A newly released report on the Feb. 14 radiation leak at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad does not determine how the leak occurred, but faults the nuclear waste facility’s contractor, the Department of Energy, a faulty ventilation system and a host of other problems for failing to contain the leak.
Those problems were compounded by an erosion of key safety programs and the nuclear repository’s lax “safety culture,” which delayed the recognition of – and response to – the radiation leak.
The leak, the first in the WIPP’s 15-year history, was preventable, the report states. It contaminated 21 workers with nonhazardous levels of radiation.
A watchdog organization said the DOE’s 302-page report, which examines the causes of the leak and the response to it, leaves critical questions unanswered. The report was made public Thursday.
The long-anticipated report, compiled by a DOE accident investigation team that began its work 17 days after the leak was first detected, said the direct cause was a breach of at least one transuranic waste container deposited in room 7 of the underground storage facility.
What caused that leak remains unknown, but a specially trained and equipped recovery team has eliminated a roof collapse in one of the containment areas as a possible cause. The report, designated as Phase 1 of the accident investigation, said the origin of the leak will be determined during Phase 2.
WIPP is a network of tunnels and waste storage rooms carved into salt beds 2,150 feet below ground east of Carlsbad. It stores transuranic waste, which is typically plutonium-contaminated trash from the nation’s defense complex, such as contaminated clothing, tools, debris and residues. The waste is highly radioactive and can take thousands of years to decay to safe radiation levels. WIPP accepted its first shipment of transuranic waste on March 26, 1999.
The facility stopped receiving waste shipments on Feb. 5 when a salt-hauling truck caught fire underground and forced the evacuation of dozens of personnel. Officials have said that incident and the leak are unrelated.
Below ground, the waste disposal area is divided into eight “panels” containing seven rooms each – each room the length of a football field – stacked to the ceiling with sealed containers of transuranic waste. WIPP managers have said they believe the radiation leak may have stemmed from either Panel 6, nearly filled with waste, or Panel 7, which recently began receiving waste.
Faulty ventilation system
A contributing factor to the Feb. 14 accident was the air filtration system, designed to prevent any contamination that might occur underground from making its way to the surface.
“The filtration portion of the ventilation system has two (High-Efficiency Particulate Air) filter bypass isolation dampers that provide a pathway of unfiltered exhaust into the environment. These isolation dampers are not suitable as a containment boundary and reduce the overall efficiency of the HEPA filter system,” the report states. “…This condition was never identified by the contractor (Nuclear Waste Partnership, the company that operates the WIPP for the DOD) or the (Carlsbad Field Office.)”
Don Hancock, who runs the Nuclear Waste Safety Program at the nonprofit Southwest Research and Information Center in Albuquerque, questioned why it took WIPP officials three weeks after surface radiation was first detected to address the ventilation problem.
“It took three weeks for that to be fixed, and the report doesn’t say why it took so long,” Hancock said Thursday.
He also said the report does not say whether any leaks occurred between Feb. 14, when the leak was first detected, and when the leak was fixed.
The report also lists eight “contributing causes” to the accident, described as events or conditions that collectively “increased the likelihood or severity of an accident.” Those related not only to the cause of the leak, but to the subsequent response to it.
In general, the report faults Nuclear Waste Partnership for failure to implement adequate management, safety, training and maintenance programs. But it also knocks DOE and its Carlsbad Field Office for ineffective oversight and a failure to hold personnel accountable for poor performance.
It also says the plant’s “safety culture” discourages questioning and creates a reluctance to bring up and document safety issues.
“Questioning attitudes are not welcomed by management and many issues and hazards do not appear to be readily recognized by site personnel,” the report states.
“Why are we paying the contractor $80 million a year to have ineffective radiation protection, maintenance and safety programs?” Hancock said. “It’s good that these problems have been identified, but it’s not good that taxpayer money is being misspent or that the DOE is not doing a good job of contracting.”
In light of those shortcomings, Hancock said, “Why should we believe that … the DOE and the contractor are going to be able to fix these things?”
Exposed workers
Although the Department of Energy has repeatedly said the leak poses no threat to the environment or the 21 workers exposed to “very low” levels of radiation, Hancock questioned why that many workers were exposed.
He said the report does not explain why, once an alarm went off indicating the presence of radiation at the surface, more than 130 workers were allowed onto the site – a move he said had the potential to contaminate even more workers.
“There was no shelter-in-place order for 10 hours,” after surface radiation was detected, he said. “That’s why we have 21 workers contaminated.”
Hancock said an independent investigation – not one led by the DOE – is needed to adequately address the problems at the WIPP.
At a town hall meeting in Carlsbad on Wednesday night – hours before the report was made public – Carlsbad Field Office manager Joe Franco said his office takes the report’s “findings very seriously.”
“We will work through the process to make sure everything is corrected,” Franco told attendees.