On December 5, 2002, the Awate Team published an article entitled “The Chronology of The Reform Movement”, which we introduced with the words “The following is a chronicle of the reform movement…” It covers the period of August 2000–the beginning of the reform movement–to December 2001. Of course, Eritreans’ call for reform is as old as our politics, so why is September 18, 2001 significant? And it hasn’t stopped after September 18, 2001: thousands continue to call for reform and then get arrested, are made to disappear or are exiled. So, again, why is September 18, 2001 significant?
Prior to September 18, 2001, all the horrendous crimes of the Revolution and the Government could be dismissed with: what is your evidence? What evidence is there that this crime you are alleging happened? In this particular case, September 18, 2001, that convenient dismissal is not available to the criminals in power: (a) those arrested and the causes they espoused were given wide publicity in Eritrean and international media; (b) those arrested and made to disappear are well-known individuals (including former cabinet members); (c) the criminals have persisted in their crime: they have not brought the arrested to a court of law, they have not passed a sentence, they have not allowed family members to visit them, they have not confirmed to their families if they are alive or dead. In short, September 18, 2001 is significant because anybody who knows the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, has no choice but to conclude that what “the government” has perpetrated is wrong. And if it can be this cruel to its own colleagues, then, anybody who can use facts and reason must conclude that it is just as likely, if not more likely, to commit the same abuse of power–arrest without charge, disappearance, failure to account for citizens, denying families visitation rights–to thousands of anonymous Eritreans.
It has been twelve years since September 18, 2001. Cruel regimes like the one in Eritrea depend on the human capacity to forget, to mis-remember, to be overwhelmed by life. They actually expect–and, unfortunately, succeed in their expectations–that new headlines, new gruesome details, new meaningless maneuvers (rotating ministers and party officials, for example) will distract us from our primary goal: justice. Cruel regimes even try to confuse people about the meaning of “justice” by focusing on its layers–social justice, economic justice–or using standards that are alien to the people’s values. In Eritrea’s traditional society–its faith and culture–justice is based on morality and ethics. On the other hand, the Eritrean regime has repeatedly said that “we have our own culture” of dealing with prisoners: the culture they are referring to is one incubated during the Revolution: it is a form of “justice” more concerned with preventing future “crimes” (by setting a scary example) than actually dealing with the present alleged transgression. This ends up achieving two things: creating a frightened society and an abusive government. An open air prison where the people are too afraid to think, to innovate, to produce: they are just serving. Serving an undeclared sentence, serving a government, until such time that it becomes unbearable and they will take any risk, pay any price, to leave their own country. The abusive government which is more concerned about future crimes than past crimes–it has defined justice to mean creating an obedient citizenery–continues to be incrementally more abusive until there is a time when the people are on the verge of rebellion. Then, the boss of the mafia regime rotates people in an attempt–one more time–to convince the people that there is nothing wrong with his vision, or his policies; there is failure in execution. And each game of musical chairs has a diminishing return because some chairs are permanent–no matter the rotation–and because people know in their hearts that the problem is not the people executing the policies but the policies themselves.
It is this culture–the culture of secrecy, the culture of political nepotism, the culture of the permanent ruling oligarchy, the culture of power abuse, the culture of lack of institutionalism, the culture of punishment/reward based not on merit but the moods of a moody dictator–that the victims of September 18, 2001 were trying to change. They were trying to reform an unjust system. And this is why you should know their story.
The following is a chronicle of the reform movement that emerged from within the PFDJ as well as academic and scholars sympathetic to the PFDJ. We think, in this day and age where facts and truth are in short supply, we owe it to our readers to give them a factual representations of the events that began on August 2000.)
August and September 2000: the Central Office of the PFDJ and the National Assembly of Eritrea hold two sessions. The PFDJ Central Office prepares an “assessment” of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war and presents it to members of the Central Committee. The assessment states, “We should not deny that some senior cadres and leaders of the front had exhibited spirit of despair and defeatism…we should identify its origins and the appropriate solutions.” Members of the Central Committee argue that the Central Office does not have the authority to level accusations against the members of the Central Committee. A decision is made to make a more comprehensive assessment for submission to the next session of the Central Committee. The National Assembly decides on Eritrea’s first election: December 2001 and appoints a committee, headed by Mahmoud Sherifo, Vice-President, to draft the electoral and party formation laws.
