The Orlando Magic are finding their footing, but how far will that propel them? (Photo: Raj Mehta – USA TODAY Sports)
By Adam Spinella
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Frank Vogel is one hell of a coach. Vogel’s team defenses are always strong and constantly improve throughout the season. He is always calm and his teams reflect that demeanor. Player development throughout his tenure in Indiana was quite clear. Hiring him is the best decision that Orlando Magic GM Rob Hennigan has made in the past five or six seasons. Vogel’s tinkering with the rotation, the team’s defense and finding ways to keep the Orlando offense churning despite a horrible blend of talent has placed the Magic right in the thick of things for a playoff spot early in the season.
The first and second unit that Vogel currently employs each have their own distinctive flavor. The first unit (Augustin, Fournier, Gordon, Ibaka, Biyombo) has supreme interior defense, two guards that can shoot and play through their posts. The reserves (featuring Payton, Meeks, Green, and Vucevic) spread the floor around the pick-and-roll with shooters. Two distinct and different styles that are as much about who they go up against as how they compliment each other.
The move of Vucevic and Payton to the bench, while giving rim protection and spacing for Evan Fournier and Aaron Gordon, has helped the Magic get rolling. For Vucevic and Payton, two players who started nearly every game of their career in a Magic uniform, the move could have had disastrous ramifications on team chemistry had they not accepted their new roles. When millions of dollars hang in the balance of how a coach utilizes you, it’s certainly understandable that pressures to remain a starter from the outside creep in. Herein lies the undervalued genius of Vogel’s coaching.
Elfrid Payton has handled the move to the second unit well, for two reasons. First, it’s fit his style of play so much better, as he is much more aggressive as a scorer and a playmaker knowing he has shooters around him. Payton’s career high came in a bench role against the Wizards on December 7th. Second, Payton still finds himself on the court when it matters most — late in the fourth quarter — especially in games when he plays well.
Over two years into his career, the flaws that Elf entered the league with have not been chipped away at. Payton is a pick and roll point guard that cannot thwart defenses that go under the screener and dare him to shoot — even from the mid-range. That lack of dynamics helps the Magic place dead last in point per possession on ball screens. Payton hesitates far too frequently, and his jump shot mechanics are pretty putrid.
Placing Vucevic on the second unit was sensible when league trends are examined. There seems to be a general consensus that scoring big men who cannot provide vertical rim protection are best-utilized in the second unit. Coaches (and the front offices that nudge them behind the scenes) prefer that rim protection so they can get fancy on both ends with a smaller, faster or more versatile lineup.
Al Jefferson, Zach Randolph, Greg Monroe, Enes Kanter and even Jahlil Okafor are examples of this trend, and they all beat up on each other in the second unit. Vooch fits perfectly with this mold and should embrace the switch the most. He’s always been one of the most polished-scoring big men in the league, thriving at the blocks and the elbows.
The best post scorer in the league casual fans often ignore, scoring and rebounding ability keeps the lethargic-foot Montenegrin in the game. But Vucevic has often been a sieve against the pick-and-roll, and even the defensive czar Scott Skiles couldn’t boost his defense. Too slow to guard perimeter bigs and not athletic or savvy enough to protect the rim, there was an increasing belief that Vucevic simply couldn’t ever be a reliable defender. Credit GM Rob Hennigan for finding the right pieces to compliment Vucevic in Serge Ibaka and Bismack Biyombo: rim protectors that can guard both the 4 and the 5.
Now, instead of building an entire scheme around protecting Vucevic and finding ways to defend the rim, Vogel has simply allowed his frontcourt to adjust to each opponent and put Vooch on the best matchup for him. The results, coupled with defending fewer athletes and more back-to-the-basket big men and pick-and-roll guards in the second unit, are massive. The Vucevic-Ibaka pairing in particular works on both ends of the court. For the most common two-man lineups that the Magic have used this season, none has been more effective than their pairing, according to basketball-reference. In fact, no other group has a net positive.
With both men hovering around 30 minutes a night, they share the court for key moments and tend to be on the court when the Magic start to make a run. To be crystal clear, the offense still is far below league average when the two share the court. Vogel has encouraged both, who are above-average outside shooters, to see a green light when they’re open on the perimeter. Having both bigs shoot from deep is the only way to open enough space for Payton or Gordon to attack (Vogel is intentional about not having Payton, Gordon and Vucevic all on the court for more than a minute or two at a time). Still, the big men can struggle their opponents honest.
