Wow, here is an update on the China ADIZ and the recent aftermath. While I did expect U.S. and Japan to express some kind of reservation over China’s recent establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Seas, I had not anticipated the full sound and fury of the storm!
Within hours after China’s public announcement of the ADIZ, the U.S. decided to send two B-52s (unarmed) to the edge of China’s ADIZ on a putative long-planned, routine “training mission.” When China did not scramble jets, the U.S. celebrated and congratulated themselves on a job well done! Not to be outdone, Japan and S. Korea then also sent military (purportedly surveillance) planes into the area without properly alerting the Chinese side without incurring Chinese interception. The Japanese also went to the extent of ordering its airlines (its two main airlines and all members of the Scheduled Airlines Association of Japan) not to comply with China’s ADIZ.
One can find much written about China’s ADIZ. In this post, I want to focus my commentaries on the indignation and concerns that many in the U.S., Japan – even S. Korea – have expressed toward China’s establishment of an ADIZ.
Before all that, I think it’s useful to provide some further clarification on China’s ADIZ. First a better map than what one might find typically online.
Clearer map of China’s Air Defense Identification Zone
There may have been some confusions initially (including from Peter Lee, whom I quoted extensively in my prior post) over the exact extent of China’s ADIZ – whether it covers Diaoyutai or not. It does. Here is a map with coordinates that hopefully will clarify such confusions.
Second, I want to give details of what exactly is required for planes to identify themselves with China’s ADIZ. Per this xinhua report reporting on the announcement of the ADIZ:
The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:
First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules.
Second, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must provide the following means of identification:
1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.
2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.
3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.
4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.
Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.
Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.
Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.
Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 a.m. November 23, 2013.
Now, to my commentary. James Fallows of the Atlantic sort of made my job easier by providing a decent summary of the main concerns over China’s establishment of the ADIZ. Below are excerpts of his summaries, followed by my response.
Unilateral Step
It is a unilateral step, announced suddenly and apparently without consultation with two countries whose civilian and military aircraft will be most affected, the US and Japan.
It includes a contested maritime area, notably the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and thus can be seen as a deliberate effort to change the status quo, even a provocation.
This seems to be most commonly indignation expressed by the U.S. and Japan. It is rampantly expressed in the media. It is part of the statement released from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel expressing grave concerns about China’s ADIZ.
The problem with the “unilateral” concern is that ADIZs have always been unilaterally defined. Of the twenty or so ADIZs around the world, which one is the result of careful international negotiation? There is no UN Convention on ADIZs (as compared with say the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS for short) because ADIZs arise from each nation’s assessment of its defense needs. ADIZs are projected into a littoral nation’s adjacent international airspace to facilitate defense of the nation’s territory.
It is important to stress that ADIZ does not represent extensions of a nation’s airspace (territory), and as such a nation doesn’t exercise exclusive claims over the area. A nation enforcing an ADIZ thus does not have the right to force airplanes to change course or to refute access to the ADIZ – unless, under the international convention of national self defense – the airplane, for example, is determined to harbor hostile intent and presents an imminent threat to the nation. When an airplane declines to follow with the protocols set for an ADIZ, and is assessed to not be a threat, the most the nation administering the ADIZ can do typically is to track it – which may include scrambling jets if it so deems.
China’s ADIZ comports with all these characteristics of an ADIZ. As Spokesman of Chinese Defense Ministry, Yang Yujun, clarified:
The purpose of East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, is to safeguard territorial and airspace security. It’s also a necessary measure to effectively exercise China’s right of self defense.
The identification zone is not a territorial airspace. It’s an area demarcated outside territorial airspace, and to establish an early warning mechanism and ensure our air security. It does not mean the expansion of territorial air space; it helps to improve the effectiveness of safeguarding China’s territorial airspace
But All Flights Must Report to Chinese Authorities, Not Just the Ones Destined to China
Its ‘rules’ demanding that aircraft identify themselves and obey Chinese direction on flight paths seem to apply to all aircraft in the zone and not only aircraft en route to China…
[This] point … is one I should have highlighted more clearly yesterday. The borders of the United States are also ringed by ADIZs. But here the ADIZ rules — mainly, a requirement for a pre-filed flight plan showing who you are and where you’re going — apply only to planes headed to destinations in the United States. They don’t affect planes passing through en route to somewhere else, say from Canada to the Caribbean. The new Chinese claim is that even planes merely passing through must comply with their ADIZ requirements.