October 1, 2000: Having met in Germany in the last week of September, thirteen Eritrean scholars and professionals, later known as “G-13”, who reside in Europe, the United States, Eritrea and South Africa, write a letter to President Isaias Afwerki. The letter, which was leaked and came to be as the “Berlin Manifesto” spoke of a nation whose government is beset by “serious contradiction and a major rift among the leadership” and called for a sober appraisal of post-war Eritrea. It called for national reconciliation, collective leadership, implementation of the ratified constitution, abolishing the “Special Court”, divesting the ruling party from the economic life of Eritrea and called on the President to seize the moment to turn a crisis into an opportunity to “re-claim your hard-earned reputation.” The letter was signed by Araya Debessay (USA); Assefaw Tekeste (USA); Bereket Habte Selassie (USA), Dawit Mesfin (UK), Haile Debas (USA); Kassahun Checole (USA); Khaled Beshir (USA), Miriam M. Omar (UK); Mohammed Kheir Omar (Norway); Mussie Misghina (Sweden); Paulos Tesfagiorgis (Eritrea); Reesom Haile (Brussels) and Lula Ghebreyesus (South Africa.) The latter withdrew her association shortly after signing the document.
October 14, 2000: Seven journalists employed with the private Eritrean press were arrested. They include Milkias Mehretab, Yousef Mohammed Ali, Dawit Habtemichael, Yebio Gebremedhin, Selam Menghis, Mathewos and Semret Asmelash. The government denied that their arrest was due to the fact that their papers publicized the “Berlin Manifesto.”
November 8, 2000: Saleh Kekya, who had served as the Chief Administrator of the president’s office and later as Eritrea’s Ambassador to the Sudan before taking the transportation and communication portfolio, was transferred to the mayorship of the port city of Assab. The Minister refused the assignment.
January 1, 2001: Dawit Mesfin, a participant in the meeting held in Germany that resulted in the “Berlin Manifesto”, is interviewed by Awate.com shortly after his return from Asmara. Mr. Dawit Mesfin, along with ten signatories of the Berlin Manifesto, had traveled to Asmara, at the invitation of President Isaias Afwerki, to discuss the issues they raised in their letter. Dawit Mesfin describes the meeting the group had with President Isaias Afwerki on November 25, 2000 as a “gate crashing experience”from the standpoint that it actually took place. However, in terms of content, about an hour of the time was spent discussing the leaking of the private letter.
January 2001: the Government of Eritrea circulates a “discussion paper” to select senior cadres and leaders of the ruling party. Entitled “Woyane’s Third Offensive And the Political Campaign That Followed It,” the paper, which was leaked to several Eritreans and Eritrean media outlets, described its purpose as an attempt to “assess the political climate that followed the Third Offensive and to expose the campaign of confusion and to challenge the budding negative commentary.” The paper, whose source later turned out to be the PFDJ’s Central Office, claims that the problem is not that the President exercises too much control, but that there was insufficient control of the ministries. The paper assessed (1) The War and Its Origins; (2) Eritrea’s Diplomatic State of Affairs; (3) Eritrea’s Economic & Social Development; (4) Implementation of Eritrea’s Constitution & Democracy; (5) The Front & Its Role. The paper’s conclusion included the following assessment:
In this destructive campaign, it is expected that the Woyane would be vanguard. It is a campaign that it has embarked on, and an effort it has accelerated, since the day after the conflict and for the last two and half years. We can skip over the role of the traitors who collaborated with Woyane by saying it is no different from Woyane. As for those who, in the midst of trying and challenging times, were jockeying and hustling about to exploit the situation by selling national and people’s interest for self-interest, we have seen many of these opportunists in our long struggle. What demands attention, although very few in number, is the [presence of] cadres and leaders of the Front who, for various reasons (panic, hopelessness, absconding responsibility, to create political opportunities by complaining about lack of position and authority) participated in the campaign.
January 19, 2001: Major-General Berhane Gebrezgabhier is fired from his duties as Chief of the Eritrean National Reserve.
February 7, 2001: Mr Mahmoud Sherifo, the Vice President of Eritrea, the Minister of Local Governments and the National Assembly-appointed Chair of the Committee to Draft Electoral Laws, was fired by the President and his subordinates (the Regional Governors) ordered to report directly to the President’s Office.
March 8, 2001: Mr. Haile Menkorios, Eritrea’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, accepts a position with United Nation as the Secretary General’s envoy to Afghanistan.
