, he explained. He confirmed that he used the work of others to reach these conclusions.
The President adjourned the hearing. It will continue tomorrow, August 2, 2016, at 9 am with the testimony of Henri Locard, followed by witness 2-TCW-976.
[1] 01307958-61 (KH).
[2] E3/10641 and E3/10642.
[3] At 11:15
[4] E3/2071, at 00087312 (EN), 00233398 (KH), 00282785 (FR).
[5] E3/2811, at 00394583 (EN), 00822562 (KH), 00796261 (FR)
[6] E3/8299, at 00217717 (EN), 00739069 (KH), 00743375 (FR).
[7] ibid.
[8] E3/2812, at 00394647 (EN), 00810744 (KH), 00394994 (FR).
[9]Number 209 (English), 170 (French).
[10] E3/1783, at 00498181 (EN), 00606766 (FR), 00659261 (KH).
[11] E3/2811, at 00394609 (EN), 00822600 (KH), 00796286 (FR).
[12] E3/23.
[13] E3/2107 00068049 (KH), 00655725 (FR), 00290205 (EN).
[14] E3/2071, at 00233387 (KH), 00292779 (FR), 0087306 (EN) and 0029278 (FR), 0087316 (EN), 00233403 (KH).
[15] E3/2649, at 00613111 (EN), 00208395 (FR), 00660598 (KH).
[16] E3/10616, E3/10617, and E3/10618.
[17] E3/10617, E3/10618.
[18] E3/2812, Pol Pot’s Little Red Book, at 00595513 (FR), 00394791 (EN).
[19] At 003950397 (EN).
[20] At page 105.
[21] E3/2251
[22] pp. 85-86.
[23] E3/10640.
[24] E3/10640.
[25] 0103580 (FR).
[26] E1/107.1, at 14:12.