Well, Fallows appears to be wrong on this point. As noted in this wiki entry, the U.S. reglation that authorizes the setting up of ADIZ is C.F.R. 99.11, and it appears to define the scope of ADIZ broadly, without limiting identification to flights destined to the U.S.
C.F.R. 99.11(a) stipulates that:
No person may operate an aircraft into, within, or from a departure point within an ADIZ, unless the person files, activates, and closes a flight plan with the appropriate aeronautical facility, or is otherwise authorized by air traffic control.
While the Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations does appear to restrict application of ADIZ to only commercial aircraft intending to enter U.S. sovereign airspace to report, in practice the U.S. military does compel all aircraft to identify all flights that enter the zone to identify themselves under the constant threats of the “scrambling of fighter interceptors.” 1
In any case, notwithstanding the Navy’s handbook, whatever restirctions the NAVY places arises out of “the right of a nation to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its territory,” not on the right of nations to self defense (e.g. U.N. Charter Article 51), on which ADIZs generally, and C.F.R. 99.11(a) specifically, are based.
But even if the U.S. were to abruptly change its policy and limit its ADIZ to apply to only inbounding flights – what of that? Would Japan and S. Korea follow suit> I don’t think so.
The thing is that any such changes by the U.S. would merely reflect the specific defense needs of the U.S. It should have no effect on what China can require. Given U.S. geography, most flights that fly nearby the U.S. coast would be entering or passing over the U.S. Thus most all flights would still, due to U.S. geography, report before under even if the policy only were to require in-bounding flights to register.
China’s geography is such that many flights do fly near to important industrial centers – without entering it. China’s defense needs (and S. Korea’s and Japan’s, too, perhaps) would be such that requiring all non-threatening flights to properly identify themselves would greatly help China carry out self defense in the least obstructive manner possible. Nothing wrong with that. Every nation must meet its own unique set of challenges. The circumstances in N. America and E. Asia are different. Nothing wrong with that.
Undesirable Security Outcomes
It looks like a pretext for one of two undesirable security outcomes. If foreign aircraft now regularly obey the new Chinese rules, we will see precedents set for the unilateral expansion of Chinese authority over contested maritime territory. Alternately, if foreign aircraft contest or ignore the Chinese zone and a dangerous or deadly incident occurs (such as a collision or a forceful encounter), then China will have prepared the way to absolve itself of legal or moral blame, making it easier to use the incident as a justification to escalate the crisis if China so chooses.
There are several points here, all unfounded.
First is the notion that China is setting the precedence for nations to unilaterally declare ADIZs over “contested maritime territory.” Actually, the precedence has been long established – by Japan over the last few decades. From the wikipedia entry on ADIZ:
Japan has an ADIZ that overlaps most of its Exclusive Economic Zone. Its eastern border was set up after World War II by the US military at 123° degrees east. This resulted in only the eastern half of Yonaguni Island being part of Japan’s ADIZ and the western half being part of Taiwan’s ADIZ. Thus on June 25, 2010 Japan extended its ADIZ around this island 22 km westwards. As this led to an overlapping with ROC’s ADIZ and the government of Republic of China expressed its “regret” over Japan’s move.[1] Regarding the coast of mainland China, Japan’s ADIZ has a distance of 130 km at its closest point.[2]
Second, there is the notion that China must respect “contested maritime territory.” I found it curious that S. Korea would protest to China the inclusion of Ieodo, also known as Socotra Rock or Suyan Rock, a group of underwater reefs near S. Korea and China, in China’s ADIZ. As China has reminded S. Korea, under current international norms, a nation has no right to “maritime territory” (i.e. waters, submerged rocks, reefs) per se, only to “terrestrial territory” (i.e. islands, rocks).
The disputed Suyan Rock is not a matter of territorial dispute, but of EEZ dispute. 2But EEZ rights do not confer air rights, and China’s ADIZ (or anyone else’s for that matter) is not based on China’s assertion of EEZ below or incompatible with S. Korea’s claim over the EEZ below per se. While China and S. Korea have yet to reach agreement of the boundary of EEZ,that dispute has no bearing to the ADIZ since EEZ confers no airspace rights. China will thus not modify its ADIZ to clear the area of Suyan Rock even if the status of EEZ in the surrounding area have yet to be clarified.