April 6, 2001: tSigenai, a private Eritrean newspaper, interviews Mr. Mahmoud Sherifo. States that his removal from office on February 5, 2001 was on the eve of the date that the committee he chaired, the Committee on Drafting Political Parties & Organizations, had a scheduled meeting to discuss the obstacles it had faced from the President’s office in carrying out its duties. The former minister explained that the committee was authorized by and accountable to the National Assembly, which had authorized its work at its 13th Regular Session (9/00). The committee had concluded its first draft on January 23, 2001, had disseminated copies of the draft to members of National Assembly members and had, via a request to the Ministry of Information, scheduled interviews with the government media for January 30, 2001. Said Sherifo: “Suddenly, on January 29, 2001, we were told by the President to refrain from disseminating any information. While we kept our counsel to be patient and go on preparing to inquire about these developments, we received a message from the President. And the message informed us that the President has major observations on the draft laws and that he would set the schedule on when to disseminate the information to the public.” Sherifo added that the “responsibility we were given by the National Assembly was snatched.” Asked why he thought the president would do that, Sherifo replied: “I think it is because the President has no desire to see the formation of political parties before the elections scheduled for the end of the year.”
April 12, 2001: The First Comprehensive Manifesto for Reform, penned by “Tesfay-Sherif”, a pseudonym for “one or more” PFDJ Reformers surfaces. This manual, written shortly after the end of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, it the first detailed glimpse at the issues raised by the Dissenters. It goes through an extensive assessment of the ruling party’s practices and their impact on the Eritrea-Ethiopia war.
On Obstacles to Institutionalism: “The most important problem hampering the establishment of institutionalization lies in freezing the constitution. It is evident that revolutionary traditions and mentality dominated the thinking of our leadership.”
On Why the national assembly is a “mere puppet”: “The National Assembly does not even have an office and does not hold regular sessions. It is presided by the President of the state who calls for sessions to convene whenever he wishes to do so. The purposes of most of the meetings are for enlightenment about developments or for hearing the reports of the cabinet of ministers and for approving them. The meetings have never come out with resolutions with the exception of pointing out, in the concluding communiqué’, to the importance of the issues that were discussed. There hasn’t been any voting system and the national assembly has never asked executive personnel or taken disciplinary steps to correct him as a legislative body controlling the executive body would be expected to do. It is only the President that is mandated with the first and last say on the concluding statements of the assembly. I think the basic reason for all these lies in the Marxists traditions of the organization and the negligence of those in charge towards the magnitude of their responsibilities. Moreover, the strength of the personality of the President and his inclination towards contempt of institutionalization and towards dwarfing the capabilities of his companions as well as his interest in having a say on everything, has greatly contributed to rendering the institution a mere puppet.”
On our relationships with:
(1) Saudi Arabia: “We started our first homework as an independent state with a fierce attack upon Saudi Arabia in our mass media,” (2) OAU “ followed by an attack upon the OAU at its regular summit held in Cairo in 1993.” (3) Arab League: “We also attacked, through statements made by our highest government officials, the Arab League of Nations expressing contempt on its role and effectiveness. (4) Sudan: “We severed our diplomatic relations with the Sudan abruptly and threatened to overthrow the regime in a few months inconsiderate of our interests in this neighboring state where a third of our population still live as refugees, employees and traders in different towns and villages within its borders. The reason that we claimed was the support given by the Sudanese government to the Eritrean Jihad group which is essentially superficial since this group does not possess the popularity that may enable it to threaten the stability of our nation and society. (5) Others: “Moreover, our language of describing the international system of relations was so blunt that it roused the anger of the great powers. We described the international system by saying; ‘the collapse of the Eastern block and the domination of the world by one country has resulted into a relationship of subjugation among states’. Such statements were said by high-ranking government officials although everybody may read that such statements did not coincide with the reality of our tiny developing country. However, such statements may reflect the stuffed grudges of the poor countries, which necessarily alerts the rich western countries that view the new world order as the culmination of a perfect social system. (6) NGO’s: “The expulsion of NGOs and their description as immoral and inhuman was the peak of our challenging encounter with the western powers that view them as the most important means of materializing the new world order. (7) Ethiopia: the only country that we trusted was Ethiopia in spite of the knowledge of every cadre in the organization and its leadership that the TPLF had evil plans which it demonstrated in the eighties in an undisputed manner…” When the president said, “we are thinking beyond what is called the border” and Ctwe are ready to found a confederation with Ethiopia” he did “not represent the thinking of the organization’s cadres or the feelings of the Eritrean people who could not forget the wounds of the past just because an ethnic minority which congratulated Eritrean independence, not because it could change the developments on the ground but because it would have been the first loser of opposing Eritrea’s independence, has come to power in Ethiopia.”