The impetus behind the lineup switch makes crystal clear sense for Vogel, allowing him to use the team’s best one-on-one scorer in a way that he is most potent. Don’t shed a tear for Vooch either moving to the second unit: he’s hauling in rebounds at the highest rate of his career, still plays 28 minutes per game and his raw numbers haven’t changed that much on offense.
Vucevic is underappreciated by the general public. But he’s not good enough to build a championship-level scheme around, or at least isn’t yet. He’s uncomfortable on the three-point line, and his mid-range jumpers are acceptable by most defense’s standards. Vucevic doesn’t dominate an offense in terms of shots, but he does in terms of touches and spacing. It’s hard to run a spread pick-and-roll attack with him unless he has a dynamic, multi-threat point guard that forces opposing big men to come out on the perimeter to contain him.
There are other key pieces on this team, and they face the small-market pressures that many other teams feel. Building through trades and the draft is necessary, and when the Magic are noncommittal to any of their other prospects or trade chips, the overall direction of the organization comes into question.
Take this summer’s prized acquisition, Serge Ibaka. Ibaka is a very, very good basketball player. He was one of the key difference-makers in the Thunder upsetting San Antonio and almost taking down the Warriors last May. Thus far in Orlando, he’s shooting nearly 40 percent from beyond the arc, far fewer of those attempts coming as a standstill option in the corners. Last year, nearly 53 percent of his three-point attempts came from the corners; this season that number is below 10 percent. Long term, that’s an encouraging trend for Ibaka.
Ibaka’s usage rate is above 20 percent for the first time in his career, while also having career bests in turnover and assist rating. He’s been more effective as a top cog in the offense, and gets isolation post-ups against smaller forwards, where he features a silky hook shot.
The Ibaka trade, while effective in both theory and execution, will always circle back to the question of whether they gave up too much in acquiring him? Victor Oladipo and the 11th pick in the 2016 draft are hefty sums to cough up for a third scoring option on an expiring deal. Oladipo has played very well for the Thunder, and it’s difficult to say he’s not better than Ibaka on his own. Even if drafting Domantas Sabonis, or the run of other bigs available early in the teens last June, wouldn’t move the needle too much, trading four years of a prospect for a 2017 free agent is a short-sighted decision. Ibaka is still barely 27 years old and has a prime still ahead of him, meaning this is not only one last payday, but a chance at a title as a major contributor. It’s a massive gamble on Hennigan’s part that they will have the upper hand in retaining Serge, or that the small-market team can adequately utilize its cap space if Ibaka bolts.
Regardless, pundits have been scratching their heads since this move because of what it signaled for Orlando’s perhaps most promising young piece: Aaron Gordon. By bringing in Ibaka to blanket Vucevic and form a worthy front court tandem, the minutes were simply not there for Gordon to evolve into a franchise cornerstone at his natural position.
Skilled 6-foot-8 guys who can defend almost any position and handle the ball don’t grow on trees. That’s why when Hennigan drafted Gordon back in 2014, it felt like the crowning jewel of his tenure in Orlando. He pushes well in transition and makes plays in the open court. There’s DPOY potential, and of course, the obvious eye test that he passes just watching his athleticism fly over the court. Watching Gordon play provides a distinct hint of Scottie Pippen somewhere inside his incredibly raw skill set.
Harping on Gordon playing out of position is no revelation; almost any NBA website has some article on it discussing the misfortune that Gordon has of playing the small forward position in Orlando. In his first two pro seasons, Gordon spent more than 60 percent of his minutes in the power forward spot; this season, less than three percent of his minutes are logged there. Usually a change in skill sets, not a logjam at the natural position, will push a team’s most talented youngster to a new spot on the floor (see Antetokounmpo, Giannis). No such change took place in Gordon; he’s done little to improve his jump shot, and his work as a primary ball handler is less than encouraging.