Third, regarding the point of China absolving itself of moral or legal blame should an incident, that complaint actually can be broadly applied to all nations administering ADIZ, not just China.
The purpose of ADIZ, as already pointed several times, is to facilitate national self defense. Usually, very little is demanded except a simple identification of aircraft and conveying of its intentions. Before China established its ADIZ, ADIZ was rarely made a big international political issue – and for good reasons. The cost of compliance is so low, and the benefit so high (i.e., the avoidance of potential loss of human lives due to avoidable incidents lost) that few bother to complain.
So now the Japanese government has ordered its airlines to disregard ADIZ. To me, that is not just insanely stupid (Japan seems to have done a “U-Turn” for now though), but strategically stupid as well. China can easily retaliate,too, by ordering all its airlines to disregard the Japanese ADIZ. Tit for tat! And should American airlines also do that, China can also do the same to the U.S. But what does that accomplish? I don’t think the Japanese military or U.S. military will start shooting down Chinese commercial flights, but I also don’t think Chinese airlines will feel that safe flying around either, making such boneheaded moves as to disobey regulations that are set up to facilitate national defense and flight safety and that are so easy to meet.
The truth is that even if Japanese airlines disregard the ADIZ, China will probably be fine. China can probably readily identify those as commercial jets and assess their threat levels. But of course, there is always a chance that mis-identifications occur and China scramble jets. When jets are scrambled, there are always chances for incidents. The defense needs of China are dictated by China’s geography. They won’t change even if you remove the ADIZ. The purpose of the ADIZ is to make it easier for China to identify risk, and if the process, lower the risks for unnecessary incidents for all.
Sovereign is as sovereign does
Fallows also find the argument that China is expanding sovereignty over adjacent space through the establishment of the ADIZ persuasive, citing this comment.
Your article about China’s ADIZ didn’t explicitly recognize a major component of the move. Namely, in international law a major way by which states acquire sovereignty over an area is by actually exercising sovereignty (i.e. administering) over it for a “reasonable” period of time and especially having other states acquiesce to its administration. As one famous court opinion put it:
“The modern international law of the acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis.”
Even if it has little real practical effect for airliners, by having them identify themselves to China Beijing will be exercising sovereignty over the area and can claim that others are acquiescing to its claims of sovereignty. This is why the U.S. and Japan immediately announced they wouldn’t comply with China’s demands and the U.S. is openly defying the order already.
Of course Japan has an ADIZ over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands but at the very least by establishing its own ADIZ (and patrolling the waters below) China is chipping away at Japan’s int’l legal claim of sovereignty. This is also why China has made a point of increasing its patrols in the South China Sea and is acquiring the necessary capabilities to constantly patrol the skies over the South China Sea.
I find this argument hogwash. If ADIZ can be used as a pretext or a prelude to taking sovereignty over a nation’s adjoining airspace or territories, the practice of establishing ADIZ would be inherently illegal under international law. As noted before, all ADIZs today are acknowledged to exist in internationally-recognized international airspace over international water. The establishment of ADIZ does not put into doubt the status of those areas – airspace or sea – as international zones.
Further to boot, China has repeatedly repudiated the exercising of any sovereignty over the airspace or the seas of East China Sea on the basis of its ADIZ. China has also made very clear the purpose of its ADIZ. The idea that China is using ADIZ as some sort of tool to clandestinely expand its territory is just plain absurd. ADIZ just doesn’t allow that. One might as well accuse China of flying a satellite in space as a ploy to grab the airspace and territories below.
However, this does not mean the establishment of ADIZ has no relevance to contested islands such as Diaoyu. ADIZ has never been unilaterally declared by one nation inside the airspace of a third party nation because such a practice would as a breach of the third nation’s sovereignty. Thus when China establishes its ADIZ over Diaoyu, it does so on the basis that no other third nations control the airspace or territories within the areas defined by its ADIZ. It is explicitly refuting Japan’s sovereignty over Diaoyu.
But is that really a surprise? Is there really a change in “status quo” here?
China’s establishment of an ADIZ that includes the airspace over Diaoyu seems to be me just a natural and legitimate result of that fact that China does not recognize Japanese sovereignty Diaoyu. But also very critically, the ADIZ per se does not extend China’s claim over Diaoyu any bit.