On Ignoring The Warning Signs from Ethiopia:
Issues such as claiming the ownership of “Badime” and “Bada” are nothing new. These claims started in the eighties although there was an intentional negligence from our side, for which we do not know the reasons. Moreover, the Ethiopians were unilaterally demarcating the places and creeping gradually towards the Gash River, probably to materialize the ancient map of old Tigray known as “Mereb- Milash”. Since 1994, the administrations of the Gash Barka region as well as our consulate in Mekele were sending reports notifying of developments concerning this issue. These reports were, however, neglected with contempt by the concerned government authorities in Eritrea and were viewed as the result of unjustified emotions. The activities of changing the marks across the border by the Tigrayan militias were described as being the deeds of some fanatics in the Zonal Administration and were not adopted by the TPLF, which was taken as a strategic friend, as an organization. In 1997 there came a new development as all the Eritrean inhabitants were deported from Badime in an organized manner. This incident was pictured by the Eritrean Television which also conducted some interviews with the deportees but the program was prohibited from being broadcast. The village of Adi-Murug in the Bada area was also occupied in about the same time.
On the Role of The “Council of Ministers”:
The Council of Ministers is totally ineffective. Any member in the council of ministers is appointed and expelled to and from the council by a letter from the President for reasons that are exclusively known only to the President. The Council does not have regular meetings and its sessions are limited to each Minister presenting the report of his Ministry and to listening to a briefing by the President on the current situation of the country. Major national issues such as foreign, security and economic policies are not discussed seriously.
On the Role of one-party state:
“…the non‑existence of political forces that compete with the PFDJ has caused a stagnation in the operational development of the efficiency of the organization and the government which became the main reason for administrative procrastination, nepotism, corruption and bureaucratic retard ness as well as the negligence towards the crucial issues of the development of the nation and the society.”
May 2, 2001: Mr. Beraki Gebreslassie, the Eritrean Ambassador is called back to Eritrea. Mr. Beraki Gebreslassie was the Minister of Information prior to his to assignment to Germany. No assignments were given to him when he returned to Eritrea.
May 21, 2001: tSigenai: Interview With Mesfun Hagos. On meetings: What is stipulated in the transitional constitution of the PFDJ is that the Executive Committee should schedule and attend a monthly meeting. In reality, it has never met monthly. Everyone knows this.” On checks and balances: “… it is always the case that the Legislature controls the Executive institution. In our experience, all the transitional constitutions that were adopted at the congresses of the Popular Front mention this process. As for its practical execution, that is a different matter.” On bequeathing power to the people: “It is not acceptable to itemize unacceptable reasons for delaying giving power to the people.” On his view of the intra-leadership dispute: “To exaggerate the differences above what is appropriate is not proper. Although the official press presents the problem as non-existent, in the streets, the threats by some of those who are pointing these out [the differences] is not good for the country. Internal disputes are solved by discussion and understanding not by threats and intimidation.”
May 24, 2001: In its inaugural issue, Shaebia org writes a conciliatory comment regarding the intra-PFDJ dispute.]
May 27, 2001: Fifteen members of the Central Committee of PFDJ [Eritrea’s ruling party] as well as Eritrea’s National Assembly signed an Open Letter to all PFDJ members. In the Open Letter, the authors, all prominent members of Eritrea’s liberation movement, accused the President of the Republic of Eritrea, Mr. Isaias Afwerki, of “conducting himself in an illegal and unconstitutional manner.” The group, which later came to be known as “G-15”, or Reformers, called on the President to convene a meeting of Central Committee and the National Assembly so that the two bodies may conduct open discussion and extensive assessment of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. The 15 signatories are: (1) Mahmud Ahmed Sheriffo (2) Haile Woldensae (3) Mesfin Hagos (4) General Ogbe Abrha (5) Hamid Hmd (6) Saleh Kekya (7) Brigadier General Estifanos Seyoum; (8) Berhane GhebreEghzabiher; (9) Astier Feshatsion; (10) Mohammed Berhan Blata; (11) Petros Solomon; (12) Germano Nati; (13) Beraki Ghebreslassie; (14) Adhanom Ghebremariam and (15) Haile Menkerios.
May 31, 2001: Meqaleh, a private Eritrean newspaper, conducts an interview with Major General Berhane Gerezgheir. The general says that on January 11, he was informed, verbally, by the Ministry of Defense that he was demoted and his rank taken. On Janauary 12, he wrote a letter to President Isaias Afwerki, demanding a written explanation for the demotion because he believes that the honor he had was not a gift but a result of 30 years of struggle. On January 20, the President’s office informed the General that the President was not willing to receive the letter and that it should be directed to the Ministry of Defense. On February 6, he wrote a letter to the Ministry of Defense and as of the date of the interview, he had not received a response. He says that in the past 7-8 years, he knows of fighters who have been “frozen” –paid but unemployed–“for a year, for two years, for five years and more.”