Playing out of position is not a factor that has ever or will ever hurt their defense: he’s more than capable of defending any small forward in the league. And playing at the 3 allows Gordon to play back to the basket against smaller wings, where he leads the team in points per possession on post-ups. With Bismack Biyombo or Nikola Vucevic sharing the court with him, there’s not enough spacing for this to be more than a change-of-pace option for the Magic. Vogel is not to blame for this switch; he’s simply working to best utilize all the pieces he has. By figuring out only a month in the season that Payton, Gordon and Vucevic cannot all share the court, he’s already improved everybody’s ability to succeed individually.
Off the ball, Gordon’s lack of reliable three-point shooting allows defenses to throw a lot of junk against the Magic, even with this new lineup featuring Augustin, Fournier and Ibaka as three above-average shooters around him. Steve Clifford zone-trapped the side ball screen when Gordon ran across the court from the strong side to the weak, and the defense didn’t even bat an eye at Gordon.
Hiding Gordon in the corners serves a solid effect on the defense – they can only help off him so much, and in one direction, with the looming defensive three seconds violation if they sag too much. But standing alone in the corner limits his play-making ability when he is forced to catch the ball on a kick-out — he can only really shoot, attack a closeout or swing the ball. Catching on the wings and in the slot would allow Gordon to dribble handoff, swing and ball screen, or even perform a face-up one-on-one move. However, when a ball screen action occurs while Gordon is on or near the wings, his defender will completely disregard him to blow up the screen action and help tag the roller.
Vogel has struggled to generate crunch time offense when Payton earns his way onto the floor late in games by out-producing D.J. Augustin in the first 40 minutes of the game. Here, Vogel runs an ATO set for Evan Fournier, where he runs a pick and roll and gets to attack the rim. The issue: the opposite corner has two non-shooters in Payton and Gordon. Even though Fournier adeptly snakes between the two ball screen defenders, he’s corralled by two help defenders waiting off hapless weakside shooters.
Experiments to put the ball in Gordon’s hands more frequently have failed this season, and are the biggest reason why the Magic are struggling to utilize him on the perimeter. Gordon is a really poor decision-maker with the ball in his hands as a ball screen offensive player. The stats don’t lie here: of all qualifying players with at least 12 percent of their possessions as a pick-and-roll ball handler, Gordon ranks fourth to last in the league by generating only 0.44 points per possession. His eFG% of 25.9 percent on ball screens is terrible, and he’s yet to draw a shooting foul.
It’s easy to tell when Gordon is coming off a ball screen to score and when he’s coming off to pass. As soon as he takes his second dribble, and he takes it hard, he’s either trying to pull-up or bulldoze his way to the rim (if he can’t get there, he picks up his dribble, pivots around for a few seconds and gets the ball out of his hands). But AG makes practically no attempt to read the different defenses he’ll face in screen-and-roll situations, and that’s part of the problem.
Vogel has almost abandoned designed ball screens for Gordon, and defenses are more than happy to give up contested mid-range pull-ups to him if he comes off one within the flow of the offense. Gordon at the power forward spot would allow him to play as a screener and read defenses as a playmaker off the roll. He adds another level of dynamic work in transition as a ball handler going against opposing 4-men. The more physical power forwards in the league are going to be tough matchups for Gordon young in his career, though he creates a mismatch on the offensive end by spreading them out as well. Simply, in a league where small-ball is the flavor of the month, playing Gordon with that trend would maximize his utility on both ends against the right lineups.
There seems to be a pattern with Hennigan’s draft picks or collection of young talent. Whether it is Aaron Gordon, Moe Harkless, Tobias Harris or even Elfrid Payton, Hennigan has never been shy of taking below-average shooters. “You can always teach shooting” is a common verbiage out there among NBA coaches and executives, supported by a few success stories along the way. On the whole, for every success story of retraining their shot to be effective, there are five projects that failed to develop consistency.
The Gordon treatment is the largest example of an issue Hennigan has exhibited throughout the Magic’s long, arduous rebuild post-Dwight Howard. Every high-level draft pick has been misused, tinkered with, log-jammed in rotations or prevented from garnering minutes altogether. 2015 first-rounder Mario Hezonja is a DNP-CD on most nights under Frank Vogel, and his development has hit a standstill after being taken over the likes of Myles Turner, Justise Winslow and Willie Cauley-Stein. Elfrid Payton hasn’t progressed as a scoring threat, but the organization never committed to providing shooters around him until placing him in a reserve role. Moe Harkless was dumped away for a top-55 protected pick and now starts on a top-five scoring team in the league. Even Victor Oladipo was slotted back and forth between lead guard and shooting guard continuously.