If Japan is so disgusted with an ADIZ that covers their territory, they can ignore the part of the ADIZ that covers Diaoyu – but to ignore the wholesale the entire ADIZ, when China has expressed legitimate defense basis for it, is stupid.
If you are of the camp that a nation should always restrain from defining ADIZ over disputed territories (i.e. islands), then you should also be of the camp that Japan has been aggressively provoking its neighbors for the last few decades. What gave Japan, for example, the right to extend its ADIZ (multiple times over the last few decades, as noted above) to cover disputed islands after disputed islands? What gives it the right today?
And you must be incensed by Japan’s unilateral actions last year to unilateral “nationalize” Diaoyu by “purchasing” it, as this Chinese reporter noted in an official U.S. press conference, because unlike ADIZ which does not advance one nation’s claim one bit, Japan’s “purchase” was meant explicitly to advance that claim to the exclusivity of all others.
A Chinese Caribbean
Fallows seem to be impressed with the imagery that China is creating a “Chinese Caribbean” by citing this comment:
Obviously as you point out it’s opaque and we can only speculate to Zhongnanhai’s [rough equivalent of the White House] motivations but I think a helpful way to think about is their view/ambition for the East China Sea is that it is/should be a Chinese Caribbean.
Think about the US role there in the late 19th century – the Venezuela thing/ Roosevelt Corollary/ getting the British out). Which is the tack I would take if I were sitting in Beijing.
This is rubbish. First, the ADIZ by definition is about creating transparency, not opaquess. By providing a channel by which friendly planes identify themselves, ADIZ reduces chances for mis-identification and misunderstanding. China’s ADIZ is an attempt to make transparent important aspects of China’s defense protocols.
Second, note how this allegation is all based on pure fear – a fear based on U.S. history of the 19th century to boot, not reality.
There is no Chinese Caribbean today. China has never expressed any intention of creating a Chinese Caribbean. However, there appears to be a U.S. Caribbean in the East China Seas. China’s rise means that the era of unquestioned U.S. dominance since WWII in the Western Pacific may be soon be over. That strikes terror at the hearts of many. But to the extent sch fear is justified, think how much the Chinese has to endure today’s very real U.S. Caribbean – one that appears increasingly unsympathetic – even hostile – to Chinese interests and concerns.
Ultimately, I can’t answer the question whether China is eventually going to set up a Chinese Caribbean, because I don’t know the future. But I do know the Chinese are serious about their notion of a peaceful rise. I also know that China today is open and receptive and willing to embrace the world – with all its differences, dangers, hopes and opportunities. However, if the U.S. appears to diss and mock Chinese interests and concerns at every turn, China will have no choice but to turn the table some time….
A generally more emboldened China
Fallows ended his article with reference to a comment expressing fears of a more “emboldened” China
I would draw your attention to the Defense Ministry spokesman’s response to the question regarding if China intended to set up ADIZ’s in other areas (e.g., the South China Seas): “China will establish other Air Defense Identification Zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are completed.”
I believe that the central question that this new provocation raises is what accounts for it? Of course, longstanding tension over the Daioyu/Senkaku issue has been rekindled and that offers a proximate explanation; the arrival of Abe into office in Japan, another.
But what I fear we may be seeing is a generally more emboldened China. There is a lengthening bread crumb trail of recent PRC activity that leads me to this observation (not yet a firm conclusion).
I’m not referencing the (still) ongoing detentions and boardings that occur with regularity over the Spratleys, the Paracels, and Scarborough Shoals, but to chest-thumping behavior such as the recent Chinese news releases covering the capability of the PLAN’s SSBNs to lay waste to much of the western United States with 20 nuclear weapons. Yes, it did come to us via the Global Times, and yes, I’m well aware that even Beijing is rapidly losing its ability to control much of what comes out of China’s increasingly pluralistic press. That said, Beijing most certainly has proven itself capable of fully controlling what is being uttered in public about its nuclear weapons capabilities.
To be clear, the concern is not on the substance – or even veracity in this latter case of the story – the Xia class SSBNs with their JL-1 SLBMs remain the Chinese maritime equivalent of the Edsel, while the JIN-class (094) SSBNs (with the JL-2 SLBMs) are not yet on operational patrol. So, again, why the chest thumping?
Well, here’s to hoping that we aren’t witnessing the emergence of a new hawkish China.