June 2, 2001: MeQaleh reports about an address by Yemane Gebreab, PFDJ Political Director and Presidential Advisor, given to a session of the youth and students held at the Junior Club, regarding the open dispute within the PFDJ leadership. The paper reports that he said, “Over the last ten years, we have been solving our internal disputes. This, too, we shall solve and move on.” Asked repeated questions on the subjects by attendants, particularly from Eritreans who arrived from foreign countries, Mr. Yemane Gebreab said, “ please forgive me as I am unable to say more on the subject.”
June 7, 2001: The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) writes Eritrea’s Justice Minister, Fozia Hashim, inquiring of the whereabouts of 15 journalists. The Justice Minister reports that they are either currently participating in national service or working for the government media or ministries.
June 8, 2001: President Isaias Afwerki fires the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr. Haile Weldense (Drue) and the Minister of Marine Resources, Mr. Petros Solomon. Mr. Haile Weldense was the Foreign Minister during the two-year war with Ethiopia. Both were signatories to the Open Letter, which was critical of President Isaias Afwerki.
June 10, 2001: MeQaleh publishes an “Open Letter to the Eritrean People” written by Major General Berhane Gebrezgheir.] In this follow-up to his interview of May 31, 2001, the General explains that his complaint is not about his demotion but wants to clarify that the measures taken against him were as a direct result of his speaking up at the sessions of the Central Committee and National Assembly meetings of August and September 2000 respectively. He says, “The Eritrean people have the right and the capability to know the truth and to propose solutions.”
June 11, 2001: Tsigenai: Interview with Petros Solomon. Excerpts: “ When confronted with criticism, it is not useful to think only in terms of digging up trenches and launching counter-offensives….criticism should be accepted with an open heart and an environment of tolerance….institutionalism is the best approach to decision-making…nobody or no institution has a monopoly on wisdom and foresight….The mandate of the Special Court has lapsed and it should cease because, at this time, it is incompatible with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.”
June 11, 2001: Keste Debena, a private Eritrean newspaper, publishes General Uqbe Abraha’s Open Letter. The letter was in response to an article that appeared in the June 9, 2001 issue of Hadas Ertra, the government newspaper, reporting the findings of the Special Court, in the case of Mr. Tekeste Tesfatsion, who was an employee of the Red Sea Trading Corporation, or 09, the ruling party’s business conglomerate. The General states that he had requested the right of rebuttal in the government newspaper and that he had been denied the opportunity, which forced him to use the private press. The Special court claimed that the accused was “given illegal access to trade on the basis of commission by the then-senior managers of 09, Mr. Oqbe Abraha and Desu TesfatSion.” In the open letter, General Uqbe proclaims his innocence and adds: “I have the right to defend myself, relying on truth and the law, in an independent court of law so I won’t be condemned for wrongs I did not commit.” General Uqbe states that when he complained to the last session of the Central Committee (8/2000) about the government’s decision to deny him from exercising “the right and the duty to serve my government and my people” and that “the act of ‘freezing’ has induced mental stress which is a violation of my human rights,” the Central Committee had agreed to investigate the matter. He believes the act of the Special Court is illegal as it undermines the work of the Central Committee and that this “goes to show, in my opinion, the preparatory work that is being undertaken for future steps against me.”
June 14, 2001: Eritrean journalists Alazar Kelit and Amanuel Zerzghi (New York) interview Ambassador Haile Menkorios. Ambassador Haile calls for tolerance. He says: “One may oppose an opinion; but it is not constructive to accuse someone of sub-nationalism and anti-national for refusing to march in step lock.” Later on, he cancels a scheduled interview because he believes it is not constructive to polarize Eritreans into supporters and critics of the Reform movement and that he has come to believe that the interview would do just that. He concludes his explanation by saying that he will neither nominate himself nor accept other’s nomination of him for any political office.
June 17, 2001: AFP reports that Petros Solomon calls for “new generation of leaders” in Eritrea. He says Eritrea needs “more flexible leadership that will be more tolerant of opinions from different political organisations, which will be more responsive to the demands of the people.” He describes the PFDJ as “a fighting, secretive, and rigid organization.”