The Magic won’t improve their offense from within; this roster is almost maxed out when it comes to shooting ability and scorers capable of carrying a heavy load. Should Orlando brass decide to get aggressive this winter, there are certainly trades out there to be made. Brandon Knight from Phoenix could be available at the right price and usurp D.J. Augustin’s role as the starting point guard. Monta Ellis and Rudy Gay would be options as go-to scorers, but neither solve the spacing dilemma. Making a move as a buyer at the deadline would only be appropriate if the Magic really feel their defense is worthy of championship consideration, and they only are missing another guy who can get buckets to jump up in the Eastern standings.
Ultimately, the decision that Hennigan has to make is this: are the flaws of this roster worth pushing through if it means making the playoffs and a first-round exit? The 2017 NBA draft is a big one, and offers many prospects that could solve lots of the long-term issues revolving around roster construction. To miss out on that opportunity just so Hennigan can save his job after a seemingly long and botched rebuilding process is the definition of futility itself. There are only so many times he can try to jam a square peg in a round hole. Soaking 40 wins out of this roster only to continually miss out on a star would be a tough look for an organization still missing a star on the perimeter that can elevate them to elite heights.
Experimenting with Gordon at the small forward was a known risk at the beginning of the season. The true mark of Hennigan’s adjusted rebuild will be how quickly he is willing to pull the plug on a failed experiment. There are too many bigs on this roster that playing Gordon at the power forward spot is a waste of someone’s talent. Keeping Gordon at the 3 just to placate the rest of the roster in a feeble attempt to win now? That’s how general managers wind up looking for work.
It’s not even Christmas yet, so it’s far too early to bail on the season when the Magic are hovering around .500 and still have their best basketball in front of them. For the most confusing assembly of talent in the league, we can only hope the captain of the ship finds a steady direction to steer in. Otherwise it’s a waste of young talent, an exceptional coach and the biggest asset of all: time.
From the Coaches Seat
Eastern Conference Hodgepodge – There are currently two games between the three-seed and the tenth-spot in the standings in the East. While Washington and Orlando are still within striking distance, it’s realistically those eight teams competing for six spots. Chicago and Atlanta are struggling most currently, while teams like Detroit (Reggie Jackson’s return) and the Knicks (shift to Porzingis-heavy offense) are on the upswing. There’s a lot of basketball to play, but it’s a bloodbath in the East.
Manimal DNP – CD – Goodbye, trade leverage. Kenneth Faried, who was on the U.S. Olympic Team just six months ago, is now a DNP in the Mile High City. Coach Mike Malone, who I have long been a fan of, made the decision to sit Faried against the Wizards last week. Michael Malone indicated that this was a one-time occurrence that fit what the team was doing against the Wizards’ style of play, and so far it seems to be plausible. But the Nuggets have been trying to deal Faried, or one of their multiple post players, for a while now. By tipping their hand that Faried would be the odd man out in smaller situations, the Nuggets have lost the high ground in leveraging a deal to get maximum return on Faried’s value.
Rubio’s Defense – Since publishing a post on the Timberwolves last week, there’s been a lot of backlash or disagreement on the perception I have that Ricky Rubio isn’t a great defender. Consider the following: Rubio has a defensive eFG% in ball screens of 63.5 percent, the worst in the league for all players who defend at least three ball screens a game. Rubio gets put in ball screens on 49 percent of his possessions, so this isn’t a small sample size. I’d been on the “Rubio’s defense is his redeeming quality” bandwagon before this season, but his work under Thibodeau has caused me to throw myself off the wagon as violently as possible.
Peak Hayward – Can we please start talking about this guy on a national scale? The entire basketball media, both television and Twitter bases, are clamoring for talks of efficiency on offense — that’s where Gordon Hayward of the Utah Jazz has thrived. The Jazz had a stumble at the end of November, and it’s been Hayward’s play that has turned it around. Going 8-1 in the nine games he’s suited up for since, Hayward’s numbers: 26.9 points, 5.2 rebounds, 3.9 assists, 1.7 steals, 49.3 percent from the field, 48.8 percent from three — on 16.7 shots per game. If Hayward isn’t an All-Star this year, I will riot.