The term phrase of “emboldened” captures the mindset of those who utters and are sympathetic to this concern. Why should China – or any nation – not be emboldened about defining and taking charge of its destiny. Why must the world fear an “emboldened China”? The way to sustainable peace is a prosperous and emboldened China, not a depressed or discouraged or whipped-down China.
The rest of the comment is just as unenlightened. For example, despite ADIZs being internationally recognized as an internationally acceptable ways of facilitating national defense, despite the fact that Japan, S. Korea, ROC (Taiwan) have it – despite China clearly announcing its reasons for an ADIZ, the reader – one “with a lot of experience in the defense world” to boot - still just doesn’t get why China need one. He would then characterize Chinese attempt at preserve territorial integrity as somehow aggressive immoral acts. To top it off, he would describe Chinese upgrading of strategic nuclear weapons as “chest thumping.”
Wait a minute. Excuse me… Chest thumping??
The Chinese has a relatively small nuclear arsenal, around the size of U.K. or France. It has a clear no first use policy. China’s nuclear policy does not depend on “mutually assured destruction,” but only on limited “assured retaliation.”
Let’s be rational here. Today, China is still trying to close the gap in military capabilities with the West. China’s defense budget is also only a fraction of the U.S. NATO countries (i.e. not counting Japan and S. Korea) spends over 70% of the world’s military budget. But even that underestimates the military hegemony the U.S. and its allies hold over the world as the bulk of the remaining 30% account for budget are spread thinly across third world nations who buy from the West outdated military equipment at inflated prices.
If what the China is doing today is “Chest Thumbing,” then what have the U.S. and its allies have been doing the last half a century or so? An “Orgy Feast.”
Big Picture
So now that the U.S. has tried to mock a mockery of China’s ADIZ, where does that leave us?
One might answer it this way. Let’s say the U.S. and Japan gets their way, and China comes out tomorrow apologizing that it has set up an ADIZ and rescinds it immediately. Does that mean China would stop patrolling the East China Seas? No. China will still have valid defense interests there. It will still patrol the area. It will still respond to threats there. As China rises, it will demand the U.S. to stop activities against China that the U.S. would consider hostile if it were it conducted on U.S. shores.
None of this will change.
The only thing that changes is that China will now have to more actively patrol the airspace to ensure and that opportunities for misunderstandings are increased. The U.S. has publicly said many times that it seeks closer military contact between the two nations. The ADIZ is one channel for that communication – for the U.S. (and Japan) side to identify routinely non-threatening flights to China when operating in strategically areas that are close to China’s strategic eastern coast.
But instead of taking the opportunity to build trust, the U.S. flew 2 B-52 bombers (unarmed, yes) and publicly made a boneheaded mockery of China.
Truth be told, if the Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations referenced above is to be trusted, the U.S. does not recognize the application of ADIZ to military aircraft, unless specifically agreed to. Per Handbook.
The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter national airspace should not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.
If so, U.S. and China ought to – as part of building “a new type of great power relationship” – to come to an agreement based on true acceptance of China’s defense concerns. Currently, China appears to pushing back through semi-legal administrative means – e.g. EEZ (China claims foreign military cannot conduct surveillance in its EEZ without Chinese approval) and ADIZ (China requires all flight within certain area to properly identify themselves or face defensive maneuvers by the Chinese air force). And the U.S. have pushed back in both instances.
I really don’t think the U.S. should continue to thwart China’s overtures. Before not too long, in a few decades perhaps, China will achieve military parity with the U.S. By then, it would not need to to push for EEZ rights and ADIZ to advance its interests. It will have the means to flout Japanese EEZ (Japan, take note. You should be on China’s side on the EEZ debate over military surveillance) and U.S. ADIZs routinely, should China deem that useful to advance its interests.
If the U.S. truly cares for long-term peace, it should seek broadly for what is just and fair – not what is politically expedient and convenient. The showdown with China over its ADIZ is not the way to go.
Notes:
Richard J. Butler, Major, USAF (April 2001). “Sovereignty and Protective Zones in Space and the Appropriate Command and Control of Assets”. Retrieved 30 November 2011. ↩
Under the UNCLOS, EEZ confer nations special rights to exclusively exploit marine resources up to 200 nautical miles from its coastline. Where the EEZ zones of nations overlap, the nations would need to negotiate for a proper boundary, of such a boundary is deemed necessary. ↩