June 22, 2001: Al-Hayat interviews President Isaias Afwerki. The President says he cannot comment on whether there is any validity to the claims of the Reformers as outlined in their Open Letter and that the judgment is up to the Eritrean people and that it is best that he exercise patience until then. He added that there was nothing new to the issues raised by the Reformers and that he considers their open letter an empty barrel that makes a loud noise and that he has warned them of the dangers to the national security. With respect to distribution of authority, he said that the problem is not that he exercises too much authority but that, in the past, there wasn’t sufficient monitoring of others. He also said that the firing of Ministers Haile Weldensaie and Petros Solomon had nothing to do with the prevailing environment. He also defended the Special Court and dismissed its critics as irrelevant.
June 20, 2001: BBC reports that at a ceremony to mark the annual Eritrea Martyr’s Day, President Isaias Afwerki announces the number killed in the Eritrea-Ethiopia war that concluded a year earlier to be 19,000. No number of wounded or POW was given.
June 20, 2001: Asmarino.com (www.asmarino.com) posts a May 10, 2001 interview President Isaias Afwerki conducted with Eritrea’s free press. Dubbed as “48 Questions in 6 Hours”, the interviewers report that the President said: “There is no such thing as freezing. I have never heard of anything called freezing.” I know nothing of the claim that “there is a great deal of difference amongst the leadership of the PFDJ.” “I am amazed by what Mahmoud Sherifo said in the interview with Tsigenay.” And that, “if there are people in authority or leaders of the Front who abdicated their responsibilities, they must have forgotten their duties. If there are those who did not do their job well, or those who did wrong, or made mistakes, they should be asked to account for it.
June 20, 2001: Asmarino.com posts a lengthy interview Mr. Haile Woldensaie (DeruE) conducted with Eritrea’s free press . In this highly controversial interview, DeruE said the following –
On petitioning, DeruE says:
“There is no law against petitioning, collectively, for a meeting. If, by refusing to hold a session, the intent is to avoid discomfort at being criticized, then there should still be a meeting as a means to educate those who are incapable of accepting or giving criticism. If the intent is to silence the dissenters, obviously one in power can do anything including muting dissent. But he still can’t kill the ideas. So, in the end, it is a futile exercise.”
On The Discussion Paper distributed by the Central Office in January 2001:
The Discussion Paper that the Central Office initiate in January is illegal because it was not approved by the Central Committee and the Executive Council. I, as a minister, was excluded from the circulation. To enable readers to reach a conclusion, I handed a copy to the private newspaper, Admas.
On the allegations of colluding with the enemy:
“In addition to being a means of escaping the truth and covering up weaknesses, to present corrective measures and assessments that were presented at the end of the war, as if they are harmonious with the enemy’s agenda and the critics as supporters of the enemy is not proper and a chilling hijacking and killing of freedom of expression.”
On the allegation that the Reformers called on the President to resign:
“After our experience in Badme, and after the initiation of confidence-building campaigns, to see the sudden developments of the Third Offensive, was only un-anticipated by the people, even senior cadres and authorities who did not have sufficient information were saddened and distressed. Given the developments, if, at the time, someone were to say: “just like Gemal Abdel Nasser offered his people to resign at the conclusion of the 1967 war when Egypt was having military problems, the President and the Government ought to submit its resignation to the people.” Is there anything wrong in saying this? Does this necessarily mean it is execution of the Woyane goals? Given the information at one’s disposal, isn’t one allowed to make recommendations on what the best military option is? To recommend withdrawal on one’s assessment that its capability is lesser or the enemy’s is greater; to recommend attack based on one’s assessment that one’s capability is greater and the enemy’s is less and then to learn that one’s assessment and thus one’s analysis may be wrong…does that mean one should be accused with defeatism or, conversely, puffery?
On those accusing the Reformers of Defeatism:
Although one can’t say that those who now are at the Central Office have never fired a gun, for them to accuse those who have successfully led many battles during the liberation war of “defeatism” is wrong and indication that they have ulterior motives which, at the very least, is to cover up blunders; or at its worst, to defame people before the PFDJ Congress.
On How To Solve the Crisis:
The president should not try to settle this dispute forcefully and should not try to solve this extra-legally or try to smash it using some pretext. It can only be solved via discussion and debate. If he wants to solve it legally, I’d like to clarify that he cannot be the prosecutor and the judge.
On the Role of the Eritrean People: The people cannot be simple observers. Just like they tried to mediate during the ELF-EPLF disputes, they have the same responsibilities now, as well.