Lakers Slide – It’s all about defense. They simply cannot defend anybody after a more realistic schedule and a few injuries have kicked in. Mozgov has come back to earth after a torrid start to the year defensively. D’Angelo Russell and Nick Young are slowly regressing to the mean in terms of their defensive effort. Teams shoot above 50 percent from two-point range against L.A. The Lakers are now last in defensive efficiency (overtaking Portland, which isn’t easy to do) and lack a roster filled with veterans, defensive-stoppers and locked-in personalities. This slide could continue for L.A.
The Motiejunas Melodrama – I’m not exactly what I would call a hardcore salary cap “expert”, though I’ve read the CBA and barely passed enough law classes in my day to know a little bit. The real experts anyone interested in cap matters should be following are Larry Coon and Albert Nahmad. Coon wrote a great blog about the situation, where Motiejunas’ agent B.J. Armstrong is essentially strong-arming the Rockets against the rules and regulations of the CBA. Once more, Nahmad adds that the structuring of the offer sheet by Brooklyn GM Sean Marks was poorly executed, allowing the Rockets to match where, had it been laid out differently, they would not have been able to. That said, the Rockets and Motiejunas eventually came to a fairly team-friendly contract agreement, and Donatas will be in Houston for the foreseeable future. He’s a fairly valuable young piece because he can stretch the floor at the 5 position; he’d be a very reliable backup. Let’s hope this doesn’t come back to change the relationship between them.
Tobias Harris, Pump Fake Master –
Things I Don’t Like – Vlade Divac the GM, road teams wearing white jerseys, the possible elimination of the NCAA one-and-done rule, Mike Breen’s goatee, Mike Breen always being “on hand”, the way any road announcer pronounces Nemanja Bjelicia, the Cavs’ athletic trainer who always wears a sweater, George Hill being injured, the phrase “pure point guard” and people who hate the Warriors just because they’re a contrarian. Sets of the Week Celtics Stack Loop Ballscreen
Brad Stevens has been running this set for a long time, but now with Horford at the 5 and other shooters all around, it is at its most effective. The Celtics sit a shooting post just inside the three point line, and have a shooter at the nail hole. Which ever side the shooter loops around the big man, that big will step to that side, setting a ball screen to lead the ball handler the opposite direction of the looper. Boston has great spacing, and they allow this three-man twirling action to have the entire middle and top of the floor to operate. With several point guards that can get to the rim but might need a step to free themselves, this is a nice action to get it open.
Warriors Jungle Curl Elevator
Nice action that we’ve seen before from several NBA teams, and Kerr drew it up to keep Klay Thompson hot on his 60-point outburst. The ball goes to Draymond at the elbow, and on the strong side Curry and Thompson curl around each other (good luck guarding this action when run at a high speed). As soon as the ball goes to Curry on the perimeter after the Thompson curl, Klay veers right up the middle of the court, and the elevator doors close behind him.
Elevator actions, like Hammer actions, are great for shooters because they can reliably get open when you’re hunting for them. However, they don’t have many secondary options after the elevator action. These plays can’t be run too many times during a game or else they lose their effect.
Nuggets Chest Wheel
One from the wayback machine here.
The Nuggets need to get the help defense away, and they run his set to open up the rim for driving lanes. An invert of the common Hawk action (side ball screen with a double stagger on the weak side), this turns the double stagger into a wheel action, where several shooters run through and around the double stagger. With Gallinari at the 3, this turns into a really strong pick-and-pop situation for the Nuggets, and allows Mudiay to get all the way to the rim if he gets a step on Curry. Gallinari can read Curry and slip if they jump the ball screen, as he does in the first clip, and there’s no help at the rim.
If the Nuggets don’t score off the first action, the ball handler can center the ball or swing it to the other side, and Gallinari will come off the wheel to the other side of the court. It’s exhaustive for his defender, to run through a double stagger, have to sprint into a hedge position on a ball screen, then turn around and sprint through another two screens on the other end of the court.
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