June 2001: Nearly 2200 individuals sign a petition for dialogue between the Reformers and the government. Written “in the name of our heroic martyrs”, the petition asks (1) President Isaias Afwerki, to exert maximum effort, leadership, care in resolving the dispute peacefully, constitutionally and legally; (2) the Signatories of the “Open Letter”, to continue seeking a peaceful, constitutional and legal resolution of the dispute; (3) Eritrea’s Religious Leaders and Elders, to do their level best to bring about understanding between the President and the Signatories of the Open Letter; (4) the heroic Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), to maintain neutrality and allow the political process to find legal, constitutional and peaceful solution; and all Eritreans, to reject and condemn any form of violence in resolving all political differences, and to show tolerance to the divergent points of view within the leadership as well as among the general public.
June 25, 2001: The Government of Eritrea reverses its decision to expel four Americans who work for various NGOs including USAid under pressure from the United States. The Americans were allegedly participating in behavior incompatible with their responsibilities.
June 27, 2000: Admas, a private Eritrean newspaper interviews Saleh Kekia . In a wide-ranging interview, Mr. Saleh Kekia talks about constitutionalism, elections, Special Court, future of PFDJ and conflict resolution. On the matter of whether raising their issues now is ill-timed, he responds: “We believed in and fought for the principles of PFDJ. PFDJ is neither too distant to us, nor too close to others. It is our front. What we are saying is we have problems in the implementation, so let’s correct them. We are saying let’s execute the goals we believe in. To say this is not the right time is to deny reality.” On whether there is a danger that the crisis could lead to confrontation, Kekia responds: I don’t believe that the situation will escalate to confrontation. Because solving problems through debate and discussion is a sign of civilized tradition, I hope we will resolve it that way.” Asked why after so many years of comraderie the situation has deteriorated, he quotes Lee Kuan Yew, “the leader who transformed Singapore from the Third World to the First World”, as having once described the secret to Singapore’s success as “confidence.” Saleh Kekia goes on to say that this absolute trust in the leadership and each other was accounted for EPLF’s success and states that this ingredient is now missing.
June 27, 2000 : Kestedebena, a private Eritrean newspaper, gives an opportunity to General Uqbe Abraha to disclose his communication with President Isaias Afwerki. The General had sent a letter to the President on 11/27/99. In his letter, the General shares with the President what the image of the President is amongst his former colleagues: (1) Comrade Isaias has changed: he no longer consults with his colleagues; he thinks that only he works for the nation; he believes in making unilateral decisions; the Cabinet is there in name only; (2) there is no institutionalism: they are there in name only; there is much interference in their work; an air of apathy and lack of accountability rules; (3) Ambiguous Policies: not based on constitution; distances friends and allies; discourages those with capital; duplication of efforts and lack of clarity; (4) No constitutionalism: national security and people’s integrity not seen within perspective of constitution; work not governed by law. In an undated letter, the president responds by asking: who is saying that I have changed? Since when? “Not consulting” with whom? About what? When? How does one express by evidence the emotional claim that the president thinks there is no other than him? Who are those saying this?
June 2001: Voice of America (VOA) interviews Petros Solomon. Mr. Petros Solomon explains that one of the reasons the Reformers were forced to write an Open Letter was because the PFDJ Central Office had conducted exclusive seminars with senior cadres using the “Discussion Paper” developed in January 2001. He went on to explain that although the nation could benefit from experienced leadership, a group whose background is working in secretive organization may not culturally adopt to an environment that requires openness and transparency. He stated that holding power for long has negative consequences and new leadership that reflects the wishes of the people should emerge. He said he wished to reassure the people that he has no doubt that the government, after conducting discussions, would solve the problem and prepare them for a constitutional government.
July 1, 2001: Qestedebena interviews General Uqbe Abraha . The General was responding to a recent finding of the “Special Court” that implicated him in the alleged crimes of Papayo, a Central Committee member who was sentenced for embezzlement. The General stated that if the issue is about embezzlement, he (General Uqbe) is innocent. But if the question deals with trusting people, then “all of us, beginning with the president, should be held accountable.”
July 3, 2001: Al Hayat, an Arab daily, reports that government officials interrogated elder Eritreans who attempted to mediate the crisis.
July 9, 2001: Mr. Hamed Hmed is detained and interrogated for allegedly informing an Arab daily correspondent in Asmara (Al Hayat) about the petition for dialogue that was facilitated by an Eritrean website, Asmarino.com. He was released after enduring “a lot of humiliation and disrespect.”
July 15, 2001: Fifty Eritrean senior citizens who had attempted to mediate the dispute between government officials were summoned by the Police Commissioner and asked to account for their motivations. The government wanted to know if they were attempting the mediation through their own initiative or because they were asked to by the Reformers. The government informed the elder citizens that, per the Penal Code, more than seven Eritreans couldn’t congregate without the prior consent of the government.July 17, 2001: The Eritrean Ambassador to Scandinavian countries, Ms. Hebret Berhe, resigns her position and moves to the United States of America. She discloses her reasons for doing so in a letter she sent Awate.com www.awate.com. She wrote: “The PFDJ led by President Isaias, is today characterized by its strong opposition to reform and democracy. When people are eagerly waiting for a democratic transition, PFDJ is postponing it indefinitely. When people are aspiring for the rule of law, it’s being stifled and Kangaroo courts (Special Court) are firmly in place doing a great disservice to justice. Malpractice of law is at its worst in the history of our nation. People are subjected to intimidation for their political beliefs. Institutions have been deliberately made not to function. A one-man rule has been firmly installed rendering the slightest democratic practice impossible. During my assignment as Ambassador of Eritrea to Sweden, Norway, and Finland since September 1999, my democratic convictions came in constant confrontation with the malpractices of the PFDJ led government.”
July 23, 2001: In an address to scholars and professionals a seminar organized by the Eritrean Studies Association in Asmara, Justice Teame Beyene accuses the executive office of interfering in the affairs of the judiciary branch.
July 25, 2001: Mr. Mathewos Habteab, the Editor-in-chief of MeQaleh, a private bi-weekly, which had interviewed many of the Reformers, was abducted by security officers from his home.
July 31, 2001: Mr. Semere Kesete, the president of student union of University of Asmara, was arrested at 7:45 AM from his home. At a graduation ceremony address, Mr. Semere Kesete had delivered a speech that included criticism of the government and the university administrators. Also, the student union and the administrators of the University of Asmara had been in negotiations about the terms of their summer campaign. The sticking points were later reported to be whether the amount of living allowances (Nkfa 800) was net of cost of meals or not.
August 1, 2001: Representatives of the Students Union of University of Asmara post an open letter at Eritrean websites. With respect to their president, they demand that: “The concerned authorities give an official statement of his present condition and whereabouts to the students Union. Should he be accused of any crime, his constitutional right be respected and his case be presented to the court. Should not he be accused of any crime, he should be immediately released and the reason for his arrest should be officially stated.”
August 3, 2001: Hadas Ertra posts an announcement by the administration of the University of Asmara. The bulletin summons students to report for duty on August 9, at 7:00 AM for a three-day orientation. They are told that the obstacle–Semere Kesete—is now in the hands of the Courts. They are told to go to the University for details of their assignment and that they are to pack their clothing, bedding and grooming stuff. As they leave, they are promised 800 Nakfa, dry food, medicine and mosquito nets.
August 3, 2001: The Reformers issue an “Open Letter to the Eritrean People”, where, for the first time, propose a detailed reform aagenda. The paper addresses the following issues: (1) War, Peace & National Security which recommends the steps that need to be taken to safeguard Eritrea’s peace and security in relationship with 1.1 Ethiopia: confidence building measures including mutual reduction of armed forces; 1.2 Sudan: disengage from each other’s internal affairs; remove each nation’s army from the common border; allow the free flow of commerce between the people of the two nations; enhance co-operation and relationship at the government level; with the approval of all parties involved, work for the peaceful resolution of Sudan’s conflict 1.3 Yemen: continue with the current policies, looking forward not back; and 1.4 General: take tangible steps to bring peace to the Horn of Africa by not supporting one another’s opposition groups; (2) Economic & Social Issues: restructuring governmental institutions, strengthening civil society, GO’s and NGOs; encouraging free enterprise; reforming land proclamation; instituting social security/retirement benefits; respecting Eritreans right of free movement; expanding vocational/trade education; ending winter student campaigns; present to court Eritreans languishing in jail without charge and notify the family members of those against whom “steps had been taken”; build subsidized housing; divorce PFDJ from economic enterprise and surrender its finances (after an audit) to a trusteeship for the benefit of the orphaned and the disabled and the demobilized; abandoning the policy of “mother tongue” in education and implementing official languages for Eritrea: “it is our view that they should be Tigrigna and Arabic but that should the subject of debate amongst Eritreans.”
August 4, 2001: Brigadier General Estifanos Seyoum was fired from his position as department director of the Inland Revenue Department, the government’s tax collection office. The General is alleged to have had arguments with the ruling party on why PFDJ is exempted from paying taxes and was reportedly in the process of suing the party. The government spokesperson, Mr. Yemane Gebremeskel,informed AFP on August 7 that the move was a “routine reshuffling of department heads.”
August 6, 2001: CPJ writes a letter to the Eritrean government inquiring on the whereabouts of Mr. Mateos Habteab, the editor-in-chief of Meqaleh newspaper.<